Date: 20090612
Docket: IMM-1639-07
Citation: 2009 FC 629
Ottawa, Ontario, June 12, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Beaudry
BETWEEN:
MOHAMMED BEN AR ZRIG
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S. 2001, c. 27 (the Act)
of a decision by Immigration Officer Nicole Léveillé (Officer Léveillé),
dated March 29, 2007. The Officer refused to grant the applicant
permanent resident status following his application for permanent residence
(APR) for humanitarian considerations.
[2]
On
July 24, 2008, the respondent filed a motion for the withdrawal of an admission,
seeking leave from the Court to withdraw an admission contained in his
memorandum dated June 21, 2007, at paragraph 20(b) and the
heading between paragraphs 25 and 26, to the effect that [translation] “the applicant was not
informed by CIC [Citizenship and Immigration Canada] of Ms. Dostie’s
positive decision before Ms. Léveillé rendered her decision”. The
respondent would also like to withdraw the admission in his further memorandum
dated December 17, 2007, at paragraph 15(b) and the heading between
paragraphs 25 and 26, to the effect that [translation] “the applicant was not formally informed by CIC
of Ms. Dostie’s positive decision before Ms. Léveillé rendered her
decision”. Finally, he wishes to withdraw his oral admission to the same effect
made during the hearing before this Court on April 29, 2008.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[3]
The
applicant, a citizen of Tunisia, was a member of the
ITM/Ennahda, a movement directed to a limited, brutal purpose. He was sentenced
in absentia to 21 years in prison in Tunisia for his
involvement. When he arrived in Canada on May 2, 1992, he
made a claim for refugee status. His spouse and three children arrived six
months later, and their claims for refugee status were successful.
[4]
His
claim before the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) was rejected on
June 30, 1994, on the grounds that he was excluded from the
definition of refugee under section F of Article 1 of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). On
July 6, 1995, Mr. Justice Pinard of this Court allowed the
application for judicial review and referred the matter to the IRB for a new
hearing.
[5]
On
January 27, 2000, the IRB again rejected the claim, finding that the
fear of persecution was well-founded, but that the applicant was excluded under
paragraphs 1F(b) and 1F(c) because he had committed, as an
accomplice, serious non-political crimes: the use of Molotov cocktails;
throwing acid in people’s faces; physical attacks; automobile fires;
threatening letters; conspiracy to assassinate leading persons in the Tunisian
government; attempted arson; bombing attacks at Sousse and Monastir on
August 2, 1987; arson at Bab Souika in February 1991
causing death; bombing attacks in France in 1986; weapons trafficking in 1987
and conspiracy to overthrow the government of former President Habib Bourguiba.
[6]
The
applicant filed an application for judicial review of this negative decision,
and the application was dismissed on September 24, 2001. The Court
certified certain questions, and the applicant appealed the decision.
[7]
On
April 7, 2003, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s
appeal (Zrig v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 178, [2003] 3 F.C. 761).
[8]
On
November 29, 2001, the applicant applied for a visa exemption on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds under subsection 114(2) of the
former Immigration Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. 1-2, in which he invoked
risks of return.
[9]
On
June 23, 2004, the applicant received a letter informing him that his
application for permanent residence as a dependent of his spouse had been
rejected because there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was a person
described in paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act, namely, that he was
inadmissible on grounds of security because he was a member of an organization
that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will
engage in terrorism, an act covered by paragraph 34(1)(c) of the
Act.
[10]
On
July 29, 2005, the application for a permanent resident visa
exemption was approved at the first stage (humanitarian and compassionate
grounds) by Immigration Officer Hélène Dostie (Officer Dostie).
[11]
The
applicant contacted Jamel Jani, assistant to Federal Member of Parliament Meili
Faille, Bloc Québécois shadow minister of Citizenship and Immigration, to
obtain more information about his file. Following an access to information
request submitted in September 2006, documents were sent to the applicant
on December 20, 2006, including Officer Dostie’s Notes to File
explaining that the applicant’s application had been approved at the first
stage of the process.
IMPUGNED DECISION
[12]
The
impugned decision that is the subject of this application for judicial review
is the decision rendered on March 29, 2007, by Officer Léveillé. It was
the second stage of the decision process described in section 25 of the
Act, which involved determining whether the applicant met all the requirements
of the Act.
[13]
The
Officer noted that the decision process for a permanent residence application
filed within Canada on humanitarian
and compassionate grounds (HC application) involved two steps. She stated that
humanitarian and compassionate considerations were considered first to
determine whether the applicant may be exempt from the requirement to obtain a
permanent resident visa before coming to Canada. According
to Officer Léveillé’s letter, the applicant was informed that his application
for an exemption had been approved on July 29, 2005.
[14]
However,
Officer Léveillé emphasized the importance of the second stage of the process,
i.e., the applicant’s obligation to respect all the other legislative
requirements of the Act. She determined that the applicant did not respect
these requirements because he was inadmissible for serious crimes under
paragraph 36(1)(c) and on grounds of security under
paragraph 34(1)(f). The officer stated that her decision was based
on the findings and observations of the Federal Court of Appeal, which upheld
the IRB’s findings that the applicant had committed a series of crimes in Tunisia as a member of
the IMT/Ennahda.
[15]
She
therefore rejected his application for permanent residence.
ISSUES
[16]
This
application for judicial review raises the following issues:
a) Did
Officer Léveillé have the jurisdiction to render the impugned decision?
b)
Was it open to Officer Nicole Léveillé to invoke paragraph 36(1)(c)
of the Act in the absence of a prior finding by the Immigration and Refugee
Board (IRB) regarding the applicability of this provision to the applicant’s
case?
c) Has
there been a breach of procedural fairness because the applicant did not have
the opportunity to make submissions on the applicability of
paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act under subsection 34(2)?
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
[17]
The
provisions applicable to this case are found at Appendix A at the end of this
document.
ANALYSIS
[18]
During
the hearing of this case on April 7, 2009, the applicant consented to the
motion for withdrawal after learning during the same hearing of the admission
by counsel for the respondent that Officer Dostie had never sent the
applicant the decision dated July 29, 2005. Accordingly, the Court
allowed the respondent’s motion.
a) Did Officer
Nicole Léveillé have the jurisdiction to render the impugned decision?
[19]
Discretionary
decisions must be made within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the
Act, and the courts must give considerable deference to decision-makers when
reviewing that discretion and determining the scope of the decision-maker’s
jurisdiction (Williams v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 F.C. 646 (C.A.). The standard of
correctness applies to questions of law.
[20]
The
applicant invokes Operational Bulletin 021 (see further docket and
memorandum resulting from the order dated August 26, 2008) at
page 214, which states the following:
In cases involving inadmissibilities A34,
A35, A37, A36(1) and A38, and where, in the officer's initial assessment, the
H&C considerations might justify an exemption, the entire case should be
forwarded to the Director of Case Review at NHQ. The officer should not provide
a formal assessment or opinion, but should make a note in FOSS that the case is
being sent to the delegated decision-maker at NHQ.
