Date:
20120720
Docket:
IMM-489-12
Citation:
2012 FC 905
Montréal, Quebec, July 20, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
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ERNIE VILLEGAS LUMOCSO
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Applicant
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and
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MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
[1] It
is understood that the rule of law and the recognition of international law,
therein, cannot be a recipe for society’s suicide in the midst of the chaos of
terror. Exceptional circumstances necessitate exceptional responses; yet, the
rule of law cannot be held hostage to chaos, it must be acknowledged as an
antidote for recalibration of society’s equilibrium-barometer throughout, or,
at the very least, restored in an incremental manner, if not completely, at the
first opportunity for its ultimate “desired” retrieval.
How the war on violence is waged
and the limits it imposes on itself, in our time, are components of the same
equation of society’s measurement of its past action – each component to be
weighed on an on-going basis.
In the fight to subjugate
violence bred of terror, at what cost is law set aside; and thus, the deepest
values, the law embodies, held in abeyance, or even discarded – when the
innocent and the guilty are undistinguished from one another. A reflection for
judgment becomes “a luxury” that certain authorities deem dispensable due to
the danger of annihilation in the midst of chaos.
Can the pendulum of the law and
justice be recalibrated or can its recalibration even be contemplated in the
heat of the action? Is there a possibility that the law, too, then, together
with life, becomes a casualty irretrievably lost to the deemed indiscriminate
danger of annihilation? Is the rule of law, simply, to be considered as a
reflection of serenity’s hindsight, not appropriate for consideration on the
battlefield of chaos?
In that situation, measured or
weighed, response or strategy is deemed by certain authorities to be the
naïveté of those distant from danger’s battlefield, not engaged or caught up in
the heat or line of fire of the situation.
If that would be the case, the
rule of law and the recognition of international law, therein, would no longer
have a place in society. The rule of law cannot simply be a bystander when
chaos reigns; it must serve as an eventual witness; thus, it formulates a
response to the disproportionate use of force, as used by units such as the one
to which the Applicant belonged.
Furthermore, it must be
recognized that a particular background, setting and context to the human
condition of a specific situation must be examined, in and of itself, before it
can be compared to any other particular background, setting and context
to the human condition, unfolding, or unfolded, elsewhere.
As the undersigned, himself, had
written in a decision, Petrov v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 FC 465, the same holds as such in this decision.
II. Introduction
[2]
The
Applicant, who was an intelligence official in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines [AFP], was denied refugee protection because there were serious
grounds to consider that he had participated, as an accomplice, in crimes
against humanity committed by the AFP.
[3]
The
following excerpts describe the context:
Two ongoing conflicts and resulting
counter-insurgency operations contextualise the third vulnerable group
consisting of suspected insurgents and sympathizers. The first conflict is that
between the AFP and the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) the New People’s Army (NPA), the second that between the AFP and Muslim
secessionists in Mindanao. In both situations those who are thought to be
associated with or sympathetic to the insurgent groups are at a higher risk of
torture and other grave human rights violations.
…
Individuals, groups and communities
associated with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Moro National
Liberation front (MNLF), the Abu Sayyaf and related factions have also faced
increased risks of torture and other grave human rights violations in the
context of counter-insurgency campaigns. [Emphasis added].
(Exhibit M-16, entitled,
Philippines: Torture persists: appearance and reality within the criminal
justice system, from Amnesty International, dated January 2003, Tribunal Record
[TR] at p 398).
[4]
Having
considered the evidence and the applicable law, the intervention of this Court
is not warranted.
III. Judicial Procedure
[5]
This
is an application, pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], for judicial review of
a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board [Board], dated January 3, 2012, in which the Applicant's refugee
protection claim was rejected due to serious reasons to consider that he has
committed crimes against humanity.
IV. Background
[6]
The
Applicant, Mr. Ernie Villegas Lumocso, is a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
[7]
The
Applicant was a member of the AFP from December 1995 to August 2007. He acted
successively as a soldier, a radio operator, an intelligence operator, and as a
team leader in the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
[ISAP].
