Docket:
IMM-5930-13
Citation:
2014 FC 416
Ottawa, Ontario, May 2,
2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Annis
BETWEEN:
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Applicant
|
and
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U.S.A.
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
The applicant, the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, seeks judicial review pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] of a decision of
the Immigration Appeal Division decision (the IAD). The IAD determined that the
respondent was not inadmissible to Canada under section 34 of IRPA, as
there was insufficient evidence to show the organization he was an admitted
member of what was an organization attempting to subvert a government by force
or one that has engaged, engages or will engage in terrorism (contrary to
sections 34(1)(b), (c), (f) of IRPA).
[2]
To protect the respondent’s right to a fair
refugee determination, a confidentiality order is in place in this matter. This
decision contains no confidential information.
II.
The Facts
[3]
The respondent U.S.A, a Nigerian citizen, made a
claim for refugee protection immediately upon entering Canada in April 2010. The respondent admitted membership in the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The file was referred
to the Immigration Division (ID) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Board for an inadmissibility determination. The ID needed to determine whether
the respondent was inadmissible to Canada on security grounds, due to his
admitted membership in an organization which, potentially, there are reasonable
grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in terrorism or
subversion by force of government (sections 34(1)(b), (c), and (f) of IRPA).
[4]
In June 2012, a Board member of the ID performed
an analysis of both subversion by force of government (s.34(1)(b), IRPA)
and terrorism (s.34(1)(c), IRPA). The Member determined that there was
insufficient evidence to show MASSOB was engaged in either of these activities.
[5]
The Minister appealed the decision to the IAD,
which conducted a de novo
analysis and determined in October 2013 that there was insufficient evidence to
show MASSOB engaged in terrorism or subversion by force of government. This IAD
finding is the decision under review in the present proceedings.
[6]
MASSOB is a separatist movement. Its goal is to
establish an independent Biafran state in south-eastern Nigeria. The organization was formed in 1999 by Chief Ralph Uwazurkie, who set out to accomplish
sedition through non-violent means. It is composed primarily of ethnically Igbo
people.
[7]
The non-violent approach was chosen by Chief
Uwazurkie as a response to the Biafran state’s violent loss in the
Nigerian/Biafran civil war in the late 60s. Between 1967 and 1970, the Igbo
people attempted to establish, by use of force, the Republic of Biafra. The civil war was bloody and divisive. MASSOB has set out to improve the position of
the Igbo people through non-violent civil disobedience, with the end goal being
the creation of an independent Biafra. Such civil disobedience includes
stay-at-home protests and marches.
[8]
The dispute between Nigeria and MASSOB has not
been peaceful. It appears that over the years, Chief Uwazurkie may have lost
control over some elements of the organization, and both the Nigerian
government and many MASSOB members (some forming independent splinter groups,
some striking out while within MASSOB) have resorted to violence against the
populace and government. MASSOB publicly denounces these violent splinter
groups.
III.
Contested decision
[9]
The potentially subversive or terrorist activities
the Member considered were:
1)
MASSOB’s seizure of oil tankers to redistribute
the oil to the eastern part of Nigeria as a protest of high oil prices in the
region and in an attempt to change government policy;
2)
violent attacks on census takers during a
MASSOB-backed attempt to encourage self-identifying Biafrans from taking the
census;
3)
attacks on police stations; and
4)
MASSOB’s vigilante clashes with a motor-park
organization MASSOB believed was extorting citizens (NARTO, an unidentified
acronym in the record), which resulted in a “shoot
on sight” order by the Nigerian government for
both MASSOB and NARTO members in the region.
[10]
The Member limited her analysis to the issue of
subversion by force of government. No attempt was made to conduct a separate
analysis on the issue of terrorism based on the rationale that the applicant
had focused its arguments on the issue of subversion by force.
[11]
With respect to the issue of subversion, the
Member’s analysis dealt primarily with MASSOB’s seizure of tanker trucks for
which it admitted responsibility. The Member concluded that the evidence on use
of force was speculative and that MASSOB’s actions were to effect change by
civil disobedience to provide a more equitable distribution of oil without any
intention to subvert the authority of the Nigerian government.
IV.
Issues
[12]
The relevant issues in these proceedings are the
following:
1)
What is the standard of review?
