Date: 20070501
Docket: IMM-5359-06
Citation: 2007 FC 465
Ottawa, Ontario, May 1, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
ALEXANDR
PETROV
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
OVERVIEW
[1]
It
is understood that the rule of law and the recognition of international law,
therein, cannot be a recipe for society’s suicide in the midst of the chaos of
terror. Exceptional circumstances necessitate exceptional responses; yet, the
rule of law cannot be held hostage to chaos, it must be acknowledged as an
antidote for recalibration of society’s equilibrium-barometer throughout, or,
at the very least, restored in an incremental manner, if not completely, at the
first opportunity for its ultimate “desired” retrieval.
How the war
on violence is waged and the limits it imposes on itself, in our time, are
components of the same equation of society’s measurement of its past action –
each component to be weighed on an on-going basis.
In the fight
to subjugate violence bred of terror, at what cost is law set aside; and thus,
the deepest values, the law embodies, held in abeyance, or even discarded –
when the innocent and the guilty are undistinguished from one another. A
reflection for judgment becomes “a luxury” that certain authorities deem
dispensable due to the danger of annihilation in the midst of chaos.
Can the
pendulum of the law and justice be recalibrated or can its recalibration even
be contemplated in the heat of the action? Is there a possibility that the law,
too, then, together with life, becomes a casualty irretrievably lost to the
deemed indiscriminate danger of annihilation? Is the rule of law, simply, to be
considered as a reflection of serenity’s hindsight, not appropriate for consideration
on the battlefield of chaos?
In that
situation, measured or weighed, response or strategy is deemed by certain
authorities to be the naïveté of those distant from danger’s battlefield, not
engaged or caught up in the heat or line of fire of the situation.
If that would
be the case, the rule of law and the recognition of international law, therein,
would no longer have a place in society. The rule of law cannot simply be a
bystander when chaos reigns; it must serve as an eventual witness; thus, it formulates
a response to the disproportionate use of force, as used by units such as the
one to which the Applicant belonged.
Furthermore, it
must be recognized that a particular background, setting and context to the
human condition of a specific situation must be examined, in and of itself,
before it can be compared to any other particular background, setting and
context to the human condition, unfolding, or unfolded, elsewhere.
INTRODUCTION
[2]
Mr.
Alexandr Petrov falls within the parameters of Section F(a) of Article 1
of the Convention. There are serious reasons for considering that he is
complicit in crimes against humanity, by virtue of his activities with the
Russian police serving in Grozny, Chechnya. The atrocities and human rights
violations are well documented.
[3]
The
documents clearly indicate that members of the Russian police in Chechnya were
directly and indirectly responsible via the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) for
activities that constitute crimes against humanity, in a widespread and
systematic fashion. The documents also establish that the Russian police was in
clear violation of international humanitarian law.
[4]
In
applying the reasoning of Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306
(C.A.), [1992] F.C.J. No. 109 (F.C.A.) (QL); to the facts of this
case, it is clear that Mr. Petrov falls within Article 1F(a) and should
therefore be excluded from Convention Refugee consideration.
[5]
In
determining whether Mr. Petrov is an accomplice in crimes against humanity
versus an innocent bystander, it is very helpful to consider the following
comments of Justice Joseph Robertson in Moreno v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298, [1993] F.C.J. No. 912 (QL):
[46] … While I do
not suggest that the task of the Board is to arrive at a conclusion which is
fully supported by the application of criminal law principles, direction may be
taken from the words of Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was) writing for a
majority of the Court in Dunlop and Sylvester v. The Queen, [1979] 2
S.C.R. 881, in which he considered the offence of aiding and abetting: Mere
presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to ground culpability.
Something more is needed: encouragement of the principal offender; an act which
facilitates the commission of the offence, such as keeping watch on enticing
the victim away, or an act which tends to prevent or hinder interference with
accomplishment of the criminal act, such as preventing the intended victim from
escaping or being ready to assist the prime culprit.
[6]
This
reasoning is applied to the case of Mr. Petrov, it is clear that he was not
just an ordinary bystander witnessing the commission of atrocities in a
detached manner; rather, he was an integral and supporting part of the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs during the commission of these gross human
rights violations. The facts of this case clearly establish that Mr. Petrov was
a knowing and active participant of an organization that was committing gross
human rights abuses against civilians, on a systematic and widespread basis. He
was a member of the apparatus/machinery of the Russian Ministry of the
Interior and the FSB whose objectives were often achieved through the
commission of human rights abuses and violations of international law such as
civilian and criminal brutality, beatings, torture and death.
