Date:
20110811
Docket: T-1680-09
Citation: 2011 FC 983
Ottawa, Ontario, August
11, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
BETWEEN:
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JIM BRONSKILL
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Applicant
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and
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MINISTER OF CANADIAN HERITAGE
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Respondent
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and
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THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
OF CANADA
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Intervener
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENT
(by paragraph numbers)
I.
Background
A. Thomas Clement Douglas’ Life.......................................................................... 3
B. The Applicable Law...................................................................................... 4-27
C. History of the Proceeding.......................................................................... 28-46
D. The Second Review of the Douglas File..................................................... 47-61
E. The Applicable Standards of
Review.......................................................... 62-82
F. Determinative Questions............................................................................ 83-85
II.
Analysis
A. Preliminary Matters
(1) The completeness of the file
before the Court.......................... 86-109
(2) The Amicus Curiae Request.................................................... 110-114
(3) The Evidence in Support of Confidentiality........................... 115-122
B. Were the documents properly
considered as section 15 exempted documents?
(1) General Considerations........................................................... 123-139
(2) Current Operational Interest................................................... 140-141
(3) Human Sources....................................................................... 142-155
(4) Technical Sources.................................................................... 156-158
(5) Targets of “transitory nature”.................................................. 159-171
(6) Identity of RCMP Officers..................................................... 172-177
(7) “Incidental Reporting”............................................................ 178-189
(8) RCMP’s Assessment of T.C. Douglas.................................... 190-193
C. Was the exercise of discretion
reasonable in the circumstance?............ 194-209
D. What factors are to be considered
in the exercise of discretion?........... 210-223
III.
Conclusion.................................................................................................... 224-228
IV.
Annex..................................................................................................... pages
92-94
[1]
The
present Application is brought under section 41 of the Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1 (the Act), whereby the Federal Court is to review Library
and Archives Canada’s (LAC) refusal to disclose portions of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police’s dossier on Tommy Clement Douglas, a Canadian politician,
deceased on February 24, 1986. The Applicant, Jim Bronskill, is a journalist
with the Canadian Press.
[2]
At
issue is what portions, if any, of the 1,142-page of LAC’s Douglas file should
be made public, additionally to what had been initially disclosed by LAC after
the access to information request (ATI request), and what has also emerged from
the Application prior to this Court’s judgment. It should be noted that the
scope of the present Judgment and the underlying ATI request does not extend to
the full record on T.C. Douglas. It only deals with the portions of the record
which LAC deemed responsive to the ATI request (see Transcript of the Public
Hearing of February 23, 2011, at p. 138).
I. Background
A. Thomas
Clement Douglas’ Life
[3]
Thomas
Clement Douglas held the office of Premier of Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1961,
when he led the first arguably social democratic government in North America. In 1961, he became the first leader of the newly formed New Democratic
Party, a title which he held for close to ten years. Much can be said of his
accomplishments both as a Member of Parliament and as a member of the
Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan. The Court mentions in passing Douglas’ spearheading of the creation of the first provincial Medicare plan. It is clear
that both History and Canadians from coast to coast have much to learn about
Mr. Douglas, and this Application can be seen as contributing in this respect.
It can also be said that access to information, whether the subject of the
request is well-known or not, benefits all Canadians.
B. The
Applicable Law
[4]
The
public’s right to information detained by government is governed by the Access
to Information Act and the Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21. The
purpose of the Access to Information Act is to enshrine an essential
component of democracy: the public’s right to government information (s 2 of
the Act). This right to government information is mandatory for both public scrutiny
of government activities, as well as the full and meaningful participation in
public debate and discussion. If the adage that information is power holds
true, then our democracy depends on the broad and liberal interpretation of the
Act, subject to valid concerns represented by the exemptions provided. The Act
has been recognized as having a quasi-constitutional status by the Supreme
Court in Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25.
[5]
The
Act itself is unambiguous as to its scope and purpose. Firstly, the Act’s
purpose is to extend the public’s right to access to information, and
that the Act was not meant to “limit in any way” access to government
information (s 2 of the Act). Section 2 of the Act also requires that the
exemptions to the right of access should be “limited and specific”. This
limited scope of the exemptions provided in the Act is essential to the Court’s
interpretation of any application brought forth, and Courts have consistently
recognized this policy objective as being a core component of the review of
refusals of disclosure:
It also appears clearly from these two provisions
that Parliament intended the Act to apply liberally and broadly with the
citizen's right of access to such information being denied only in limited and
specific exceptions (Canada Post Corp. v Canada (Minister of Public Works),
[1995] 2 FC 110 FCA; see also, inter alia, Canada (Information
Commissioner) v Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police),
2003 SCC 8; Rubin v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1998] 2 FC 430
(FCA)).
[6]
The
process for access to information begins with a written and sufficiently
detailed request made to the institution that has the records sought (s 6 of
the Act). In this case, the Applicant made a request directly to LAC. There is
currently no direct process by which citizens may know which access requests
are pending and the records sought after in these requests. The “head of a
government institution”, as defined by the Act, is responsible for responding
accurately and completely to the ATI request (ss 4(2.1) of the Act).
Furthermore, the Act instructs that the head of a government institution shall
“subject to the regulations, provide timely access to the record” without
regard to the identity of the person making the ATI request (ss 4(2.1) of the
Act).
[7]
The
head of a government institution may refuse access to the records sought:
Where
access is refused
10. (1) Where the head
of a government institution refuses to give access to a record requested
under this Act or a part thereof, the head of the institution shall state in
the notice given under paragraph 7(a)
(a)
that the record does not exist, or
(b)
the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal was based or, where
the head of the institution does not indicate whether a record exists, the
provision on which a refusal could reasonably be expected to be based if the
record existed,
and
shall state in the notice that the person who made the request has a right to
make a complaint to the Information Commissioner about the refusal.
Existence
of a record not required to be disclosed
(2)
The head of a government institution may but is not required to indicate
under subsection (1) whether a record exists.
Deemed
refusal to give access
(3)
Where the head of a government institution fails to give access to a record
requested under this Act or a part thereof within the time limits set out in
this Act, the head of the institution shall, for the purposes of this Act, be
deemed to have refused to give access.
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Refus
de communication
10. (1) En cas de refus de
communication totale ou partielle d’un document demandé en vertu de la
présente loi, l’avis prévu à l’alinéa 7a) doit mentionner, d’une part,
le droit de la personne qui a fait la demande de déposer une plainte auprès
du Commissaire à l’information et, d’autre part :
a) soit le fait que le
document n’existe pas;
b) soit la disposition
précise de la présente loi sur laquelle se fonde le refus ou, s’il n’est pas
fait état de l’existence du document, la disposition sur laquelle il pourrait
vraisemblablement se fonder si le document existait.
Dispense
de divulgation de l’existence d’un document
(2)
Le paragraphe (1) n’oblige pas le responsable de l’institution fédérale à
faire état de l’existence du document demandé.
Présomption
de refus
(3)
Le défaut de communication totale ou partielle d’un document dans les délais
prévus par la présente loi vaut décision de refus de communication.
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[8]
For
it to have sufficient traction, the Act enshrines the independent review of
refusals of disclosure as another core principle (ss 2(1)). The Office of the
Information Commissioner of Canada is statutorily mandated to review refusals
of disclosure if a complaint is made in writing, and may initiate an
investigation on its own behalf (s 30). Its investigative powers are clearly
set out in the Act, and include the power to summon and enforce the appearance
of persons (para 36(1)(a)); the power to administer oaths and evidence
(para 36(1)(b) and para 36(1)(c)); and the power to access all
government records, subject to security clearance of staff (para 36(1)(d)
and ss 36(2)).
[9]
The
Information Commissioner’s investigative mandate is complemented by its
obligation to report to the government institution if it finds a complaint to
be well-founded, and must provide its findings in support (ss 37(1)). In this
respect, the Information Commissioner may also make recommendations and make a
request that notice be given of the steps taken or proposed to implement these
recommendations, or alternatively, reasons why these are not implemented (ss
37(2) of the Act). Where, following the investigation of a complaint, the head
of a government institution maintains the refusal of disclosure of the record,
the Information Commissioner informs the complainant that a right of review
before the Federal Court is available (ss 37(5) of the Act). However, the
Court’s review is of the decision of the head of the government institution to
refuse disclosure, not the decision of the Information Commissioner (3430901
Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Industry), 2001 FCA 254 [herein referred
to as Telezone], at para 42).
[10]
It
should also be noted that the Information Commissioner’s mandate is broader
than what is alluded to in the present reasons. Suffice to say that the
Information Commissioner’s mandate is one that should be taken with the utmost
vigour and energy. Truly, the Information Commissioner is one of the custodians
of our democracy.
[11]
Once
the Information Commissioner’s review is completed, and if the head of the
government institution’s refusal is maintained, the complainant may file an
application before the Federal Court for a review of the refusal of disclosure
(s 41). The Information Commissioner may file this application as well, and
even appear on behalf of the initial complainant (s 42). The Court must be
granted access to all the relevant documentation (s 46), and ultimately, is
responsible for not divulging any of the protected information during the process
of the application (s 47). The nature of the review undertaken by the Court
will be discussed below.
[12]
In
the case at bar, the exemption that was chiefly claimed is that of section 15
of the Act. Initially, LAC had refused access on the basis of section 19 as
well. These provisions read as follows:
International
affairs and defence
15. (1) The head of
a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under
this Act that contains information the disclosure of which could reasonably
be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs, the
defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada or the
detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities,
including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such
information
(a)
relating to military tactics or strategy, or relating to military exercises
or operations undertaken in preparation for hostilities or in connection with
the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities;
(b)
relating to the quantity, characteristics, capabilities or deployment of
weapons or other defence equipment or of anything being designed, developed,
produced or considered for use as weapons or other defence equipment;
(c)
relating to the characteristics, capabilities, performance, potential,
deployment, functions or role of any defence establishment, of any military
force, unit or personnel or of any organization or person responsible for the
detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities;
(d)
obtained or prepared for the purpose of intelligence relating to
(i)
the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, or
(ii)
the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities;
(e)
obtained or prepared for the purpose of intelligence respecting foreign
states, international organizations of states or citizens of foreign states
used by the Government of Canada in the process of deliberation and consultation
or in the conduct of international affairs;
(f)
on methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, collecting,
assessing or handling information referred to in paragraph (d) or (e)
or on sources of such information;
(g)
on the positions adopted or to be adopted by the Government of Canada,
governments of foreign states or international organizations of states for
the purpose of present or future international negotiations;
(h)
that constitutes diplomatic correspondence exchanged with foreign states or
international organizations of states or official correspondence exchanged
with Canadian diplomatic missions or consular posts abroad; or
(i)
relating to the communications or cryptographic systems of Canada or foreign states used
(i)
for the conduct of international affairs,
(ii)
for the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, or
(iii)
in relation to the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or
hostile activities.
Definitions
(2)
In this section,
“defence
of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada”
«
défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada »
“defence
of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada” includes the efforts
of Canada and of foreign states toward the detection, prevention or
suppression of activities of any foreign state directed toward actual or
potential attack or other acts of aggression against Canada or any state
allied or associated with Canada;
“subversive
or hostile activities”
«
activités hostiles ou subversives »
“subversive
or hostile activities” means
(a)
espionage against Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada,
(b)
sabotage,
(c)
activities directed toward the commission of terrorist acts, including
hijacking, in or against Canada or foreign states,
(d)
activities directed toward accomplishing government change within Canada or foreign states by the use of or the encouragement of the use of force, violence
or any criminal means,
(e)
activities directed toward gathering information used for intelligence
purposes that relates to Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, and
(f)
activities directed toward threatening the safety of Canadians, employees of
the Government of Canada or property of the Government of Canada outside Canada.
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Affaires
internationales et défense
15. (1) Le responsable
d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de documents
contenant des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement
de porter préjudice à la conduite des affaires internationales, à la
défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada ou à la
détection, à la prévention ou à la répression d’activités hostiles ou
subversives, notamment :
a) des renseignements
d’ordre tactique ou stratégique ou des renseignements relatifs aux manoeuvres
et opérations destinées à la préparation d’hostilités ou entreprises dans le
cadre de la détection, de la prévention ou de la répression d’activités
hostiles ou subversives;
b) des renseignements
concernant la quantité, les caractéristiques, les capacités ou le déploiement
des armes ou des matériels de défense, ou de tout ce qui est conçu, mis au
point, produit ou prévu à ces fins;
c) des renseignements
concernant les caractéristiques, les capacités, le rendement, le potentiel,
le déploiement, les fonctions ou le rôle des établissements de défense, des
forces, unités ou personnels militaires ou des personnes ou organisations
chargées de la détection, de la prévention ou de la répression d’activités
hostiles ou subversives;
d) des éléments
d’information recueillis ou préparés aux fins du renseignement relatif à :
(i)
la défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada,
(ii)
la détection, la prévention ou la répression d’activités hostiles ou
subversives;
e) des éléments
d’information recueillis ou préparés aux fins du renseignement relatif aux
États étrangers, aux organisations internationales d’États ou aux citoyens
étrangers et utilisés par le gouvernement du Canada dans le cadre de
délibérations ou consultations ou dans la conduite des affaires
internationales;
f) des renseignements
concernant les méthodes et le matériel technique ou scientifique de collecte,
d’analyse ou de traitement des éléments d’information visés aux alinéas d)
et e), ainsi que des renseignements concernant leurs sources;
g) des renseignements
concernant les positions adoptées ou envisagées, dans le cadre de
négociations internationales présentes ou futures, par le gouvernement du
Canada, les gouvernements d’États étrangers ou les organisations
internationales d’États;
h) des renseignements
contenus dans la correspondance diplomatique échangée avec des États
étrangers ou des organisations internationales d’États, ou dans la
correspondance officielle échangée avec des missions diplomatiques ou des
postes consulaires canadiens;
i) des renseignements
relatifs à ceux des réseaux de communications et des procédés de
cryptographie du Canada ou d’États étrangers qui sont utilisés dans les buts
suivants :
(i)
la conduite des affaires internationales,
(ii)
la défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada,
(iii)
la détection, la prévention ou la répression d’activités hostiles ou
subversives.
Définitions
(2)
Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent au présent article.
«
activités hostiles ou subversives »
“
subversive or hostile activities”
«
activités hostiles ou subversives »
a) L’espionnage dirigé
contre le Canada ou des États alliés ou associés avec le Canada;
b) le sabotage;
c) les activités visant
la perpétration d’actes de terrorisme, y compris les détournements de moyens
de transport, contre le Canada ou un État étranger ou sur leur territoire;
d) les activités visant
un changement de gouvernement au Canada ou sur le territoire d’États
étrangers par l’emploi de moyens criminels, dont la force ou la violence, ou
par l’incitation à l’emploi de ces moyens;
e) les activités visant à
recueillir des éléments d’information aux fins du renseignement relatif au
Canada ou aux États qui sont alliés ou associés avec lui;
f) les activités
destinées à menacer, à l’étranger, la sécurité des citoyens ou des
fonctionnaires fédéraux canadiens ou à mettre en danger des biens fédéraux
situés à l’étranger.
«
défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada »
“ defence
of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada ”
«
défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada » Sont
assimilés à la défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada
les efforts déployés par le Canada et des États étrangers pour détecter,
prévenir ou réprimer les activités entreprises par des États étrangers en vue
d’une attaque réelle ou éventuelle ou de la perpétration d’autres actes
d’agression contre le Canada ou des États alliés ou associés avec le Canada.
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Personal
information
19. (1) Subject to
subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose
any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as
defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act.
Where
disclosure authorized
(2)
The head of a government institution may disclose any record requested under
this Act that contains personal information if
(a)
the individual to whom it relates consents to the disclosure;
(b)
the information is publicly available; or
(c)
the disclosure is in accordance with section 8 of the Privacy Act.
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Renseignements
personnels
19. (1) Sous réserve du
paragraphe (2), le responsable d’une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser
la communication de documents contenant les renseignements personnels visés à
l’article 3 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels.
Cas
où la divulgation est autorisée
(2)
Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut donner communication de documents
contenant des renseignements personnels dans les cas où :
a) l’individu qu’ils
concernent y consent;
b) le public y a accès;
c) la communication est
conforme à l’article 8 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements
personnels.
