Date: 20260415

Docket: IMM-23912-24

Citation: 2026 FC 498

Toronto, Ontario, April 15, 2026

PRESENT: Mr. Justice Brouwer

BETWEEN:

DAMIAN STANLEY CHIJINDU AHAMBA

Applicant

and

THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPARDNESS

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1] Damian Stanley Chijindu Ahamba is a refugee claimant from Nigeria. He was found inadmissible to Canada based on his past membership in an organization called the Indigenous People of Biafra [IPOB]. The Immigration Division [ID] of the Immigration and Refugee Board [IRB] determined that the IPOB was engaged in subversion by force of the Nigerian government, and that Mr. Ahamba’s membership in the organization therefore rendered him inadmissible under ss 34(1)(b) and (f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. Mr. Ahamba argues that the ID’s interpretation of the legislation failed to take international law into account and was unreasonable. As explained below, I agree and will set aside the decision.

I. Background

[2] Mr. Ahamba is a citizen of Nigeria and is of Igbo, indigenous descent. In 2010 he became involved in the Biafran independence movement and in 2012, he joined the newly formed Igbo independence organization, IPOB. Although there is no evidence to suggest he had any official role within the IPOB, Mr. Ahamba identified as a member and supported the organization by helping to organize peaceful protests and disseminating information encouraging Biafrans to speak out about injustices experienced by their community.

[3] In April 2014, Mr. Ahamba was arrested and held without charge for three days. Before being released he was warned to stop organizing protests. He did not stop, and in May 2015 he was arrested again. This time he was held for 10 days and tortured before being released, again without charge. He resumed his political advocacy but in October 2015 he learned that the military was looking for him again. He went into hiding to avoid arrest and two months later, in December 2015, he fled to the USA with his wife and their child, on a student visa. His active involvement with the IPOB ceased with his departure from Nigeria.

[4] In November 2019, for reasons detailed in their refugee claims, Mr. Ahamba and his spouse, along with their daughter and US-born son, crossed into Canada and claimed refugee protection. They asserted a well-founded fear of persecution in Nigeria based on Mr. Ahamba’s membership in the IPOB and his activism on their behalf.

[5] Mr. Ahamba’s spouse and eldest child were granted refugee protection by the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the IRB, based on their association with Mr. Ahamba. Both the Refugee Protection Division and the RAD found Mr. Ahamba’s spouse to be a credible witness, and they accepted as fact that Mr. Ahamba had been detained and tortured by Nigerian authorities because of his activism with the IPOB. Processing of Mr. Ahamba’s own refugee claim, however, was suspended because the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] had alleged his IPOB membership rendered him inadmissible to Canada on the grounds that the IPOB was engaged in subversion by force of the Nigerian government, contrary to ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) of the IRPA. The CBSA referred the matter to the IRB’s ID for an admissibility hearing, which took place on January 24, 2024.

[6] By decision dated December 12, 2024, the ID accepted CBSA’s allegation and issued a Deportation Order against Mr. Ahamba for inadmissibility under ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) of the IRPA. The ID determined that (a) although Mr. Ahamba ceased active involvement with the IPOB when he left the country in 2015 and had had no further contact or involvement since that time, he remained a member for four more years until at least 2019, and (b) the IPOB had been engaged in subverting the Nigerian government since its formation in 2012.

II. Legislation

[7] Subsection 34(1) of the IRPA provides as follows:

III. Issues

[8] In his Memorandum of Fact and Law, Mr. Ahamba asserts that the ID violated the duty of procedural fairness, made an unreasonable finding regarding the temporality of Mr. Ahamba’s membership under s. 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, and based its determination that the IPOB had engaged in “subversion by force” contrary to s. 34(1)(b) of the IRPA on a number of unreasonable findings of fact regarding the character, history and activities of the IPOB.

[9] In addition, following this Court’s request for submissions on the relevance of the October 10, 2025, decision of Justice Sébastien Grammond in Ali v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1682 [Ali], Mr. Ahamba argues that ID unreasonably failed to consider whether the Deportation Order against him based on his inadmissibility was “consistent with the constraints imposed by international law, specifically, the principle of non-refoulement set out in Article 33 of the Convention” (Ali at para 7, referring to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 [Convention]). As explained below, I find this latter issue to be determinative.