[7]
Even
if we accept that Mr. Petrov was never personally the one to inflict the pain
or to actually participate in the gross human rights violations, he must have
been aware of the atrocities committed by the organization of which he was an
integral part. He was part of the operation, even if he was not at its
nervous system. At a minimum, he played a supporting role to the
functions of the Ministry of the Interior, assisting the FSB and providing
support functions during his involvement with the Russian police. Therefore, he
is complicit in crimes against humanity committed by the Russian police and
FSB.
[8]
The
Court refers to the matter of Guitierrez v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), (1994) 84 F.T.R. 227, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1494
(QL):
[22] …
three prerequisites must be established in order to provide complicity in the
commission of an international offence: (1) membership in an organization which
committed international offenses as a continuous and regular part of its
operation, (2) personal and knowing participation, and (3) failure to
disassociate from the organization at the earliest safe opportunity.
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
[9]
This
is an application for judicial review, pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA), of a decision of the
Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Board)
rendered on August 6, 2006 wherein it found the Applicant was neither a
Convention refugee, nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 96
and subsection 97(1) of the IRPA by reason that he was excluded from protection
pursuant to section 98 of the IRPA under Article 1F(a) of the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention) for complicity in crimes
against humanity.
BACKGROUND
[10]
The
Applicant, Mr. Alexandr Petrov, is a citizen of Russia. In June 1, 1993, Mr. Petrov voluntarily
joined the Department of Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Tatarstan Republic, where he served as an operative representative
for the criminal police until April 1996.
[11]
In
March 1996, Mr. Petrov was chosen to go to Grozny, Chechnya to search for the military
commander, Shamil Bassayev, and to neutralize terrorist groups. Mr. Petrov allegedly
objected but was advised that it was his duty and that he would be tried and incarcerated
if he refused.
[12]
On
April 23, 1996, Mr. Petrov arrived in Grozny as a member of the group “Vitayz”, which was
composed of forty three (43) participants from the Department of Criminal
Investigation from forty three (43) different cities across Russia. Although Mr. Petrov
was informed by Moscow authorities that his
direct assignment was to locate Shamil Bassayev, the situation in Gozny had
changed. Once in Grozny, Mr. Petrov became a member of a battalion specially
designated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and was involved in actual
military actions in the Chechnya war.
[13]
While
in Chechnya, Mr. Petrov and other
members of Vitayz arrested Chechen rebels and neutralized several terrorist
groups. In June 1996, when the mission was over, twenty eight (28) members of
the group remained alive. Many of them, including Mr. Petrov, were declared
enemies by Chechen rebels. For his service during that time period, Mr. Petrov
was granted a cross for personal courage by the President of Russia.
[14]
Mr.
Petrov alleges that his problems began upon his return to Kazan on June 20, 1996, when
a journalist published, without his consent, an article in the Tatar newspaper
relating to his involvement in Chechnya.
[15]
In
1997, Mr. Petrov received threatening telephone calls and was beaten numerous
times. In addition, Mr. Petrov was demoted from the head of the criminal research
department of the Department of Criminal Investigation to an operative.
[16]
In
November 1997, Mr. Petrov was interrogated by the FSB about his activities in Chechnya. He was advised that
the authorities had concrete information relating to his actions in Chechnya that they were
investigating. Mr. Petrov then signed a document instructing him not to leave Kazan and to appear when
required.
[17]
In
April 1998, Mr. Petrov resigned from the police force. In January 1999, he was
detained and interrogated by the police as to his actions in Chechnya and his police work. In
July 1999, Mr. Petrov was beaten by four men; these assailants included an
individual that Mr. Petrov had seen in the FSB office. Following this
incident, Mr. Petrov moved out of Kazan and went to Moscow.
[18]
In
the Fall of 2000, Mr. Petrov learnt that there existed a campaign of repressing
the participants of Chechnya in Moscow. Due to this campaign,
one of the members of Vitayz was beaten several times by officials of the
Department of the Prevention of Terrorism, and false criminal charges were made
against him. Moreover, Mr. Petrov alleges that four members of the group Vitayz
were killed under strange circumstances. Mr. Petrov contends that the Vitayz
members were murdered as they had witnessed the events in Chechnya. He also alleges that
he, as well as his fellow Vitayz members, were perceived as being dangerous to
the government and were therefore being eliminated.