[8]
As
an intelligence officer, the Applicant tracked members of the Abu Sayyaf separatist organization and arrested the leader of the organization, named Galib
Andang “Commander Robot”, in December 2003.
[9]
The
Applicant entered Canada on August 6, 2007 with a visitor’s visa for the
purpose of the study of the English language as a part of a military training
program.
[10]
Should
he return to his country of origin, the Applicant alleges a fear of persecution
by the Abu Sayyaf separatist organization due to his participation in the
arrest of its leader.
V. Decision under Review
[11]
The
Board excluded the Applicant from the benefit of refugee protection pursuant to
section 98 of the IRPA and sections 1F(a) and 1F(c) of the
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees [Convention].
[12]
The
Board relied on the documentary evidence demonstrating the existence of serious
grounds to consider that the AFP had committed crimes against humanity. The
Board had confronted the Applicant with the evidence.
[13]
The
Board found that serious grounds exist by which to consider that the Applicant
had participated in crimes against humanity as an accomplice during his
military service. To support its conclusion, the Board considered the six
criteria stated by this Court in Ryivuze v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2007 FC 134, 325 FTR 30.
[14]
With
respect to the nature of the organization, itself, the Board recognized the
army’s overall legitimate role.
[15]
With
regard to the method of recruitment, the Board concluded that the Applicant was
not recruited forcibly and joined the AFP voluntarily because it provided stable
employment.
[16]
Concerning
the third criterion, which is the position in the organization, the Board
explained that the exceptional service rendered by the Applicant to the AFP
allowed him to reach the rank of a technical sergeant. He was an active member
of the intelligence in the global war against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group
conducted by the AFP.
[17]
Regarding
the Applicant’s knowledge of the atrocities committed within his organization,
the Board compared the documentary evidence to the Applicant’s testimony.
According to the Applicant, the crimes were committed by the communists and Abu Sayyaf and not by the army.
[18]
The
Board preferred the documentary evidence to that of the Applicant. The Board
found that the Applicant had actively been involved as an intelligence official
and had acted with wilful blindness (Shakarabi v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 145 FTR 297, [1998] FCJ No 444
(QL/Lexis)).
[19]
With
respect to the length of time in the organization, the Board noted that the
Applicant was a member of the AFP for a considerable period of time, from the
beginning of December 1995 until August 2007.
[20]
With
regard to the Applicant’s opportunity to leave the organization, the Board
noted that the Applicant even wore his military uniform to the Board hearings
and he had remained an AFP member even subsequent to his arrival in Canada to
study English. Eventually, he alleges that he would be considered a deserter.
The Board concluded that the Applicant neither chose nor wanted to be
disassociated from the AFP.
VI. Issue
[21]
Is
the Board’s decision to exclude the Applicant from refugee protection for
complicity in crimes against humanity, pursuant to section 98 of the IRPA,
reasonable?
VII. Relevant Legislative
Provisions
[22]
The
following legislative provision of the IRPA is relevant:
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Exclusion
— Refugee Convention
98. A person referred
to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a
Convention refugee or a person in need of protection
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Exclusion
par application de la Convention sur les réfugiés
98. La personne visée
aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne
peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger.
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[23]
The
following legislative provisions of the Convention scheduled to the IRPA
are relevant:
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SCHEDULE
(Subsection 2(1))
SECTIONS E AND F OF
ARTICLE 1 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
E.
This
Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent
authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the
rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the
nationality of that country.
F. The provisions of
this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in
the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes;
(b) he has committed a
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his
admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty
of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
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ANNEXE
(paragraphe 2(1))
SECTIONS E ET F DE
L’ARTICLE PREMIER DE LA CONVENTION DES NATIONS UNIES RELATIVE AU STATUT DES
RÉFUGIÉS
E. Cette Convention ne
sera pas applicable à une personne considérée par les autorités compétentes
du pays dans lequel cette personne a établi sa résidence comme ayant les
droits et les obligations attachés à la possession de la nationalité de ce
pays.