[21]
The
respondent cites an excerpt from further down in the same Bulletin and argues
that officers have the authority to render a negative decision:
Officers have the delegated authority to
render a negative decision on any application, regardless of the
inadmissibility, if they are of the opinion that there are insufficient H&C
grounds. Thus, if the officer has reason to believe that a serious
inadmissibility exists, including those involving security (A34), human and
international rights violations (A35), and organized criminality (A37),
officers should refuse the application if they are of the opinion that insufficient
H&C grounds exist.
[22]
The
respondent notes that, according to Officer Léveillé, the latter paragraph
applied to the applicant, therefore she had jurisdiction to render the impugned
decision. However, the applicant notes that the decision does not mention
whether she was of the opinion that insufficient H&C grounds existed, which
goes against Officer Dostie’s decision, in which she found that
humanitarian and compassionate grounds existed. Furthermore,
Officer Dostie’s decision has not been challenged before this Court.
[23]
The
applicant claims that Officer Léveillé did not have the authority to reject the
applicant’s application, citing Operational Bulletin 021, which states the
following: “If the officer is of the opinion that the H&C considerations might
justify an exemption, but he or she does not have the delegated
authority to grant the exemption, the case should be forwarded to the Director
of Case Review, NHQ, for assessment.” The impugned decision was under the
jurisdiction of the Director of Case Review, and Officer Léveillé’s reasons
make no mention of whether she was of the opinion that the H&C
considerations were insufficient.
[24]
Operational
Bulletin 021 is a set of guidelines or procedural instructions arising
from the Minister’s authority to delegate. Because the respondent admits that
the decision was made under Operational Bulletin 021, the Court must bear
in mind the powers delegated under this instrument as well as previous
decisions in reviewing this decision.
[25]
According
to the applicant, the Court must consider section 6 of the Act, which sets
out the scope of the Minister’s delegation power. The applicant argues that he
made submissions relating to subsection 34(2) of the Act, explaining
that his presence would not be detrimental to the national interest, and that
those submissions were referred to in Officer Dostie’s decision (see
page 13, volume 1, Tribunal Record), in which the following was noted with
respect to the applicant: [TRANSLATION] “Neither he nor his family has abused
Canada’s protection or the freedom that they have found here, and they have
always shown a deep respect for Canadian institutions.” Officer Léveillé
therefore lacked jurisdiction to render a decision on this because such
allegations had to be considered by the Minister himself, as set out in
subsection 34(2) of the Act.
[26]
Thus,
in delegating his discretionary power under section 25 of the Act, it is
not open to the Minister to segment it as he pleases, and he may not limit the
power of his delegate by imposing on officers a duty to “refuse the application
if they are of the opinion that insufficient H&C grounds exist”. The
respondent’s directive denies the applicant the benefit of the Act,
particularly subsection 34(2) of the Act.
[27]
The
applicant claims that Moiseev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 88, (2007) 323 F.T.R. 164, cited by the respondent,
does not apply to this situation, in which an H&C application has been
filed or allegedly filed under section 25 of the Act, as this application
is addressed directly to the Minister. Clearly, the Minister may delegate
certain powers under section 25, but he may not so limit or segment a
discretionary power as to make it, in essence, a non-discretionary power.
[28]
By
taking over the file and failing to forward it to the Director of Case Review,
Officer Léveillé engaged in a reassessment of whether humanitarian and
compassionate considerations existed, since, according to the Operational
Bulletin, officers “should refuse the application if they are of the opinion
that insufficient H&C grounds exist”. Officer Léveillé’s decision could
therefore only be rendered if she revisited Officer Dostie’s decision with
respect to the existence of sufficient H&C grounds to justify granting the
exemption.
[29]
The
respondent submits that it is clear from a reading of section 25 that the
Minister may grant permanent resident status to an inadmissible person, but he
may also, at his discretion, refuse to do so, which is what occurred in this
case. In his subsection 25(1) application, the applicant never
specifically asked the Minister to grant him permanent resident status despite
the inadmissibilities in question, and in fact has never admitted to falling
under paragraphs 34(1)(f) and 36(1)(c) of the Act.
[30]
In
this case, Officer Léveillé found that [translation]
“despite the weight of the humanitarian and compassionate considerations”, she
was forced to conclude that the applicant was inadmissible to Canada under
paragraphs 36(1)(c) and 34(1)(f) of the Act. According to Officer Léveillé,
the humanitarian and compassionate considerations raised by the applicant were
insufficient to justify granting permanent resident status, therefore his file
did not need to be forwarded to the Director of Case Review at NHQ.
[31]
The
respondent submits that the CIC’s operational bulletins and guidelines are not
regulations. They do not have force of law and do not create any substantive
rights or legitimate expectations (Legault v. Canada, 2002 FCA 125,
[2002] 4 F.C. 358 at p. 372; Canadian Assn. of Regulated Importers v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 2 F.C. 247 (C.A.) at pp. 256-257; Sahota
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 123, 164
A.C.W.S. (3d) 682 at para. 20). Even if Officer Léveillé had not
followed the directive at issue, it would not have been open to this Court to
invalidate her decision on that basis. However, the decision must comply with
the Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations), which it does.
[32]
The
respondent submits that the applicant is confusing the H&C grounds that
exempted him from having to apply for an immigrant visa from outside Canada with the
H&C grounds that were insufficient to justify granting him permanent
resident status in Canada, in light of the inadmissibilities that apply
to him. Officer Léveillé had to consider the H&C grounds invoked by the
applicant in a different context. Officer Dostie’s decision is res judicata only in
regard to the existence of H&C grounds that justify granting the applicant
an exemption from the requirement to obtain an immigrant visa abroad, which
meant that his permanent residence application could be processed in Canada.
Officer Dostie’s decision is therefore not res judicata for Officer Léveillé
with respect to the impugned decision. The H&C grounds sufficient to
justify a foreigner’s requirement to apply for permanent residence from abroad
are not necessarily sufficient to justify granting him permanent resident
status in Canada, despite the inadmissibilities that apply to him (Mpula v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 456, 160 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 334 at paras. 31 and 36).
[33]
The
respondent agrees with the applicant’s argument that Officer Léveillé did not
have jurisdiction to grant the applicant relief from his inadmissibility under
paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act, but the applicant has never asked
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (see
paragraph 4(2)(d) of the Act) to grant the applicant relief from
the inadmissibility under subsection 34(2) of the Act (since under
subsection 6(3), the determination referred to in subsection 34(2)
must be made by the Minister himself).
[34]
Moreover,
the applicant did not ask the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in his
application under subsection 25(1) of the Act, to grant him permanent
resident status in Canada, after granting him relief from inadmissibility
pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act, under
paragraph 36(3)(c) of the same Act. Nor did the applicant ask the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to forward, pursuant to
subsection 34(2) of the Act, a request to the Minister of Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness for relief from the inadmissibility to which he is
subject under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act. It was therefore
incumbent on the applicant to apply to the appropriate minister for relief from
the inadmissibilities to which he was subject. He is responsible for his own
failure to do so.