[19]
In
August 2002, Mr. Petrov entered Canada and claimed refugee protection shortly thereafter.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[20]
The Board
reviewed all of the evidence submitted and found that Mr. Petrov should be
excluded from refugee protection for the following reasons: (1) there are
serious reasons to believe that the Applicant committed crimes against humanity
while participating in the military operations in Chechnya in 1996; (2) there
are serious reasons to believe that Mr. Petrov was complicit in abuses of
detainees by turning them over to the FSB knowing full well that the FSB
tortured detainees in Chechnya; and (3) there are serious reasons to believe
that the Applicant had knowledge of the serious and widespread human rights
violations that were being committed by law enforcement and correctional
officials in Russia while he served the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1992
to 1998 and by these same officials in Chechnya while he was serving there in
1996.
ISSUE
[21]
Did
the Board err in concluding that Mr. Petrov should be excluded from refugee
protection pursuant to Article 1F(a) of the Convention?
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
[22]
Sections
96, 97 and 98 of the IRPA state:
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(a)
is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason
of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their
country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of
nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them
personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to
exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against
Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment if
(i)
the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of
the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that
country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that
country,
(iii) the risk is not
inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of
accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to
provide adequate health or medical care.
98. A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the
Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of
protection.
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96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié
— la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa
race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe
social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et
ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de
chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays
dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut y retourner.
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays
dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire,
d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention
contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou
peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la
protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du
pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
98. La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier
de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de
personne à protéger.
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[23]
Article 1F of the Convention
states:
1F.
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments
drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b)
He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
|
1F. Les dispositions de cette Convention ne seront pas
applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de penser :
a) Qu’elles ont commis un crime contre la paix, un crime de
guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, au sens des instruments internationaux
élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions relatives à ces crimes;
b) Qu’elles ont commis un crime grave de droit commun en dehors
du pays d’accueil avant d’y être admises comme réfugiés;
c) Qu’elles se
sont rendues coupables d’agissements contraires aux buts et aux principes des
Nations Unies.
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(Emphasis added.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[24]
Whether
Mr. Petrov should be excluded from refugee protection under Article 1F(a)
of the Convention is a question of mixed fact and law and should thus be
reviewed on a standard of reasonableness simpliciter. The Court can
therefore not intervene unless the Board’s decision is unreasonable. (Shrestha
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 887, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1154 (QL).)
ANALYSIS
[25]
According
to Section 98 of the IRPA, the definition of Convention refugee does not
include any person to whom the Convention does not apply pursuant to Section E
or F of Article 1 of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees. Sections E and F are included in the Act by way of a Schedule. In Mr.
Petrov’s case, Article 1F(a) is relevant and reads as follows:
1F.
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect
to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments
drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
|
1F. Les dispositions de cette Convention ne seront pas
applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de penser :
a) Qu’elles ont
commis un crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre
l’humanité, au sens des instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des
dispositions relatives à ces crimes;
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[26]
Article
1F of the Convention seeks to exclude from the benefit of refugee status
persons whose conduct, either towards civilians or, as government agents,
towards other states, is held to have breached international norms of
acceptable behaviour.
Burden and Standard of
Proof
[27]
In
the context of exclusion, in respect of the Immigration Law Framework, the onus
is on the Minister to establish that there are “serious reasons for considering”
that the individual has committed an excludable act.
[28]
The
standard of proof, “serious reasons for considering”, and the meaning of that
phrase have now been determined in Canada law. In Ramirez, above, the Federal
Court has stated that the words, “serious reasons for considering”, establish a
lower standard of proof than a balance of probabilities, the usual civil law
standard of proof. A balance of probabilities is, of course, already lower than
the criminal law standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Framework for Crimes
Against Humanity
[29]
The
Federal Court in Shakarabi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1998) 145 F.T.R. 297,
[1998] F.C.J. No. 444 (QL), ruled that:
[20] The
courts often consider statements by academics, commentators and various
domestic and international courts and tribunals in order to arrive at a
definition of crimes against humanity. These statements help to define further
the bare bones of the definition provided in such international instruments as
the Charter of the IMT. Through its decisions, the Federal Court interprets
these statements in accordance with the international instruments in order to
provide a definition for all interested parties. Thus, the real issue is
whether the acts which the Board identified are crimes against humanity as
discussed in the court's jurisprudence.