F. Les dispositions de
cette Convention ne seront pas applicables aux personnes dont on aura des
raisons sérieuses de penser :
a) Qu’elles ont commis un crime
contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, au sens des
instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions relatives à
ces crimes;
b) Qu’elles ont commis un crime
grave de droit commun en dehors du pays d’accueil avant d’y être admises
comme réfugiés;
c) Qu’elles se sont rendues
coupables d’agissements contraires aux buts et aux principes des Nations
Unies.
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VIII. Position of the Parties
[24]
The
Applicant submits that the Board failed to provide reasons in support of
several of the criteria of Ryivuze, above, relating to the method of
recruitment. In addition, the Applicant argues that the Board failed to
establish a link between his position and his alleged complicity in crimes
against humanity. The Applicant explains that his role was not one of leadership
and that he was simply subordinate to his officers’ orders. He contends that
his mission to capture the leader of the Abu Sayyaf group was a legitimate one.
He added that, in an armed conflict, civilians are regrettably victims of human
rights violations.
[25]
The
Applicant, then, argues that Shakarabi, above, does not apply to his
case as he acted against a terrorist group, not against civilians, and that the
AFP has no brutal purpose; therefore, the information he obtained as an
intelligence officer did not concern the innocent population but rather an
internal enemy.
[26]
The
Applicant submits that the Board omitted to address the sixth criterion and,
furthermore, did not question his credibility. Consequently, his testimony to
the effect that he had not participated in crimes against humanity should have
been believed. The Applicant adds that the Board failed to address the country
of origin’s documentary evidence and, specifically, his certification from the
Human Rights Commission, therein.
[27]
The
Respondent submits that, according to the documentary evidence, the Board’s
finding that the AFP is an organization that has committed crimes against
humanity is reasonable in light of the evidence.
[28]
With
respect to the Applicant’s complicity, the Respondent contends that the Board,
having recognized the active role the Applicant played as an intelligence
official, was entitled to find that the Applicant was complicit in crimes
against humanity, especially, given the fact that the documentary evidence
demonstrates crimes were committed in the same region where the Applicant
operated.
[29]
The
Respondent argues that the reasons given by the Board should be read as a
whole, not microscopically, and that they are supported by the jurisprudence of
this Court.
IX. Analysis
[30]
The
decision to exclude the Applicant from the definition of refugee under
subsections 1F(a) and (c) of the Convention is reviewable
under the standard of reasonableness; therefore, the Board’s conclusion must
fall in the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para 47; Ryivuze, above).
[31]
Furthermore,
according to the Supreme Court of Canada, “the reasons must be read together
with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls
within a range of possible outcomes” (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’
Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3
SCR 708 at para 14).
[32]
It
should also be noted that the words “serious reasons for considering that”,
pursuant to section 1F of the Convention, refers to a burden of proof
less onerous than the civil burden of proof on a balance of probabilities (Ramirez
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 FC 306).
[33]
This
Court is of the opinion that the Board provided a detailed analysis that gave
sufficient reasons to support its conclusion.
Crimes against
Humanity
[34]
The
Applicant’s own admission of the existence of serious grounds to consider that
the AFP had committed crimes against humanity is significant, despite the fact
that the Board itself did not qualify the AFP as an organization with a limited
brutal purpose.
[35]
Given
the documentary evidence assessed and the context of the Applicant’s admission,
the Applicant has not demonstrated that the Board erred in its finding that the
AFP had committed crimes against humanity as per section 7 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on July 17, 1998.
[36]
The
evidence cited by the Board demonstrated unequivocally that these crimes were
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population and were in the nature of crimes against humanity (Mugesera
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 39, [2005] 2
SCR 91).
[37]
The
Board specifically focused its analysis on the human rights violations against
civilians that had been committed by the AFP during its war against the Abu Sayyaf separatist organization (Board’s Decision at paras 13-16).
Complicity
[38]
The
main issue raised by the Applicant concerns his complicity. Essentially, he
denies knowledge of the AFP’s crimes against humanity given the methods and
activities of the organization in its military role.
[39]
Complicity
is based on the existence of a shared common purpose and knowledge that a said
individual has of the commission of the specific crimes discussed (Ishaku v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 44 at para 57; Thomas v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 838).