[35]
The
Court is of the view that Officer Léveillé did not exceed her jurisdiction by
rendering a decision at the second stage. As pointed out by the respondent, the
decision-maker is not bound by Operational Bulletin 021 in this case, as
it involves the Minister’s delegated powers. The case law clearly establishes
that policy guidelines are merely administrative documents that do not create
legitimate expectations or substantive rights (Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney
General),
2004 FCA 213, [2005] 1 F.C.R. 3 at para. 30; Byer v. Canada, 2002
FC 518, 114 A.C.W.S. (3d) 417).
[36]
Furthermore,
a Minister's delegate must assess an H&C application in light of all
relevant factors, and the Court called upon to review the decision of a
delegate must uphold it even if the assessment of relevant factors could have
been done differently (Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras. 54-56, 68, 73-75; Suresh v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 3, at paras. 34-38).
[37]
In
this case, Officer Léveillé considered and analyzed all the H&C grounds
raised by the applicant before finding that none justified an exemption from
the applicability of the Act. To the extent that section 25 of the Act
confers a discretionary power on the Minister, the Court does not see how
Officer Léveillé’s decision could be considered unreasonable just because she
could have given a different weight to the grounds alleged to justify the
H&C application. Officer Léveillé considered the decision in which the
Federal Court of Appeal found that the applicant was inadmissible, and rendered
her decision despite the weight of the H&C considerations (see page 6,
volume 1, Tribunal Record).
b) Was it open
to Officer Nicole Léveillé to invoke paragraph 36(1)(c) of the
Act in the absence of a prior finding by the Immigration and Refugee Board
(IRB) regarding the applicability of this provision to the applicant’s case?
[38]
This
is a question of mixed fact and law, to be reviewed on the standard of
reasonableness (Dunsmuir v. Nouveau-Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 190 at paras. 164 and 166).
[39]
The
applicant points out that in her decision, Officer Léveillé did not mention
that, in her opinion, the H&C considerations were insufficient, and notes
that contrary to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act, he is not the
subject of a section 44 report based on section 36. The applicant’s
report on inadmissibility, prepared on June 15, 2004, pursuant to
section 44 of the Act, does not state that he is inadmissible under
paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act, therefore the decision-maker in this
case could not invoke this provision to refuse to grant the applicant permanent
resident status under subsection 25(1) of the Act.
[40]
It
was not open to the Officer to find that the facts reviewed by the IRB and the
Federal Court of Appeal constituted aiding and abetting within the meaning of
sections 21 and 22 of the Criminal Code, R.S., 1985, c. C-46,
to the effect that the applicant was a party to offences committed by the
Ennahda movement. The Federal Court of Appeal noted in its reasons that the
issue is one that requires debate. The Officer thus committed an error of law.
[41]
The
applicant invokes section 14 of the Regulations, dealing with
paragraph 34(1)(c), and submits that the Regulations do not
contain, in Part 3 on Inadmissibility, a similar provision for the
purposes of paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act. The applicant submits
that it was not open to the Officer to circumvent the Regulations to come to a
finding that the applicant had committed [translation] “a series
of crimes” in Tunisia and that [translation] “these
constituted serious crimes within the meaning of subsection 36(1)(c)
of the IRPA”. Officer Léveillé could therefore not rely on the decision of
the Federal Court of Appear upholding the IRB decision, in which the applicant
was found to be subject to paragraph 1F(b) of the Convention because he
had committed serious non-political crimes.
[42]
The
applicant refers to the transitional provisions in Part 20 of the
Regulations and notes that there is no equivalent to the inadmissibility
clauses under the former Act that could be transferred under the new Act.
Section 339 of the Regulations comes closest, but inadmissibility cases
are not mentioned. The distinction made by Officer Dostie in her notes thus
becomes more meaningful: [translation]
“. . . the IRPA does not provide an exception for persons seeking an exemption
from the requirement for a permanent resident visa beyond legislative
requirements, including those related to security and criminality checks, the
second stage of the process.”
[43]
The
respondent submits that if the Court were to accept the applicant’s argument,
Canadian immigration officers abroad would not be able to reject permanent
residence applications under paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act, because
on his understanding, section 44 can only be applicable to a permanent
resident or foreigner located in Canada. In other words, an immigration officer
may not refuse to grant an immigrant visa to somebody who is outside of the
country, under paragraph 36(1)(c), based on the authority provided
in subsection 11(1) of the Act.
[44]
Preparation
of the report described in section 44 constitutes the first stage of a
process that could result in the issue of a removal order against the person in
question. The decision in this case, rendered under subsection 25(1), is
related to an application for permanent resident status and does not constitute
a removal order. Officer Léveillé did not make a finding that the
applicant was inadmissible from Canada under paragraph 36(1)(c) for
the purpose of his removal from Canada. The decision-making
authority granted to the Minister under subsection 25(1) of the Act is
clear, and it was not the intent of Parliament to involve the Immigration
Division before the Minister could invoke inadmissibility. The Minister, and
not exclusively the Immigration Division, is therefore authorized by the Act to
decide whether the person may be an inadmissible person (Figueroa v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 181 F.T.R. 242, 96
A.C.W.S. (3d) 844 at para. 10, aff’d 2001 FCA 112, 212 F.T.R. 318 at
para. 8; Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(1995), 93 F.T.R. 297, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 834 at para. 11).
[45]
Based
on the reasons of the IRB and Federal Court of Appeal, Officer Léveillé could
have reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant had committed “outside Canada” at least
one “offence that if committed in Canada would constitute an
offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment
of at least ten years”. The respondent submits that this is the same burden of
proof as that required for the application of paragraphs 1F(b) and
1F(c) of the Convention. Moreover, the Officer could be certain that
conspiring to assassinate people or to commit arson constituted an offence in Tunisia, and the
applicant has not challenged this.
[46]
The
respondent cites paragraph 465(1)(a) of the Criminal Code,
noting that the Federal Court of Appeal found that it was not unreasonable for
the IRB to find that it had serious grounds to believe that the applicant had
committed, among others, the offence of conspiring to assassinate leading
figures of the Government of Tunisia in 1990, 1991 and 1992. The respondent
also cites sections 433 and 434 of the Criminal Code, noting that
the Federal Court of Appeal found that it was not unreasonable for the IRB to
find that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant had
committed, among others, the offence of setting automobiles on fire in 1987 and
1990, as well as arson at Bab Souika (Tunisia) in February, causing death.
Under the Criminal Code, these offences are punishable by a term of
imprisonment of at least 14 years in the case of setting automobiles on
fire and imprisonment for life for the arson at Bab Souika.