[30]
The
starting point in defining crimes against humanity is Article 6 of the Charter
of International Military Tribunal (UNHCR Handbook, Jan./88, Annex V, p. 88),
which defines the term to include:
(c) …
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population…
[31]
Article
6 goes on to state:
(c)
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan.
[32]
Article
II of Control Council Law No. 10, Berlin, December 20, 1945, defines crimes against humanity
as follows:
…Atrocities
and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.
[33]
The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, signed July 1, 1998, is the
most accurate reflection of the current state of international law with respect
to crimes against humanity. It effectively codified and built on the
International Law in the area of crimes against humanity, as it was developed
in 1945 (Statute of Nuremberg, Charter of the International Military Tribunal).
Article 7 of he Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as follows:
…
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law, torture, sexual violence, and other inhumane acts of a
similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health.
[34]
In
2000, the Canadian Parliament enacted the Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24, which effectively implemented the Rome Statute.
Section 6 of the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act deals with
offences committed outside Canada. Section 6(3) defines “crime against humanity” as follows:
means
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
sexual violence, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is
committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group and that,
at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a crime against
humanity according to customary international law or conventional
international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations, whether or not it
constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place
of its commission.
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Meurtre, extermination, réduction en
esclavage, déportation, emprisonnement, torture, violence sexuelle,
persécution ou autre fait — acte ou omission — inhumain, d’une part, commis
contre une population civile ou un groupe identifiable de personnes et,
d’autre part, qui constitue, au moment et au lieu de la perpétration, un
crime contre l’humanité selon le droit international coutumier ou le droit
international conventionnel ou en raison de son caractère criminel d’après
les principes généraux de droit reconnus par l’ensemble des nations, qu’il
constitue ou non une transgression du droit en vigueur à ce moment et dans ce
lieu.
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[35]
Professor
Hathaway states:
…
Crimes against humanity consist of fundamentally inhuman conduct, often
grounded in political, racial, religious or other bias. Genocide, slavery,
torture, and apartheid are examples within this category.
(Hathaway, James C. The Law of Refugee Status
(Toronto): Butterworths, 1991,
p. 217.)
[36]
In Sivakumar
v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration),
[1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.), the Federal Court has ruled that crimes against
humanity must generally be committed in a widespread or systematic fashion, in
war and in times of peace.
[37]
The principal
argument advanced by Mr. Petrov is that the Board erred in finding that he is
excluded from Canada pursuant to Article 1F(a) of the Convention because
the Board failed to apply the proper legal test to determine whether Mr. Petrov
was complicit in “crimes against humanity”.
Crimes Against
Humanity
Definition
of Crimes Against Humanity
[38]
Subsection
6(3) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, provides the
following definitions:
"crime
against humanity" means murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution or any other inhumane act
or omission that is committed against any civilian population or any
identifiable group and that, at the time and in the place of its commission,
constitutes a crime against humanity according to customary international law
or conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of
nations, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at
the time and in the place of its commission.
"war
crime" means an act or omission committed during an armed conflict that,
at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a war crime
according to customary international law or conventional international law
applicable to armed conflicts, whether or not it constitutes a contravention
of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission
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«crime
contre l’humanité » Meurtre, extermination, réduction en esclavage, déportation,
emprisonnement, torture, violence sexuelle, persécution ou autre fait — acte
ou omission — inhumain, d’une part, commis contre une population civile ou un
groupe identifiable de personnes et, d’autre part, qui constitue, au moment
et au lieu de la perpétration, un crime contre l’humanité selon le droit
international coutumier ou le droit international conventionnel, ou en raison
de son caractère criminel d’après les principes généraux de droit reconnus
par l’ensemble des nations, qu’il constitue ou non une transgression du droit
en vigueur à ce moment et dans ce lieu.
«crime
de guerre » Fait — acte ou omission — commis au cours d’un conflit armé et
constituant, au moment et au lieu de la perpétration, un crime de guerre
selon le droit international coutumier ou le droit international
conventionnel applicables à ces conflits, qu’il constitue ou non une
transgression du droit en vigueur à ce moment et dans ce lieu.