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[Emphasis
added]
[13]
The
exemptions laid out in the Act are to be considered in two aspects by the
reviewing Court. Firstly, exemptions in the Act are either class-based or
injury-based. Class-based exemptions are typically involved when the nature of
the documentation sought is sensitive in and of itself. For example, the
section 13 exemption is related to information obtained from foreign
governments, which, by its nature, is a class-based exemption. Injury-based
exemptions require that the decision-maker analyze whether the release of
information could be prejudicial to the interests articulated in the exemption.
Section 15 is an injury-based exemption: the head of the government institution
must assess whether the disclosure of information could “be expected to be injurious
to the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada or the detection, prevention or suppression of
subversive or hostile activities”.
[14]
In
the case at bar, while LAC had custody of some of the sought after records, it
was required by the Act and Treasury Board Policy to consult with the
institution from which the records originated. In this case, the record
originated from the RCMP’s Security Intelligence Division. As this division was
replaced by a civilian intelligence service, the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS), in 1984, LAC consulted with that organization as to the nature
of the documentation and the applicability of the Act’s exemptions.
[15]
The
second component of the exemptions under the Act is to determine whether the
exemption is mandatory or discretionary. In the case of mandatory exemptions,
the provisions of the Act mandate that the decision-maker “shall refuse to
disclose” the records when they fall under the exemption (see, inter alia,
section 19). In the case of discretionary exemptions, the decision-maker “may
refuse” to disclose the record. Section 15 is a discretionary exemption, the
aspects of which will be considered at length in the present reasons.
[16]
The
Library and Archives of Canada Act, SC 2004, c 11 is inextricably linked
to the Act. The most obvious link in the present application is that LAC is the
respondent to the ATI request, but over and above that, the Library and
Archives of Canada Act should be considered in every review of an ATI
request, regardless as to the department or decision-maker involved. The
responsibilities conferred by section 12 of the Library and Archives of
Canada Act to the Librarian and Archivist, the head of LAC support this
contention:
Destruction
and disposal
12. (1) No government
or ministerial record, whether or not it is surplus property of a government
institution, shall be disposed of, including by being destroyed, without the
written consent of the Librarian and Archivist or of a person to whom the
Librarian and Archivist has, in writing, delegated the power to give such
consents.
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Élimination
et aliénation
12. (1) L'élimination ou
l'aliénation des documents fédéraux ou ministériels, qu'il s'agisse ou non de
biens de surplus, est subordonnée à l'autorisation écrite de l'administrateur
général ou de la personne à qui il a délégué, par écrit, ce pouvoir.
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[17]
Considering
the broad definitions of “government or ministerial record” and “government
institution” found within the Library and Archives of Canada Act, it can
be said that the ultimate approval of destruction and retention of
documentation is an integral part of LAC’s mandate. Evidently, Parliament
considers access to information in Canada and document retention as essential
components of citizens’ right to government information.
[18]
LAC’s
objectives are to be considered by any government institution assessing ATI
requests as these objectives further compound the Act’s objectives and
reinforce the importance of access to government records. In all clarity, LAC’s
statutory mandate is defined as:
Objects
7. The objects of the
Library and Archives of Canada are
(a)
to acquire and preserve the documentary heritage;
(b)
to make that heritage known to Canadians and to anyone with an interest in Canada and to facilitate access to it;
(c)
to be the permanent repository of publications of the Government of Canada
and of government and ministerial records that are of historical or archival
value;
(d)
to facilitate the management of information by government institutions;
(e)
to coordinate the library services of government institutions; and
(f)
to support the development of the library and archival communities.
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Mission
7. Bibliothèque et
Archives du Canada a pour mission :
a) de constituer et de
préserver le patrimoine documentaire;
b) de faire connaître ce
patrimoine aux Canadiens et à quiconque s'intéresse au Canada, et de le
rendre accessible;
c) d'être le dépositaire
permanent des publications des institutions fédérales, ainsi que des
documents fédéraux et ministériels qui ont un intérêt historique ou
archivistique;
d) de faciliter la
gestion de l'information par les institutions fédérales;
e) d'assurer la
coordination des services de bibliothèque des institutions fédérales;
f) d'appuyer les milieux
des archives et des bibliothèques.
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[19]
This
mandate is not a passive one. LAC is instructed by Parliament to “acquire and
preserve” the documentary heritage of Canadians. It is also instructed to “make
that heritage known” as well as “facilitating access” to it. Insomuch as
facilitating access to government documentation is the very objective of the
Act, LAC’s mandate is not only similar; it is the logical extension of the Act.
The Preamble of the Library and Archives of Canada Act reinforces this
synergy between the Act and LAC’s mandate:
HEREAS
it is necessary that
(a)
the documentary heritage of Canada be preserved for the benefit of present
and future generations;
(b)
Canada be served by an institution that is a source of enduring knowledge
accessible to all, contributing to the cultural, social and economic
advancement of Canada as a free and democratic society;
(c)
that institution facilitate in Canada cooperation among the communities
involved in the acquisition, preservation and diffusion of knowledge; and
(d)
that institution serve as the continuing memory of the government of Canada and its institutions;
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Attendu
qu'il est nécessaire :
a) que le patrimoine
documentaire du Canada soit préservé pour les générations présentes et
futures;
b) que le Canada se dote
d'une institution qui soit une source de savoir permanent accessible à tous
et qui contribue à l'épanouissement culturel, social et économique de la
société libre et démocratique que constitue le Canada;
c) que cette institution
puisse faciliter au Canada la concertation des divers milieux intéressés à
l'acquisition, à la préservation et à la diffusion du savoir;
d) que cette institution
soit la mémoire permanente de l'administration fédérale et de ses institutions,
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[20]
The
use of the preamble of an act to fully grasp its purpose is a method that is
without controversy and a useful tool to understand LAC’s mandate and the
mission with which it was entrusted with by Parliament. Professor Ruth Sullivan
has stated that preambles and purpose statements are “the most authoritative
evidence of purpose” (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of
Statutes, 5th ed., Lexis Nexis, 2008, at p 271). Professor Côté
offers the view that the caselaw has evolved in a manner such that the preamble
is to be considered, unless the circumstances, such as the clarity of the
dispositions to be interpreted, justify not considering the indicia of intent
that the preamble offers (Pierre-André Côté, avec la collaboration de Stéphane Beaulac
et Mathieu Devinat, Interprétation des lois, 4th ed., Les
Éditions Thémis, 2009, at para 226).
[21]
The
Library and Archives of Canada Act emphasizes the accessibility of
documentation, as well as its contributory role to Canada’s democracy (“enduring
knowledge accessible to all, contributing to the cultural, social and economic
advancement of Canada as a free and democratic society”). Again, LAC is
mandated with a pragmatic mission: “acquisition, preservation and diffusion
of knowledge” [emphasis added]. Ultimately, LAC is the custodian of our
documentary heritage and the information contained therein (“continuing memory”
or “mémoire permanente”). Whether or not the records are in LAC’s
possession or not is beside the point, all government institutions answer to
the Librarian and Archivist and those with his delegated authority in terms of
document retention. Any decision to dispose of these records thus falls to the
Librarian and Archivist or those with his delegated authority (section 12 of
the Library and Archives of Canada Act).
[22]
Not
only do the principles of statutory interpretation allow for consideration of
statutes adopted on similar issues, the coherence of the Canadian legal order
requires that the inherent principles of statutes in similar matters be
considered fully complementary, especially in an issue as important as access
to information. It is clear that the complimentary purposes of the Act and the Library
and Archives Act of Canada are such that they are inextricably linked, as
would the aims of the Privacy Act if it was to be considered by the
Court in the present application. Professor Sullivan offered a learned
perspective on statutes on the same subject:
The presumptions of coherence and consistent
expression apply as if the provisions of these statutes were part of a single
Act. Definitions in one statute are taken to apply in the others and any
purpose statements in the statutes are read together. (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan
on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed., Lexis Nexis, 2008, at
p 412)
[Emphasis added]
[23]
This
approach is consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court in R v Ulybel
Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 in terms of interpreting statutes in similar
matters.
[24]
It
should be noted that Madam Justice Sharlow of the Federal Court of Appeal has
stated in Blank v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2001 FCA 374
that “the Court should consider only the Act and the jurisprudence guiding its
interpretation and application. Laws requiring disclosure in other legal
proceedings cannot narrow or broaden the scope of disclosure required by the
Access to Information Act.” However, in Blank, the Court was asked to
import the Stinchcombe standard of disclosure in criminal matters to the
ATI requests. The Court distinguishes the Blank case with the present
application and comments therein with regards to the Library and Archives of
Canada Act. Again, the Library and Archives of Canada Act and the Access
to information Act are statutes adopted in pari materia, and are
thus not incompatible and do not have the same implications as importing the Stinchcombe
standard of disclosure of criminal law to ATI requests.
[25]
Thus,
the dynamic mandate and purpose of LAC, including the intrinsic value of
documentary archives and access thereof, must be considered by any
decision-maker when considering ATI requests, as these fully complement the
objectives and spirit of the Act itself.
[26]
This
Court is mandated with the important task of safeguarding the confidentiality
of the information it is to assess and must take “every reasonable precaution”
to protect it from disclosure (s 47 of the Act). The Federal Court is also
mandated with a similar task in other national security matters. Under the Canada
Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, section 38.12 and subsection 38.04(4)
entrust the Court with the responsibility of protecting confidential
information. Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001,
c-27, paragraph 83(1)(d) confers to the Court the responsibility to
protect the information submitted in the context of security certificates.
[27]
However,
under the Canada Evidence Act and under the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, the power to draft summaries of the information is clearly
provided for by statute. This power has not been clearly given by Parliament to
the Information Commissioner or the decision-maker. The summary accomplishes a
balance between the protection of national security information and the right
to know a case or to be provided with relevant information. In the context of
access to information, the right to access to information in and of itself
could be balanced with national security information by providing summaries.
While the Court could consider the issuance of summaries under the broad powers
of section 50, it should be noted that this is a lengthy and resource-intensive
exercise. It can be anticipated that the present application could have
proceeded more efficiently if the head of the government institution and the
Information Commissioner had the power to issue summaries, which could then be
reviewed by the Court.
C. History of
the Proceeding
[28]
Since
the Applicant’s original ATI request in November 2005, the request and
subsequent proceedings have evolved in such a way that a general history is
required to render a clear picture of the situation, as it may be illustrative
of the dynamics of access to information in Canada. Applications under the Act
are supposed to proceed in a summary way (s 45 of the Act). As will be seen,
the nature and volume of the records were such that proceeding in a summary way
was not possible. It would be expected that such a historical file would be
processed more efficiently through all stages.
[29]
The
Applicant’s request was brought to LAC in November 2005 and stated the
following:
A copy of the RCMP Security Service File(s) on
Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas. (see attached biography). The 20th
anniversary of Mr. Douglas’s death is February 24, 2006. I ask that you begin
processing this request immediately as it will likely involve several weeks of
preparation given the backlogs in handling applications under the Access to
Information Act.
[30]
As
indicated by the Public Affidavit of Nicole Jalbert, Access to Information and
Privacy Coordinator for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Douglas dossier was to be retained “because of its historical significance”. It was
transferred to the National Archives of Canada, as it was then, in April 2000.
[31]
As
the records were contained in the “RG146 – Records of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service” file, LAC proceeded to consult with CSIS. After this initial
consultation, the Senior Analyst in charge of the file wrote to the Applicant
on December 9, 2005, indicating that an extension of up to 390 days was
required beyond the statutory 30 day limit, as a result of the required
consultations with CSIS, as prescribed under 9(1)(b) of the Act.
[32]
By
way of a letter from the Senior Analyst at LAC, CSIS was instructed as follows
(Exhibit 1 to the Cross-Examination of Nicole Jalbert, March 2, 2010):
If you wish us to withhold these records or portions
thereof, please mark them accordingly. We require a detailed written rationale
demonstrating that the information recommended for exemption falls under one or
more provisions of the Access to Information Act. Other substantiating
information you can produce which will help us to support an exemption would
also be useful.
[33]
Citing
concerns of administrative expediency, Nicole Jalbert indicated during her
cross-examination that CSIS only relied upon “sort of an umbrella rationale”,
which gives an appreciation to LAC analysts about the general rationale behind
exemptions, but not case-specific evidence (pp 40-41 of the Cross-Examination
of Nicole Jalbert, January 21, 2010). The review undertaken by CSIS aimed to
see if the documents properly fell within the section 15(1) exemption of the
Act. On October 31, 2006, CSIS provided LAC with the redacted documents with an
indication of what exemption was claimed over the portions of the record (Cross-Examination
of Bill Wood, March 8, 2010).
[34]
The
rationale document provided by CSIS was submitted in the public documentation,
albeit in a redacted form. As will be seen later, as a result of the ex
parte, in camera portion of the application, redacted portions of
this document became public. The rationale document as well as the “Library and
Archives (LAC) Consultations” document are now publicly available as a result
of the present application.
[35]
The
internal review of the record indicates that the Senior Analyst assigned to the
review of CSIS’ recommendations was given the file on December 5, 2006 (“Access
to Information Request –A-2005-00450/MIC – Bronskill, Jim (Media)”, Exhibit 2
to the Cross-Examination of Bill Wood, March 8, 2010).
[36]
On
December 12, 2006, LAC’s Senior Analyst wrote to the Applicant indicating that
456 records from the file could be disclosed, but that the others were to be
withheld under the exemptions provided by sections 15 and 19 of the Act. It was
indicated that section 10 was also relied upon, whereby the institution was
refusing to confirm or deny the existence of the records. It was later
indicated that the reference to section 10 was said to be inadvertent.
[37]
On
January 17, 2007, the Applicant made a formal complaint to the Information
Commissioner of Canada, protesting “the excessive number and scope of the
exemptions applied to the records”.
[38]
By
way of a letter dated August 27, 2009, more than two years after this complaint
was filed, the Information Commissioner found that the Applicant’s complaint
was not justified. Further, the Information Commissioner indicated that its
office had reviewed the documents strictly under the prism of section 15(1) of
the Act, and that it was not necessary to review the documents under section 19(1),
as the documents were deemed to be properly withheld under section 15(1).
[39]
The
Application for judicial review pursuant to section 41 of the Act was brought
before this Court in October 2009. Pursuant to section 52 of the Act, Madam
Prothonotary Aronovitch granted leave to the Respondent to file evidence on an ex
parte basis by way of an Order dated December 9, 2009. The Respondent
sought to strike two affidavits from the record, which were deemed irrelevant
and opinion-based. While acquiescing that some of the portions of the
Affidavits of Wesley Wark and Craig Heron were opinionated, Madam Prothonotary
Tabib denied the Minister’s motion to strike the affidavits by an Order dated
February 11, 2010.
[40]
Pursuant
to section 52 and the nature of the section 15 exemption claimed, Chief Justice
Lutfy assigned this Court to hearing the Application, both for the in camera
portion, as well as the public hearing (Order dated September 7, 2010).
[41]
The
ex parte portion of the hearing took place in Ottawa on November 30,
2010. In light of the concerns highlighted by the Supreme Court in Ruby v
Canada (Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75 and Chief Justice Lutfy in Kitson
v Canada, 2009 FC 1000, and recently confirmed by the Federal Court of
Appeal in Attaran v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 2011 FCA 182,
above, it was clear for all the Parties involved, including the Court, that the
ex parte, in camera hearing of the Application was to be limited
to the very minimum, so as to not adversely affect the open court principle as
well as the Applicant’s interests. As related by Associate Chief Justice Jerome
in Maislin Industries Ltd. v Canada (Minister for Industry, Trade &
Commerce), [1984] 1 FC 939 (CA), at page 942, the directions for proceeding
on an ex parte, in camera basis “should be such as to safeguard
the public interest in the administration of justice, and the rights of any
parties not permitted to participate”. The Court independently also reviewed
the complete, unredacted record before proceeding to this ex parte, in
camera hearing.
[42]
After
an ex parte teleconference, a summary of the ex parte, in
camera hearing was prepared by counsel for the Respondent at the request of
the Court. It was approved by the Court and filed. Summarily, it related the
process followed during the closed hearing, as well as the Court’s concerns.
The Summary indicates the following:
i.
Concerns
addressed by the Court were:
a. Whether additional
information could be released in two of the documents previously released to
the Applicant, entitled “Rationale Document for CSIS exemptions used by
National Archives” and “Library and Archives (LAC) Consultations”.
b. To what extent is the
mandate of Library and Archives Canada addressed in the evidence.
c. How was the discretion
under section 15 exercised by Library and Archives Canada?
d. To what extent was
that exercise of discretion reasonable?
ii.