2)
Did the Member fail to properly consider whether
MASSOB had engaged in terrorism?
3)
Did the Member adopt the wrong test of
subversion by force?
4)
Was the Member’s finding that MASSOB had not
engaged in force by the seizure of tanker trucks an erroneous finding of fact
made without regard for the material before it?
5)
Was the Member’s conclusion that by seizing the
tanker trucks MASSOB was engaging in civil disobedience not intended to subvert
the Nigerian government by force reasonable?
V.
Standard of review
[13]
Both the applicant and the respondent argued a
reasonableness standard of review, which is supported by recent case law (B074
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1146 at para 23; P.S. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 168 at para 5). That standard of review
is applicable here, as both issues are questions of fact or mixed fact and law.
VI.
Relevant legislation
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
SC 2001, c 27
|
Loi sur l’immigration et la protection
des réfugiés
LC 2001, ch 27
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Rules of Interpretation
33. The facts that constitute inadmissibility
under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions and, unless
otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to
believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur.
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Interprétation
33. Les faits - actes ou omissions - mentionnés
aux articles 34 à 37 sont, sauf disposition contraire, appréciés sur la base
de motifs raisonnables de croire qu’ils sont survenus, surviennent ou peuvent
survenir.
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Security
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign
national is inadmissible on security grounds for
[…]
(b) engaging in or instigating the
subversion by force of any government;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
[…]
(f) being a member of an organization that
there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage
in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
|
Sécurité
34. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire
pour raison de sécurité les faits suivants :
[…]
b) être l’instigateur ou l’auteur d’actes
visant au renversement d’un gouvernement par la force;
c) se livrer au terrorisme;
[…]
f) être membre d’une organisation dont il y
a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’elle est, a été ou sera l’auteur d’un
acte visé aux alinéas a), b) ou c).
|
VII.
Analysis
A.
Statutory requirements and standard of proof
[14]
Section 33 of IRPA requires that the
applicant establish the facts that constitute inadmissibility under section 34 “for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that
they have occurred, are occurring or may occur”.
The Member therefore had to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the
respondent had met the standard of proof of providing “reasonable
grounds to believe” that the applicant had engaged
in acts referred to in section 34.
[15]
In regards to standards of proof, none of the
accepted legal thresholds or standards of proof, including the requirement to
establish reasonable grounds to believe, should be confused with the threshold
of satisfying a decision-maker on a conclusion of fact. The latter requires a
demonstration that on the basis of the admissible evidence, it is more likely
than not that the fact occurred - in effect, a finding on a balance of
probabilities. The question, then, is once a conclusion has been arrived at in
regard to the facts, whether those facts meet the standard of reasonable
grounds to believe that the impugned acts occurred.
[16]
In the case at hand, during oral submissions,
the most controversial aspect of the proceedings was the question of how best
to define the standard of “reasonable grounds to
believe” that the impugned conduct had occurred.
[17]
This standard has been acknowledged as a low
threshold, and one that is significantly lower than the criminal threshold of “beyond a reasonable doubt”
or the civil threshold of a “balance of
probabilities”.
[18]
In Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 [Mugesera] at paragraph 114, the
Supreme Court described the same standard in a matter involving crimes against
humanity as follows:
The first issue raised by section 19 (1) (j) of
the Immigration Act is the meaning of the evidentiary standard that there be
“reasonable grounds to believe” that a person has committed a crime against
humanity. The FCA has found, and we agreed, that the “reasonable grounds to
believe” standard requires something more than mere suspicion, but less than
the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of
probabilities: Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.), at p. 445; Chiau v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 297 (C.A.) at paragraph 60. In
essence, reasonable grounds would exist where there is an objective basis
for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information: Sabour
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2009), 9 Imm. L.TR.
(3d) 61 (F.C.T.D.) (Sabour).
[My emphasis]
[19]
In the case at hand, the applicant referred
repeatedly to the standard to be met as that of “something
more than mere suspicion”. The respondent referred
to the test as “an objective basis for the belief
which is based on compelling and credible information”.
The applicant argued that these constitute the same standard, but I disagree.