IV. Analysis

A. The ID unreasonably failed to take international law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, into account as an important legal constraint on the interpretation of s. 34(1) of the IRPA

[10] To evaluate the reasonableness of the ID’s decision, this Court asks whether the decision “bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 99). This approach applies also to the evaluation of a tribunal’s interpretation of legislation, and requires the reviewing court not to “undertake a de novo analysis of the question or ‘ask itself what the correct decision would have been’” (Vavilov at para 116) but to “examine the administrative decision as a whole, including the reasons provided by the decision maker and the outcome that was reached” (Vavilov at para 116). As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Mason:

[69] Although an administrative decision maker need not “engage in a formalistic statutory interpretation exercise in every case” (para. 119), its decision must be consistent with the “modern principle” of statutory interpretation, which focusses on the text, context, and purpose of the statutory provision. The decision maker must demonstrate in its reasons that it was alive to those essential elements (para. 120). The omission of a minor aspect of the text, context, or purpose is unlikely to undermine the decision as a whole: omissions are not “stand-alone grounds for judicial intervention” (para. 122). In each case, “the key question is whether the omitted aspect of the analysis causes the reviewing court to lose confidence in the outcome reached by the decision maker” (para. 122). For example, an administrative interpretation may well be unreasonable if it fails to consider the potentially harsh consequences of its interpretation of a statutory provision for a large class of individuals, and whether, in light of those consequences, the legislature would have intended the provision to apply in that way (paras. 191-92). And even if a decision does not explicitly consider the meaning of a relevant provision, the court may be able to discern the interpretation adopted from the record and evaluate whether it is reasonable (para. 123).

[11] In rendering the decision under review, the ID relied on established jurisprudence from this Court and from the Federal Court of Appeal to interpret the scope of inadmissibility under ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) of the IRPA. In particular, it found based on often-cited judgments in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Singh, 1998 CanLII 8281 (FC) and Poshteh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85 (incorrectly cited by the ID as “2005 FC 1034”), that “membership” under s. 34(1)(f) has consistently received a “broad interpretation,” and that pursuant to Wasta Ismael v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1520, if membership is admitted there is generally no need for further analysis.

[12] To interpret “subversion by force of a government” under s. 34(1)(b) of the IRPA, the ID relied on Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v U.S.A., 2014 FC 416 [U.S.A.], Oremade v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2005 FC 1077 [Oremade], and Najafi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 262 [Najafi]. These authorities define subversion as “‘accomplishing change by illicit means’ and … most commonly…the use or encouragement of force, violence or criminal means with the goal of overthrowing a government” (U.S.A. at para 36), and note that “by force” includes “coercion or compulsion by violent means, coercion or compulsion by threats to use violent means, and…reasonably perceived potential for the use of coercion by violent means” (Oremade at para 27). As noted by the ID, this jurisprudence also rejected the notion that the term “any government” might be limited to democratic or human-rights-respecting ones, finding to the contrary that the provision also applies to governments that are oppressive and racist (Najafi at para 70).

[13] These authorities either do not engage with, or reject, the notion that international law – and particularly the principle of non-refoulement – might constrain the interpretation of the provisions at issue.

[14] This jurisprudence has long been relied upon by this Court as well as by the ID to interpret s. 34(1) of the IRPA as casting a wide net. However, on September 27, 2023 – more than a year before the ID issued the decision under review – the Supreme Court of Canada issued its groundbreaking decision on the interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA in Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 [Mason]. The decision, as I read it, constitutes a course correction, “forcefully” reminding the parties and the courts that international law has an important role to play for the interpretation of domestic legislation, particularly the IRPA (Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Weldemariam, 2024 FCA 69 at paragraph 34 [Weldemariam]; Mason at paras 104-117). Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a finding of inadmissibility under s. 34(1) of the IRPA that fails to account for the constraints imposed by international law is unreasonable. This is because such an interpretation could result in a foreign national being returned to a country where they may face persecution, contrary to Canada’s non-refoulement obligation as expressed in Article 33 of the Convention. The Court held that “the principle of non-refoulement – ‘the cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime’” forms a “critical legal constraint on interpretation of the IRPA, one that Parliament has decreed must be considered in construing and applying the IRPA” (Mason at para 117). As Justice Grammond has described the decision in Ali:

[20] …Mason signalled a major change with respect to the role of the Convention and the principle of non-refoulement in the interpretation of section 34. The Court underscored the presumption that statutes must be interpreted in a manner consistent with international law. It noted that this presumption assumed added force with respect to the Act because paragraph 3(3)(f) of the Act requires it to be construed and applied in a manner that “complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory”, including the Convention.