[47]
The
applicant’s argument that the Regulations do not contain, for the purposes of
applying paragraph 36(1)(c), a provision similar to section 14
of the Regulations is irrelevant, as Officer Léveillé did not write that she
was bound by the Federal Court of Appeal’s reasons. She simply relied on that
decision. For the purpose of a decision under subsection 25(1) of the Act,
the Minister may rely on findings of fact by the IRB, and all the more so when,
as in this case, they are upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal (Yassin v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FC 1029, 117
A.C.W.S. (3d) 605 at para. 24; Figueroa, Federal Court of Appeal
decision cited above at paras. 10 to 13).
[48]
The
respondent draws a parallel by explaining that this Court has decided, with
respect to paragraph 15(b) of the Regulations, which involves the
application of paragraph 35(1)(a) of the Act and is drafted like
section 14 of the same Regulations, that a decision-maker under the Act,
whether the IRB or an immigration officer, must accept as conclusive earlier
findings made by the IRB with respect to the applicability of
paragraph 1F(a) of the Convention (Syed v. Canada (Minister of
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2006 FC 1163, 300 F.T.R. 132 at paras. 24
to 26).
[49]
Similarly,
in Legault v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1997), 219 N.R. 376, 74
A.C.W.S. (3d) 649, cited with approval in Kiani v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 233 N.R. 170, 83 A.C.W.S. (3d) 822,
the Federal Court of Appeal decided that an umpire could rely solely on an
indictment by a United States court and an arrest warrant issued by this Court
to find that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant had
committed serious crimes abroad and that he was therefore covered by
subparagraph 19(1)(c.1)(ii) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C.
(1985), c. I-2 (now paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act). Here
Officer Léveillé was entitled to rely on the final decision of a Canadian
court, in this case the Federal Court of Appeal, that it was not unreasonable
for the Refugee Division to find that it had reasonable grounds to believe that
the applicant had committed serious non-political crimes abroad within the
meaning of paragraph 1F(b) of the Convention.
[50]
Finally,
the respondent points out that the applicant has presented no new evidence that
was not before the Federal Court of Appeal and that he has made no attempt to
demonstrate that he did not commit the offences identified by Officer Léveillé
on the basis of the Federal Court of Appeal decision dated April 7, 2003.
Officer Léveillé found that the judgment and reasons of the Federal Court of
Appeal constituted credible evidence, and her decision to rely on that case,
which fell squarely within her discretion in this case, was perfectly legal (Legault,
above at para. 10).
[51]
As
stated above, a delegate of the Minister must assess and H&C application in
light of all the relevant factors, and a Court called upon to review the
decision of a delegate must uphold it even if the assessment of relevant
factors could have been done differently (Baker, above, at
paras. 54-56, 68, 73-75; Suresh, above, at paras. 34-38).
[52]
As
stated by the respondent, this is not about a removal order, but rather an
application for permanent residence, which is based on a discretionary decision
with respect to H&C considerations. In this case, Officer Léveillé
considered and analyzed all the H&C grounds invoked by the applicant before
finding that none justified an exemption from the requirements of the Act.
[53]
To
the extent that section 25 of the Act grants the Minister a discretionary
power, it was reasonable for Officer Léveillé to take into account the
Federal Court of Appeal’s decision, given that it involved the same applicant
and the same factual background. It was also reasonable for the applicant to
expect Officer Léveillé to mention the same grounds as the Federal Court
of Appeal. The considerable weight that the Officer gave to the reasons in the
Federal Court of Appeal justifies her conclusion.
c) Has there
been a breach of procedural fairness because the applicant did not have the
opportunity to make submissions on the applicability of paragraph 36(1)(c) of the
Act under subsection 34(2)?
[54]
As
stated above, issues of procedural fairness must always be reviewed according
to the standard of correctness (Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney
General),
2005 FCA 404, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 392 at para. 46).
[55]
The
applicant states that he could not have suspected that the officer would find
that acts committed by the ITM/Ennahda would be considered offences he had
committed within the meaning of subsection 36(1) of the Act, and he
submits that he did not have the opportunity to make representations on this
issue. The applicant relies on Moiseev, cited above at para. 28:
[…] The jurisprudence is quite clear that
the duty of fairness is not breached if the applicant had an opportunity to
respond to the concerns raised in the visa officer’s mind: see, for example, Au,
above; Zheng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
[1999] F.C.J. No. 1397 (F.C.) (QL).
[56]
According
to the applicant, the respondent is attempting to do here what it did not do
before the Federal Court of Appeal, since according to the Federal Court of
Appeal decision, the issue of the applicability of paragraph 36(1)(c)
requires a debate. Accordingly, the officer could not cite the provisions in
paragraph 36(1)(c) without at least hearing submissions on this
issue before making her decision.
[57]
The
applicant claims that he should have been notified before the decision was
rendered that Officer Léveillé was planning to apply paragraph 36(1)(c)
of the Act. The officer did not fulfil her duty of fairness by failing to
notify him of her intention to consider the applicability of
paragraph 36(1)(c), thereby depriving the applicant of the benefit
of the Act.
[58]
The
respondent submits that the Minister respected procedural fairness in applying
paragraph 36(1)(c). CIC notified the applicant, despite the fact
that it was not obligatory to do so, that another decision would or could be
issued, given the provisions of the Act dealing with security and criminality.
In her reasons, disclosed to the applicant on December 20, 2006,
Officer Dostie specified not only that her decision constituted the first
stage of the decision process under section 25 of the Act, but also that
the issue of legislative requirements “related to security and criminality
checks”, which clearly indicated that the applicant’s application for permanent
residence could be refused on grounds of serious crime under
paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act.
[59]
In
any case, neither the Minister nor Officers Dostie or Léveillé were required to
notify the applicant of the possible application of paragraph 36(1)(c)
(Suleyman v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 780, 330 F.T.R. 205 at paras. 38
to 42).
[60]
In
Johnson v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 2,
[2008] F.C.J. No. 10 (QL), this Court established that “there is no
requirement for notice of an officer's concerns where these arise directly from
the Act and Regulations that the officer is bound to follow in his or her
assessment of the applicant” (Parmar v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 139 F.T.R. 203, 75
A.C.W.S. (3d) 923 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 36).
[61]
In
this case, on April 7, 2003, a majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the
applicant’s inadmissibility under paragraph 1F(b) and stated that there
was no need to deal with the issues related to the applicability of paragraph
1F(c). This decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
[62]
The
applicant therefore knew as of that date that the Court of Appeal had found
that it was not unreasonable for the IRB to have found that it had serious
grounds to believe that he had committed serious non-political crimes before
arriving in Canada in 1992.
[63]
The
evidence shows that on December 20, 2006, the applicant was aware of
Officer Dostie’s decision (July 29, 2005), in which she informed
him that his file would be subject to a second-stage review, namely, security
and criminality checks.
[64]
He
could have applied for an exemption under subsection 34(2) and attempted
to persuade the Minister that his presence in Canada would not be
detrimental to the national interest. Officer Léveillé’s decision was
rendered on March 29, 2007. The applicant did nothing during this
period and it is not open to him now to argue that he was unaware of his
inadmissibility.