Counsel
for the Minister brought precision to the categories of information that had
been protected by presenting the Court with a series of examples through specific
reference to the documents.
iii.
Counsel
for the Minister advised the Court of its intention, and undertook, to review a
number of documents for possible release.
iv.
The
Court presented counsel for the Minister with a number of documents that were
of concern; the purpose of which was to examine the extent to which the mandate
of Library and Archives Canada was considered during the exercise of discretion
under section 15.
[43]
Due
to extraneous circumstances, the public hearing which was to be held on December
14, 2010 was adjourned on consent and was to be rescheduled. In the meantime,
counsel for the Minister submitted by way of a letter dated December 13, 2010
that the matter be adjourned for 90 days while the Respondent undertook a
review of the documents in good faith in order to release more information
further to the in camera hearing. Additional disclosure was to be made
before March 31, 2011. At the time, counsel for the Applicant opposed this new
review of documentation, as it was argued that the record should be evaluated
as it was initially placed before the Court. It was nonetheless filed before
the Court on February 16, 2011.
[44]
The
Court indicated in a teleconference with the parties on December 17, 2010, that
the present Application could proceed directly to judgment on the basis of the
written representations of the Parties. However, counsel for the Parties
instructed that the matter should proceed to a public hearing, as there were
live issues to be debated in a public forum. The hearing was set for February
23, 2011, in Ottawa and went ahead as scheduled.
[45]
The
public hearing allowed the Parties to make representations on the nature of the
section 15(1) exemption of the Act, as well as other issues that will be dealt
with in the present reasons. However, through a letter submitted on February
24, 2011, counsel for the Respondent clarified certain aspects of the
representations made during the public hearing.
[46]
Apart
from the considerations pertaining to the second review of the documentation, counsel
for the Respondent clarified what was alluded to in terms of changes in policy
within CSIS and LAC as a result of the proceedings. In the letter of February
24, 2011, it was said that “CSIS recommended the release of most of the records
obtained through technical sources (intercepts and surveillance) when the
subject of interest was transitory in nature. This recommendation will be
applied to all CSIS files that were transferred to LAC, because of their
historical importance, from this point forward”. This was noted to be a
“significant departure” in which historical records were reviewed by CSIS and
LAC. However, what consists of a subject of interest of transitory nature
remains to be defined with more precision.
D. The Second
Review of the Douglas File
[47]
As
noted above, a second review of the Douglas file was undertaken by the
Respondent and filed before the Court just before the public hearing.
[48]
Firstly,
in the letter dated February 24, 2011 (see para 46 of these reasons), counsel
for the Respondent clarified the three reasons why a second review of the
documentation was undertaken by the Respondent. These three reasons alluded to
were: more than five years had passed between the original request and the
hearing of the application; the Respondent had acknowledged to the Court that
there were inconsistencies in the withholding of information; and a number of
comments during the in camera hearings were such that it “made it
appropriate to conduct a further review”.
[49]
Secondly,
in the letter dated February 24, 2011, the rationale for the release of
additional information was further detailed by counsel for the Respondent. In
this letter, counsel for the Respondent also stated that the exemption of
section 19(1) was no longer relied upon. During the review of the
documentation, the Court found that section 19(1) concerns could still be found
within the documents. However, as section 19 was not argued or relied upon, the
analysis strictly deals with section 15(1).
[50]
In
light of the second review of the litigated file, the Court was faced with an
important question: what was the nature of this second review of the documents?
Is it a de novo decision, which should proceed before the Information
Commissioner before the Court can validly review them? At first glance, it
could appear as though the requirements of section 41 imply that the matter be
put to the Information Commissioner before being put before the Court. This is
also the interpretation this section received recently in Statham v Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, 2010 FCA 315, at para 64.
[51]
This
issue was raised during the public hearing, but was left open as the Parties
required time to make supplementary submissions. In this respect, the Court
also instructed the Parties to contact the Office of the Information
Commissioner in the view of obtaining its position on whether the Court had
jurisdiction to consider this second review of the Douglas dossier.
[52]
By
consent of the Parties, the Information Commissioner brought a motion in
writing to be granted intervener status for the jurisdictional issue. Leave was
granted by the Court by an Order dated March 28, 2011 for the Information
Commissioner to be granted status as an intervener in regards to the
jurisdictional issue.
[53]
The
Commissioner framed the jurisdictional issue as follows:
Does the requirement in s.41 of the ATIA that the
Commissioner investigate a refusal to disclose records, or parts thereof, prior
to the commencement of a s.41 ATIA application for review remove the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court to review the information released by LAC on
February 16, 2011?
[54]
Relying
on Byer v Canada (Information Commissioner) et al., 2004 FC 119, the
Information Commissioner submitted that once the section 37(2) of the Act
report was provided, the office was functus officio for the purpose of
the application, absent a new complaint made to the Office of the Information
Commissioner. Furthermore, as the same exemption was claimed in the new review
of the documents, the Commissioner had thus examined the first release of
documents and found the complaint not to be founded. Hence, no new exemptions
were raised, and the documents at issue were the very same. As such, the
Information Commissioner is argued to be functus officio for the
Application.
[55]
By
an Oral Direction dated April 5, 2011, the Court granted the Parties leave to
file supplementary submissions to address the second review of documents more
elaborately.
[56]
Counsel
for the Applicant submitted further representations in regards to the
supplementary disclosure. Counsel appropriately highlighted that the documents
made public through the second review showed the flawed logic behind the
Respondent’s initial assessment of the records. Furthermore, counsel for the
Applicant pointed out that portions of documents were missing from the record.
[57]
The
essential question of the missing documentation and the fragmentation of the Douglas dossier will be dealt with in the present reasons, as it is a critical element of
the application.
[58]
The
Respondent has argued that disclosure was refused when information taken out of
context could be unfair to Mr. Douglas. The Applicant submitted that this was
unjustified and that it is a “patronizing approach”.
[59]
Citing
a precedent from the United Kingdom, the Applicant also suggested that an amicus
curiae or a special advocate be appointed at the late stage in the
application to conduct the review of the records. It is said that the nature
and extent of the documents concerned were such that they could constitute a
burden on the Court.
[60]
Counsel
for the Respondent vigorously opposed this request for several reasons:
firstly, it was said that all the issues have been fully presented to the
Court; secondly, that it was for the Court to conduct a de novo review;
thirdly, that appointing an amicus curiae would render the role of the
Information Commissioner meaningless; and, lastly, that the authorities
provided were to be distinguished as they arose in different legal contexts.
[61]
As
the thorough history of this application has been dealt with, it is proper to
address the question of the applicable standards of review in this application.
E. The
Applicable Standards of Review
[62]
As
indicated, the Application was brought under section 41 of the Act. Moreover,
the exemption claimed by LAC in this instance is the section 15 national
security exemption. Section 50 calls upon the Court to determine if the head of
the institution had “reasonable grounds on which to refuse” disclosure, full or
partial, of the records in question.
[63]
At
face value, the plain reading of section 50 indicates that the review proceeds
on the assessment of the reasonableness of LAC’s refusal of disclosure. Indeed,
“reasonable grounds” for withholding the information is the standard provided
by section 50. Furthermore, section 15 instructs that the head of the
government institution may refuse disclosure if the disclosure could
“reasonably be expected to be injurious” to the subject matters identified in
section 15. On the basis of the plain reading of these sections, the Court
could satisfy itself that the review of the refusal of disclosure should
proceed on the assessment of a reasonableness standard.
[64]
Indeed,
this Court has applied the reasonableness standard of review to the
applications brought under section 50 (see, inter alia, Steinhoff v Canada (Minister of Communications), (1998) 83 CPR (3d) 380; Canada (Prime Minister),
X v Canada (Minister of National Defence), (1992) 58 FTR 93 (Strayer J.);
Kitson, above). The pragmatic and functional analysis required to assess
the standard of review could be resolved on the basis of the statute and the
case law (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, at para 57 and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, at
para 18).
[65]
However,
what decision is the Court to review? Should the Court proceed in a one-step
analysis of the refusal to disclose under the grounds provided under section
15, or is there more under sections 15 and 50 that is required of the Court?
[66]
This
Court has adopted different approaches to its powers of review provided by the
Act under sections 49 and 50. Indeed, sections 49 and 50 remain distinct, and
the assessment of the standards of review needs to adapt itself to the
particular realities of these provisions of the Act. The determination of the
standards of review under section 49 cannot be imported in the analysis under
section 50. Likewise, the Court’s analysis cannot subsume one exemption to
another, even if the Court’s power is derived from the same section, i.e.
section 49 or section 50. The nature of the exemptions provided in the Act is
such that the standard of review is not to be found in sections 49 or 50, but
rather, in the wording of the exemption itself, in this case, section 15.
[67]
Section
49 gives the Court power to order disclosure or to make any order deemed
appropriate arising from the refusal of disclosure under sections of the Act
that are not referred to in section 50. Section 50 itself gives the Court power
to intervene in matters arising from section 14 (federal-provincial affairs),
section 15 of the Act (national security and international affairs), paragraph
16(1)(c) (enforcement of laws and conduct of an investigation),
paragraph 16(1)(d) (security of penal institutions) and paragraph 18(d)
(financial interests of government). What is common between the refusals
reviewed under section 50 is that the head of the government institution
refusing disclosure has the discretion to do so, and the exemptions are
injury-based, not class-based.
[68]
This
dichotomy between mandatory and discretionary exemptions as well as
injury-based and class-based exemptions in the Act implies that the Court’s
review of refusals to disclose is highly contingent of the section under which
the exemption was claimed. Class-based exemptions are provided when the nature
of the information is such that it can be determined on the standard of
correctness whether the exemption claimed under the Act applies or not (Telezone,
above; Canada (Minister of Industry) v Canada (Information Commissioner),
2001 FCA 253; Sherman v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2002 FCT
586 (FC)). It is feasible for the Court to assess whether a document falls
within a class-based exemption or another. For example, either information was
obtained in confidence from a foreign government or it was not (paragraph
13(1)(a) of the Act). Either information is personal information under
section 19 of the Act or it is not. The determination of a class-based
exemption is indeed one that lends itself to a review on a correctness basis,
as counsel for the Applicant noted during the public hearing; these exemptions
are of a “binary” nature.
[69]
However,
the applicability of the injury-based exemption of section 15 is to be
determined on the standard of reasonableness. Firstly, this is what is
instructed by section 50 and section 15 themselves (“reasonable grounds to
refuse disclosure”, “reasonably be expected to be injurious…”). Secondly, this
Court has proceeded with the reasonableness standard when dealing with section
15 exemptions (Do-Ky v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade), (1999) 164 FTR 160 (CA), at para 7; Kitson v Canada
(Minister of National Defence), above; Steinhoff v Canada (Minister of
Communications), above; X v Canada (Minister of National Defence),
(Strayer J.), above; Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime
Minister), [1993] 1 FC 427 (FCTD)). Thirdly, the Court notes the nature of
the information falling under section 15 is such that “a range of acceptable
outcomes defensible in fact and in law” does exist in terms of what constitutes
information injurious to the matters highlighted in section 15. Reasonable
people can reasonably disagree as to what falls within section 15, and the
present application is the perfect example of this.
[70]
Thus,
for an application under section 50 contesting the application of the section
15 exemption, the first step is to assess whether the information could
reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs,
the defence of Canada or any allied or associated state, or the detection,
prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities, as defined by
section 15. The standard of proof in this respect is that of the reasonable
expectation of probable harm, as indicated in Canada Packers v
Canada (Minister of Agriculture), [1989] 1 FC 47 (FCA).
[71]
The
assessment of the applicable standards of review also calls for the assessment
of the other component of section 15: its discretionary nature. The dichotomy
between mandatory and discretionary exemptions needs to be emphasized by the
Court in the assessment of the review to be undertaken. If an exemption is
mandatory, the first step, i.e. the evaluation of whether information falls
within an exemption, will be sufficient. In these cases, as there is no
discretion, the head of the government institution has an obligation to refuse
to disclose if the exemption applies. Thus, there is only one decision to
review: whether the application of the exemption is correct or reasonable, according
to the exemption claimed.
[72]
When
the Court is faced with a discretionary exemption, it must also review the
exercise of the head of the institution’s discretion in refusing disclosure.
This was expressly discussed by Justice Rothstein, as he then was, in the case
of Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister),
above, when the following was noted at paragraph 23:
In the case of mandatory exemptions, the only
decision to be made is whether the record comes within the description that the
Act requires be exempted from disclosure. In the case of discretionary
exemptions such as that under section 14, two decisions are necessary: first,
does the record come within the description that is contemplated by the
statutory exemption invoked in a particular case; and second, if it does,
should the record nevertheless be disclosed. [Emphasis added]
[73]
This
two-step analysis for the refusal of disclosure under discretionary exemptions
was confirmed by Justice Nadon, as he then was, in the case of Do-Ky v
Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), [1997] 2 FC
907 (FCTD), at para 32, a judgment which was appealed on other grounds and
confirmed by the Appeal Division of the Federal Court of Canada, as it then was
(Do-Ky (CA), above). Also, while this case dealt with the section 21(1)(a),
the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed in Telezone, above, at para 47, that
the exercise of discretion was also to be reviewed “on the grounds normally
available in administrative law for the review of administrative discretion,
including unreasonableness”. The Federal Court of Appeal also adopted a
two-step approach in Canada (Minister of Industry) v Canada (Information Commissioner), 2001 FCA 253. More recently, although considering a
provincial statute, the Supreme Court confirmed that not only is the
qualification of the records to be reviewed, but also the exercise of
discretion when an act confers it to the decision-maker (Ontario (Public
Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers' Association, 2010 SCC 23).
[74]
It
appears as though the two-step analysis for discretionary exemptions has not
always been clearly and consistently applied by this Court. However, for the
Act’s objects and purpose to be given full meaning and breadth, the two-step
analysis, where the exercise of discretion must also be reviewed on a
reasonableness standard, must prevail.
[75]
Firstly,
the Act clearly sets out that decisions on the disclosure of government
information should be reviewed independently of government. It is the Office of
the Information Commissioner that assumes part of this essential duty of
independently reviewing refusals of disclosure under its statutory mandate.
However, this statutory power falls short of ordering disclosure of documents.
While the Commissioner has a crucial role to play in access to information
requests, it is clear that the Commissioner’s powers can only go so far, and
whose recommendations are within the realm of political sanctions. It is the
Federal Court that has the power to order disclosure, and to make any other
orders as deemed appropriate, as per sections 49 and 50 of the Act. Thus, for
the review to be truly independent of government, both the application of the
exemption and the exercise of discretion, if applicable, are to be reviewed by
the Court.
[76]
The
two-step approach to the analysis and review of claimed exemptions under
section 15 of the Act, under reasonableness for both issues, has recently been
confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Attaran v Canada (Minister of
Foreign Affairs), above.
[77]
These
elements indicate that applications under the Act are more than a typical
application for judicial review. This is supported by the fact that
applications for review are brought directly under the Act and that broad
remedies are available to the Court, implying that this is not a question of
standards of review per se. The Court’s role in the process is also
broader: in camera hearings are conducted and submissions from
Applicants can only argue in abstracto as to why refusals of disclosure
are not justified (Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General), [2000] 3 FC 589
(FCA), at para 36; Attaran v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs),
above, at para 26). In another respect, depending on the exemption claimed, a
decision-maker’s discretion may be at play, calling for some or no deference
from the Court.
[78]
In
Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Commissioner of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2003 SCC 8, the Supreme Court interpreted
the scope and purpose of the Act, although this was done in the context of
section 19, a class-based, mandatory exemption, pertaining to personal
information. Justice Gonthier conducted a full pragmatic and functional
analysis of the standard of review under section 19 of the Act. In this
respect, Justice Gonthier emphasized the principle of independent review
provided for by the Act, as well as the fact that applying exemptions of the
Act imply legal analysis, something the RCMP Commissioner had no expertise in.
This led the Supreme Court to conclude that there was a less deferential
standard to be considered. More precisely, the following was noted in respect
to the Act’s objectives:
In my opinion, this purpose is advanced by adopting
a less deferential standard of review. Under the federal scheme, those responsible
for answering access to information requests are agents of a government
institution. This is unlike the situation under many provincial access to
information statutes, where information requests are reviewed by an
administrative tribunal independent from the executive (Macdonell v. Quebec (Commission d’accès à l’information), 2002 SCC 71 (CanLII), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 661,
2002 SCC 71). A less deferential standard of review thus advances the
stated objective that decisions on the disclosure of government information be
reviewed independently of government. Further, those charged with responding
to requests under the federal Access Act might be inclined to interpret the
exceptions to information disclosure in a liberal manner so as to favour their
institution (3430901 Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry),
2001 FCA 254 (CanLII), [2002] 1 F.C. 421, 2001 FCA 254, at para. 30). As such,
the exercise of broad powers of review would also advance the stated purpose
of providing a right of access to information in records under the control of a
government institution in accordance with the principle that necessary
exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific.