[15] The Supreme Court found that to align s. 34(1)(e) with the limited scope of permissible exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement under the Convention, it must be interpreted as requiring a nexus with national security or the security of Canada (Mason at para 121).

[16] In Weldemariam, issued a few months after Mason, the Federal Court of Appeal considered the implications of Mason for the interpretation of a different security inadmissibility provision under s. 34(1) of the IRPA. The Federal Court of Appeal determined that the analysis in Mason was not limited in application to s. 34(1)(e) but applied with equal force to the interpretation of s. 34(1)(a) of the IRPA, inadmissibility for “espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests.” The Federal Court of Appeal found that the ID’s broad interpretation of the provision, which failed to account for the international law principle of non-refoulement, ran afoul of the Convention:

[60] ...This interpretation could subject individuals to being deported to persecution once they have been found to be inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(a) for being engaged in activities that were contrary to Canada’s interests, without there ever being a finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that they pose a danger to the security of Canada. This is because, under this interpretation, the exceptions under Article 33(2) would not apply.

[61] In other words, the ID’s interpretation would allow the refoulement of persons inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(a) of IRPA in circumstances that are outside the scope of the Article 33(2) exceptions.

[17] The Federal Court of Appeal determined that, consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mason regarding s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA, the only reasonable interpretation of s. 34(1)(a) was a narrower one that included a nexus to national security. Notably, the fact that the ID’s decision was rendered before Mason had been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada did not insulate it from a finding that the failure to take into account the critical legal constraint of non-refoulement in the interpretation of the provision was a reviewable error (Weldemariam at para 52) and was unreasonable.

[18] In Ali, my colleague Justice Grammond applied both Mason and Weldemariam to find that the ID’s interpretation of ss. 34(1)(b.1) and (f), though generally consistent with the above-noted pre-Mason jurisprudence, was unreasonable because it, too, failed to account for the constraints imposed by international law. He explained:

[30] In my view, the pre-Mason case law gave section 34 a scope that greatly exceeds that of the exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement. This stems from the fact that the presumptions it sets out are not subject to any clearly defined limits that would ensure a nexus with the security of Canada. This is especially the case for the ground of membership in an organization: Lapaix at paragraph 64. As I mentioned above, the organization may have hundreds of thousands of members; it could have renounced its wrongful activities a long time ago, and membership in the organization is defined broadly and flexibly. The concatenation of the broad interpretation of these various concepts, especially if they are assessed independently from one another, results in the inadmissibility of persons who pose no danger to the security of Canada. I also do not exclude that the definition of the wrongful acts—subversion, in this case—may be problematic, even though Mr. Ali did insist on this aspect in his submissions.

[31] This overbreadth stems from the fact that the pre-Mason case law defined the main concepts used by section 34 without considering whether the result was consistent with the principle of non-refoulement. In other words, the case law never considered whether the presumptions established by section 34 retained a rational link with their object, namely, the danger to the security of Canada: Mason at paragraph 121. It also did not require the ID to consider, at the end of its analysis, whether the person it is about to find inadmissible is a danger to the security of Canada. Yet, according to Mason and Weldemariam, considering this issue is essential to ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and to guarantee that the Act is construed and applied in a manner that complies with “international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory”, specifically, the Convention, as required by paragraph 3(3)(f) of the Act. Although Mason and Weldemariam dealt with specific components of section 34, their underlying reasoning applies to the provision as a whole and even to other grounds for inadmissibility: Wahab v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1985 at paragraphs 24–26.

[19] Justice Grammond concluded:

[35] Mason and Weldemariam … force the ID (and the IAD) to take measures to prevent section 34 from resulting in the inadmissibility of persons who do not pose a danger to the security of Canada. As the ID in Mr. Ali’s case did not do so, its decision is unreasonable.

(1) Applicant’s position

[20] Ms. Ahamba argues that the binding decisions in Mason and Weldemariam, together with Ali, leave no doubt that the ID’s interpretation of ss. 34(1)(f) and (b) was unreasonable because it fails to account for the legal constraints imposed by international law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement.