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[39]
Subsection
6(1.1) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, provides that
the commission of a crime includes inchoate offences:
6. (1.1) Every person who conspires or attempts
to commit, is an accessory after the fact in relation to, or counsels in
relation to, an offence referred to in subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable
offence.
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6. (1.1) Est coupable d’un acte
criminel quiconque complote ou tente de commettre une des infractions visées
au paragraphe (1), est complice après le fait à son égard ou conseille de la
commettre.
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[40]
Contrary
to Mr. Petrov’s allegations, the Board did not fail to distinguish between his
voluntary employment in the Ministry of Internal Affairs between 1993 to1996
and his involvement in Chechnya in 1996. The Board in
fact divided its reasons to two parts by stating:
The following analysis will discuss the
general situation in Russia first and then the hostilities in Chechnya.
[41]
The
hostilities in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation broke out in December
1994. As indicated in documentary evidence submitted to the Court, when the
claimant arrived in Grozny in April 1996,
fighting, violence and violation of human rights had been going on in Chechnya for more than one year.
The UN Economic and Social Council (Council) issued a report on The Situation
of Human Rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation on March 26, 1996. As
indicated in the report, human rights and humanitarian law were grossly
violated by both sides in the conflict (UN Council’s Report, March 1996, p. 24);
however, the following discussion will focus on the violation committed by the
Federation side for the reason of its high relevance to the determination of
the exclusion issue in the present case.
[42]
In
its Introduction the UN Council’s report stated:
1. At the fifty-first session of
the Commission on Human Rights, the Chairman read out a statement indicating
the Commission's consensus agreement in connection with the situation of human
rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation (see
E/1995/23-E/CN.4/1995/176, para.594). In the statement, entitled
"Situation of human rights in Chechnya", the Commission expressing
its deep concern over the disproportionate use of force by the Russian armed
forces, deplored the grave violations of human rights, before and after the
beginning of the crisis, as well as of international humanitarian law and the
continuation of those violations.
The report stated:
2. The Commission strongly
deplored the high number of victims and the suffering inflicted on the civilian
population and on displaced persons, and the serious destruction of
installations and infrastructure used by civilians. It called for all those who
had committed violations of human rights against individuals to be brought to
justice.
The report further stated:
5. During 1995 and 1996, the High
Commissioner for Human Rights carried out a number of consultations with
Russian authorities on the human rights situation in Chechnya. During his
meeting on 17 January 1995 with the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrey
Kozyrev, the High Commissioner appealed for an immediate end to violence and
violations of human rights in Chechnya and offered to the Russian authorities
the cooperation of his Office.
(UN Council’s Report, March
1996.)
[43]
Based
on information from various sources, including a number of non-governmental
organizations, e.g. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Unrepresented
Nations and Peoples Organization, etc., the report detailed abuses committed by
Federal forces as cited in the Minister’s submissions to the Board which were
submitted to the Court:
55. Russian
Ministry of Interior Forces (senior officers) allegedly fired into a group of
soldiers who refused to obey orders to kill the civilian population. In
this regard reports were critical of the behaviour and conduct of the
Federal military personnel serving in the field and noted that they lacked
training in humanitarian law.
61. Attacks
by Federal forces on Chechen towns and villages have been characterized as
completely indiscriminate, disproportionate and deliberate. Reports also
describe, in the victims' own words the indiscriminate attacks against
displaced persons in transit, and the shelling of their camps by Federal
soldiers. For example, on 7 March 1995, outside the village of Achkhoy-Martan,
south-west of Grozny, Federal troops reportedly opened fire on two vehicles
transporting people fleeing the conflict zone and shot dead seven people,
including five women and a three­month-old baby girl.
65. … According to
those sources, in February and March 1995 concentration centres, situated at
army bases beyond outside control and verification, became the sites of the
most comprehensive violence and cruel or degrading acts committed against the
detainees. Systematic beatings, torture and other forms of ill-treatment,
including electric shocks, were said to be routine during detention at
"filtration points" or transportation between them. In the latter
case detainees with their hands and legs tied were allegedly loaded onto trucks
in several layers, one on top of another. As a result some prisoners suffocated
to death.
