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. … …[S]ubsection 17.1(1) gives parties two choices. Parties may appear in person or be represented by counsel. … The words “in person” mean “physically present”. ... By contrast, if I interpret subsection 17.1(1) as allowing corporations to appear in person or be represented by counsel, all three versions of Rule 30(2) would be ultra vires as they would unduly restrict a corporation’s ability to appear in person. … …[T]he Court was created at the same time that the Rules came into effect. … [I]it is far more likely that the original version of Rule 30(2) paralleled subsection 17.1(1) than that it violated it. ... In the alternative, if I am wrong, and corporations are able to appear in person, I would still deny the Corporate Appellants’ motions. …. ...

. … [I]nformation stored on a registrant’s computer server qualifies as supporting documentation. … I conclude that the Regulations do not set out a general requirement for the supporting documentation to be issued or signed by the supplier. ...

In very general terms, significant elements of the series of transactions included: Grenon’s RRSP transferring its units of FMO to a newly-formed unit trust (“TOM” – which was found in Grenon not to qualify as a mutual fund trust) – in exchange for units of TOM representing close to 100% of the issued and outstanding TOM units. ... All of these transactions were pre-ordained. … [I]t cannot be said that the Appellants enjoyed “the three key attributes of ownership, namely, risk, use and possession” …. ...

Under the gifting component, each taxpayer transferred $10,200 to a registered charity (“TGTFC”) of which $10,000 per LP Unit was funded by a loan from FT (the “TGTFC Loan” – maturing in February 2019) that required that the borrowed funds be so transferred to TGTFC and that bore interest at 7.85% p.a., of which 3.75% p.a. was required to be paid annually in cash (“cash-pay interest”) and the balance was to be funded through with further cash advances from the lender (“capitalized interest”), namely, FT. ... In confirming CRA’s complete denial of charitable credits to the taxpayers (and before turning to the effect of the split-receipting rule in s. 248(32) and the limited-recourse amount rule in s. 142.3(7)), Owen J stated (at para 272): Maréchaux and Kossow hold that a transfer of property is not gratuitous if a benefit flows to the transferee as part of an interconnected series of transactions that includes the transfer of property. … In finding that there was such a benefit here by virtue of the TGTFC Loan having been made at an unreasonably low rate of interest, Owen J stated (at paras 311, 314, 316): I find it especially difficult to believe that an arm’s length commercial lender in the same circumstances would lend such significant amounts, which accumulate over 9 years to become even larger amounts, at a rate that is only roughly 1% above the rate on a 10-year residential mortgage. ... In my view, a lender in these circumstances would require detailed information to support the creditworthiness of the Appellants … and would require full disclosure of all liabilities…. … I conclude that a commercially reasonable interest rate on the TGTFC Loans would be no less than… 10%. ...

After noting (at para. 725) that “the purpose of the foreign affiliate regime is to allow Canadian multinationals to compete in international markets through foreign subsidiaries without attracting Canadian income tax,” Owens J stated (at para. 726) that “there is nothing exceptional, unusual or inappropriate about the Appellant’s decision to … have CESA execute the HEU Feed Agreement.” Accordingly, the transactions respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements were not described in s. 247(2)(b)(i) – nor were the BPCs and CC Contracts, which were not “commercially irrational” (para. 736) – and it thus was not relevant (regarding s. 247(2)(b)(ii)) that the primary purpose of the series respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements (but not of the BPCs and CC Contracts) in light of the use as part of the series of a foreign affiliate (CESA/DCEL) was to save Canadian tax. Turning to s. 247(2)(a) and (c), he found that in light of the depressed uranium market at the time, the HEU Feed Agreement that in a sense was accorded on CESA did not have significant value, and that it only became very valuable to CESA as a result of the significant increase in market uranium prices after 2002 (para. 787) – and a similar analysis applied to the Urenco Agreement. ...

Therefore, questions asking about the purpose of an agreement or transaction, as well as questions asking about the reason for an agreement or transaction, could come within the purview of subsection 103(1) …. ... I do not think that the … Questions are improper merely because they seek to explore Mr. Thompson’s state of mind or (in his capacity as a director and officer of the Appellant) his reasons, purpose, intention or understanding in respect of the Transactions …. ...

After finding that, consistently with Shapiro, that the harvesting and storage of stem cell blood from a newborn satisfies the first three elements, Bocock J dismissed the appeal, finding that the fourth element was not satisfied, stating (at paras 13 and 14): … The letter suggests something akin to good standard health practices. ... The provision creates a deduction for … present and future ailments. It is not intended to create a deduction for generic and undiagnosed population-wide illness and disease. The 2017 letter …, some 17 months after the procedure and its language, descriptive rather than directive, cannot provide evidence of a medical prescription undertaken by the Appellant in 2016. ...

The Queen, 2019 TCC 76, rev'd 2021 FCA 160-- summary under Subsection 256(8) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 256- Subsection 256(8) loss streaming rules are conditioned on an acquisition of effective control After finding that a third-party did not have a call right to acquire a further block of shares sufficient to give it a s. 251(5)(b) right to acquire control of a Lossco, Paris J found that there was no abuse of the loss-streaming rules (and, in particular, of ss. 256(8) and 251(5)(b)), stating (at paras. 134, 147): I … find that the object, spirit and purpose of subsection 111(5) is to target manipulation of losses of a corporation by a new person or group of persons, through effective control over the corporation’s actions…. [T]he circumstances referred to by the Respondent do not, in my view, indicate that Matco had effective control over the majority of the voting shares of the Appellant prior to the IPO …. ...

The Investment Agreement also appears to contemplate the possibility of a sale of the Remaining Shares (or some of those shares) to a third party, without the need for Matco’s consent …. ... Furthermore, he accepted (at para. 62) testimony that: [I]t was Newco’s choice to sell the Remaining Shares to Matco, and … the decision was made to accept Matco’s offer in April 2009 because Newco needed the money for its operations and was concerned about the possibility of a decline in value of those shares …. ...

In finding that this arrangement did not constitute a joint venture for s. 273 purposes, Teskey J first quoted (at para. 52) from an extended extract from Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation v. Graham, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 686 (N.S.S.C.) including the following passage from Williston on Contracts: [T]he decisions are in substantial agreement that the following factors must be present: (a) A contribution by the parties of money, property, effort, knowledge, skill or other asset to a common undertaking; (b) A joint property interest in the subject matter of the venture; (c) A right of mutual control or management of the enterprise; (d) Expectation of profit, or the presence of “adventure”, as it is sometimes called; (e) A right to participate in the profits; (f) Most usually, limitation of the objective to a single undertaking or ad hoc enterprise. … Teskey J then stated (at para. 55): I do not find there existed the right to participate in profits nor an expectation of profit, from the infrastructure for either party. ...