[21] Although Mr. Ahamba argued before the ID that “subversion by force of any government” should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the international legal principle of self-determination, he did not place Mason before the ID nor did he raise the principle of non-refoulement as an interpretive constraint. This does not matter. The duty to interpret s. 34(1) of the IRPA consistently with the “critical legal constraint” of international law is not contingent on the parties asking the tribunal to do so. Rather, the duty flows from the requirements of the legislation itself – in particular ss. 3(2)(b) and 3(3)(f) – and the well-established principle of conformity with international law (Mason at paras 104-106, 117; Weldemariam at paras 52-54; Ali at para 20).

(2) Respondent’s position

[22] The Minister does not challenge Mr. Ahamba’s assertion that the ID did not consider the principle of non-refoulement. However, she objects to Mr. Ahamba’s argument that the ID’s failure to consider the principle of non-refoulement was a reviewable error because Mr. Ahamba did not raise the argument in his Memorandum of Fact and Law. She submits in the alternative that Ali was wrongly decided and that, “properly understood,” Mason and Weldemariam do not require the ID to consider the principle of non-refoulement when interpreting ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) of the IRPA. I will address the Minister’s objection first.

(a) The objection is unfounded

[23] I agree with the Minister that Mr. Ahamba did not clearly argue, in his Memorandum of Fact and Law, that the ID erred by failing to account for the principle of non-refoulement as a critical legal constraint on the interpretation of s. 34(1) of the IRPA. He did, however, expressly rely on Mason for “the overarching interpretative principle in s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA, [that] the Act must be construed and applied in accordance with international instruments to which Canada is a signatory.” Mason was therefore before the Court from the outset. The Minister, however, chose not to engage with it in her own Further Memorandum of Argument, and neither party raised Weldemariam or Ali in their written arguments despite the relevance of the judgments.

[24] Because of this apparent gap in the pleadings with respect to two binding authorities and one very recent potentially persuasive judgment that applied them, the Court issued a Direction to the parties a few days before the hearing, putting counsel on notice that they should be prepared to address the Ali judgment in the oral hearing. At the hearing, however, the Minister advised that she had not had enough time to prepare pleadings on Ali and requested additional time to do so in writing after the hearing. The Applicant did not object and the Minister’s request was granted, permitting both parties to provide written representation on Ali, and on any questions they wish to propose for certification.

[25] Notwithstanding this notice to the parties before the hearing and the Court’s permission to make post-hearing written submissions, the Minister maintains that the Court should decline to entertain Mr. Ahamba’s argument based on Ali because it is “new” and was not raised either in Mr. Ahamba’s Application for Leave and Judicial Review or in his Memorandum of Fact and Law.

[26] There is no merit to the Minister’s objection. The boilerplate list of grounds contained in the Application for Leave and Judicial Review was sufficient to put the Minister and the Court on notice that the reasonableness of the ID’s decision was at issue. As noted above, moreover, while Ali was not addressed in Mr. Ahamba’s memorandum (because it postdates it), Mason was explicitly raised in Mr. Ahamba’s challenge to the reasonableness of the ID’s interpretation of the inadmissibility provisions. Moreover, the Minister was put on notice in advance of the hearing that Ali was to be addressed and was given an additional week after the hearing to provide written arguments on the issue, notwithstanding the prior notice. The Minister does not allege any prejudice or unfairness, and none arises. The objection is therefore dismissed.

(b) Ali is persuasive

[27] The Minister argues in the alternative that Ali was wrongly decided – largely because it conflicts with the pre-Mason jurisprudence that Justice Grammond carefully distinguished – and that Mason, “properly understood and read in its context,” is “not necessarily dispositive” of grounds of inadmissibility beyond s. 34(1)(e).

[28] The issue before the Court is therefore whether, pursuant to the reasoning in Mason, the ID is required to take account of the principle of non-refoulement when interpreting the scope of the IRPA’s security inadmissibility provisions – here ss. 34(1)(b) and (f); in Mason s. 34(1)(e); in Weldemariam s. 34(1)(a); in Wahab v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1985, s. 35(1)(b); and in Ali ss. 34(1)(b.1) and (f). The Court of Appeal found it is in Weldemariam. Justice Grammond found the same in Ali, as did my colleague Justice Janet Fuhrer in Wahab. The Minister has neither distinguished these recent authorities nor persuaded me that they are wrongly decided and should not be followed.

[29] The Minister argues that Ali is no more persuasive than two other post-Mason decisions, Talukder v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1489 [Talukder] and Nanan v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 138 [Nanan], in which the pre-Mason jurisprudence continued to be relied upon.