…
67. … Since the spring of 1995,
reports indicate, the practice of detaining people elsewhere than in the
officially established "filtration camps" has become
widespread. Reportedly, 2,000 men were detained in concentration camps,
including many teenagers and old men who had not participated in the military
resistance. Other sources allege that Federal forces have frequently
detained any Chechen male, regardless of whether there was any evidence of their
involvement in the armed opposition, in order to exchange them for captured
Russian soldiers.
68. Reports indicate that since
30 September 1995 Federal forces surrounded and cut off the town of Sernovodsk.
As a result, 3,600 internally displaced persons at the town's sanatorium
complex, the 20,000 residents of Sernovodsk and other internally displaced
persons living with relatives or friends reportedly suffered food shortages.
Reports also indicate that Russian officials were reported to be directing aid
to northern areas of Chechnya believed to be more supportive of central
government rule and away from two other regions, southern Chechnya and the Republic
of Daghestan, which had become a refugee centre. In addition, it is reported
that the Russian authorities have repeatedly attempted to block humanitarian
relief to the area by creating bureaucratic difficulties for relief
organizations, interfering with the distribution of aid and halting medical
evacuations from Grozny.
(UN
Council’s Report, March 1996.)
[44]
In a
newspaper article (submitted by the claimant to the Board), Grozny, at the time of his
arrival, was described as “Grozny … Looks like Stalingrad – the ashes everywhere. What your eye
catches right away is that there are no kids on the streets, all stores are
closed, food markets are the only place where you can buy food.” The
description was not inconsistent with the above quoted documentary evidence.
The moment the claimant stepped his foot on Grozny, he saw, with his eyes, the
consequences of fighting, violence and violation of human rights in Chechnya.
[45]
One
year later, the UN Council issued another report on March 20, 1997. Its
assessment of the situation in Chechnya was almost identical as a year ago. The report stated:
1. … In the statement at its
fifty-second session, the Commission expressed its deep concern that the
disproportionate use of force by the Russian Federation armed forces was
continuing to lead to grave violations of human rights, as well as of
international humanitarian law.
2. The Commission strongly deplored the high number of victims and the
suffering inflicted on the civilian population and on displaced persons, and
the serious destruction of installations and infrastructure used by civilians.
It called for all those who had committed violations of human rights and other
crimes to be brought to justice. The Commission called urgently for an
immediate cessation of the hostilities and of violations of human rights and
for immediate contacts between representatives of the parties with the aim of
achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict, consistent with respect for the
territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and
reiterated that the fundamental human rights of the people of the Republic of Chechnya
should be upheld. It further called for the unhindered delivery of humanitarian
aid to all groups of the civilian population in need.
[46]
The
US DOS report described the situation in Chechnya in the similar fashion, stating:
The
Government’s human rights record showed little progress in 1996. Domestic and
foreign human rights groups continued to document serious violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights in the Republic of Chechnya by both Russian military and Chechen
separatist forces. Violations committed by Russian forces continued to occur on
a much larger scale than those of the Chechen separatists. Russian forces
engaged in the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, resulting in
numerous civilian deaths. They also prevented civilians from evacuating from
areas of imminent danger and humanitarian organizations from assisting
civilians in need. These actions were in conflict with a number of Russia’s international obligations, including those concerning the
protection of civilian noncombatants. Security forces were also responsible for
disappearances in Chechnya.
(US Department
of State Report for 1996, January 1997.)
[47]
Based
on credible sources, the US DOS report pointed out that “Attempts by federal
forces in August to hold Grozny were also characterized by indiscriminate use
of air power and artillery, destroying several residential buildings and a
hospital” and “during the battle for Grozny federal forces occupied a hospital and used
patients as human shields.”
[48]
The
documentary evidence from various sources indicated that international
community all firmly condemned gross and widespread violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation side in Chechnya in 1995 and 1996.
Complicity
finding properly made
Definition
of complicity
[49]
In Penate
v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration),
[1994] 2 FC 79, [1993] F.C.J. No. 1292 (QL), Justice Barbara J. Reed concludes
the following in what concerns questions of complicity:
[5] The Ramirez, Moreno and Sivakumar cases
all deal with the degree or type of participation which will constitute
complicity. Those cases have established that mere membership in an
organization which from time to time commits international offences is not normally
sufficient to bring one into the category of an accomplice. At the same time,
if the organization is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose, such
as a secret police activity, mere membership may indeed meet the requirements
of personal and knowing participation. The cases also establish that mere
presence at the scene of an offence, for example, as a bystander with no
intrinsic connection with the persecuting group will not amount to personal
involvement. Physical presence together with other factors may however qualify
as a personal and knowing participation.