[40]
As
stated by the Federal Court of Appeal, it must be recognized that “exclusion
applies even if the specific acts committed by the appellant himself are not
crimes against humanity as such. In short, if the organization persecutes the
civilian population the fact that the appellant himself persecuted only the
military [militant segment of the] population does not mean that he will escape
the exclusion, if he is an accomplice by association as well” (Harb v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 39 at para 11).
[41]
The
Board did not qualify the AFP as an organization with a limited brutal purpose.
To the contrary, the Board conceded that the AFP is an organization with a
legitimate purpose despite the ample documentary evidence that demonstrates
that this organization does not always act within the limits of the law and
that it does commit human rights violations. The Board did correctly set out
the applicable law in the present case.
[42]
The
Board did not commit a reviewable error when it referred to the case of Shakarabi,
above, in its analysis, which had been involved with an entity that had a
limited brutal purpose. To the contrary, the Board demonstrated how the
Applicant would or should have been aware of the crimes committed. As stated in
Tayar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 567:
[26] According to the case law, where an
individual is or should be aware that information the individual provides to a
group responsible for committing crimes against humanity, or information that
may have harmful consequences for the persons it concerns (such as torture,
rape, imprisonment without being charged or tried, mass expulsion of civilians
from their territory), a panel may reasonably conclude
that the individual was complicit, as that term is understood in
international criminal law, in the crimes against humanity so committed …
[Emphasis added].
[43]
The
Board did not apply a presumption of knowledge as the Applicant contends.
Rather, the mental element or mens rea required was not inferred because
of his mere membership; rather, the Board conducted a detailed analysis to
demonstrate how the Applicant had been an accomplice in the commission of
crimes against humanity.
[44]
In
the present case, applying the criteria of Ryivuze, above, the Board
noted inter alia that the Applicant:
a) Joined
the AFP voluntarily and had been a member for 12 years;
b) While
he was not an officer, he had been a sergeant in a high-ranking position and
had acted as an intelligence officer;
c) Had
excellent military service that provided him with the opportunity as a result
to progress within the army hierarchy;
d) Gathered
information and conducted investigations that led to the arrest of the leader
of the Abu Sayyaf group;
e) Provided
information to soldiers by which to neutralize the leader of the Abu Sayyaf
group;
f) Conducted
interrogations;
g) Had
an active role in the operations conducted by the ISAP by which to arrest Abu
Sayyaf organization members and the commander himself, in December 2003;
h) Admitted
having heard of the atrocities against civilians through the media, but denied
that the AFP had been the author of such atrocities;
i) Entered
Canada due to the AFP in order to learn English for its needs;
j) Wore
his uniform during the Board’s hearings and remained associated with the AFP
even subsequent to his arrival in Canada.
[45]
All
of these findings are not contested by the Applicant. They led the Board to the
conclusion that the Applicant had knowingly participated in the commission of
the crimes against humanity by the AFP. On this matter, itself, the Court
disagrees with the Applicant, who contends that the Board did not provide
sufficient reasons.
[46]
It
is clear that the position held by the Applicant had had an impact on the
Board’s negative inference subsequent to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision
in Sivakumar v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1
FC 433, [1993] FCJ No 1145 (QL/Lexis) (CA):
10 In my view, the case for an
individual's complicity in international crimes committed by his or her
organization is stronger if the individual member in question holds a position
of importance within the organization. Bearing in mind that each case must be
decided on its facts, the closer one is to being a leader rather than an
ordinary member, the more likely it is that an inference will be drawn that one
knew of the crime and shared the organization's purpose in committing that
crime. Thus, remaining in an organization in a leadership position with knowledge
that the organization was responsible for crimes against humanity may
constitute complicity …
(Reference is also made to Abbas
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 17, 245 FTR
174; Torkchin v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995]
FCJ No 113 (QL/Lexis))
[47]
The
Applicant was an intelligence official who had contributed directly and
effectively to the capture of the leader of the enemy organization, the AFP.