[65]
The
Court finds that Officer Léveillé’s decision cannot be characterized as
unreasonable in light of the particular circumstances of this case.
[66]
The
applicant proposed the following questions for certification by the Court:
[translation]
Q1. When an H&C review has
been accepted by a first officer, who finds that the applicant is subject to
risks that constitute unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship in
the circumstances, and the applicant is inadmissible to Canada under
subsection 34(1) of the IRPA, is it open to the Minister to delegate
to a second officer the task of reviewing the file and rendering a decision on
whether the applicant’s presence in Canada would be detrimental to the national
interest, in light of subsection 69(3) of the IRPA?
Q2. Given the delegation of
authority contained in “Operational Bulletin 021”, dated
June 22, 2006, or any other delegation stipulating that “officers
do not have the delegated authority to grant exemptions with respect to the
following inadmissibilities - Criminality -A36(1)”, is it open to an
officer to render a decision about an applicant who is inadmissible under
A36(1) and to reject him without a specific delegated authority if another
officer has accepted an H&C application on the basis that the applicant is
subject to risks that constitute unusual and undeserved or disproportionate
hardship in the circumstances?
Q3. Given the fairness measures
set out in the “Operational Bulletin 021” or other applicable directives
or guidelines, - such as IP-5 section 11.1 in this case -, stipulating
that officers must apply procedural fairness in making their decisions, if
an officer decides to rely on a ground of inadmissibility that has not resulted
in a specific inadmissibility order, and if that ground could result in the
rejection of an application for permanent residence that can be processed in
Canada following a positive H&C decision, is it open to the officer to
render a decision in the case without expressly informing the applicant or,
in the alternative, does the applicant have a right to be informed of this fact
and to have the opportunity to make submissions before a decision is rendered?
[Emphasis
in the original.]
[67]
The
respondent objects to these questions for the following reasons:
[68]
Question
no. 1: the respondent points out that the applicant refers to
subsection 69(3) at the end of the first question. The Court notes that
this is an error, and that the applicant intended to refer to subsection
34(2). Given that Officer Léveillé did not render a decision under
subsection 34(2), the Court is of the view that it would not be
appropriate to certify the first question.
[69]
Question
no. 2: the Court agrees with the respondent that Officer Léveillé did
not require a specific delegation of authority to render the impugned decision.
[70]
Question
no. 3: in light of paragraphs 61 to 64 of these reasons, the Court is
of the view that it is not necessary to certify this question.
[71]
In
reviewing the questions proposed by the applicant, the Court also considered
the comments of the Federal Court of Appeal in the recent decision Valera v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 145, [2009]
F.C.J. No. 549 (QL) with respect to the role of the judge in deciding whether
to certify a question.
JUDGMENT
THE
COURT ORDERS that:
1. The
respondent’s motion for the withdrawal of an admission be allowed in accordance
with the terms of the re-reamended draft order attached as a schedule to the
respondent’s further reply, dated November 25, 2008 (document
number 34); and
2. The
application for judicial review be dismissed. No question is certified.
“Michel
Beaudry”
Certified
true translation
Francie
Gow, BCL, LLB
SCHEDULE A
Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act,
2001, c. 27
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11. (1) A foreign national
must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other
document required by the regulations. The visa or document may be issued if,
following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national
is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
(2)
The officer may not issue a visa or other document to a foreign national
whose sponsor does not meet the sponsorship requirements of this Act.
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11. (1)
L’étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, demander à l’agent les
visa et autres documents requis par règlement. L’agent peut les délivrer sur
preuve, à la suite d’un contrôle, que l’étranger n’est pas interdit de
territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
(2)
Ils ne peuvent être délivrés à l’étranger dont le répondant ne se conforme
pas aux exigences applicables au parrainage.
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25. (1) The Minister shall, upon
request of a foreign national who is inadmissible or who does not meet the
requirements of this Act, and may, on the Minister’s own initiative, examine
the circumstances concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign
national permanent resident status or an exemption from any applicable
criteria or obligation of this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it
is justified by humanitarian and compassionate considerations relating to
them, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected, or
by public policy considerations.
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25. (1) Le ministre doit, sur
demande d’un étranger interdit de territoire ou qui ne se conforme pas à la
présente loi, et peut, de sa propre initiative, étudier le cas de cet
étranger et peut lui octroyer le statut de résident permanent ou lever tout
ou partie des critères et obligations applicables, s’il estime que des
circonstances d’ordre humanitaire relatives à l’étranger — compte tenu de
l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant directement touché — ou l’intérêt public le
justifient.
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33. The facts that constitute
inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions
and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable
grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur.
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33. Les faits — actes ou
omissions — mentionnés aux articles 34 à 37 sont, sauf disposition contraire,
appréciés sur la base de motifs raisonnables de croire qu’ils sont survenus,
surviennent ou peuvent survenir.
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34. (1) A permanent resident or
a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
(a)
engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
(b)
engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
(c)
engaging in terrorism;
(d)
being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e)
engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety
of persons in Canada; or
(f)
being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to
believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c).
(2)
The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility
in respect of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the
Minister that their presence in Canada
would not be detrimental to the national interest.
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34. (1) Emportent interdiction
de territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits suivants :
a)
être l’auteur d’actes d’espionnage ou se livrer à la subversion contre toute
institution démocratique, au sens où cette expression s’entend au Canada;
b)
être l’instigateur ou l’auteur d’actes visant au renversement d’un
gouvernement par la force;
c)
se livrer au terrorisme;
d)
constituer un danger pour la sécurité du Canada;
e)
être l’auteur de tout acte de violence susceptible de mettre en danger la vie
ou la sécurité d’autrui au Canada;
f)
être membre d’une organisation dont il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire
qu’elle est, a été ou sera l’auteur d’un acte visé aux alinéas a), b) ou c).
(2)
Ces faits n’emportent pas interdiction de territoire pour le résident
permanent ou l’étranger qui convainc le ministre que sa présence au Canada ne
serait nullement préjudiciable à l’intérêt national.
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35. (1) A permanent resident or
a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of violating human or
international rights for
(a)
committing an act outside Canada that constitutes an offence
referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act;
(b)
being a prescribed senior official in the service of a government that, in
the opinion of the Minister, engages or has engaged in terrorism, systematic
or gross human rights violations, or genocide, a war crime or a crime against
humanity within the meaning of subsections 6(3) to (5) of the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act; or
(c)
being a person, other than a permanent resident, whose entry into or stay in
Canada is restricted pursuant to a decision, resolution or measure of an
international organization of states or association of states, of which
Canada is a member, that imposes sanctions on a country against which Canada
has imposed or has agreed to impose sanctions in concert with that organization
or association.
(2)
Paragraphs (1)(b) and (c) do not apply in the case of a permanent resident or
a foreign national who satisfies the Minister that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to
the national interest.