Finally, the nature of the issue before the Court
also militates in favour of providing broad powers of review. The dispute
requires the RCMP Commissioner to interpret s. 3(j), and in particular, the
statement that personal information does not include “information about an
individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government institution
that relates to the position or functions of the individual . . .”. Thus,
the Commissioner is called upon to interpret the Access Act and the Privacy
Act, taking into account the general principles underlying them. This is a
question of law that does not turn on any finding of fact. It is also a
question of a highly generalized nature, owing to the fact that the Access Act
and the Privacy Act determine the disclosure obligations for each of the
many institutions governed by the Access Act. These factors further indicate
that courts ought not to be restrained in reviewing the Commissioner’s
decisions.
[Emphasis added]
[79]
This
Court cannot import the totality of the Supreme Court’s learned reasoning in Canada
(Information Commissioner) v Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police), above, as the exemption claimed was different. Furthermore,
correctness cannot be adopted as the standard of review, namely because it runs
counter to the plain-reading of section 15 of the Act and because the
decision-maker retains some discretion in the decision to withhold information
from disclosure.
[80]
However,
some of the Supreme Court’s findings give proper context to the underlying
dynamics of access to information law in Canada. Firstly, as the Federal Court
of Appeal noted in Telezone, above, which was cited approvingly by
Justice Gonthier, institutions responding to access to information requests may
tend to apply exemptions liberally so as to limit disclosure and scrutiny of
their organization. Also, it remains true that decisions on access to
information require an interpretation of the Act, which is inherently a legal
question for which the reviewing Court is indeed the proper forum for such a
determination.
[81]
It
should also be noted that counsel for the Respondent indicated, while
discussing another topic during the Cross-Examination of Nicole Jalbert, that
“a judicial review application is a de novo review by the Federal Court
and a judge of the Federal Court sees the records and makes their own
determination on whether the claimed exemptions apply to the records”
(Transcript of the Cross-Examination of Nicole Jalbert, March 2, 2010, p 9).
[82]
Considering
these elements, and for exemptions under the Act to be truly “limited and specific”,
as required by law, as well as the fact that the Act to be interpreted in a
“purposive and liberal manner” (Statham v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
2010 FCA 315), it is clear that the Court reviewing refusals of disclosure
under discretionary exemptions are to review 1) whether the documents fall
within the exemption claimed and 2) whether discretion was exercised properly.
However, the Act’s objectives and their interpretation by the courts is such
that this discretion is on the lower end of the spectrum, and that the Court is
given ample jurisdiction and powers to review the exemptions claimed, as well
as the exercise of discretion. This conclusion is necessary for the Act to be
given its full meaning and breadth. As the Federal Court of Appeal noted in Telezone,
above, at para 36, “if the Court were to confine its duty under section 41 to
review ministerial refusals of access requests by deferring to ministerial
interpretations and applications of the Act, it would, in effect, be putting
the fox in charge of guarding the henhouse” (see also The Canadian Council
for Christian Charities v Canada (Minister of Finance), (1999) 99 DTC 5337
(FCTD)). Therefore, some deference has to be given, but not to the point of
neutralizing the role of the judiciary as provided for by the legislation.
F. Determinative
Questions
[83]
The
questions raised by the case at bar are as follows:
1.
Were
the documents properly considered as section 15 exempted documents?
2.
What
factors are to be considered in the exercise of discretion?
3.
Was
the exercise of discretion reasonable in the circumstance?
[84]
The
Court will consider both the documentation as it was reviewed initially, as
well as the second exercise of discretion that is the second review. This is
necessary in order to give the most representative analysis of this case as it
proceeded before the Court. Furthermore, it should be noted that two of the
reasons advanced by counsel for the Respondent for the second review result
from the Court proceedings themselves: the passage of time and the Court’s
comments in the ex parte, in camera hearings. It cannot be that
the Respondent will be exempt from the Court’s scrutiny and analysis by way of
Judgment because discretion was exercised de novo during the
proceedings.
[85]
After
detailing general considerations applicable to the case at bar, the Court will
review the withheld information as it was classified and submitted by the
Respondent.
II. Analysis
A. Preliminary
Matters
(1) The
completeness of the file before the Court
[86]
After
the second release of the Douglas dossier, counsel for the Applicant
appropriately submitted to the Court that the documentation submitted was not
complete, and that sections of documents were absent from the file (for
example, pp199-202; pp 213-215; pp 238-242; pp 645-649; pp 750-754; pp 819-821;
pp 832-836). As this was never brought to the attention of the Court, and the
Court itself did not notice this, a further public hearing was held to address
this important issue.
[87]
Typically,
the missing pages are portions of intelligence reports on other targets where
only some portions are found within the ATI documentation. Some of the sections
pertaining to T.C. Douglas are still within the file, others are still within
the file but do not address T.C. Douglas. As such, there are no indicia of what
could be found in the missing portions of the report.
[88]
The
Respondent addressed these concerns with additional submissions and affidavits.
It was confirmed that what was transferred to the Applicant was the complete
record as it was its LAC’s possession. No copies of this file were kept by
CSIS. However, the affidavits are silent as to whether there is more
information in LAC’s possession about T.C. Douglas, for example, if he would be
mentioned or targeted by an RCMP program or anything of this nature. The
initial referral to section 10 of the Act in LAC’s initial response to the ATI
request leaves the Court with doubts, if not concerns, about this issue. It has
been stated on the public record that documents which could be covered under
section 13 of the Act (Information obtained in confidence of a foreign
government, international organization, provincial government, etc) remain with
CSIS, and were not subject to the present application.
[89]
These
doubts are further confirmed by counsel for LAC’s submission that the
Applicant’s request “was not a request for access to all records related to Mr.
Douglas in the possession or control of LAC”. LAC interpreted the Applicant’s
ATI request literally. Indeed, what was requested was a “copy of the RCMP
Security Service File(s) on Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas” [Emphasis
added – it is plural]. Of course, the Applicant would be interested in all the
documents detained by LAC transferred by the RCMP or CSIS concerning T.C.
Douglas. The wording of his request specified “the RCMP Security Service
File(s)”, which could arguably include information on T.C. Douglas found in
other files.
[90]
By
way of example, counsel for the Applicant suggested that “if Mr Douglas’ name
turns up on a document titled, for example, “Security Panel: Plans for
Internment of Dissenters”, the public should know”. Indeed, what has transpired
from the Respondent’s response is that such a document would not have
been included in response to the Applicant’s ATI request. Again, the initial
mention of LAC’s reliance on section 10 of the Act is perhaps not as
inadvertent as indicated. Maybe the initial approach of referring to section 10
was replaced by a strictly literal interpretation of the ATI request, making
the reference to section 10 unnecessary. Sadly, the content and scope of what
information the government holds concerning T.C. Douglas was never addressed ex
parte, as the Court was led to believe that there was only one “playing
field”, that which constitutes the documentation submitted in response to the
ATI request, save from the information emanating from foreign sources, which
remains with CSIS. There needs to be a balance in an institution’s literal
response to an ATI request and whether there would be more on the subject
sought that is linked to the ATI request, more so when the institution is LAC,
the custodian of Canada’s history and documentary heritage.
[91]
As
for the missing pages, Ms. Jalbert’s affidavit referred and enclosed the
relevant portions of an RCMP policy applicable during the time that the Douglas
file was kept active (“ “I” Directorate Manual of Filing for Operation, Case
and Policy Files”, January 1st, 1959). Applying a process known as
“extracting”, the filing clerks would only incorporate into a file the relevant
portions of a record with the first and last page of the original report.
However, Ms. Jalbert could not address to what extent this was applied to the Douglas file. It appears likely that this policy was applied to the portions of the
documentation with missing pages. However, documents comparable in length and
subject did not miss pages. Hence, it remains unclear as to why there were
missing pages.
[92]
More
importantly, Ms. Jalbert attests the following: “When I reviewed the records
contained in the Tommy Douglas file in January, 2010, and when the request was
initially processed, I noticed that some pages were missing. (…) Because the
issue of the missing pages was not raised by the applicant before April 18,
2011, and did not otherwise appear to be an issue, it was not addressed in the
affidavit I swore in January 2010.”
[93]
This
is a troubling assertion. There is no wonder why the Applicant did not raise
the issue: little to no access was given to these documents in response to the
ATI request. It is only once the second review was done by the Respondent that
the Applicant had access to many portions of the documentation. The Applicant
raised the issue at the first reasonable opportunity given. Hence, the
affiant’s approach is disingenuous, and is further compounded by counsel’s
unsubstantiated assertion that “the purpose of the Act is to provide a right of
access to information in records under the control of a government institution.
The right of access is not to be confused with a right to the preservation of
records”.
[94]
It
is worrisome that such is the approach taken by the Respondent, designated by
law as responsible for (a) acquiring and preserving the documentary heritage of
Canada; (b) making that heritage known to Canadians and to anyone with an
interest in Canada and facilitating access to it;
(c) being the permanent repository
of publications of the Government of Canada and of government and ministerial
records that are of historical or archival value (section 7 of the Library
and Archives of Canada Act). Furthermore, this completely undermines what
has been deemed “necessary” by the Preamble of the Library and Archives of
Canada Act, namely:
HEREAS
it is necessary that
(a)
the documentary heritage of Canada be preserved for the benefit of
present and future generations;
(b)
Canada be served by an institution that is a source of enduring knowledge
accessible to all, contributing to the cultural, social and economic
advancement of Canada as a free and democratic society;
(c)
that institution facilitate in Canada cooperation among the communities
involved in the acquisition, preservation and diffusion of knowledge;
and
(d)
that institution serve as the continuing memory of the government of Canada and its institutions;
|
Attendu
qu'il est nécessaire :
a) que le patrimoine
documentaire du Canada soit préservé pour les générations présentes et
futures;
b) que le Canada se dote
d'une institution qui soit une source de savoir permanent accessible à
tous et qui contribue à l'épanouissement culturel, social et économique de la
société libre et démocratique que constitue le Canada;
c) que cette institution
puisse faciliter au Canada la concertation des divers milieux intéressés à
l'acquisition, à la préservation et à la diffusion du savoir;
d) que cette institution
soit la mémoire permanente de l'administration fédérale et de ses
institutions,
|
[Emphasis
added]
[95]
Contrary
to what is submitted, there is an arguable right to the preservation of Canada’s documentary heritage. For example, if an overzealous document-destruction policy
were adopted, it would surely be reviewable by the Court. It is entirely within
LAC’s mandate to ensure an adequate preservation of Canada’s documentary
heritage, and it is troubling that the contrary was argued by LAC, the
custodian of Canada’s history, before this Court.
[96]
It
is also worrisome that Bill Wood, Acting Director of the Access to Information,
Privacy and Personnel Records Division at LAC, swears that “LAC neither
verifies the completeness of the record, the content of the record nor does it
do a page count of the record”. Bill Wood attests that “the record that was
before the Court was the same as the record that was in the care and control of
LAC in the circumstances and that the hard-copy Tommy Douglas File from which
the request was processed did not contain the missing pages”. Additional
missing pages were identified by LAC, and the Court thanks LAC for its efforts,
albeit belated, to address these pressing issues. One has to wonder what would
have happened had the Applicant not identified these missing pages in the
context of this application. It is true the answers given are not entirely
satisfactory, but the sworn information is such that LAC has gone as far as it
can in respect to the issue of missing pages.
[97]
Ms.
Jalbert was present during the ex parte hearing, as was Mr. Wood. As
discussed above, and as is clear from the caselaw, ex parte submissions
are to be made under a duty of utmost good faith (Ruby, above; see also
para 41 of these reasons).
[98]
Not
identifying missing pages, despite having knowledge of this issue, cannot be
excused under the premise that “it was not addressed by the Applicant”. In the
context of the ex parte hearing, not alluding to other documents which
would be of interest to the Applicant, or not explaining LAC’s literal
interpretation of the ATI request are of concern and may be associated to
breaches of the duty of utmost good faith highlighted by the Supreme Court in Ruby,
above. Or, simply, not telling the Court that LAC has more documents concerning
T.C. Douglas in its possession could also be a breach of the duty of candor. In
the interest of clarity, a discussion was held on the applicability of Ruby
to the ex parte hearing, and counsel for the Respondent recognized on many
occasions ex parte his duty as an officer of the Court of utmost good
faith. Let it be clear: it is not counsel for the Respondent’s conduct which is
being reviewed, but rather, his client’s and CSIS’.
[99]
As
for remedies for this aspect of the case, it seems as though the Court has
already done what it could in the circumstances by ordering an inquiry as to
the completeness of the file. Unsatisfying answers were given, but it appears
that LAC is content with this approach. During the last public hearing, the
Court made it clear that it would be ready to consider involving CSIS in some
way, but counsel for both parties declined. There is not much more a Court can
do in such circumstance.
[100] In this respect,
as the ATI request identified that it was the RCMP Security Service record(s),
with a clear indication of a possibility of a plurality of records that were
sought, the Court is not entirely satisfied that LAC has meaningfully responded
to the request. Nowhere is it sworn or stated that, for example, “all the
information in LAC’s possession pertaining or mentioning T.C. Douglas has been
given”. Rather, the focus is drawn on the intelligence file on T.C. Douglas
itself. Counsel for the Respondent stated in writing that “it was not a request
for access to all records related to Mr. Douglas in the possession or control
of LAC”. In this light, one can quote the case of Saint John Shipbuilding
Ltd. v Canada (Minister of Supply and Services), (1988) 24 FTR 32 (FCTD),
at para 6, in support of the disclosure of relevant ancillary information, more
so when this information could be seen as being not being “ancillary” at all,
being encompassed by the ATI request:
It
seems to me that the Respondent is acting within the spirit of s.2 of the Act
in making available to the Requesters not just the specific document requested
but ancillary documentation or information which would facilitate the ability
of the Requesters to understand the government information which they have
requested. Indeed, I can envisage circumstances in which the Respondent could
be properly criticized for withholding ancillary information of that sort once
it has determined that the primary information should be released.
[101] The Court finds
that additional steps are to be taken by LAC, in light of the consistent characterization
of the litigated records as the “responsive records”. Counsel for the
Respondent argues that “there is no judicial authority supporting the
suggestion that the Court should order LAC to conduct a different search, one
is broader than the applicant’s own request.” The Court is inclined to believe
that LAC interpreted restrictively the ATI request as the “record” (singular)
on T.C. Douglas, which would only be the intelligence file itself, and not
whether more information, if not all, the information on the individual in
LAC’s control was sought. It was. It is reasonable to infer this from the
request from the standardized ATI request form, which, it should be said, does
not provide much space or envisage a dissertation as to the exact scope of the
ATI request. It is an access to information request that was addressed
to LAC, not a literal access to records request. Surely, reasonable
inferences must be made by LAC to address whether it is meaningfully responding
to the ATI request.
[102] Evidently, there
are concerns as to not creating a context where requestors under the Act would
be able to make broad, imprecise ATI requests. However, these reasons should
not be interpreted as condoning this and encouraging overbroad and imprecise
ATI requests. Simply, in this case, the request was sufficiently clear and the
Court is not satisfied that it has been meaningfully addressed.
[103] It is true that
the Court’s powers under section 50 of the Act are remedial, implying that
orders arise from a refusal of disclosure. Justice Strayer indeed indicated in X
v Canada (Minister of National Defence), above, that “refusal of access is
a condition precedent to an application” under sections 49 and 50 of the Act.
[104] In this case,
the Court takes the Respondent’s possible restrictive interpretation of the ATI
request as a possible refusal of disclosure in and of itself. Also, the
breaches of the duty of utmost good faith arising from the ex parte
portion of the application are such that the remedy under section 50 is
justified.
[105] Otherwise, there
are refusals of disclosure in this case, and it is open for the Court to make
an order under section 50. If the Court’s jurisdiction to make the following
order falls into question, one could also rely on the inherent jurisdiction of
the Court to ensure compliance with the high standards set out in Ruby,
above, which are applicable to these proceedings.
