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Respecting the scope of s. 6, Noël C.J. further noted (at para. 12): [S]ection 6 does effectively amend the statutory time periods in federal legislation for starting proceedings in this Court: see, for example, subsection 27(2) of the Federal Courts Act … (the time limit for bringing appeals) and sections 18.1(2) and 28 [thereof] … (the time limit for bringing an application for judicial review). … Thus, if a party had thirty days to appeal a judgment of the Federal Court to this Court and twenty days had elapsed by March 13, 2020, the deadline for appealing the judgment would be September 23, 2020. ... For example, orders requiring a proceeding to be prosecuted urgently on shortened time limits to further the public interest and to avert some harm or prejudice would be invalidated with retroactive effect. … The Federal Courts Rules are not made “under an act of parliament” in the usual way in which this term is understood. … Beyond this, construing section 6 as allowing Parliament to unilaterally interfere with the management and governance of ongoing proceedings would invade a core judicial function …. ...

. … [T]he Tax Court concluded that leaving them as assumptions placed an onus on the respondents that they would not otherwise bear. ... An assumption that is a statement of mixed fact and law does not put any additional onus on the taxpayer … [since] “when the validity of the assessment is attacked in point of law…there is really no onus on either party ….” ... Further, the Tax Court did not consider whether leaving the assumptions as is would better serve the trial process. … [T]he Tax Court therefore erred in law …. ...

The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to the CCTB during those years, but referred the matter back to the Minister so that “taxpayer relief in the form of a waiver of any applicable interest and penalties under the Act and also a remission of taxes pursuant to the Financial Administration Act ” may be “seriously consider[ed].” In striking this referral part of the judgment, De Montigny JA stated (at paras 32, 33 and 36): … It is only when the Tax Court allows an appeal that it can refer the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment. Nor is it for the Tax Court to interfere with the discretion of the Minister, if only by suggesting that the Minister “may” seriously consider taxpayer relief in the form of a waiver of any applicable interest and penalty under the Act, and a remission of taxes pursuant to the Financial Administration Act …. … While he was entitled to express his views about the impact of the CRA’s error and the fact that relief should be considered in his reasons, he should have limited himself, in the judgment, to dismissing the appeal. … ...

After having noted (at para. 10) that ‘fundamental characteristics of religion include that the followers have a faith in a higher power such as God, entity, or Supreme Being; that followers worship this higher power; and that the religion consists of a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship,” Rivoalen JA found that the Minister’s denial of the appellant’s registration as a charity did not violate its rights under the Charter, stating (at paras. 15 and 16): Section 27 of the Charter is not a substantive provision that can be violated and is “relevant only as an aid to interpretation” …. The respondent, however, concedes that the state’s duty of religious neutrality under section 2(a) of the Charter relates to section 27, in part “with a view to promoting and enhancing diversity” …. … [S]ection 2 of the Charter protects the rights of the appellant’s members to practise their beliefs in Atheism and the Minister cannot interfere with the practice of these beliefs …. ... The appellant can continue to carry out its purpose and its activities without charitable registration …. ...

In confirming that the ecological gift instead was made in 2008 when the gifted property was disposed of, Noël CJ stated (at paras 39, 42, 44): [W]hen property is gifted … the disposition takes place when ownership of the gifted property is transferred from the donor to the donee … The question as to when a “gift was made” for purposes of paragraph 110.1(1)(d) is fully answered by paragraph 38(a.2). That paragraph provides, by referring specifically to ecological gifts, that “the disposition is the making of a gift” …. This is consistent with the wording used in subparagraph 69(1)(b)(ii) which speaks of a disposition “by way of gift inter vivos ”…. ...

In dismissing the Crown’s appeal, Woods JA stated (at paras. 35, 37-39, and 42): … Parliament’s intent must override O.A. Brown where legislative intent is clear as it is in the provisions applicable in this case. … The particular circumstances of this case clearly call into question the application of O.A. ... Further, the property has only one use – to move teeth or jaws. It is also relevant that the appliances provided to patients are almost invariably accompanied by orthodontic services. … [T]he listing of orthodontic appliances in Schedule VI would have very limited application if the Crown’s position were correct. ...