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35. (1) Emportent interdiction
de territoire pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux les faits
suivants:
a)
commettre, hors du Canada, une des infractions visées aux articles 4 à 7 de
la Loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre;
b)
occuper un poste de rang supérieur — au sens du règlement — au sein d’un
gouvernement qui, de l’avis du ministre, se livre ou s’est livré au
terrorisme, à des violations graves ou répétées des droits de la personne ou
commet ou a commis un génocide, un crime contre l’humanité ou un crime de
guerre au sens des paragraphes 6(3) à (5) de la Loi sur les crimes contre
l’humanité et les crimes de guerre;
c)
être, sauf s’agissant du résident permanent, une personne dont l’entrée ou le
séjour au Canada est limité au titre d’une décision, d’une résolution ou
d’une mesure d’une organisation internationale d’États ou une association
d’États dont le Canada est membre et qui impose des sanctions à l’égard d’un
pays contre lequel le Canada a imposé — ou s’est engagé à imposer — des
sanctions de concert avec cette organisation ou association.
(2)
Les faits visés aux alinéas (1)b) et c) n’emportent pas interdiction de
territoire pour le résident permanent ou l’étranger qui convainc le ministre
que sa présence au Canada ne serait nullement préjudiciable à l’intérêt
national.
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36. (1) A permanent resident or
a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for
(a)
having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act
of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10
years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of
imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed;
(b)
having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in
Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by
a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or
(c)
committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was
committed and that, if committed in Canada,
would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a
maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.
(2)
A foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of criminality for
(a)
having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act
of Parliament punishable by way of indictment, or of two offences under any
Act of Parliament not arising out of a single occurrence;
(b)
having been convicted outside Canada
of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable
offence under an Act of Parliament, or of two offences not arising out of a
single occurrence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute offences under an
Act of Parliament;
(c)
committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the
place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an
indictable offence under an Act of Parliament; or
(d)
committing, on entering Canada, an offence under an Act of
Parliament prescribed by regulations.
(3)
The following provisions govern subsections (1) and (2):
(a)
an offence that may be prosecuted either summarily or by way of indictment is
deemed to be an indictable offence, even if it has been prosecuted summarily;
(b)
inadmissibility under subsections (1) and (2) may not be based on a conviction
in respect of which a pardon has been granted and has not ceased to have
effect or been revoked under the Criminal Records Act, or in respect of which
there has been a final determination of an acquittal;
(c)
the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)(b) and (c) and (2)(b) and (c) do
not constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent resident or foreign
national who, after the prescribed period, satisfies the Minister that they
have been rehabilitated or who is a member of a prescribed class that is
deemed to have been rehabilitated;
(d)
a determination of whether a permanent resident has committed an act
described in paragraph (1)(c) must be based on a balance of probabilities;
and
(e)
inadmissibility under subsections (1) and (2) may not be based on an offence
designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence
under the Young Offenders Act.
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36. (1) Emportent interdiction
de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants :
a)
être déclaré coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi fédérale
punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans ou d’une infraction
à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est
infligé;
b)
être déclaré coupable, à l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise
au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un
emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans;
c)
commettre, à l’extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada,
constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un
emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans.
(2)
Emportent, sauf pour le résident permanent, interdiction de territoire pour
criminalité les faits suivants :
a)
être déclaré coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable
par mise en accusation ou de deux infractions à toute loi fédérale qui ne
découlent pas des mêmes faits;
b)
être déclaré coupable, à l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise
au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par
mise en accusation ou de deux infractions qui ne découlent pas des mêmes
faits et qui, commises au Canada, constitueraient des infractions à des lois
fédérales;
c)
commettre, à l’extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait
une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation;
d)
commettre, à son entrée au Canada, une infraction qui constitue une
infraction à une loi fédérale précisée par règlement.
(3)
Les dispositions suivantes régissent l’application des paragraphes (1) et (2)
:
a)
l’infraction punissable par mise en accusation ou par procédure sommaire est
assimilée à l’infraction punissable par mise en accusation, indépendamment du
mode de poursuite effectivement retenu;
b)
la déclaration de culpabilité n’emporte pas interdiction de territoire en cas
de verdict d’acquittement rendu en dernier ressort ou de réhabilitation —
sauf cas de révocation ou de nullité — au titre de la Loi sur le casier
judiciaire;
c)
les faits visés aux alinéas (1)b) ou c) et (2)b) ou c) n’emportent pas
interdiction de territoire pour le résident permanent ou l’étranger qui, à
l’expiration du délai réglementaire, convainc le ministre de sa réadaptation
ou qui appartient à une catégorie réglementaire de personnes présumées
réadaptées;
d)
la preuve du fait visé à l’alinéa (1)c) est, s’agissant du résident
permanent, fondée sur la prépondérance des probabilités;
e)
l’interdiction de territoire ne peut être fondée sur une infraction qualifiée
de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ni sur une
infraction à la Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants.
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44. (1)
An officer who is of the opinion that a permanent resident or a foreign
national who is in Canada is inadmissible may prepare
a report setting out the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to
the Minister.
(2)
If the Minister is of the opinion that the report is well-founded, the
Minister may refer the report to the Immigration Division for an
admissibility hearing, except in the case of a permanent resident who is
inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have failed to comply with the
residency obligation under section 28 and except, in the circumstances
prescribed by the regulations, in the case of a foreign national. In those
cases, the Minister may make a removal order.
(3)
An officer or the Immigration Division may impose any conditions, including
the payment of a deposit or the posting of a guarantee for compliance with
the conditions, that the officer or the Division considers necessary on a
permanent resident or a foreign national who is the subject of a report, an
admissibility hearing or, being in Canada, a removal order.
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44. (1) S’il estime que le
résident permanent ou l’étranger qui se trouve au Canada est interdit de territoire,
l’agent peut établir un rapport circonstancié, qu’il transmet au ministre.
(2)
S’il estime le rapport bien fondé, le ministre peut déférer l’affaire à la
Section de l’immigration pour enquête, sauf s’il s’agit d’un résident
permanent interdit de territoire pour le seul motif qu’il n’a pas respecté
l’obligation de résidence ou, dans les circonstances visées par les
règlements, d’un étranger; il peut alors prendre une mesure de renvoi.
(3)
L’agent ou la Section de l’immigration peut imposer les conditions qu’il
estime nécessaires, notamment la remise d’une garantie d’exécution, au
résident permanent ou à l’étranger qui fait l’objet d’un rapport ou d’une
enquête ou, étant au Canada, d’une mesure de renvoi.
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Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227
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14. For the purpose of
determining whether a foreign national or permanent resident is inadmissible
under paragraph 34(1)(c) of the Act, if either the following determination or
decision has been rendered, the findings of fact set out in that
determination or decision shall be considered as conclusive findings of fact:
(a)
a determination by the Board, based on findings that the foreign national or
permanent resident has engaged in terrorism, that the foreign national or
permanent resident is a person referred to in section F of Article 1 of the
Refugee Convention; or
(b)
a decision by a Canadian court under the Criminal Code concerning the foreign
national or permanent resident and the commission of a terrorism offence.