[106] As will be seen,
the remedy crafted is not onerous: either there are more records or there are
not, or LAC has another explanation. If the Respondent relies upon section 10
of the Act, then it shall formally constitute a refusal for which the Court
currently has no jurisdiction to evaluate.
[107] Given that LAC’s
mandate is proactive, aims to facilitate access to government records,
and that LAC must seek to make Canada’s documentary heritage known, the Court
orders, pursuant to section 50 of the Act, that LAC justify, in writing, to the
Applicant whether it has more information on T.C. Douglas in its control,
beyond what has already been disclosed within the present application, or if it
relies on section 10 of the Act, or if any other response is warranted.
Contrary to what counsel for the Respondent submits, it is not about expanding
the ATI request. Rather, it is about ensuring that a restrictive interpretation
of the ATI request has not prevailed.
[108] Perhaps, if Canada proceeded as other democracies do, with a declassification process of dated records,
many of these issues would arise in a more limited context. This would also
make it easier for the Respondent to meet its evidentiary burden of providing
specific and detailed evidence for documents or portions thereof still withheld
despite declassification. It would also be less taxing for CSIS’ resources, for
LAC’s resources, and indeed, for the Court’s as well.
[109] In respect to
the completeness of the records and the compliance with the ATI request, the
sole binding order aims to ensure that LAC has complied with the ATI request’s
spirit and intent, that is, to understand the RCMP’s interest in T.C. Douglas.
(2) The Amicus
Curiae Request
[110] As
discussed above, the counsel for the Applicant had made a last minute request
that the Court should avail itself of the broad powers provided by section 50
of the Act in order to appoint an amicus curiae in order to help the
Court with its analysis and review of the documentation.
[111] The
power to appoint amicus curiae is not expressly provided for
within the Act. Under the Canada Evidence Act, the appointment of an amicus
has been done in more than one instance (see, for example, Khadr v
Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 46). In the security certificate
context, special advocates are appointed and accomplish functions that are much
broader than typical amici curiae. The Applicant has argued that the
broad powers conferred by section 50 of the Act are such that the Court does
indeed have the power to appoint amicus curiae. The Respondent argued
that not only was the appointment of an amicus not necessary, but that
such an order was not contemplated by the legislation.
[112] In
the context of access to information in Steinhoff v Canada (Minister of
Communications), (1998) 83 CPR (3d) 380, Justice Rothstein, as he then was,
refused a motion seeking to grant access to litigated documents by counsel for
the applicant, subject to an undertaking of non-disclosure, an undertaking of
obtaining proper security clearance and an undertaking of not using the
documents for any other purpose.
[113] For
the purpose of this application, no amicus shall be appointed. Firstly,
to involve an amicus at this late stage would require prolonging the
case for at least another six months. The Court was aware that such a request
could arise, and during the early stages of the application, at no time was
this request brought to the Court. Hence, it did not arise in a timely manner,
notably because it arose after lengthy reviews of the documentation by the
Court. Secondly, the Court has reviewed for a second time all the claimed
exemptions and the documentation submitted. To involve an amicus at this
stage would not contribute anything more. Thirdly, because of the remedies
provided by the present reasons, a review of the documentation with an amicus
is not necessary.
[114] Without
deciding this issue, the Court assumes for the purposes of this file only that
the appointment of an amicus could fall within the ambit of the broad
powers of section 50 of the Act.
(3) The
Evidence in Support of Confidentiality
[115] Apart
from counsel’s representations during the closed and public hearings, counsel
for the Respondent submitted three affidavits. Two of them have public and
confidential versions. The first is from Nicole Jalbert, the Access to
Information and Privacy Coordinator for CSIS. As an exhibit to Ms. Jalbert’s
Public Affidavit, an “umbrella” document sets out the main grounds on which
portions of the documentation were withheld. Summarily, the Public Affidavit
sets out three grounds for which the information should not be disclosed.
Firstly, disclosure could identify employees, internal procedures and
administrative methodologies of CSIS. Secondly, the disclosure could identify
or tend to identify CSIS’ interest in individuals, groups or issues, including
the existence or absence of past or present investigations, their intensity and
degree of success. Thirdly, Ms. Jalbert contends that the information could
tend to identify sources of information or the content of information provided
by a source, technical or human. Ms. Jalbert’s affidavit also included a brief
history of CSIS and how it assumed the RCMP’s Intelligence Branch’s mandate
upon its creation.
[116] Ms.
Jalbert’s affidavits did not indicate the specific relation between disclosure
of precise documents and the alleged injury: only general, class-based
arguments were submitted about the nature of the documentation and the injury
caused if released to the public. Also, no information was submitted as to
whether discretion was exercised for the release of information, or whether if
it was released because there was no injury resulting from its disclosure. In
respect to discretion, no information was submitted as to whether historical
interests were balanced with national security concerns.
[117] As
discussed, a second review of the documentation was undertaken by LAC, which
undeniably proceeded with consultation with CSIS. As a result of the second
review, it appears some of the grounds on which the Respondent relied to refuse
disclosure were no longer relied upon with the same intensity, namely in
regards to “transitional operational interests” and technical sources. Thus,
Ms. Jalbert’s affidavits must be taken into consideration in light of the
second review, as it nuances the arguments brought forth initially in regards
to the alleged injury resulting from disclosure.
[118] The
second set of affidavits on file is those of Bill Wood, Acting Director of the
Access to Information, Privacy and Personnel Records Division of LAC. Mr. Wood
clarified LAC’s mandate and detailed the process followed for the assessment of
Mr. Bronskill’s ATI request.
[119] The
third affidavit is that of Heather Squires, an articling student employed with
the Department of Justice. The affidavit presents what is otherwise known as a
Vaughn Index. It is titled “Recommendations Sheet”, and indicates what
provision of the Act is used to justify whether records were withheld. However,
as section 19(1) is no longer in play, it can be said that the Recommendations
Sheet is not particularly useful, as all records are withheld under 15(1). The
Recommendations Sheet does not detail what aspect of section 15(1) is
contemplated. A more specific list was made available to the Court on an ex
parte basis. This list basically correlates the grounds for refusal brought
forth by Ms. Jalbert with the specific pages of the record. No such list was
provided for the second review. The affidavit of Heather Squires also provides
a redacted document entitled “Rationale Document for CSIS Exemptions Used by
National Archives”. The unredacted version was submitted on an ex parte
hearing, and following this hearing, the Court advised the Respondent to
consider whether more portions of this document could be disclosed. This was
done by the Respondent, and it now falls within the public domain. This
document details the rationales behind CSIS’ interpretation of section 15, as
well as other exemptions of the Act.
[120] Also,
during the course of the closed hearing, counsel for the Respondent made
representations as to how injury could result from disclosure. This was also
dealt with to a certain extent in the public context.
[121] Information
was submitted ex parte to classify documents under different headings to
indicate which type of information was protected. This methodology was not
followed for the second review, and so, the Court can only rely on the general
argumentation submitted.
[122] Such
is the Respondent’s evidence. In all candour, the Court can state that the
enterprise of reviewing the documentation consisted mainly of deductions and
reading into the Respondent’s general submissions and evidence. Courts have
consistently recognized the requirements of “specific and detailed” evidence as
the Respondent’s burden in an ATI case. The large volume of documents, spanning
over forty years of RCMP activities, probably did not lend itself to the
time-consuming enterprise of specifically and precisely detailing the alleged
injury, but surely it is not for the Court to endeavour such an enterprise
without more evidence from the Respondent. Considering the important interests
at play when dealing with national security information, it was clear that the
application could not be granted on the sole basis of the Respondent’s
incapacity to meet evidentiary requirements. However, it should be said that
the Court’s resources were considerably taxed during the course of the review
of the documentation, as the evidence did not deal specifically with the
documentation. Surely, the onus should not be on the Court to infer probable
injury from over 1000 pages of documentation. More should be done on the
Respondent’s part to provide more specific information, especially as a result
of the second review of the documentation.
B. Were the
documents properly considered as section 15 exempted documents?
(1) General
Considerations
[123] As
stated above, the present application deals with section 15 of the Act. In keeping
with the two-step analysis, the first step consists in identifying whether the
documents fall under the claimed exemption or not. Under section 15, disclosure
of the documents must be found to be “reasonably expected to be injurious to
the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada or any state allied
or associated with Canada or the detection, prevention or suppression of
subversive or hostile activities”. As the grounds for injury are indicated
generally, section 15 goes on to describe elements of what could constitute
such injurious disclosure of information.
[124] The
Federal Court of Appeal has recently stated that the burden of proof under an
application under the Act depends on the circumstance of the case (Attaran v
Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), above, at paras 20-27). Ultimately,
the Federal Court of Appeal decided that within the context of the application
brought under section 15, where ex parte hearings were held, and where
the applicant had no precise knowledge, that “the appellant cannot be required
in this case to bear the burden of establishing on a confidential record he
cannot access that the respondent failed to give consideration to the exercise
of discretion. The burden of proof is on the respondent to establish that the
discretion was exercised in a reasonable manner” (Attaran v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), above, at para 27). A similar context arises in
the present application, due to the nature of the file, its volume and the
particular position in which the Applicant is placed. Hence, it is for the
Respondent to show that the discretion was reasonably exercised. The Respondent
also bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the exemptions
claimed.
[125] The
standard of proof to be met by the Respondent, as the party resisting
disclosure, requires that a “reasonable expectation of probable harm” is to be
shown (Canada Packers v Canada (Minister of Agriculture),
above; Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister),
above). This burden of proof has been interpreted as a “heavy onus” (Canada
(Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister), above, at para 113;
see also Sherman v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2004 FC 1423; Rubin
v Canada (Mortgage and Housing Corp.), [1989] 1 FC 265 (FCA)).
[126] Justice
Rothstein, as he then was, articulated the standards which heads of government
institutions refusing disclosure must meet in the seminal Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister) case cited above. Noting
that the Court can only act upon the evidence before it, Justice Rothstein
stated that the party seeking to maintain confidentiality must demonstrate its
case “clearly and directly” and that a “general approach to justifying
confidentiality is not envisaged” (Canada (Information Commissioner) v
Canada (Prime Minister), above, at para 119). It has also been stated that
a clear and direct linkage is required between the evidence adduced and the
alleged injury, the latter which must also not be speculative (see, inter alia,
Do-Ky (FCTD), at paras 32-34).
[127]
The
Court can do no better than to cite Justice Rothstein again in the case of Canada
(Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister), above, at para 122,
when it was stated in all clarity that:
Descriptions of possible harm, even in substantial
detail, are insufficient in themselves. At the least, there must be a clear and
direct linkage between the disclosure of specific information and the harm
alleged. (…) The more specific and substantiated the evidence, the stronger the
case for confidentiality. The more general the evidence, the more difficult it
would be for a court to be satisfied as to the linkage between disclosure of
particular documents and the harm alleged.
[128] While
the Court must rely in this case on the evidence before it by the party seeking
to bar disclosure, it is clear that the evidence presented and the expertise
underlying it must be “balanced against the primary purpose of the Act, namely,
the provision of a public right of access to government records” (Telezone,
above, at para 36).
[129] The
injury-based determination that must be undertaken by the Court is indeed one
that balances the Act’s aims and objectives, more precisely, that the Act’s
exceptions be interpreted restrictively. Again, Justice Rothstein provided
ample guidance in the Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister) case on what factors can guide the Court’s analysis in analyzing whether
there are reasonable expectations grounds for probable harm. Cited as a
non-exhaustive list, these are noted as follows:
1. The exceptions to access require a reasonable
expectation of probable harm.
2. The considered opinion of the Information
Commissioner should not be ignored.
3. Use of the information is to be assumed in
assessing whether its disclosure would give rise to a reasonable expectation of
probable harm.
4. It is relevant to consider if the information
sought to be kept confidential is available from sources otherwise available by
the public or whether it could be obtained by observation or independent study
by a member of the public acting on his or her own.
5. Press coverage of a confidential record is
relevant to the issue of expectation of probable harm from its disclosure.
6. Evidence of the period of time between the date
of the confidential record and its disclosure is relevant.
7. Evidence that relates to consequences that could
ensue from disclosure that describe the consequences in a general way falls
short of meeting the burden of entitlement to an exemption from disclosure.
8. Each distinct record must be considered on its
own and in the context of all the documents requested for release, as the total
contents of the release are bound to have considerable bearing on the
reasonable consequences of its disclosure.
9. Section 25 of the Act provides for the severance
of material in a record that can be disclosed from that which is protected from
disclosure under an exemption provision. The severance must be reasonable. To
disclose a few lines out of context would be worthless.
10. Exemptions from disclosure should be justified
by affidavit evidence explaining clearly the rationale exempting each record.
(Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister), above, at para 34) [Citations omitted]
[130] It should
also be noted that as the fact that a document is not directly linked to an ATI
request does not necessarily constitute grounds for refusal of disclosure, it
is not for the decision-maker to exclude what he or she determines as not
relevant to the access request, so long as these documents constitute the
record sought (X v Canada, [1992] 1 CF 77, at para 44 (FCTD) (Denault
J.)).
[131] In
addition, the Act’s exemptions are not to be validated by the Court when used
to prevent embarrassments or to hide illegal acts (Carey v Ontario,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 637; Canada (Attorney General) v Canada (Commission of Inquiry
into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar), 2007 FC
766; see also subsection 47(2) of the Act).
[132] The
Court must also assess whether the severance of the records sought, if any, was
reasonably done (s 25 of the Act). Under the broad powers conferred by the
Court under section 50, it is conceivable that the Court may undertake this
exercise in severability in ordering that the documents be disclosed in part.
However, the records themselves in the case at bar span over 1,000 pages, and
surely the Court’s expertise does not span to assessing the exact severance to
be undertaken and all the interests at play. An exercise in severance of the
records will not be undertaken by the Court in the context of the present
application.
[133] The
assessment of the reasonable expectation of probable harm is one that must be
consistent. It would be highly illogical, and run counter to the Act, if the
head of a government institution would apply inconsistent standards between
different documents, more so if the inconsistencies would be in the very same
ATI request. Where the decision-maker must make a determination of the injury
caused by disclosure, inconsistent redactions and assessments of the injury
resulting from disclosure may constitute grounds for additional disclosure
ordered by the Court.
[134] This
aspect of the case is not the same as in Canada (Minister of Justice)
v Blank, 2007 FCA 147, where the consistency of the severance undertaken
was dealt with in respect to a class-based exemption, solicitor-client
privilege under section 23 of the Act. The Federal Court of Appeal in Blank,
2007 FCA 147, relied upon Babcock v Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC
57 to support its findings. In Babcock, the Supreme Court ruled that the
doctrine of the Crown’s waiver of privilege could not apply under section 39 of
the Canada Evidence Act. However, section 39 deals with a class-based
exemption, that of Cabinet confidence. Hence, in this case, it is the
assessment of injury caused by disclosure that is relevant. Whether
confidentiality was waived or not is not relevant as it is in cases where
sections 20 or 23 of the Act are applied. Rather, when injury was deemed absent
or not sufficient as to allow the disclosure of documents, the Court must also
consider whether this evaluation is consistent throughout the litigated
documentation.
[135] In
the case at bar, it was made abundantly clear by the Court to counsel for the
Respondent in the ex parte, in camera hearing that the severance
and disclosure made was inconsistent throughout the documentation. Counsel for
the Respondent acknowledged as much, and recognized it to be one of the grounds
for which the second review was undertaken. However, upon review of the second
release of information, the Court finds that the documentation is still
inconsistently redacted, as will be detailed below.
[136] For
the purpose of clarity, and before the second review of the documentation will
be further discussed, it is appropriate for the Court to state that the
information that was first withheld from the Applicant was clearly done in a
manner than runs counter to the Act’s principles, as well as the mandate of
LAC. Furthermore, it can be said that LAC failed to exercise its residual
discretion, once the documents had been seen to be covered by the section 15
exemption. The finding that the release of several documents would imply
“reasonable expectation of probable harm” was flawed for a considerable portion
of the documentation, as the subsequent disclosure resulting from this
proceeding has shown. There was simply no exercise of the residual discretion
for release, which is necessary for the realization of the Act’s purpose, as
well as LAC’s mandate to preserve and diffuse Canada’s history.
[137] That
said, this Court has to analyze the records as they now stand. The Court will
analyze the categories of documents still withheld, as it follows counsel for
the Respondent’s argumentation and the logic applied by the Respondent in
refusing disclosure. When applicable, the Court will add other categories of
information still withheld. The Court reiterates that this is the first stage
of the application: the assessment of reasonable expectation of probable harm
under section 15 of the Act.