[30] It is true that in Talukder Justice Henry Brown applied the pre-Mason jurisprudence on “membership” and rejected the submission that Mason imposed a requirement to consider the principle of non-refoulement or the consequences of an inadmissibility finding (Talukder at paras 70-83). However, with the greatest respect, I am unable to discern in Justice Brown’s findings an engagement with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mason at paras 104-111, 115, 117, or of the Federal Court of Appeal in Weldemariam at paras 34, 38-65, on these very issues. The Talukder judgment also appears to rely, at least in part, on the fact that the decision under review was rendered before the Mason and Weldemariam judgments were issued (Talukder at paras 81-82), a consideration that, again with respect, is difficult to square with Mason at paragraph 104 and Weldemariam at paragraph 52. As such, I do not find that Talukder undermines the persuasiveness of Justice Grammond’s subsequent and more detailed analysis in Ali.

[31] As for Nanan, while it is true that Justice Grammond stated there that he continued to be bound by the Federal Court of Appeal’s pre-Mason decision in Kanagendren v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 86 [Kanagendren] with respect to the definition of membership under s. 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, there is nothing in the judgment to suggest that the implications of Mason and Weldemariam were actually raised and argued by the parties, nor did Justice Grammond provide his rationale for his conclusion that he remained bound by Kanagendren in light of Mason and Weldemariam. Nanan is therefore less persuasive than Justice Grammond’s subsequent, fully developed reasoning in Ali.

(c) Redundancy and “absurd consequences” not established

[32] The Minister also argues that adopting Justice Grammond’s interpretation of Mason and Weldemariam would render s. 34(1)(d) of the IRPA – inadmissibility for “being a danger to the security of Canada” – redundant and would lead to “absurd” consequences, such as a requirement that the ID conduct an individualized risk assessment as part of every admissibility hearing, which the Minister notes would exceed its jurisdiction.

[33] The redundancy argument was considered in Mason. The Supreme Court of Canada was clearly unpersuaded that the potential for redundancy or overlap outweighed the other interpretive considerations – namely the principle of non-refoulement – that justified requiring a nexus between the relevant act of violence and national security or the security of Canada in the interpretation of s. 34(1)(e). As Justice Grammond explained further in Ali, “the various components of s. 34(1) of the Act can be considered as presumptions that the person concerned is a danger to the security of Canada based on the conduct in question” whereas “[o]nly paragraph 34(1)(d) is not a presumption because it explicitly refers to a danger to the security of Canada” (Ali at para 29).

[34] The Minister’s claim that applying Mason, Weldemariam and Ali would require the ID to conduct an individualized risk assessment as part of every admissibility hearing is, at best, premature and speculative as to how the ID will reinterpret the provisions at issue, on redetermination, in a way that accounts for the constraints of international law. The Minister certainly has not established that the only way to do so is to require an individualized risk assessment as part of the admissibility determination (notably neither Mason, nor Weldemariam, nor Ali found any such requirement). And there are obvious alternatives, such as requiring a clear nexus to Canada’s national security for inadmissibility under s. 34(1)(b) of the IRPA (as required by Mason and Weldemariam), and/or adopting a non-refoulement-respecting interpretation of “membership” under s. 34(1)(f) from refugee law (per Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40; see also Lapaix v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 111 at para 69).

[35] The Minister will have an opportunity to participate in the redetermination of this matter before the ID. If the ID reaches an interpretation of the provisions at issue with which the Minister disagrees, the Minister can challenge that interpretation on appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division and/or, with leave, on judicial review before this Court.

(d) Najafi has been overtaken by Mason and Weldemariam

[36] Finally, I am also unable to accept the Minister’s submission that this Court should continue to apply the Federal Court of Appeal’s 2014 interpretation of s. 34(1)(b) of the IRPA from Najafi. To do so would be to ignore the subsequent binding judgments of the Supreme Court in Mason in 2023 and of the Federal Court of Appeal in Weldemariam in 2024.

[37] In Najafi, the Federal Court of Appeal found that inadmissibility and removal are “distinct concepts” that “should not be confused” with one another, and relied on the fact that Mr. Najafi had refugee status to find that, regardless of an inadmissibility finding, he could not be removed “without additional substantive steps being taken in accordance with the provisions in the IRPA meant to ensure protection against “refoulement” as set out in the Refugee Convention” (Najafi at para 54). The Federal Court of Appeal therefore determined that, for the purposes of Mr. Najafi’s appeal, “the only relevant international human rights instrument” at issue was the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) [being Sch. V of the Geneva Conventions Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. G-3], 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, ratified by Canada in 1990 (Protocol I)” (para 47). It is therefore indisputable that that the Federal Court of Appeal did not consider the principle of non-refoulement as a constraint on the interpretation of ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) of the IRPA (paras 47-54).