[20]
In my view, the statutory wording “reasonable grounds to believe”
imports a standard of proof which lies between more than mere suspicion
and a balance of probabilities. This is how the Court in Mugesera
described it: “[the] standard requires something
more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil
matters of proof on the balance of probabilities.”
The applicant is attempting to apply the lowest end of this range by reference
to a standard “of something more than a mere
suspicion.” which can be distinguished from the
highest possible threshold referred to by the Court in Mugesera as lying
just below the balance of probabilities. I interpret the Court’s reasons in
Mugesera as establishing a threshold which would represent a middle
ground between the two extremes of what might possibly constitute reasonable
grounds to believe a fact.
[21]
A standard or onus of proof is necessarily a
threshold, and not a range. Thus, standards such as the “balance
of probabilities” and “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt” are minimum thresholds
which must be overcome in order to succeed in establishing civil liability or
criminal conduct. The degree to which a factual conclusion exceeds such a
threshold is irrelevant. Exceeding these thresholds by any degree meets the
onus.
[22]
The standard of “reasonable
grounds to believe” is novel by traditional legal
standards because beliefs are very open ended measures which, by definition, do
not need to be founded on rationally established facts. Requiring the belief to
be “reasonable” brings
the standard into the factually-bound legal world. However, this standard still
leaves a range of circumstances that could arguably constitute a reasonable
belief. I conclude that this explains why the Supreme Court chose to express
the test in a more concrete and detailed fashion, with the intention of fixing
the meaning of the standard by reference to elements of its composition that
are familiar in the juristic world.
[23]
The Court in Mugesera described the need
for information (evidence) that on an objective basis (as measured by the
reasonable person assessing the probative value of the evidence) can be
considered compelling (persuasive) and credible (reliable as to its source). This
standard is entirely different from that of establishing “more
than a mere suspicion”. It is also the meaning
that the Supreme Court has indicated should be ascribed to the statutory
standard of “reasonable grounds to believe,” and which I am bound to apply.
[24]
The respondent also argued that the test should
include the term “corroborated”. This was the third element of the standard as it was
stated in the Sabour decision, i.e. “compelling,
credible and corroborated information”, to which
case the Supreme Court made reference above. However, the Court clearly did not
include the term “corroborated” when adopting the test from Sabour. To add the
requirement of corroboration would set too high a standard, such as where there
exists credible and compelling evidence of torture from an individual, which
cannot be corroborated by other sources. Indeed, by requiring
corroboration, the court would be imposing a standard higher than that required
in criminal law to convict someone beyond a reasonable doubt. As stated by
David Paciocco and Lee Stuesser in The Law of Evidence, 6th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc. 2011) at 522
in regards to corroboration of evidence:
Strict corroboration rules are becoming less
common and much less technical than they once were. They are being repealed and
in some cases replaced by other rules that are intended to provide guidance to
triers of fact.
B.
Engaging in Terrorism – IRPA Section 34(1)(c)
[25]
Terrorism has been defined under section 34 of IRPA
as including ““[1] any act intended to cause death
or serious bodily injury [2] to a civilian, or to any other person not taking
an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict [3] when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel the government or international organization to do or abstain from
doing any act” (Suresh v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para 98) [my bracketing].
[26]
The applicant submits that the Board failed to
consider whether MASSOB engaged in terrorism. Given the almost complete absence
of any reference to terrorism, not to mention any analysis of the issue, I must
agree with this submission.
[27]
The failure to consider the applicant’s
arguments on terrorism appears to have arisen as a result of a misapprehension
by the Member of the Minister’s arguments as focusing on paragraph 34(1)(b)
of the IRPA, which concerns subversion by force, to the exclusion of any
arguments regarding paragraph 34(1)(c), which concerns terrorism. At
paragraph 11 of the decision, the Member states: “The
appellant Minister’s arguments focused on paragraph 34(1)(c), whether
the MASSOB engaged in or instigated subversion by force.”
[28]
Nowhere in the decision does the Member state
the test or analyze any facts in relation to the arguments put forward by the
Minister regarding terrorism. I agree that the passing reference to the word “terrorism” in the Member’s
reasons was insufficient to suggest that the issue had been considered in any
meaningful fashion whatsoever.