[138] Again,
the Court emphasizes that what is at issue does not constitute the full record
currently held by the government on T.C. Douglas. Only the portion which was
deemed “responsive” by LAC is dealt with, as the ATI request was addressed to
LAC.
[139] Furthermore,
rather than deal with documents themselves within these reasons, an Annex is
provided where a chart identifies improperly withheld documents, and highlights
reasons why this is the case. The Annex also details how the chart is to be
read and considered by the decision-maker.
(2) Current
Operational Interest
[140] Counsel
for the Respondent indicated the following during the course of the public
hearing of February 23rd, 2011: “Records that could identify
subjects of investigation that are still of concern to the service were not
released” (Transcript of the Public Hearing of February 23rd, 2011,
p 135). However, it should be said that the evidence provided did not indicate
all the likely current operational interests found in the file. The Court
undertook limited independent research to verify some elements, as a cautious
approach is necessary in national security matters. More should be done on the
Respondent’s part so that the Court is not placed in such a position.
[141] This
kind of information is reasonably withheld from disclosure. The injury-test set
out in section 15 is clearly met in regards to this information and LAC’s
decision in this respect is reasonable, unless redactions can be made or
discretion properly exercised so that some historical information is released. The
Annex highlights documents where this could be done.
(3) Human
Sources
[142]
The
disclosure of information pertaining to human sources is directly anticipated
as an exemption within the Act, at paragraph 15(1)(f).
[143] The rationale document provided
by CSIS to LAC states that “the most important tool of any security agency is a
human source”. The Respondent’s position is such that the protection of human
sources of CSIS and its predecessor must be absolute and that “there is no
basis in law or in fact to support a temporal limitation on that privilege once
it is recognized by the Court” (Transcript of the Public Hearing of February
23, 2011, p 129). The anonymity of human sources, past and present, is said to
be paramount to the current work of sources, as well as for the recruitment of
future sources.
[144] This very Court has recognized
the human source privilege in Harkat (Re), 2009 FC 204. The question of
whether CSIS informers benefit from a class-based privilege once the conditions
for finding a common-law privilege are met has been certified for consideration
by the Federal Court of Appeal. Evidently, the considerations in the Harkat
case were different than the present, but the applicable principles should
remain the same. The general approach in Harkat (Re) was followed in a
case arising from section 38.04 of the Canada Evidence Act heard by my
colleague Justice Mosley in Canada (Attorney General) v Almalki, 2010 FC
1106 (varied by 2011 FCA 199). Justice Mosley nuanced the approach and
indicated that there were some limitations as to whether the privilege applies
to only some informants for who confidentiality was assured. Evidently, further
appellate guidance on this matter will prove to be timely and useful.
[145]
Human sources
in intelligence matters should benefit from similar protection as police
informers benefit under the current state of the law.
[146] The privilege of anonymity has
been recognized to police informers by the Supreme Court, save for the “innocent-at-stake”
exception (see generally, Bisaillon v Keable, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60; R v
Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281; Named Person v Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 43).
[147] The privilege of journalistic
sources is less categorical, and applies within the evidentiary framework
suggested by Wigmore on Evidence, as applied by the Supreme Court in R
v National Post, 2010 SCC 16 and Globe and Mail v Canada (Attorney
General), 2010 SCC 41. The four factors, cited as a “general framework”,
for a Court to consider when addressing if the identity of a journalist source
should be revealed are:
(1) the relationship must originate in a confidence
that the source’s identity will not be disclosed;
(2) anonymity must be essential to the relationship
in which the communication arises;
(3) the relationship must be one that should be
sedulously fostered in the public interest; and
(4) the public interest served by protecting the
identity of the informant must outweigh the public interest in getting at the
truth.
(R v National Post, 2010 SCC 16, at para 53)
[148] It
should also be noted that the Wigmore framework had also been applied by
this Court in Charkaoui (Re), 2008 FC 61.
[149]
The records
that are the object of the application were collected by the RCMP’s
Intelligence Service Division. The RCMP is defined as a “police force” by
section 3 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC 1985, c R-10. It
could be argued that human sources under the RCMP’s Intelligence Division were
police-informers. Evidently, this argument would be in direct line with the
controversies leading up to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain
Activities of the RCMP, known as the MacDonald Commission. In sum, the
convoluted nature of the RCMP’s activities between police work and intelligence
before the creation of CSIS in 1984 is such that former RCMP informers in
intelligence matters cannot be readily qualified as police-informants.
[150] The
Court is of a mind that the identity of human sources must be protected and
that it is well established that they are the essential to CSIS’ operations. A
form of triad should be expressly recognized with the three main informer-type
privileges: police, intelligence, and to some extent journalistic sources.
Again, the Court indicates that the power to provide summaries in other national
security matters has proven to be a way to provide information while protecting
the identity of sources. The power to reasonably sever records under section 25
can also be relevant to the protection of human sources.
[151] Having
said that, the Court notes that the public records as they now stand release
considerable information pertaining to sources within RCMP investigations on
T.C. Douglas. Evidently, for many documents, no source is readily identifiable
within the records. Sometimes, the Respondent has released that “a reliable
source” or “a source” has provided information. However, this has not been
consistently done by the Respondent in the record as it was after the second
round of disclosure. Again, consistency in the withholding of documents and
information is a clear concern of the Court.
[152] Proper
perspective must be given to the protection of human sources within an ATI
request. While the protection of sources is directly contemplated by paragraph
15(1)(f) of the Act, the exemption is not a class-based exemption.
Information should not be withheld because it emanates from a human source. The
head of the government institution, in this case LAC, in consultation with
CSIS, must assess whether there is reasonable expectation of probable harm in disclosing
the information. In the present records, LAC did release information pertaining
to human sources, but did not do so in a consistent manner. In any event, no
personal identifiers of human sources have been disclosed, such as there is no
reasonable expectation of probable harm. A human source reasonably expects that
the information provided will be used. It can be said that the “use” of this
information also includes ATI requests pertaining to past investigations, so
long as the source is not identifiable and that there is no reasonable
expectation of probable harm in disclosure. Clearly, a class-based approach in
regards to human sources had been followed in the original disclosure of
documents, and to some extent, in the second review as well.
[153] In regards
to the second review of the Douglas dossier, the Annex provided with these
reasons highlight documents where reasonable severance of the records can be
done, so as to disclose the information within them, while protecting the
identity of human sources.
[154] As
seen from the “Library and Archives (LAC) Consultations” document, a blanket
policy was followed in regards to monitored meetings, which adopted an approach
whereby the number of people present in a meeting and its date were a key
factor to consider. However, it seems this very policy was not consistently
followed for the second review of the documentation and as such, it cannot be
seen as indicative of prejudice of disclosure of information in regards to
human sources.
[155] Counsel
for the Respondent hinted at internal policies within CSIS that the protection
of confidential sources was not timeless, despite what was argued in the
pleadings and factums: “There is a timeframe with confidential sources” (p 198
of the Transcript of the Public Hearing of February 23, 2011). Perhaps this
policy should be made public in order to clarify the underlying rationales to
exemptions within the Act, and a public debate could ensue on the duration of
the protection of human sources, something other democracies and our allies
have long made public.
(4) Technical
Sources
[156] LAC’s
first response to the applicant’s ATI request was such that a class-based
approach was adopted in regards to technical sources: CSIS and LAC reasoned
that all identifiers of technical sources, in current use or not, were to be
protected. Thus, the injury resulting from disclosure was presumed to be
applicable to all the documents where technical sources were the source of the
reporting.
[157] During
the course of the proceeding, and through the second review of the
documentation, technical sources used for the constitution of the Douglas dossier were alluded to. The approach recommended by CSIS to LAC was to release
“most of the records obtained through technical sources, intercepts and
surveillance where the subject of interest was transitory in nature”. This
approach implies that it not so much the technical sources in and of themselves
that are relevant to injury, but whether they relate to past interests or not.
[158] As
the decision-maker’s approach indicates, the protection of technical sources is
not absolute, as it is the information obtained through technical sources that
is relevant under the Act. Again, the issuance of summaries could be beneficial
to reveal information relevant under the ATI request, while protecting current
technical sources. The Annex will not deal with information emanating from
technical sources, as the Respondent’s approach is reasonable in this respect.
(5) Targets
of “transitory nature”
[159] The
first response to the ATI request was grossly erroneous in respect to past
targets of the RCMP’s Intelligence Branch. There was no reasonable expectation
of probable harm in disclosing most targets of a “transitory nature”. This was
made clear during the ex parte, in camera hearing. In support of
this contention, it was emphasized that several of these targets were already
publicly known. For example, it had been confirmed through the work of the
MacDonald Commission that the New Democratic Party’s (NDP) Waffle Group, the
Communist Party of Canada and similar groups were of interest to the RCMP. The
use of the MacDonald Commission reports is highly informative in the present
matter. It is this Commission which gave rise to the creation of CSIS and
inspired its mandate and its separation from the RCMP (see, for example, Royal Commission of Inquiry into
Certain Activities of the RCMP,
vol. 1, p 422, for discussions on the role of a civilian security intelligence
agency). The work of the MacDonald Commission was referred to ex parte,
as well as during the public hearing.
[160] In
fact, the MacDonald Commission clarified the legitimate activities that an
intelligence service may enterprise with groups that represent arguably
“extreme” views, yet participate in the democratic process. The Commission clearly
articulated the nuance between expressing views in a democratic process that
may be considered extreme and what constitutes subversive activities. The
Commission stated in all clarity the following:
The importance to democracy of drawing the line correctly
between legitimate dissent and subversion calls for sophisticated judgment and
political understanding on the part of those who carry out security operations.
(Royal Commission
of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, vol. 1, p.409)
Strong dissent from the status quo is not a
category of activity about which security intelligence should be collected; nor
is the planning and carrying out of political demonstrations and processions,
which, although may involve violations of local by-laws and confrontations with
law enforcement officials, are not aimed at destroying fundamental elements of
Canadian democracy. (Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, vol. 1, p.417)
All should be free to participate in discussions
over the future of Canada and none should be the target of investigation by the
security intelligence agency so long as they adhere to legal and democratic
means of pursuing their aspirations. (Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, vol. 1, p.466)
[161] Clearly,
limits were placed on the RCMP’s monitoring of political parties in Canada. And as the Commission spurred the creation of CSIS, these limits can be said to be
of considerable interest to CSIS as well. As such, no injury can be found in
disclosing past activities that had already been made public and critiqued
severely.
[162] Considerable
portions of the MacDonald Commission’s report are relevant to the period at
issue within the documentation. More precisely, and by way of example, the Commission
clearly took issue with the wide scope of the investigation of the Waffle
Group, a faction of the NDP in its early days as a political party:
A non-violent political group’s “extreme left
posture” should provide no rationale whatsoever for a security intelligence
agency to use intrusive intelligence-gathering techniques to collect
information about the group’s activities and intentions. Moreover, it is even
more objectionable when such a rationale is used to justify the collection of
information about an element of a legitimate political party which is in
opposition to the party in power. (Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, vol. 1, p.482)
[163] An
entire section of the Commission’s report deals with the monitoring of elected members
of Parliament and election candidates. Indeed, this review of the RCMP’s
activities provides an informative analysis of the categories of information
collected and whether the information was necessary (Royal Commission of
Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, vol.1, p 468, “(b) Members
of Parliament, election candidates and surveillance of the Waffle”). One of
the Commission’s conclusions in respect to certain aspects of monitoring
political activities reads as follows:
Indeed the cases show that members of the Security
Service have not understood the difference between legitimate political
dissent, which is essential to our democratic system, and such political
advocacy or action as would constitute a threat to the security of Canada. (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, vol.1,
p.474)
[164] This
quote should not be taken wholly out of context, as the Commission’s analysis
is more nuanced in regards to the monitoring of political activities. However,
it can be said that relevant guidance to the RCMP’s activities has been
provided by the MacDonald Commission. The Douglas dossier is illustrative of
many of the conclusions drawn in respect to the overzealousness of the RCMP’s
Intelligence Division. Thus, the disclosure of targets of a transitory nature,
especially when they relate to political parties and advocacy groups, has
already been done in several instances. The reasons and rationale underlying
the monitoring of these activities, and their inherent difficulties, have been
discussed in public fora. Basically, a Royal Commission denounced some
of the RCMP’s activities. Today, under the Act, access to the first-hand source
of information about the scope and purpose of these activities is refused. This
is unacceptable.
[165] The
crux of the MacDonald Commission’s work in regards to the RCMP’s monitoring of
political activities is articulated around the drawn-out definition of
“subversive activity”, as it was then defined by the RCMP. Commenting on the
far-reaching nature of the definition, the Commission stated that:
We find such a wide definition of subversion
dangerous and unacceptable because it does not clearly distinguish radical
dissent from genuine threats to Canada’s security. (Royal Commission of
Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, vol.1, p.480)
[166] It is
also quite interesting to note that the MacDonald Commission reviewed the Douglas dossier in the course of its mandate, as evidenced by p1030 of the documentation.
[167] It
should be noted that section 15 of the Act contemplates whether the disclosure
of information could hamper the monitoring of “hostile or subversive
activities”. As stated, the evidence on the record does not establish which
aspect of section 15 is contemplated by LAC and CSIS in refusing disclosure.
However, the MacDonald Commission expressed concerns over the broad definition
of subversion. In the context of the present application, the Court can safely
state that it shares similar concerns in regards to the use of an overbroad
definition of “prevention and detection of subversive or hostile activities” in
the context of section 15 of the Act.
[168] Thus,
there is no reasonable ground for injury preventing the release of these
documents. History and Canadian democracy require that historical facts, like
the monitoring of legitimate political activities, be known. Refusing
disclosure under the Act of these historical events is unacceptable in most
circumstances, more so when this is already made public through a Royal
Commission initiated for the very purpose of investigating these activities.
[169] Furthermore,
the historical context in which the RCMP constituted the Douglas dossier is
different from today’s. The litigated files span from the end of the 1930s to
the 1980s, a tumultuous historical period to say the least. The fears of
socialism leading up to the Second World War, and the Cold War context that
followed it do not constitute the threats with which Canada is confronted
today. Surely, extremism, whatever the dogma it is attached to, is of worry when
violent means are advocated. But there is no “reasonable cause for probable
harm” when the perceived threats of the time have eroded and the “transitory
targets” are made public. Furthermore, the Court finds that the disclosure of
these targets is in fact positive: Canadians learn from this disclosure and it
informs the historical context in which our country’s intelligence community
operated in and in which decisions were taken.
[170] Thus,
the approach followed in terms of targets of a “transitory nature” during the
course of the second review is reasonable in most respect. Again, the Court
laments the conduct of the first review of the documentation, especially in
regards to targets already made public. The Court also stresses the fact that
the approach followed must be consistent. As such, the Annex appended to these
reasons shall highlight documents pertaining to “targets of a transitory
nature” that should be disclosed.
[171] Also,
more is expected of the Respondent in defining what constitutes “targets of a transitory
nature”. As noted, this approach was only brought forth in the days prior to
the public hearing of February 23, 2011, and was not clearly defined for the
Court. From the documentation, it also appears as an approach which was
inconsistently followed.
(6) Identity
of RCMP Officers
[172] After
the second review of the documentation, the exemption claimed by LAC over the
records is that of section 15(1), not section 19(1). In fact, under section
19(1), the identity of RCMP officers would be disclosed, as the fact that
people were employed by the RCMP does not constitute “personal information”
under the Act, as per the definition provided in section 2 of the Privacy Act:
But, for the purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and
section 19 of the Access to Information Act, does not include
(j) information about an individual who is or was an
officer or employee of a government institution that relates to the position or
functions of the individual including,
(i) the fact that the individual is or was an
officer or employee of the government institution,
(ii) the title, business address and telephone
number of the individual,
(iii) the classification, salary range and
responsibilities of the position held by the individual,
(iv) the name of the individual on a document prepared
by the individual in the course of employment, and
(v) the personal opinions or views of the individual
given in the course of employment
(emphasis added)
[173] The
same could not be said if the documents dealt with the information dealt with
covert CSIS operatives, due to the applicability of section 18 of the CSIS
Act:
Offence
to disclose identity
18. (1) Subject to
subsection (2), no person shall disclose any information that the person
obtained or to which the person had access in the course of the performance
by that person of duties and functions under this Act or the participation by
that person in the administration or enforcement of this Act and from which
the identity of
(a)
any other person who is or was a confidential source of information or
assistance to the Service, or
(b)
any person who is or was an employee engaged in covert operational activities
of the Service
can
be inferred.