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14. Les
décisions ci-après ont, quant aux faits, force de chose jugée pour le constat
de l’interdiction de territoire d’un étranger ou d’un résident permanent au
titre de l’alinéa 34(1)c) de la Loi :
a)
toute décision de la Commission, fondée sur les conclusions que l’intéressé a
participé à des actes terroristes, qu’il est visé par la section F de
l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés;
b)
toute décision rendue en vertu du Code criminel par un tribunal canadien à
l’égard de l’intéressé concernant une infraction de terrorisme.
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15. For the purpose of determining whether
a foreign national or permanent resident is inadmissible under paragraph
35(1)(a) of the Act, if any of the following decisions or the following
determination has been rendered, the findings of fact set out in that
decision or determination shall be considered as conclusive findings of fact:
(a)
a decision concerning the foreign national or permanent resident that is made
by any international criminal tribunal that is established by resolution of
the Security Council of the United Nations, or the International Criminal
Court as defined in the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act;
(b)
a determination by the Board, based on findings that the foreign national or
permanent resident has committed a war crime or a crime against humanity,
that the foreign national or permanent resident is a person referred to in
section F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention; or
(c)
a decision by a Canadian court under the Criminal Code or the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act concerning the foreign national or permanent
resident and a war crime or crime against humanity committed outside Canada.
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15. Les décisions ci-après ont,
quant aux faits, force de chose jugée pour le constat de l’interdiction de
territoire d’un étranger ou d’un résident permanent au titre de l’alinéa
35(1)a) de la Loi :
a)
toute décision rendue à l’égard de l’intéressé par tout tribunal pénal
international établi par résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies
ou par la Cour pénale internationale au sens de la Loi sur les crimes contre
l’humanité et les crimes de guerre;
b)
toute décision de la Commission, fondée sur les conclusions que l’intéressé a
commis un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, qu’il est visé par
la section F de l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés;
c)
toute décision rendue en vertu du Code criminel ou de la Loi sur les crimes
contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre par un tribunal canadien à l’égard
de l’intéressé concernant un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité
commis à l’extérieur du Canada.
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17. For the purposes of
paragraph 36(3)(c) of the Act, the prescribed period is five years
(a)
after the completion of an imposed sentence, in the case of matters referred
to in paragraphs 36(1)(b) and (2)(b) of the Act, if the person has not been
convicted of a subsequent offence other than an offence designated as a
contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Young
Offenders Act; and
(b)
after committing an offence, in the case of matters referred to in paragraphs
36(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Act, if the person has not been convicted of a
subsequent offence other than an offence designated as a contravention under
the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Young Offenders Act.
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17. Pour l’application de
l’alinéa 36(3)c) de la Loi, le délai réglementaire est de cinq ans à compter
:
a)
dans le cas des faits visés aux alinéas 36(1)b) ou (2)b) de la Loi, du moment
où la peine imposée a été purgée, pourvu que la personne n’ait pas été
déclarée coupable d’une infraction subséquente autre qu’une infraction
qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ou une
infraction à la Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants;
b)
dans le cas des faits visés aux alinéas 36(1)c) ou (2)c) de la Loi, du moment
de la commission de l’infraction, pourvu que la personne n’ait pas été
déclarée coupable d’une infraction subséquente autre qu’une infraction
qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ou une
infraction à la Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants.
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18. (1) For the purposes of
paragraph 36(3)(c) of the Act, the class of persons deemed to have been
rehabilitated is a prescribed class.
(2)
The following persons are members of the class of persons deemed to have been
rehabilitated:
(a)
persons who have been convicted outside Canada of no more than one offence
that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an
indictable offence under an Act of Parliament, if all of the following
conditions apply, namely,
(i)
the offence is punishable in Canada by a maximum term of
imprisonment of less than 10 years,
(ii)
at least 10 years have elapsed since the day after the completion of the
imposed sentence,
(iii)
the person has not been convicted in Canada of an indictable offence under an Act
of Parliament,
(iv)
the person has not been convicted in Canada of any summary conviction offence
within the last 10 years under an Act of Parliament or of more than one
summary conviction offence before the last 10 years, other than an offence
designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence
under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,
(v)
the person has not within the last 10 years been convicted outside Canada of
an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an
Act of Parliament, other than an offence designated as a contravention under
the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,
(vi)
the person has not before the last 10 years been convicted outside Canada of more than one offence
that, if committed in Canada, would constitute a summary
conviction offence under an Act of Parliament, and
(vii)
the person has not committed an act described in paragraph 36(2)(c) of the
Act;
(b)
persons convicted outside Canada of two or more offences that, if committed
in Canada, would constitute summary
conviction offences under any Act of Parliament, if all of the following
conditions apply, namely,
(i)
at least five years have elapsed since the day after the completion of the
imposed sentences,
(ii)
the person has not been convicted in Canada of an indictable offence under an Act
of Parliament,
(iii)
the person has not within the last five years been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act
of Parliament, other than an offence designated as a contravention under the
Contraventions Act or an offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,
(iv)
the person has not within the last five years been convicted outside Canada
of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under
an Act of Parliament, other than an offence designated as a contravention
under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Youth Criminal Justice
Act,
(v)
the person has not before the last five years been convicted in Canada of
more than one summary conviction offence under an Act of Parliament, other
than an offence designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act or
an offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,
(vi)
the person has not been convicted of an offence referred to in paragraph
36(2)(b) of the Act that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable
offence, and
(vii)
the person has not committed an act described in paragraph 36(2)(c) of the
Act; and
(c)
persons who have committed no more than one act outside Canada that is an offence in the
place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an
indictable offence under an Act of Parliament, if all of the following
conditions apply, namely,
(i)
the offence is punishable in Canada by a maximum term of
imprisonment of less than 10 years,
(ii)
at least 10 years have elapsed since the day after the commission of the
offence,
(iii)
the person has not been convicted in Canada of an indictable offence under an Act
of Parliament,
(iv)
the person has not been convicted in Canada of any summary conviction offence
within the last 10 years under an Act of Parliament or of more than one
summary conviction offence before the last 10 years, other than an offence
designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence
under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,
(v)
the person has not within the last 10 years been convicted outside of Canada
of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under
an Act of Parliament, other than an offence designated as a contravention
under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Youth Criminal Justice
Act,
(vi)
the person has not before the last 10 years been convicted outside Canada of
more than one offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute a summary conviction
offence under an Act of Parliament, and
(vii)
the person has not been convicted outside of Canada of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an
indictable offence under an Act of Parliament.
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18. (1) Pour l’application de
l’alinéa 36(3)c) de la Loi, la catégorie des personnes présumées réadaptées
est une catégorie réglementaire.