[6] As I understand the jurisprudence, it is that a person who
is a member of the persecuting group and who has knowledge that activities are
being committed by the group and who neither takes steps to prevent them
occurring (if he has the power to do so) nor disengages himself from the group
at the earliest opportunity (consistent with safety for himself) but who lends
his active support to the group will be considered to be an accomplice. A
shared common purpose will be considered to exist. I note that the situation
envisaged by this jurisprudence is not one in which isolated incidents of
international offences have occurred but where the commission of such offences
is a continuous and regular part of the operation.
[50]
Furthermore,
in Harb v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 39, [2003] F.C.J. No. 108 (QL), the
Federal Court of Appeal stated:
[11] The first of these arguments
does not apply in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the crimes with
which the appellant was charged that led to his exclusion, but that of the
crimes alleged against the organizations with which he was supposed to be
associated. Once those organizations have committed crimes against humanity and
the appellant meets the requirements for membership in the group, knowledge,
participation or complicity imposed by precedent (see inter alia, Ramirez v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.); Moreno
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298
(C.A.); Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.); Sumaida v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 66 (C.A.); and Bazargan v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration (1996), 205 N.R. 232 (F.C.A.)), the exclusion
applies even if the specific acts committed by the appellant himself are not
crimes against humanity as such. In short, if the organization persecutes the
civilian population the fact that the appellant himself persecuted only the
military population does not mean that he will escape the exclusion, if he is
an accomplice by association as well.
[51]
Finally,
the Federal Court of Appeal in Bazargan v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration) (1996), 205 N.R. 282 (F.C.A.), states that it is not
necessary to prove, in a case such as that of Mr. Petrov, that he is part
of an organization that is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose to
conclude on complicity. Instead, the Court concluded that it is sufficient to
demonstrate that an organization has committed crimes against humanity that are
part of the operations of the organization in which the individual in question is
associated:
[11] In our view, it goes without
saying that "personal and knowing participation" can be direct or
indirect and does not require formal membership in the organization that is
ultimately engaged in the condemned activities. It is not working within an
organization that makes someone an accomplice to the organization's activities,
but knowingly contributing to those activities in any way or making them
possible, whether from within or from outside the organization. At p. 318 F.C.,
MacGuigan, J.A. said that "[a]t bottom complicity rests ... on the
existence of a shared common purpose and the knowledge that all of the parties
in question may have of it". Those who become involved in an operation
that is not theirs, but that they know will probably lead to the commission of
an international offence, lay themselves open to the application of the
exclusion clause in the same way as those who play a direct part in the
operation.
[52]
In
light of the evidence brought forward before the Board, the Board’s decision
was reasonable and consistent with the jurisprudence of this Court.
Factors
in determining whether an individual is an accomplice to crimes against
humanity
[53]
The
Federal Court has enumerated six factors to consider in determining whether an
individual is considered an accomplice in crimes against humanity. These
factors are:
(1) Nature of the
organization;
(2) Method of recruitment;
(3) Position/rank in the
organization;
(4) Knowledge of
organization’s atrocities;
(5) Length of time in the
organization;
(6) Opportunity to leave the
organization.
(Reference is made to Sungu v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 1207, [2002] F.C.J. No.
1639 (QL), at paragraphs 33, 44; Sivakumar, above, at paragraphs 9-13; Omar
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 861, [2004] F.C.J.
No. 1061(QL), at paragraph 9; and Kaburundi v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 361, [2006] F.C.J. No. 427 (QL), at
paragraphs 32-35, 44-45.)
[54]
The
factors cited above were considered by the Board in this case, thus confirming
the reasonableness of the Board’s decision.
(1) Nature
of the organization
[55]
If
an organization is found to have a limited, brutal purpose, the personal
participation of an individual in committing crimes against humanity is presumed
by their sole membership in the organization. In this case, the Board did not
conclude that the battalion of special designation of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs or the Russian army had a limited, brutal purpose. Consequently,
complicity in crimes against humanity had to be established by the Minister at
the hearing based on proof of Mr. Petrov’s personal participation in such
crimes, during his time with the Russian army in Chechnya in 1996.