[29]
This is particularly the case because references
to terrorism in the decision were made in conjunction with references to
subversion by force of the government. This would appear to indicate that the
Member considered both issues as subject to the same test. This is far from the
case inasmuch as terrorism requires proof of conduct intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury for the purpose of the intimidation of civilians or
persons not involved in hostilities, or to compel conduct by governmental
agencies.
[30]
In light of the fact that the appeal before the
Member was based on the written arguments of the parties, it is irrefutable
that the Minister advanced separate and distinct submissions in regard to the
issue of terrorism, particularly in the form of evidence describing a beating
administered to a senior Methodist church cleric who was accused of providing
information to the joint army and police team that it was claimed had attacked
MASSOB headquarters.
[31]
The respondent argues that the fact that this
evidence, which was reiterated in various sources, referred to suspected
members of MASSOB was sufficient to permit the Member to ignore the incident.
However, the reasoning provided by the cleric in the documentary evidence
clearly connects the matter to MASSOB in a manner which would appear to meet
the definition of terrorism. The Member was required to come to a decision on
the reliability of this evidence, given that if accepted, it would form the
basis for a conclusion that MASSOB engaged in acts of terrorism.
[32]
There was also reference in the evidence to
incidents of violence causing injury to persons conducting a census on behalf
of the Nigerian government. The evidence before the Member included a denial by
MASSOB that they were involved in this conduct. Nevertheless, no analysis of
this evidence was undertaken, although it raised the prima
facie issue of possible
terrorist acts committed by MASSOB.
[33]
It is not for this Court to carry out the
necessary analysis, make findings of fact and supply the reasons that might
have been given by the Member had she addressed these issues (see Komolafe v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431 at para 11).
[34]
Inasmuch as a finding that MASSOB had engaged in
a terrorist act within the meaning of paragraph 34(1)(c) would render
the respondent inadmissible under the IRPA, the decision must be set
aside in respect of its conclusions on terrorism and sent back before a different
member for determination.
C.
Engaging in or Instituting the Subversion by
Force of Any Government – IRPA paragraph 34(1)(b)
[35]
IRPA does not
define either “subversion”
or “terrorism”.
However, the courts have provided guidance with respect to the definition of
both terms.
[36]
Subversion by force of a government has been
defined as “accomplishing change by illicit means” and as “[any] act that is
intended to contribute to the process of overthrowing a government, or
most commonly as the use or encouragement of force, violence or criminal means
with the goal of overthrowing a government, either in part of its territory or
in the entire country” (Maleki v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 131 at para 8; Eyakwe
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship And Immigration), 2011 FC 409 at paras 7
and 30; Suleyman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 780 at para 63).
[37]
“By force” has been understood to mean “reasonably perceived potential for the use of coercion
by violent means” (Oremade v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1077 [Oremade #1] at para 27; Oremade
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 1189 at para 4).
Intention may also be demonstrated based upon a presumption that “a person knows or ought to have known and to have
intended the natural consequences of their action [sic]”
(Oremade #1, supra at para 30).
(1)
Did the Member adopt the wrong test to determine
the issue of subversion by force?
[38]
The applicant argues that the Member misstated
the issue before her by framing it as whether there was a serious possibility
that MASSOB had become a subversive organization, referring to the Member’s
statement at paragraph 15 of her reasons as follows:
The relevant context for analysis of the MASSOB’s
relationship to the cited events is that the MASSOB began as a non-violent,
non-military organization. Given that context, there must be credible evidence
that indicates a serious possibility or a degree of probability that the
MASSOB, at some point, altered its original position and became a terrorist or
subversive organization.
[39]
Were I to conclude that this statement formed
the basis of the Member’s decision, I would agree that it improperly frames the
issue for consideration. However, a careful analysis of the Member’s reasons
indicates that her decision was based upon a conclusion that the evidence did
not support a finding that MASSOB had engaged in subversion by force, and that
its intention was not to overthrow the Nigerian government, both issues which I
consider below.
(2)
Was the Member’s finding that MASSOB had not
engaged in force by the seizure of tanker trucks an erroneous finding of fact
made without regard for the material before it?
[40]
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the
issue of subversion by force turned mainly on the incident involving the
seizure of oil tankers. Unlike the other incidents, MASSOB accepted
responsibility for this conduct. The Member’s reasons concerning the tanker
truck incident are stated at paragraph 16, which contains a number of issues
that are of concern to the Court.