(2)
Font partie de la catégorie des personnes présumées réadaptées les personnes
suivantes :
a)
la personne déclarée coupable, à l’extérieur du Canada, d’au plus une
infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi
fédérale punissable par mise en accusation si les conditions suivantes sont
réunies :
(i)
l’infraction est punissable au Canada d’un emprisonnement maximal de moins de
dix ans,
(ii)
au moins dix ans se sont écoulés depuis le moment où la peine imposée a été
purgée,
(iii)
la personne n’a pas été déclarée coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une
loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation,
(iv)
elle n’a pas été déclarée coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi
fédérale punissable par procédure sommaire dans les dix dernières années ou
de plus d’une telle infraction avant les dix dernières années, autre qu’une
infraction qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les
contraventions ou une infraction à la Loi sur le système de justice pénale
pour les adolescents,
(v)
elle n’a pas, dans les dix dernières années, été déclarée coupable, à
l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait
une infraction à une loi fédérale, autre qu’une infraction qualifiée de
contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ou une infraction à
la Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents,
(vi)
elle n’a pas, avant les dix dernières années, été déclarée coupable, à
l’extérieur du Canada, de plus d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada,
constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par procédure
sommaire,
(vii)
elle n’a pas commis l’infraction visée à l’alinéa 36(2)c) de la Loi;
b)
la personne déclarée coupable, à l’extérieur du Canada, de deux infractions
ou plus qui, commises au Canada, constitueraient des infractions à une loi
fédérale punissables par procédure sommaire si les conditions suivantes sont
réunies :
(i)
au moins cinq ans se sont écoulés depuis le moment où les peines imposées ont
été purgées,
(ii)
la personne n’a pas été déclarée coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une
loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation,
(iii)
elle n’a pas, dans les cinq dernières années, été déclarée coupable au Canada
d’une infraction à une loi fédérale, autre qu’une infraction qualifiée de
contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ou une infraction à
la Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents,
(iv)
elle n’a pas, dans les cinq dernières années, été déclarée coupable, à
l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait
une infraction à une loi fédérale, autre qu’une infraction qualifiée de
contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ou une infraction à
la Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents,
(v)
elle n’a pas, avant les cinq dernières années, été déclarée coupable au
Canada de plus d’une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par procédure
sommaire, autre qu’une infraction qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la
Loi sur les contraventions ou une infraction à la Loi sur le système de
justice pénale pour les adolescents,
(vi)
elle n’a pas été déclarée coupable d’une infraction visée à l’alinéa 36(2)b)
de la Loi qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction punissable par
mise en accusation,
(vii)
elle n’a pas commis l’infraction visée à l’alinéa 36(2)c) de la Loi;
c)
la personne qui a commis, à l’extérieur du Canada, au plus une infraction
qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale
punissable par mise en accusation si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :
(i)
l’infraction est punissable au Canada d’un emprisonnement maximal de moins de
dix ans,
(ii)
au moins dix ans se sont écoulés depuis le moment de la commission de
l’infraction,
(iii)
la personne n’a pas été déclarée coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une
loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation,
(iv)
elle n’a pas été déclarée coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi
fédérale punissable par procédure sommaire dans les dix dernières années ou
de plus d’une telle infraction avant les dix dernières années, autre qu’une
infraction qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les
contraventions ou une infraction à la Loi sur le système de justice pénale
pour les adolescents,
(v)
elle n’a pas, dans les dix dernières années, été déclarée coupable, à
l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait
une infraction à une loi fédérale, autre qu’une infraction qualifiée de
contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ou une infraction à
la Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents,
(vi)
elle n’a pas, avant les dix dernières années, été déclarée coupable, à
l’extérieur du Canada, de plus d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada,
constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par procédure
sommaire,
(vii)
elle n’a pas été déclarée coupable, à l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction
qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale
punissable par mise en accusation.
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339. A determination made in Canada before the coming into
force of this section that a person is not a Convention refugee is deemed to
be a claim for refugee protection rejected by the Board.
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339. Est
assimilée au rejet d’une demande d’asile par la Commission la décision rendue
au Canada avant l’entrée en vigueur du présent article selon laquelle une
personne n’est pas un réfugié au sens de la Convention.
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Criminal
Code, R.S.,
1985, c. C-46
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21. (1) Every one is a party to
an offence who
(a)
actually commits it;
(b)
does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit
it; or
(c)
abets any person in committing it.
(2)
Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an
unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in
carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or
ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable
consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.
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21. (1) Participent à une
infraction :
a)
quiconque la commet réellement;
b)
quiconque accomplit ou omet d’accomplir quelque chose en vue d’aider
quelqu’un à la commettre;
c)
quiconque encourage quelqu’un à la commettre.
(2)
Quand deux ou plusieurs personnes forment ensemble le projet de poursuivre
une fin illégale et de s’y entraider et que l’une d’entre elles commet une
infraction en réalisant cette fin commune, chacune d’elles qui savait ou
devait savoir que la réalisation de l’intention commune aurait pour
conséquence probable la perpétration de l’infraction, participe à cette
infraction.
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22. (1) Where a person counsels
another person to be a party to an offence and that other person is
afterwards a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party to
that offence, notwithstanding that the offence was committed in a way
different from that which was counselled.
(2)
Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offence is a party
to every offence that the other commits in consequence of the counselling
that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be
committed in consequence of the counselling.
(3)
For the purposes of this Act, "counsel" includes procure, solicit
or incite.
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22. (1) Lorsqu’une personne
conseille à une autre personne de participer à une infraction et que cette
dernière y participe subséquemment, la personne qui a conseillé participe à
cette infraction, même si l’infraction a été commise d’une manière différente
de celle qui avait été conseillée.
(2)
Quiconque conseille à une autre personne de participer à une infraction
participe à chaque infraction que l’autre commet en conséquence du conseil et
qui, d’après ce que savait ou aurait dû savoir celui qui a conseillé, était
susceptible d’être commise en conséquence du conseil.
(3)
Pour l’application de la présente loi, « conseiller » s’entend
d’amener et d’inciter, et « conseil » s’entend de l’encouragement
visant à amener ou à inciter.
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433. Every person who
intentionally or recklessly causes damage by fire or explosion to property,
whether or not that person owns the property, is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for life where
(a)
the person knows that or is reckless with respect to whether the property is
inhabited or occupied; or
(b)
the fire or explosion causes bodily harm to another person.
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433. Est coupable d’un acte
criminel et passible de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité toute personne qui,
intentionnellement ou sans se soucier des conséquences de son acte, cause par
le feu ou par une explosion un dommage à un bien, que ce bien lui appartienne
ou non, dans les cas suivants :
a)
elle sait que celui-ci est habité ou occupé, ou ne s’en soucie pas;
b)
le feu ou l’explosion cause des lésions corporelles à autrui.
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434. Every person who intentionally or recklessly causes
damage by fire or explosion to property that is not wholly owned by that
person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding fourteen years.
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434. Est coupable d’un acte
criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de quatorze ans quiconque,
intentionnellement ou sans se soucier des conséquences de son acte, cause par
le feu ou par une explosion un dommage à un bien qui ne lui appartient pas en
entier.
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