[38] Nine years later in Mason, however, the Supreme Court explained not only that a removal order based on inadmissibility under s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA would, “as a general rule, allow for a removal order without protection from refoulement, contrary to Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention” (para 110), but also that this conclusion was not dependent on the appellant being a refugee claimant:

[115] That neither Mr. Mason nor Mr. Dleiow is a refugee claimant does not detract from this conclusion. The Refugee Convention imposes an important legal constraint on the interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) generally, irrespective of whether the specific foreign national subject to deportation is a refugee claimant.

[39] The Supreme Court concluded that “the role of the Refugee Convention in constraining the interpretation of the IRPA is a question of law, one that Parliament by s. 3(3)(f) has expressly directed a court or administrative decision maker to consider,” and that the principle of non-refoulement is “‘the cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime’, and a critical legal constraint on interpretation of the IRPA, one that Parliament has decreed must be considered in construing and applying the IRPA” (para 117). It determined therefore that a failure to consider the issue was not merely “the omission of a ‘minor aspect of the interpretive context’” but was “a crucial omission” that made a decision unreasonable” (para 117).

[40] In Weldemariam the Minister argued that “the reasonableness of the ID’s interpretation of paragraph 34(1)(a) … should not turn on whether it considered the principle of non-refoulement.” This was because, according to the Minister, echoing the reasoning from Najafi, “the determination of admissibility is distinct from the removal process, and the ID’s finding that Mr. Weldemariam is inadmissible to Canada does not put him on a path to removal so as to trigger the principle of non-refoulement” (Weldemariam at para 42). The Federal Court of Appeal found, however, that it was now bound by Mason (para 40), and it therefore rejected the Minister’s argument:

[43] [T]he same may be said of a finding under paragraph 34(1)(e) of IRPA. The Supreme Court was nevertheless of the view that international law principles, including the principle of non-refoulement, should guide the interpretation of that provision: Mason, above at paras. 109-111.

…

[50] The Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that processes available after a finding of inadmissibility under paragraph 34(1)(e) provide adequate protection against refoulement. Indeed, the Court expressly found that none of these processes ensured compliance with Canada’s international legal obligations under the Refugee Convention: Mason, above at paras. 110-114. These processes are similar to those that would be available to Mr. Weldemariam following an inadmissibility finding under paragraph 34(1)(a) of IRPA.

[51] From this, I am satisfied that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mason requires that this Court consider Canada’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, and, in particular, the principle of non-refoulement, in assessing the reasonableness of the ID’s interpretation of paragraph 34(1)(a) of IRPA at the admissibility stage of the process.

[41] Although I acknowledge that Najafi has not been expressly overturned, it is nevertheless clear that its reasoning has been overtaken by Mason and Weldemariam, and that the latter judgments now govern. As the Federal Court of Appeal found in Weldemariam at paragraph 41: “It is not open to this Court to disregard the express teachings of the Supreme Court with respect to the duty on immigration adjudicators to construe and apply IRPA in a manner that complies with the international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory.”

V. Conclusion

[42] For all these reasons, I agree with Justice Grammond’s analysis and find that Mason and Weldemariam require ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) to take international law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, into account as an important legal constraint on the interpretation of s. 34(1) of the IRPA. This is not only a reflection of horizontal stare decisis; I would have reached the same conclusion on the basis of Mason and Weldemariam even if Ali had not already been decided.

[43] In the case at bar, the ID did not take into account the principle of non-refoulement when interpreting the scope of ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) of the IRPA as the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal required it to do. The ID’s interpretation is therefore unreasonable.

[44] The remedy sought by Mr. Ahamba is an order setting aside the ID decision and remitting the matter of Mr. Ahamba’s inadmissibility to a different panel of the ID for redetermination. I will so order. The ID will have an opportunity to reinterpret the scope of inadmissibility for “subversion by force of any government” (s 34(1)(b) of the IRPA) and for “membership” (s 34(1)(f)) in light of the legal constraints imposed by international law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement.