[41]
Firstly, the Member based her decision on a
patently unreasonable conclusion of fact when she indicated that “the use of or threats to use force remains in the realm
of speculation.” During his oral arguments, the
respondent conceded that the evidence that described the seizing of tanker
trucks as a “forceful interception” of petroleum tankers under the direction of MASSOB was
unchallenged. He based his argument instead on the lack of intention on the part
of MASSOB to overthrow the Nigerian government by these acts.
[42]
Even if actual force was not used, the seizing
of tanker trucks could not be described as anything other than giving rise to a
“reasonably perceived potential for the use of
coercion by violent means”.
(3)
Was the Member’s conclusion that by seizing
tanker trucks, MASSOB was engaging in civil disobedience not intended to
subvert the Nigerian government by force unreasonable?
[43]
I also conclude that the Member’s conclusion
that MASSOB’s actions were not intended to subvert the government by force, but
rather were “more in keeping with an act of civil
disobedience” as unreasonable to the point of not
falling within a range of reasonable acceptable outcomes. On no account can one
find the conduct of seizing tanker trucks by force, which is normally described
as “hijacking”, to be
an act of civil disobedience. Had members of MASSOB blocked the entry of the
trucks by passively placing themselves or other objects in their way, an
argument could certainly be made that these were acts of civil disobedience.
The fact that the contents of the tankers were distributed amongst the
population is further proof that MASSOB’s conduct constituted the unlawful use
of force to take possession of property not belonging to it.
[44]
The Member’s description of this conduct as a “threat” (apostrophized in
her reasons) “to interfere with economic
activity…more in keeping with civil disobedience” is
equally unreasonable. This description reflects the type of conduct intended to
overthrow a government.
[45]
Ultimately, if one reads the Member’s reasons
carefully, her conclusion is that seizure of the trucks was not subversion. She
describes this conduct as civil disobedience by stating that MASSOB’s intention
was to address inequities and imbalances in the price of oil to Biafra in comparison with the rest of the country, and not to overthrow the government.
[46]
I set out the relevant passages from paragraph
16 of the Member’s decision relating to the intention underlying the
interception of the tanker trucks as follows:
There are documentary references to the
MASSOB’s stated intention to intercept oil tankers. The documented intention
was to coerce the federal government to redress imbalance in the distribution
of petroleum products in the country because of perceived inequity due to
non-availability of fuel in the MASSOB region at the government approved price.
Reports indicate that the MASSOB vowed to resist all opposition to it seizure
until the inequity and imbalance was redressed.
[…]
Furthermore, taking into consideration the
complex economic and political environment in Nigeria and the Biafran region in
particular, the vow to intercept tankers is not reasonably equivalent to
the use of coercion to overthrow the government of Nigeria.
[…]
In the absence of more reliable and consistent
reporting about the seizure of tankers, the available evidence is not
sufficient to show reasonable grounds to believe that there were actions by the
MASSOB intended to subvert the government.
[My emphasis]
[47]
There is evidence of statements by MASSOB that
its purpose in forcefully seizing the tanker trucks was to address inequities
of supply and pricing of an essential commodity by taking over its
distribution. The obvious consequence of this conduct, however, was to subvert
the authority of the Nigerian government in a confrontational and damaging
manner, which had the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the central
government. This consequence flows directly from MASSOB’s seizure of control of
a fundamental aspect of the Nigerian economy in a manner that challenges the
government’s authority to ensure that the country’s economy is not disrupted by
unlawful means, which the seizing of tanker trucks carrying an essential
commodity most assuredly represents.
[48]
As was noted by Justice Phelan of this Court in Oremade
#1, supra, at para 30, one is presumed to intend the results of
one’s actions. Taking control of the supply system of oil in a region of a
country represents an overt act intended to subvert the government. The
Member’s decision concluding the contrary was clearly unreasonable.
[49]
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the
decision of the IAD is set aside. Given the conclusion that seizing the tankers
by force constituted the engaging in subversion by force under paragraph 34(1)(b)
of the IRPA, the matter is returned to the IAD with a direction to allow
the appeal of the appellant Minister.