His efforts had been recognized by the AFP and he had been recommended for the
Distinguished Conduct Star Award (TR at p 195).
[48]
As
noted by the Board, the documentary evidence demonstrates that operations
conducted in 2003 involved violence of an inhumane degree which had, in fact,
been directed against the civilian population.
[49]
Reference
is made to
Exhibit M-21 which is entitled, “Terrorism and Human Rights in the Philippines
Fighting Terror or Terrorizing?”. It emanates from the International Federation
for Human Rights, dated April 2008, and specifies:
Along with the President, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are one of the main stakeholders in the
fight against terrorism. Along with the police, the army is generally
pointed out as the main perpetrator of human rights violations in the
Philippines: most of the civilians met during the fact finding mission
said they were more scared by the army than by terrorist groups.
…
Testimonies collected by the FIDH mission confirm
that torture occurs in most cases when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the law enforcement agencies arrest an individual suspected of rebellion or
of being an “enemy of the State.” Some persons met by the mission spoke about a
“culture of torture” within the AFP. Victims met by the mission unanimously
pointed out to the responsibility of AFP or the Philippine National Police
(PNP). Civilian auxiliaries under the control of AFP are also accused of
practicing torture. [Emphasis added].
(TR
at pp 676 and 706).
[50]
Moreover,
Exhibit M-13, entitled, US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights
Practices 2002 – Philippines, dated March 31, 2003, states:
Within the AFP, the CHR observed greater sensitivity
to the need to prevent human rights violations. Officers with human rights
violations cannot be promoted. Nevertheless, abuses still occurred. Human
rights activists complained of abuses by government security forces against
suspected ASG and NPA members in captivity. According to the Moro Human Rights
Center, members of the AFP frequently beat ASG suspects.
The CHR documented one case of torture from January
through June; TFDP reported seven cases from January through June. The AFP was implicated in many of these cases.
On March 31, AFP units reportedly beat 27 suspected
ASG members in Zamboanga City. The 27 complained that they were tied,
blindfolded, and punched until they admitted to membership in the ASG. As of
July, the authorities still detained seven, including two minors, in the
Basilan provincial jail. The rest had been released.
(TR
at pp 291-292).
[51]
Finally,
with regard to the certification from the Philippine Commission on Human
Rights, it is noted that the Board is not obligated to mention every piece of
evidence submitted; furthermore, the relevance of this document was not
demonstrated by the Applicant. It provides only information to the effect that,
as of September 2010, the Applicant had not had any cases pending against him (TR
at p 201).
[52]
Having
regard to the evidence and the applicable law, this Court is of the opinion
that the Board’s decision is reasonable.
X. Conclusion
[53]
For
all of the above reasons, the Applicant’s application for judicial review is
dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT ORDERS that the Applicant’s
application for judicial review be dismissed. No question of general importance
for certification.
Obiter:
Any
decision is, of course, not only a dialogue with, and between, the parties
themselves; but, it is also a silent dialogue between the three branches of
government, (each within its limits, exercising restraint): recognizing, that the
executive branch decides the direction of government and implements legislation
by initiating, managing and executing policies inherent to, and flowing from,
legislation; the legislative branch approves and enacts or passes legislation; the
judiciary interprets and applies legislation.
For
this dialogical process, the constitution, in its supremacy, serves as a guide
for the three branches of government. The legislative branch is not to enact
legislation that would subject anyone to cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment; neither is the executive branch to deprive anyone of their right to
life, liberty and security of the person, except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.
In
the case at bar, the gamut does not end with this decision. It is left to
the executive branch to act and effect the next step, which is, now, its alone
to take, within its jurisdiction [subsequent to an eventual Pre-Removal Risk
Assessment on which a determination will be made as to whether the Applicant’s
life is in peril due to potential pursuit further to his having been directly instrumental
in the arrest of a renowned terrorist organization leader]. [Emphasis
added].
The obiter, in large measure, is drawn
from an obiter to a decision of the undersigned wherein potential peril to the
Applicant was considered a likelihood (Soe v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 671).
“Michel M.J. Shore”