A. Other grounds

[45] Mr. Ahamba also asserts that the ID violated the duty of procedural fairness, made unreasonable findings of fact regarding Mr. Ahamba’s membership in the IPOB and the nature and activities of the IPOB itself, and erred in finding that “there is no temporal component in the analysis of an allegation of inadmissibility,” contrary to well-established jurisprudence (El Werfalli v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 FC 612 at para 62; Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 1092 at para 49; Chowdhury v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 189 at paras 13-20; Abdullah v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 949 at paras 28-34; and Babu v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2022 FC 510). As I have already found that the decision was unreasonable for other reasons, it is unnecessary to decide these additional issues and the principle of judicial restraint weighs against doing so. The matter of Mr. Ahamba’s admissibility will be remitted to the ID for redetermination by a different Member in any event, and that redetermination must be reasonable, procedurally fair, and consistent with the applicable jurisprudence including this judgment.

VI. Certified question

[46] The Minister has proposed the following question for certification:

Does the SCC’s decision in Mason interpreting para. 34(1)(e) IRPA require a narrow interpretation of para. 34(1)(b) of IRPA that would thwart Parliament’s clear intent as evidenced by Standing Committee testimony and referred to by the Federal Court in Najafi v. Canada (MPSEP), 2013 FC 876, aff’d in Najafi v. Canada (MPSEP), 2014 FCA 262, application for leave dismissed by the SCC 2015-04-23?

[47] To be certified under s. 74(d) of the IRPA, a question must meet certain criteria. As the Federal Court of Appeal explained in Obazughanmwen v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2023 FCA 151:

[28] It is well established in the jurisprudence of this Court that a question cannot be certified unless it is serious, dispositive of the appeal and transcends the interests of the parties. It must also have been raised and dealt with by the court below, and it must arise from the case rather than from the judge’s reasons. Finally, and as a corollary of the requirement that it be of general importance pursuant to section 74 of the IRPA, it cannot have been previously settled by the decided case law: see Liyanagamage v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1637 (QL) at para. 4; Mudrak v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 178 at para. 36; Lewis v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FCA 130 at paras. 36, 39 (Lewis).

[48] The Applicant opposes certification, arguing that the Respondent has not raised an unsettled question or issue of broad significance or general importance:

[T]he interpretive constraint is settled by SCC (Mason) as confirmed at the FCA (Weldemariam) and again at the FC (Ali). The Respondent’s position is essentially a disagreement with the law as it stands. Certification cannot be used to re-litigate facts or repackage fact-specific disputes as a legal issue.

[49] I agree with Mr. Ahamba that the question proposed by the Minister cannot be certified. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the question of whether Mason requires an interpretation of s. 34(1)(b) of the IRPA “that would thwart Parliament’s clear intent as evidenced by Standing Committee testimony” is serious (which is doubtful), it does not arise from this case and has not been raised and dealt with in this judgment. It is thus also not dispositive. Further, even if the question were rephrased to remove the leading rhetorical framing, the underlying question – as far as this Court can tell – of whether the interpretive constraint identified in Mason in respect of s. 34(1)(e) applies also to s. 34(1)(b), the answer is, in my respectful view, clear from the reasoning in Mason and confirmed by Weldemariam, Ali and Wahab. While the question of how international law – in particular the principle of non-refoulement – impacts the interpretation of ss. 34(1)(b) and (f) of the IRPA remains open, to be addressed by the ID on redetermination, the question of whether it has a role to play is settled.

[50] The question proposed by the Minister therefore cannot be certified.

VII. Conclusion

[51] For all of these reasons, Mr. Ahamba’s application will be granted and the matter of his admissibility to Canada will be remitted to the ID for redetermination in accordance with these reasons and the binding caselaw discussed in it.

[52] There is no serious question of general importance for certification.

JUDGMENT in IMM-23912-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The Application is granted.

2. The decision under review is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Immigration Division for redetermination by a different Member in accordance with these reasons.

3. No question is certified.

"Andrew J. Brouwer"

 

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

Docket:	IMM-23912-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:	DAMIAN STANLEY CHIJINDU AHAMBA v THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPARDNESS
PLACE OF HEARING:	TORONTO, ontario
DATE OF HEARING:	JANUARY 27, 2026
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	BROUWER j.
DATED:	april 15, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Warda Shazadi Meighen	For The Applicant
Teresa Ramnarine	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Landings LLP Barrister & Solicitor Toronto, Ontario	For The Applicant
Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario	For The Respondent