[56]
The
Board found that Mr. Petrov was engaged in crimes against humanity while in Chechnya in 1996, given his own
admissions that he used his gun, arrested and detained individuals,
participated in the war and actual military actions, exhumed corpses to
identify terrorists, and neutralized terrorist groups. (Board’s decision, at
pages 19-24, Transcript of hearing (February 7, 2006), at page 88, Transcript
of hearing (June 14, 2006), at pages 15-25.)
(2)
Method of recruitment
[57]
Mr.
Petrov was a member of the battalion of special designation of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs from April 23, 1996 to June 20, 1996 (for a total period of
two months). This was not a voluntary membership.
(3)
Position/rank in the organization
[58]
The
Board found that, although Mr. Petrov did not have a particular rank in the
Russian army in Chechnya in 1996, he was part of
a team of some elite nature, rather than an ordinary official:
No evidence before the panel suggested
that the claimant had a particular rank in “the battalion of special
designation of the Internal Affairs Ministry”. Moreover, the claimant alleged
in his PIF narrative that he was selected for the mission in Chechnya because he “was Russian and looked like a Chechen”.
However, the evidence that “the battalion of the special designation of the
Internal Affairs Ministry” was composed of 43 members selected from the
Department of Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 43
cities across Russia, the claimant’s candidacy in the team was confirmed by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Moscow, and, before
being sent to Chechnya, the claimant went to Moscow to be received by the Vice
Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation led the panel to tend to
look at “the battalion of special designation of the Internal Affairs Ministry”
as a team of some elite nature than an ordinary group of officials.
(Board’s decision, at pages 24-25)
(4) Knowledge
of organization’s atrocities
[59]
The
Board found that Mr. Petrov had knowledge of the atrocities committed by the
FSB:
The documentary evidence indicated that
violations of human rights in Chechnya were committed not only by the FSB, but
also by other components of the Federal forces, including the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, “the group which the claimant was part of.”
The claimant agreed that the FSB “were
torturing detainees” and believed that “he is a first hand witness not only to
the crimes committed by the FSB and the Russian government in Chechnya but to the fact that the war is being perpetrated for
reasons which are economic in nature.”
The claimant acknowledged that he “did
apprehend criminals who he turned over to other soldiers” and he heard of
“prisoners being beaten or tortured”, but stated that “he did not see anything
first hand.”
However, with or without seeing torture or
beating of prisoners, it could be inferred that the claimant knew that he was
indirectly involved in abuses of prisoners and detainees by the FSB in the
sense that he turned those arrested over to the FSB.
(Board’s decision, at pages 18-19, Transcript of
hearing (February 7, 2006), at pages 75-84)
(5) Length
of time in the organization
[60]
The
Board did acknowledge, contrary to the Applicant’s allegations, that Mr. Petrov
was in Chechnya for two months. As
such, the Board concluded that the nature of Mr. Petrov’s involvement in Chechnya was sufficient for the
Board’s finding of complicity:
Also, in the panel’s opinion, what was
more significant was not what rank the claimant held in the battalion or for
how long he stayed in Chechnya, rather was what activities he was
engaged in and what transpired in this period of two months. As discussed
above, the claimant fired his weapon, neutralized “terrorists”, participated in
the war and actual military actions, made arrests, turned detainees to the FSB,
exhumed corps, etc., in this two-month period in Chechnya.
(Board’s decision, at page 25)
(6) Opportunity to leave the
organization
[61]
The
Board assessed this factor and stated the following:
The claimant did stay in Chechnya for two
months, but he stayed with the battalion in Chechnya
until the mission was over. The claimant alleged that he was forced to Chechnya. However, upon his return to Kazan,
he was granted a cross for personal courage and bravery by the president of Russia.
…
After what he experienced in Chechnya in 1996, no evidence was tendered to suggest that the
claimant made efforts to disassociate himself from the Ministry of Internal
Affairs until 1998 when he was “offered to resign”.
(Board’s decision, at page 25)
[62]
In
light of all the evidence, the Board’s inadmissibility finding is not
unreasonable. The Board applied the facts to the applicable criteria and did
not err in its application of the law.
CONCLUSION
[63]
For the reasons
above, this judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT ORDERS that
1.
The application for
judicial review be dismissed;
2.
No serious question
of general importance be certified.
“Michel M.J. Shore”