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. … [I]nformation stored on a registrant’s computer server qualifies as supporting documentation. … I conclude that the Regulations do not set out a general requirement for the supporting documentation to be issued or signed by the supplier. ...

In also rejecting the single property argument, Fournier JCQ stated (at paras 551-552): [T]he assets acquired under the … franchise agreement must be considered separately for tax shelter determination purposes because they have different tax characteristics. The software suite is a Class 12 property while the membership right is an eligible capital property with different rates of depreciation. … The definition of tax shelter contained in TA section 1079.1 … militates in favour of an individual analysis of the property in question in order to determine whether or not it qualifies as a tax shelter. ...

. … Mr. Racine cannot be said to have sat in appeal from a decision he made. ... Sokol. … Dr. Sokol’s evidence was clear, compelling, and demonstrated the appellant’s knowing involvement in the scheme. … Although the above was sufficient in itself to result in the dismissal of this appeal, for the sake of completeness Gleason JA also addressed the other arguments, finding that the organization “had inadequate control over the distribution of funds in Israel” (para. 60); it did not ensure that that the agent used the charity’s resources to carry out activities on the charity’s behalf (paras. 63 and 44); it failed to keep accurate books and records by falsifying minutes of Board of Directors’ meetings and not maintaining documentation to support travel expenses, remuneration paid to fundraisers, activities in Israel and the donation scheme (para. 65); and it failed to file accurate information returns (paras. 74 and 75). ...

" Furthermore, the rebuttable presumption articulated in Marconi – that income earned by corporations acting consistently with their objects is income from a business – was not helpful here as "presumably corporations will act within their objects [and] the legislative scheme expressly contemplates a corporation earning income from property. ...

BG1(1) of the Income Tax Act 2004 (NZ) provided that a tax avoidance arrangement (defined to include an arrangement that has “tax avoidance as its purpose or effect … [or] as 1 of its purposes or effects … if the purpose or effect is not merely incidental”) was void as against the Commissioner. ...

In very general terms, significant elements of the series of transactions included: Grenon’s RRSP transferring its units of FMO to a newly-formed unit trust (“TOM” – which was found in Grenon not to qualify as a mutual fund trust) – in exchange for units of TOM representing close to 100% of the issued and outstanding TOM units. ... All of these transactions were pre-ordained. … [I]t cannot be said that the Appellants enjoyed “the three key attributes of ownership, namely, risk, use and possession” …. ...

Under the gifting component, each taxpayer transferred $10,200 to a registered charity (“TGTFC”) of which $10,000 per LP Unit was funded by a loan from FT (the “TGTFC Loan” – maturing in February 2019) that required that the borrowed funds be so transferred to TGTFC and that bore interest at 7.85% p.a., of which 3.75% p.a. was required to be paid annually in cash (“cash-pay interest”) and the balance was to be funded through with further cash advances from the lender (“capitalized interest”), namely, FT. ... In confirming CRA’s complete denial of charitable credits to the taxpayers (and before turning to the effect of the split-receipting rule in s. 248(32) and the limited-recourse amount rule in s. 142.3(7)), Owen J stated (at para 272): Maréchaux and Kossow hold that a transfer of property is not gratuitous if a benefit flows to the transferee as part of an interconnected series of transactions that includes the transfer of property. … In finding that there was such a benefit here by virtue of the TGTFC Loan having been made at an unreasonably low rate of interest, Owen J stated (at paras 311, 314, 316): I find it especially difficult to believe that an arm’s length commercial lender in the same circumstances would lend such significant amounts, which accumulate over 9 years to become even larger amounts, at a rate that is only roughly 1% above the rate on a 10-year residential mortgage. ... In my view, a lender in these circumstances would require detailed information to support the creditworthiness of the Appellants … and would require full disclosure of all liabilities…. … I conclude that a commercially reasonable interest rate on the TGTFC Loans would be no less than… 10%. ...

., Ms Ellison] “because of a court order under the Family Law Act 1975 ” (Australia). ... In essentially returning to and concluding on the beneficial ownership issue, she stated (at para. 164): [T]he orders vested statutory rights and a beneficial interest of some kind in Ms Ellison but … I do not consider that interest can be characterised as beneficial ownership …. ... None of those matters arise on construction of the orders. … In short, on their own terns, the orders have no operation and cannot be enforced. ...

After noting (at para. 725) that “the purpose of the foreign affiliate regime is to allow Canadian multinationals to compete in international markets through foreign subsidiaries without attracting Canadian income tax,” Owens J stated (at para. 726) that “there is nothing exceptional, unusual or inappropriate about the Appellant’s decision to … have CESA execute the HEU Feed Agreement.” Accordingly, the transactions respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements were not described in s. 247(2)(b)(i) – nor were the BPCs and CC Contracts, which were not “commercially irrational” (para. 736) – and it thus was not relevant (regarding s. 247(2)(b)(ii)) that the primary purpose of the series respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements (but not of the BPCs and CC Contracts) in light of the use as part of the series of a foreign affiliate (CESA/DCEL) was to save Canadian tax. Turning to s. 247(2)(a) and (c), he found that in light of the depressed uranium market at the time, the HEU Feed Agreement that in a sense was accorded on CESA did not have significant value, and that it only became very valuable to CESA as a result of the significant increase in market uranium prices after 2002 (para. 787) – and a similar analysis applied to the Urenco Agreement. ...

However, in granting an extension of the 30-day period, he stated (at paras. 44-45): To grant an extension of time, there must be (i) a continuing intention to pursue the application, (ii) some merit to the application, (iii) no prejudice to the Respondent, and (iv) a reasonable explanation for the delay (Canada (AG) v Hennelly (1999), 244 NR 399 (FCA) …. The interests of justice can override an applicant’s failure to meet the Hennelly test …. ...