Exceptions
(2)
A person may disclose information referred to in subsection (1) for the
purposes of the performance of duties and functions under this Act or any
other Act of Parliament or the administration or enforcement of this Act or
as required by any other law or in the circumstances described in any of
paragraphs 19(2)(a) to (d).
Offence
(3)
Every one who contravenes subsection (1)
(a)
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years; or
(b)
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
1984,
c. 21, s. 18.
|
Infraction
18. (1) Sous réserve du
paragraphe (2), nul ne peut communiquer des informations qu’il a acquises ou
auxquelles il avait accès dans l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont
conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou lors de sa participation à
l’exécution ou au contrôle d’application de cette loi et qui permettraient de
découvrir l’identité :
a) d’une autre personne
qui fournit ou a fourni au Service des informations ou une aide à titre
confidentiel;
b) d’une personne qui
est ou était un employé occupé à des activités opérationnelles cachées du
Service.
Exceptions
(2)
La communication visée au paragraphe (1) peut se faire dans l’exercice de
fonctions conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi
fédérale ou pour l’exécution ou le contrôle d’application de la présente loi,
si une autre règle de droit l’exige ou dans les circonstances visées aux
alinéas 19(2)a) à d).
Infraction
(3)
Quiconque contrevient au paragraphe (1) est coupable :
a) soit d’un acte
criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;
b) soit d’une infraction
punissable par procédure sommaire.
1984,
ch. 21, art. 18.
|
[174] As
for the identity of RCMP agents, LAC relied upon an umbrella rationale whereby
the assessment made was one that involved the date of the report and the rank
of the officer, so as to ensure that disclosure of reports from officers that
could still be alive would not be released. This approach fetters the
injury-assessment required by section 15. In fact, the redactions made in
regards to the names of RCMP officers are completely inconsistent in regards to
a section 15(1) injury assessment.
[175] It
could also be said that the burden of proof for showing injury from disclosure
is higher when other sections of the Act or the Privacy Act require that
such information be disclosed. This is so because a consistent interpretation
of the Act is that reliance on one exemption bars the government from relying
on another during the application before this Court (see, inter alia, Saint
John Shipbuilding Ltd. v Canada (Minister of Supply and Services), (1990)
67 DLR (4th) 315, at para 9 (FCA), citing approvingly Saint John
Shipbuilding Ltd. (FCTD), above).
[176] Furthermore,
it should be noted that the names of RCMP Officers do not fall under the scope
of section 18 of the CSIS Act, whereby it is not permitted to disclose
the name of CSIS employees engaged in covert operations, as the officers were
not employees of CSIS.
[177] The
names of all the RCMP officers must be disclosed save for those involved in
covert operations as infiltrators or sources. This is entirely consistent with
the findings of the Supreme Court in Canada (Information
Commissioner) v Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police),
2003 SCC 8.
(7) “Incidental
Reporting”
[178] The
Respondent’s approach, even within the second review of the documentation, was
that documents where T.C. Douglas was only mentioned in passing were not
disclosed. The reason behind this is that it would be “unfair” to Mr. Douglas
should the information be taken out of context, and for this reason, entire
documents were withheld.
[179] This
rationale is also entirely inconsistent with the Act. Firstly, it can be said
that the assessment of T.C. Douglas’ person, affiliations and career is one for
History and Canadians to judge. Surely, LAC and CSIS cannot choose to pre-empt
this judgment and substituting it with one of their own. Citizens and
professionals will study the records, discuss them and ultimately, conflicting
opinions may arise. But this whole exercise is positive in and of itself and
should not be precluded by LAC. In fact, LAC’s mandate not only enables it, but
makes it responsible, for the diffusion of such historical documents. As
discussed above, sole custodianship by LAC of government records is simply not
enough: more should be done to facilitate access and be more responsive
to the legislative mandate conferred by the Library and Archives of Canada
Act.
[180] Refusing
disclosure of these documents is based on the premise that it does not relate
to T.C. Douglas per se, and thus does not constitute the basis of the
ATI request. As such, the mentions of Douglas’ person are said to be
“incidental reporting”.
[181] Justice
Denault has stated clearly in X v Canada, [1992] 1 CF 77, at para 44,
that “the fact that information is not directly related to an access request is
not a basis for exemption under the Act”. As such, separating portions of a
dossier under the premise that they are not related is an error in law. LAC,
and all government institutions, must consider the documents sought under the
Act as they are. They must not attempt to portion them off into categories
based on relevance. Institutions are mandated under the Act to evaluate both
whether an exemption exists, and if it is class-based or injury-based
exemption. They must then consider their discretion to release the documents,
despite the exemption. Nowhere in this analysis is “relevance” a factor.
[182] The
Respondent has argued that the purpose of the Act is “not met or advanced by
providing access to isolated words or phrases that have no meaning in isolation
or that do not provide “information” to the requestor” (citing Murchison v
Export Development Canada, 2009 FC 77, at paras 63-64). The Murchison
case indeed arose in the context of the Privacy Act, but it remains
informative.
[183] However,
the Murchison case is very different from the present, not because it
arises in the context of the Privacy Act, but because the information
withheld in that context did not relate at all to the request for information
that was made. Mr. Murchison sought information as to why he was refused
employment with Export Development Canada, and not all the information in or
around the relevant portions of the government records addressed this request.
In this case, the whole RCMP intelligence file on T.C. Douglas was sought.
Provided that human source concerns and targeting issues are reasonably
protected, the file is to be released as is, and not portioned off into
what is deemed relevant (see also paras 153 and 158 of the present reasons).
[184] It is
also paramount to realize that the constitution of an intelligence file is in
and of itself informative for intelligence purposes. What constitutes a file is
indicative of many important considerations, such as a subject’s influence,
associations or network. If the Act was construed to accept relevance as a
factor to withhold information, meaningful access to files such as T.C.
Douglas’ would be unduly portioned off. The nature and content of a file
provides valuable information, and secluding documents which would only “directly”
relate to the ATI request would hinder this process.
[185] Accepting
relevance as a consideration could also contribute to a situation where the
number of access requests would dramatically rise. For example, if T.C. Douglas
was mentioned in passing at a Communist Party of Canada meeting, and this is
frequently the case in the records, it would be illogical for LAC to block
access to the records on the basis that the ATI request did not ask for
anything pertaining to the Communist Party of Canada. In that case, an
applicant would be frustrated in his or her requests for information and would
have to multiply access requests in order to get the full picture. This cannot
be the intent and purpose of the Act.
[186] Even
if relevance was accepted, and again, the Court is strongly opposed to it, it
can be said that all records pertaining to T.C. Douglas in government’s
possession are relevant. Mentioning Douglas’ person, even in passing, is
relevant to History. It shows who were interested in seeking his counsel, his help
and critiqued his actions. In sum, “incidental reporting” constitutes relevant
information on a person and his or her place in History.
[187] Under
the applicable standard of review, there are no reasonable grounds for probable
injury in this disclosure. The reasoning applicable to “transitory targets”
wholly applies in this case as well, and thus, no injury can be found in
disclosing the RCMP’s interest and monitoring of targets, subject to the
conclusion of this Court on human sources and the like.
[188] As section
19 of the Act is not relied upon, there is also no reasonable expectation of
probable harm under section 15 resulting from the disclosure of opinions about
T.C. Douglas emitted “incidentally” in records found in the Douglas dossier.
The Respondent has clearly stated that it is not relying upon section 19 of the
Act, and bears the consequence of this decision. It is also surprising, if not
worrisome, that the Information Commissioner found that LAC’s initial
withholding of information could solely be justified under section 15 of the
Act. Clearly, the scope of section 15 of the Act was exceeded in both reviews
of the documentation, as well as in the Information Commissioner’s review of
the documents.
[189] Thus,
for documents were incidental reporting was the premise of the refusal of
disclosure, the Court orders that these documents be made public. The Annex
provided will identify examples where incidental reporting is a flawed premise
for the withholding of information.
(8) RCMP’s
Assessment of T.C. Douglas
[190] Perhaps
the documents pertaining to the RCMP’s assessments of T.C. Douglas form the
most valuable portions of the Douglas dossier. However, this is not relevant to
the assessment of injury resulting from disclosure under section 15. Again,
what is important and what the Court must be satisfied of is that there are
“reasonable grounds for probable injury” if the information is disclosed.
[191] The
opinions of RCMP officers in regards to T.C. Douglas constitute “opinions made
during the course of employment”. These are stated by subparagraph 3(j)(v)
of the Privacy Act as not being “personal information”, which in
turn, exempts it from the ambit of section 19 of the Act.
[192] In the case of “investigator’s
comments” or any like documents found within the records, the Court orders that
the documents be made public. There are no “reasonable grounds for injury”
under section 15 resulting from disclosure. There may be cases for exceptional
redactions to be made, considering some of the interests described in these reasons.
[193] By
way of example, during the course of the application and after the second
review, a news article was referred to during the public hearing whereby a
retired RCMP Officer was contacted for his comments in regards to T.C. Douglas.
Surely, this cannot be the injury that LAC and CSIS refer to in regards to the
opinions of RCMP officers. Again, subject to the findings in regards to human
sources and technical intercepts, the documents pertaining to the RCMP’s
assessment of T.C. Douglas are to be disclosed. Examples of these documents are
highlighted in the chart found in the Annex to these reasons.
C. Was the exercise
of discretion reasonable in the circumstance?
[194] As
discussed above, it is for the Respondent to prove that not only was there an
exercise of discretion, but that it was reasonably done. As was the case in Attaran
v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) before the Federal Court of Appeal,
“the question is whether the Court can infer from the subsequent release or
non-release of information that the decision-maker considered [its] discretion
to release information, notwithstanding that the information otherwise fell
within subsection 15(1) of the Act” (para 31).
[195] As was seen by the history of the
proceedings, concerns were raised during the ex parte hearing in regards
to the proper exercise of discretion and whether the required analysis under
section 15 was meaningfully addressed by LAC. Pertaining to the first review of
the documentation, these concerns were serious and there was nothing to suggest
that discretion was considered in any respect. For example, some facts lead to
the conclusion that LAC forwent the section 15 analysis due to deference to
CSIS during the consultations. Further, the short amount of time taken by the
LAC analyst (less than a week) is indicative that no reasonable assessment of
discretion was made.
[196] In addition, the evidence on the
record, both public and confidential, does not establish that the Office of the
Information Commissioner duly acquitted itself of its duties, namely in regards
to discretion. Justice Kelen considered the record found in the Attaran v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 2009 FC 339 (varied on other grounds in 2011 FCA
182) and commented it as follows:
The confidential information on the record shows
that the Information Commissioner performed a thorough investigation, asked a
number of probing questions, and secured a number of further disclosures from
the respondent. At that point, the Information Commissioner was satisfied that
the documents disclosed with redactions, which are now before the Court, were
in compliance with the ATIA.
[197] No
such inquiry is supported by the evidentiary record. Even more, and as stated
above, the Office of the Information Commissioner did not even undertake the analysis
of section 19 of the Act, deeming that all the records were properly withheld
during the course of the first review of the documentation. In keeping with the
principle of independent review in the Act, it is clear that the Commissioner
has a determinative role to play. The Commissioner must not be dazzled by the
claims made based on national security as a thorough and independent review
must be undertaken with a critical mind, in keeping with the legislative
objectives at play.
[198] As
for the second review of the documentation undertaken as a result of the ex
parte hearing, it is paramount to address the reasons submitted by counsel
for the Respondent indicating why his client undertook a second review of the
documentation. As described above, the reasons for the second review were: more
than five years had passed between the original request and the hearing of the
application; the Respondent had acknowledged to the Court that there were
inconsistencies in the withholding of information; and a number of comments
during the in camera hearings were such that it “made it appropriate to
conduct a further review”. It does not appear that CSIS underwent an analysis
as to whether there was additional discretion to disclose the documents,
despite the applicability of the exemption during the course of the first
review of the documentation (Cross-Examination of Nicole Jalbert, March 2,
2010, p 57).
[199] In
supplementary submissions, it was stated by the Respondent that “the release of
less redacted records was the result of the exercise of discretion by the
respondent”. No further rationale as to what factors were considered in the
alleged exercise of discretion was alluded to. No specific and detailed
evidence was given in regards to this exercise of discretion, other than this
general statement. The Court thus prefers the initial statement explaining the
reasons for the second review, rather than the general statement that
“discretion was exercised”. Basically, the second review of documentation was
the result of much more than the exercise of discretion, and as such, there is
no indicium of discretion being considered, despite the generic statement to
the contrary. The circumstance of the case and its evolution before this Court
is such that the exercise of discretion cannot be inferred. The documents
considered in the Annex where “historical significance” is indicated are
examples of where disclosure could be made if discretion was reasonably
exercised.
[200] The
Federal Court of Appeal recently offered guidance as to the evidentiary
requirements to demonstrate the exercise of discretion. In Attaran v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), at para 36, it was stated that:
Conversely, just as the absence of express evidence
about the exercise of discretion is not determinative, the existence of a
statement in a record that a discretion was exercised will not necessarily be
determinative. To find such a statement to be conclusive of the inquiry would
be to elevate form over substance, and encourage the recital of boilerplate statements
in the record of the decision-maker. In every case involving the discretionary
aspect of section 15 of the Act, the reviewing court must examine the totality
of the evidence to determine whether it is satisfied, on a balance of
probabilities, that the decision-maker understood that there was a discretion
to disclose and then exercised that discretion. This may well require the
reviewing court to infer from the content of the record that the decision-maker
recognized the discretion and then balanced the competing interests for and
against disclosure, as discussed by the Court in Telezone at paragraph 116.
[201] On a
balance of probability, the Court is not satisfied that discretion was
exercised.
[202] Initially,
the reliance by LAC on a general “umbrella rationale” given by CSIS is clearly
indicative of an extensive reliance on CSIS’ assessment of the records (see
para 33 of these reasons). It is unclear to what extent this general rationale
prevailed during the course of the second review, or even if it was relied
upon. In this respect, the reasons and rationale underlying the second review
of the documentation are no clearer than the three reasons identified above.
[203] This
is the case because the Court does not accept that the second review is the
sole result of the exercise of discretion. In fact, given the discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the first review of documentation, it can be said that a
portion of the documentation was released simply for the purposes of
consistency in the injury assessment required by section 15. As discussed
above, many documents did not meet the standard of proof where a “reasonable
expectation of probable harm” was to be expected from disclosure. For example,
targets disclosed under the MacDonald Commission, or threats which have
disappeared from the intelligence landscape do not reasonably meet the
injury-assessment of section 15, if the Act and the Library and Archives of
Canada Act are to be given their full meaning and application. Hence, the
release of these documents is not the result of the exercise of discretion, but
is simply the fruit of the analysis which should have been undertaken in the
first place.
[204] This
case is different from the Attaran case which was recently decided by
the Federal Court of Appeal. Here, at least after the ex parte hearing
where the Court drew the attention to its existence, it can be inferred that
the decision-maker knew that the discretion existed. What cannot be inferred is
that it was used reasonably, if at all. However, as was the case in Attaran,
the statement provided in regards to the exercise of discretion is “generic in
nature and by itself cannot satisfy the Court that the discretion conferred by
subsection 15(1) of the Act was exercised” (para 29).
[205] The
factors guiding the exercise of discretion are discussed below and provide
guidance as to the scope and nature of this discretion. The Court’s review of
the second release of information has not satisfied the need for a meaningful
and reasonable exercise of discretion, if there even was an exercise of
discretion. As detailed in the Annex, there are many examples of documents
where, despite a considerable historical interest, a factor which shall be
discussed below, they are still withheld, despite the fact that severance could
be undertaken to protect the information which requires it, such as the
identity of human sources and current operational interests.
[206] For
example, the interests safeguarded by the protection of human sources meet the
injury assessment of section 15, if the jurisprudential standards for the
recognition of the privilege are met. Thus, disclosing the identity of human
sources is strongly indicative of prejudice. Yet, it is not a blanket approach
to protection if the privilege is claimed under section 15, where an injury
assessment must be made: discretion remains applicable if overriding factors
apply.
[207] The
disclosure of past operational interests is arguably different to this example
of the identity of human sources, more so when they have been previously known
in public fora. Most of these simply do not meet the injury assessment
under section 15. If they did, there would be a strong presumption in favour of
disclosure, as the interests identified in section 15 are not meaningfully
prejudiced by disclosure.