In rejecting this submission and confirming the Minister’s assessment of Tusk Exploration under Part XII.6, Webb JA stated (at paras 28-29): … [T]he reference to “purports to renounce” in subsection 66(12.73) … is a reference to an amount that the corporation stated in the forms that it filed that it was renouncing and hence an amount that it claimed that it was renouncing. ... Furthermore, since subsection 66(12.73) … refers to both an amount that a corporation “purports to renounce” and to an amount that a corporation “can renounce”, amounts that a corporation “purports to renounce” cannot be restricted to only amounts that it “can renounce”. Because Parliament has chosen to use two different expressions, it must mean that Parliament did not intend for the two expressions to be synonymous. … [P]aragraph 66(12.73)(d) … provides that any reduction in the amounts renounced does not affect the calculation of the amount payable under Part XII.6…. ...

., 2018 FCA 166-- summary under Subsection 245(4) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 245- Subsection 245(4) allocation of most partnership profits to a lossco that acquired its interest at year end without economic risk was vacuous and abused ss. 96(1)(f), 103(1) and 160 The taxpayer was a holding company which wholly-owned a “Partnerco” holding an approximate ¼ limited partnership interest in a strata development partnership (the partnership) which, by May 25, 2006, had realized income of $13 million from the sale of most of the strata units. ... In finding that such allocation defeated the object of s. 96(1) and thus was abusive for purposes of s. 245(4), Woods JA stated (at paras. 68-69, 71) that: [T]he allocation of the partnership’s income for tax purposes to Nuinsco, which became a partner one day before the end of the partnership’s fiscal period, frustrates the object, spirit or purpose of paragraph 96(1)(f) … by divorcing the economic consequences of the arrangement from the allocation of taxable income … [as] Nuinsco had virtually no economic interest or risk in the real estate development … except for a 10 percent “deal fee”. ... In also finding that there was an abusive circumvention of s. 160, i.e., avoidance of the application of s. 160 to the stock dividends and preferred share redemptions (viewed as being in combination a gratuitous transfer of property by the Partnercos to the Holdcos) as a result of the acquisition of control of the Partnercos (resulting in deemed taxation year ends of the Partnercos occurring before they had been allocated partnership income and, therefore, before they had incurred a tax liability) occurring shortly before the partnership fiscal period end, Woods JA stated (at paras. 123): [T]he acquisition of control of Partnerco arose as part of a series of transactions that was devoid of any purpose or effect except to obtain a tax benefit, or in this case, two tax benefits – the avoidance of tax by Partnerco and the avoidance of liability under section 160 by Holdco. … Landrus … makes it clear that abuse may be established by the vacuity of transactions. ...

The Crown submitted that “where a transfer is effected through a number of preordained transactions that together result in the transferor’s patrimony being depleted … [the word] ‘time’ [in s. 160] can encapsulate the whole of the transactions effecting the transfer” (para. 28). In rejecting this submission, Noël CJ stated (at para. 58): [T]he adequacy of the consideration given must be measured against the value of the property transferred by way of a “snapshot” taken at the point in time when the transfer takes place. … [I]t is not disputed that Newco gave Oldco adequate consideration at that time …. ... In further reversing the finding below, that the note (the “Oldco Note”) issued by Oldco to redeem its shares only had nominal value so as to engage the application of s. 160, he stated (at paras. 62-63): [I]t was not open to the Tax Court judge to hold that the Newco note had “considerable” value and that the Oldco note had a “nominal” value since both were backed by the same assets (Reasons at para. 57). … I also agree …that the Oldco note represented a bona fide debt in the face amount of $30 million. … The law is clear that the payment of a bona fide debt cannot trigger the application of subsection 160(1) which is precisely what took place when the notes were discharged …. ...

Nearly every error a taxpayer might make in over-contributing to his or her RRSP (other than a simple arithmetical error) will be caused by a misunderstanding of the applicable limits – an error of law. … Similarly, the fact that the error might have been made by a third party advisor or as a result of erroneous advice given by such advisor does not automatically mean that the error cannot be reasonable. ... However, in going on to dismiss his appeal, she stated (at paras, 77-78): … Mr. ... Connolly does not appear to have made any inquiries … to confirm his contribution room. ...