[208] The
sum total of the discussion on discretion is perfectly coherent with section 15
of the Act as an injury-based and discretionary exemption. If Parliament would
have recognized the interests protected by section 15 as always being
prejudiced by disclosure, even with the passage of time, institutional changes
and the like, it would have adopted a class-based and non-discretionary
exemption. It is also coherent with the fact that exemptions under the Act must
be limited and specific.
[209] In
the case at bar, considering the reasons given for the second review, and
considering the “generic” statement that discretion was exercised, the Court
does not find that discretion was exercised. The second review was undertaken
to ensure consistency and compliance with the section 15 injury-assessment. If
discretion was found to have been exercised, it was not done in a reasonable
manner.
D. What
factors are to be considered in the exercise of discretion?
[210] The
interests highlighted in the Library and Archives of Canada Act as well as
those in the Act itself further compound the notion that the injury-assessment
under section 15 and more importantly, the exercise of discretion for the
disclosure of information, are to be taken seriously, with a presumption in
favour of disclosure when exercising discretion. Surely, if the discretion is
given, it must be meaningfully considered and done so in keeping with the
objectives of the Act.
[211] It
can be said that even the initial qualification of records as exempt under
section 15 of the Act is in and of itself an exercise of discretion. But given
that the evidentiary requirements are such that “specific and detailed”
evidence must be given, it can be said that the purpose of the Act is to limit
the variance of this initial qualification. Secondly, it should also be
restated that the prejudice alleged in disclosure must not be abstract or
speculative, as recognize by the caselaw. If this exercise is meaningfully
addressed by the decision-maker, then the residual discretion to disclose
despite a “reasonable expectation of probable harm” can adequately be addressed
to information which actually causes this reasonable expectation of probable
harm, yet can be disclosed nonetheless. The conferral of discretion by the Act
is the embodiment of a clear legislative intent that some information may well
be disclosed despite an alleged injury.
[212] No
clear policy has been submitted in regards to the way LAC and CSIS assess
historical records under the Act and how discretion is to be considered by
decision-makers. As for the exercise of discretion, the new “policy” in regards
to “targets of a transitory nature” is one that more adequately describes the
process under the injury-assessment than the exercise of discretion.
[213] As
for the case at bar, the following factors are relevant in the assessment of
whether discretion should be exercised.
[214] Firstly,
the principles and objectives of the Act and of the Library and Archives of
Canada Act are in and of themselves factors to be considered by the
decision-maker. Because these are the enabling statutes, surely they must be
considered in their entirety in the course of the analysis of a section 15
exemption, which includes discretion. Thus, given the “limited and specific”
nature of exemptions, and LAC’s mandate to facilitate access to Canada’s documentary heritage, it is clear that the decision-maker’s discretion is guided
by these important considerations. The quasi-constitutional nature of the Act
further compounds this, as do the important ramifications of the principles of
access to information, which have been discussed at length in these reasons.
[215] Secondly,
it is important to note there is no direct consideration of the “public
interest” in disclosure of information, as is the case in the Canada
Evidence Act and under some provincial statutes, namely Ontario’s, which
has been considered by the Supreme Court in Ontario (Public Safety and
Security) v Criminal Lawyers' Association, above. However, given the
principles of the Act and the qualification of LAC’s mandate of preserving and
facilitating access to information as being contributory to our democratic
life, there is an arguable implicit public interest in access to information
requests. While not directly at play and not as a stand-alone argument to
counter necessary exemptions, the public’s right to know is always at the heart
of any ATI request, not least because of the Act’s quasi-constitutional nature.
Further to this argument, the Act itself cannot be used to hide embarrassments
or illegal acts (see para 131 of these reasons), thereby recognizing an
inherent public interest in the application of the Act.
[216] In
its qualification of the residual discretion for disclosure of exempt
information, the Supreme Court noted that the decision-maker “must go on to ask
whether, having regard to all relevant interests, including the public
interest in disclosure, disclosure should be made” (Ontario (Public Safety
and Security) v Criminal Lawyers' Association, at para 66).
[217] “All
relevant interests” include the historical value of a document. LAC has, or
should have, the necessary resources to assess this, in keeping with its
important mandate within our democracy. Historians are the experts in this type
of assessment, and surely, their help can be summoned to help any institution
in its assessment of whether documents are historically relevant. In the case
at bar, the very reason that LAC had been transferred the documents was because
of their “historical significance”. To hold on to them, without any public
access, goes against LAC’s pragmatic mandate described above. As such, the
historical value of a document, more so when LAC is the record-holder, is a
factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion.
[218] In
line with the historical value of a document is the fact that the exercise of
discretion shall consider the passage of time between the inception of the
document and the ATI request. While the passage of time is to be considered in
the assessment of the injury resulting from disclosure (Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister), above), it is also to be
considered under the prism of whether discretion should be exercised. This has
been alluded to as obiter by Chief Justice Lutfy in Kitson,
above, at para 40, in qualifying the Court’s refusal to grant the ATI request:
“It may be that the outcome would be different if the request were made some
time after the CF are no longer engaged in Afghanistan. However, this decision
is not one to be made today”. As such, if injury is present, yet at a lower end
of the spectrum, the passage of time may be an important factor. This is the
case because as the times change, so do the bases of “reasonable expectation of
probable harm”, save for the protection of human sources, current operational
interests and similar issues. Justice Strayer also commented on the passage of
time in the case of X v Canada (Minister of National Defence), above,
at para 8:
“I can only say that it appears to me quite
unreasonable to conclude that the information in these documents which all bear
dates of 1941 or 1942 and relate to a time when Canada was engaged in a world
war, could reveal anything pertinent to the conduct of Canada’s international
relations and its national defence over 50 years later in time of peace.”
[219] The
passage of time is a factor, among others. It could well be that the passage of
time in regards to the identity of human sources is different, as counsel has
acknowledged publicly that there is a “timeframe for confidential sources”. And
so, indeed, as it is argued by the Respondent, there is no “magic number” for
the passage of time, and section 15 provides no direct guidance as to what
passage of time is sufficient. This highlights the importance of a considered
and thorough analysis of the reasonable expectation of probable harm under
section 15 as well as the residual discretion to disclose.
[220] Furthermore,
the Federal Court of Appeal has stated that the prior public disclosure of the
information provides an “incentive for the exercise of discretion to release
the information” in some cases (Attaran v Canada (Minister of Foreign
Affairs), at para 41). In the case at bar, the prior public disclosure
often created a context where there was no reasonable expectation of probable
harm in disclosure. Where there was, and it is worthy of repeating that the
evidence is insufficient in many respect to establish this, the prior public
disclosure of information is clearly a factor militating for disclosure, given
the passage of time.
[221] From
the list of relevant factors discussed by Justice Rothstein, as he then was, in
Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister) for
the injury analysis, the following can also be indicative that discretion
should be exercised in favour of disclosure:
- Press coverage of a confidential record is
relevant to the issue of expectation of probable harm from its disclosure.
However, this factor cannot override the fact that access requests must be
processed independently of who addresses them, as media has no priority within
the ATI system (para 4(2.1) of the Act);
- Each distinct document must be considered on its
own and in the context of all the documents requested for release, as the total
contents of the release are bound to have considerable bearing on the
reasonable consequences of its disclosure;
- Whether section 25 of the Act, providing the power
to sever records, can be applied to protect the identity of human sources and
other interests. It provides for the severance of material in a record that can
be disclosed from that which is protected from disclosure under an exemption
provision. The severance must be reasonable. In the Annex, examples of this are
found within the “Source Concerns” column.
[222] Recognizing
the aforementioned factors as being essential to the exercise of LAC’s, or any
institutions’, discretion under section 15 is necessary for the Act to be given
its full scope and for its principles to be given their proper weight.
Furthermore, as the decision-maker in this case was LAC, these considerations
are furthered by LAC’s mandate as the custodian of Canada’s documentary
heritage and its role to actively promote access to it.
[223] In
this case, there is no doubt that more should have been done before the
application for judicial review on the Respondent’s part to ensure it was
acquitting itself of its all-too-important legislative mandate. It is
disappointing that the Act’s intent and LAC’s mandate have been not been given
their true scope, notably as this file concerns a prominent and influential
Canadian, Mr. Thomas Clement Douglas, which was transferred to LAC because of
its historical significance.
III. Conclusion
[224] In
sum, the Court is not satisfied that the information still withheld is retained
in a manner consistent with section 15 of the Act. More should be done on the Respondent’s
part to ensure consistency in disclosure, and many documents cannot be found to
be consistently, and reasonably withheld under the grounds found in section 15.
Furthermore, the exercise of discretion, or rather, the lack thereof, shall be
considered with the factors described above.
[225] The
matter is to be sent for redetermination to LAC, with specific guidance to
consider these reasons, their spirit as well as the examples found within the
Annex. LAC is to conduct a new review within 90 days of this Judgment. Given
the lack of evidence as to the exercise of discretion, and even for the
assessment made under section 15, LAC would be wise to detail and evidence the
steps and approach taken for this third review of the documentation, including
how it exercised its discretion.
[226] Furthermore,
given the breach of the duty of candour and the considerations described in
regards to the completeness of the information provided by LAC on T.C. Douglas,
and pursuant
to section 50 of the Act, the Court orders that LAC justify, in writing, to the
Applicant whether it has more information on T.C. Douglas in its control,
beyond what has already been disclosed within the present application, or if it
relies on section 10 of the Act or for any other reasons. LAC has 30 days to
comply with this Order.
[227] It is
clear that this decision should in no way be interpreted as downplaying
concerns about the identification of human sources or important national
security concerns such as current operational interests. Rather, this case
addresses how the passage of time can assuage national security concerns.
Furthermore, this case highlights the importance of transferring information to
the public domain for the benefit of present and future Canadians, as well as
our collective knowledge and memory as a country.
[228] The
parties have come to an agreement as to the costs of this application.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
- The
matter is to be sent for redetermination to LAC, with specific guidance to
consider these reasons, their spirit as well as the examples found within the
Annex. LAC is to conduct a new review within 90 days of this Judgment;
- The Court orders that
LAC justify, in writing, to the Applicant whether it has more information on
T.C. Douglas in its control, beyond what has already been disclosed within the
present application, or if it relies on section 10 of the Act, or if another
response is applicable, within 30 days of this Judgment.
“Simon
Noël”
IV.
Annex
The
following chart aims to highlight documents the Court has identified as
inappropriately withheld or inappropriately severed. The chart should not be
interpreted as being an exhaustive account of the improperly severed or
withheld documents. Rather, it is the fruit of a time-consuming and thorough
review by the Court of the documents. It is meant as a guide for the
decision-maker in the new review that will be undertaken. Suffice to say that
the Court’s review of documents has proven to be an onerous task, especially
with the lack of specific evidence justifying the withholding of information.
The
categories of information found in the chart are linked to the sections of the
reasons where they are analyzed. The ratio of the reasons is to be
complemented by the following examples.
The
“Source Concerns” column is linked to both human and technical sources. When it
has been identified as a concern for a document, what is implied is that more
information could be disclosed while protecting the appropriate concerns
pertaining to sources.
The “Incidental
Reporting” column addresses documents where T.C. Douglas was only mentioned in
passing. As addressed in the reasons, relevance of the information is not a
criterion which is recognized by the Act. As such, these documents should be
disclosed. Furthermore, LAC’s approach to “incidental reporting” has proven
inconsistent throughout the documentation, and the documents identified within
the following chart are examples of this.
The
“Targets of a “transitory nature”” column aims to identify where LAC’s approach
undertaken under the second review of documentation was inconsistent. As the
Court understands LAC’s “new” approach, information found in documents where
“targets of a transitory nature” were considered was to be disclosed. However,
this was not the case for several documents. Again, the lack of specific
evidence implied that the Court inferred that many targets were of a
“transitory nature”, save for those logically connected to important
operational interests identified ex parte.
The
“RCMP’s analysis of T.C. Douglas” column identifies documents were the
assessments and opinions of RCMP officers were inappropriately withheld.
The
“Historical Component” column identifies documents where the decision-maker
should have considered whether the residual discretion to disclose the
information in light of the historical value of the information found within
the documents could trump the alleged prejudice resulting from disclosure.
Here, the Court singles out documents where clearly, the exercise of discretion
could have reasonably resulted in disclosure of the information within these
documents, while being consistent with human and technical source concerns.
Again,
the review of documentation undertaken by the Court was done with evidence that
was not ideal. LAC’s general evidence and approach to the section 15 analysis
was such that the review of documentation needed to be done, and clear guidance
needs to be given. This is especially the case as a second review was
undertaken after the ex parte, in camera hearing, which resulted
in a “different” approach taken by LAC. However, this approach has also proven
to be inconsistent and flawed.
This was
not the case for all documents. In fact, it could well be that different
analysts went through the documentation and made the second round of
severances. The Court has to be fair and signal that not all the documentation
was improperly withheld.
For
example, the following documents were released despite concerns the fact that
the documents include “incidental reporting” about T.C. Douglas: pp.969-972;
pp.960-963; pp.1002-1003.
Another
example of the results of a consistent and serious analysis of section 15
concerns is the documents pertaining to “New Left Actions in Political Parties
in Canada” (pp.905-917). This is the perfect example of what should have been
the result for most of the documents found in the Douglas dossier.
It
should again be stressed that one of the Court’s core concerns is that of the
consistency of the severances made. As an example, there are several different
documents pertaining to the McGill Moratorium Committee’s protest of February
28, 1970. While there may well be source concerns, there are clear
inconsistencies in the information that is still withheld. There are important
inconsistencies in the redactions of identifiers such as “a reliable source”
and the like, which are often released but inexplicably withheld in other
circumstance.
Again,
the chart relates the Court’s concerns for many, but not all the documents,
found in the file. It cannot serve as a replacement or shortcut to a new and
thorough review of the documentation which will consider the reasons and
concerns highlighted therein.
Page number of document
|
Source Concerns
|
Incidental
Reporting
|
Targets of a “transitory
nature”
|
RCMP’s analysis of T.C.
Douglas
|
Historical
Component
|
p.10
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
|
p.20
(para 6)
|
|
|
X
|
|
|
pp.22-24
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.35-37
|
|
|
X
|
|
|
pp.53-54
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
X
|
pp.57-58
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.61-64
|
|
X
|
|
|
X
|
p.68
|
X
|
|
|
|
|
p.69
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
p.92
(para 2)
|
X
|
|
|
|
|
pp.100-103
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.107-109
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.110
|
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
p.120
|
X
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.126
|
X
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.132
|
X
|
X
|
X
(see also pp.368,371)
|
|
|
pp.148-153
|
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
pp.161-165
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.169
|
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
p.180
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.183
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.188-189
|
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
pp.195-196
|
X
|
|
X
|
|
|
pp.217-218
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.236-237
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
p.269
|
X
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
p.272
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.273-274
|
X
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
pp.282-283
|
X
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
pp.284-287
|
|
X
|
|
|
|
pp.291-292
|
|
X
|
|
|
|
pp.297-299
|
|
X
|
|
|
|
pp.305-307
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.334-335
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.337-340
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.354-356
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.359-360
|
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
pp.368-370
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.371-373
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.375-377
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.379-380
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.384-387
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.405-406
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.411-412
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.415-416
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.421-424
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
X
|
pp.426-429
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.452-455
(para 9)
|
X
|
|
|
|
X
|
p. 457
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.476
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.478
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.482-483
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.484-485
|
X
|
|
|
|
|
pp.516-517
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.521-522
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.527-528
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.529-531
|
X
|
|
|
|
|
p.565
(para 11)
|
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
pp.567-568
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.575-576
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
p.586
(para 8)
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.601-605
|
|
X
|
|
|
X
|
pp.639-640
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
|
pp.642-643
|
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
pp.655-657
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.663-665
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.697-698
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.727-728
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.765-768
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.774-775
(paras 9, 10, 11, 13)
|
X
|
|
|
|
|
pp.777-781
|
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
|
pp.787-789
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.801-802
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.828-830
|
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
pp.837-843
|
|
X
|
X
|
|
|
pp.891-893
|
X
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.923-924
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.989-993
|
|
X
|
|
|
|
p.998
|
X
|
|
|
|
|
pp.1009-1010
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
p.1021
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.1023-1029
|
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
pp.1035-1039
|
|
X
|
|
X
|
X
|
pp.1040-1046
|
X
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.1049-1052
|
|
|
Unknown
(no evidentiary basis provided
to the Court)
|
|
|
p.1087
|
|
|
|
|
X
|
pp.1108-1109
|
|
|
|
|
X
|