Docket: IMM-7442-24
Citation: 2026 FC 357
Ottawa, Ontario, March 17, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott
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BETWEEN: |
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A.F.M.B. ET AL |
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Applicants |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicants are described as 76 Palestinian nationals from the Gaza Strip [Gaza] with relatives in Canada. They bring this application, seeking an order of mandamus, related to the alleged failure by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] to process their web form submissions and issue to them unique reference codes [Codes] as a precondition to them submitting applications for temporary resident visas [TRVs], pursuant to the Temporary public policy to facilitate temporary resident visas for certain extended family affected by the crisis in Gaza [the Policy] established by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [the Minister] under section 25.2 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
[2] As explained in further detail below, this application is allowed, because the Respondent has not satisfied me that the application is either moot or futile, and the Applicants have met the test that must be satisfied when seeking relief in the nature of mandamus. My Judgment will order relief similar, but not identical, to that requested by the Applicants.
II. Background
A. The Policy
[3] Section 25.2 of IRPA provides the Minister authority to grant permanent resident status or an exemption to a foreign national who is inadmissible or does not meet the requirements of IRPA, if the foreign national complies with any conditions imposed by the Minister and the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by public policy considerations.
[4] Pursuant to that authority, on December 22, 2023, the Minister announced the Policy, which referenced the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and was described as intended to provide a humanitarian pathway to safety and recognize the importance of keeping families together. The Policy came into force on January 9, 2024.
[5] The Policy exempts foreign nationals applying for a TRV from certain listed provisions of the IRPA and its regulations (the requirement not to be financially inadmissible to Canada and the obligation to establish that they would leave Canada at the end of their authorized period of stay) provided they meet the following eligibility criteria and conditions:
Part 1
1. The foreign national:
i. has submitted an application for a temporary resident visa;
ii. was in the Gaza Strip on the day they submitted their application;
iii.is a Palestinian Territory passport holder;
iv. has identified an anchor, who meets the requirements in Annex A;
v. is the spouse, common law partner, child (regardless of age), grandchild, parent, grandparent or sibling of the anchor identified in condition iv. of Part 1;
vi. has a signed statutory declaration from the anchor identified in condition iv. of Part 1 in which the anchor attests that:
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they have the intention to provide the support set out in Annex B for the foreign national and their family members as defined in section 1(3) of the Regulations, and
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they have not accepted, and understand they are not to accept, any financial compensation from the foreign national and their family members;
vii. has submitted the application by electronic means (applied online) or with an alternate application format provided by the department if the foreign national or their representative indicated they are unable to apply online.
Part 2
2. The foreign national:
i. is a family member, as defined in subsection 1(3) of the Regulations, of a foreign national who has applied under this public policy and has been found to meet the conditions listed in Part 1;
ii. has submitted an application for a temporary resident visa; and
iii. has submitted the application by electronic means (applied online) or with an alternate application format provided by the department if the foreign national or their representative indicated they are unable to apply online.
Part 3
3. The foreign national
i. holds a temporary resident visa that was issued following facilitation under Part 1 or Part 2; and
ii. seeks to enter Canada as a visitor.
[6] A.B. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1514 [A.B.] at paragraph 13, described as follows the stages of an application for a TRV pursuant to the Policy:
13. The Policy defines the application process in three distinct stages. First, the anchor relative completes a statutory declaration and confirms their eligibility and commitment to supporting the applicant. Second, the anchor relative submits a webform with the required documents. If the application meets the requirements and space is available, the IRCC issues a reference code. Third, the applicant submits their TRV application through the IRCC portal along with their reference code and other required documents.
[7] For clarity, I note that these three stages of the application process are distinct from the three Parts of the Policy identified above.
[8] Significantly, and as emphasized by the Respondent, the Policy as initially announced included start and end dates. The start date was January 9, 2024, and, initially, Parts 1 and 2 (overseas visa facilitation) of the Policy expired once 1,000 TRV applications had been accepted into processing or one year after the Policy came into effect, whichever was first, such that no additional applications could be accepted into processing following expiration. On May 27, 2024, the Policy was updated to increase the cap on the number of TRV applications that could be accepted into processing to 5,000. The Policy also provided throughout that it could be revoked at any time.
B. The Applicants
[9] The Applicants are all described as parents, siblings, nieces or nephews of Canadian permanent residents or citizens. Together, the Applicants commenced 16 applications for judicial review, all of which were consolidated into the present proceeding by previous Orders of this Court. Referencing the Court file numbers of the individual applications, the Applicants’ Further Memorandum of Fact and Law provides the following procedural history of the Applicants’ interactions with IRCC, based principally on information derived from the Certified Tribunal Record [CTR]:
Procedural History of IMM-18705-24
14. The anchor relative in matter IMM-18705-24 is a permanent resident of Canada. The Applicants are the anchor relative’s brother, sister-in-law and their four children. The anchor relative sent a web form for her 17 year old nephew on January 12, 2024. On August 26, 2024, an email from IRCC’s EPIC Special Initiatives ("EPIC") was sent to IRCC case processing agent Jacob Edelson. EPIC asked Officer Edelson to review the web form submission. The email contained the materials uploaded to the web form as well as two templates. One template was to be sent to the anchor relative if the web form was deemed complete, and the other template was to be sent to the anchor relative if the web form was deemed incomplete. This email will be hereinafter referred to as the “EPIC instructions.” On the same day, August 26, 2024, Officer Edelson responded to EPIC and stated “A-Z review complete. Application complete.” The email also contains the filled out ‘complete’ template, without a unique reference code, confirming that the application is complete. No unique reference code was sent to the anchor relative.
15. On September 17, 2024, the anchor relative resubmitted the web form with an updated statutory declaration form, which included the anchor relative’s brother, sister-in-law and their other children. On March 7, 2025 the anchor relative was sent a template email entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying them of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-18712-24
16. The anchor relative in matter IMM-18712-24 is a permanent resident of Canada. The Applicants are the anchor relative’s sister, brother-in-law, and their three children. The anchor relative submitted a complete web form to IRCC on January 12, 2024. On August 23, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC case processing agent Shawn Scissons. There is no indication in the CTR that Officer Scissons ever assessed the web form as instructed. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying her of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-18719-24
17. The anchor relative in matter IMM-18719-24 is a permanent resident of Canada. The Applicants in this matter are the anchor relative’s sister, brother-in-law, and their seven children. On January 12, 2024, the anchor relative submitted a complete web form to IRCC. On August 23, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC case processing agent Shawn Scissons. There is no indication in the CTR that Mr. Scissons ever assessed the web form as instructed. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications” notifying her of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-18856-24
18. The anchor relative in matter IMM-18856-24 is a permanent resident of Canada. The Applicants are the anchor relative’s brother, sister-in-law, and their two children. The anchor relative submitted a complete web form to IRCC on January 12, 2024. On August 23, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC case processing agent Shawn Scissons. There is no indication in the CTR that Officer Scissons ever assessed the web form as instructed. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying her of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-20029-24
19. The anchor relative in matter IMM-20029-24 is a permanent resident of Canada. The Applicants are the anchor relative’s brother and his three children. On January 12, 2024, the anchor relative sent a web form for her 17 year old nephew. On August 26, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC case processing agent Jacob Edelson. On the same day, August 26, 2024, Officer Edelson forwarded the email of EPIC to IRCC program assistant Sareen Gharib with the message “for training.” Officer Gharib responded to the email sent by EPIC on the same date and copied Officer Edelson. Her email stated: “A-Z review complete. Application complete.” The email also contains the filled out ‘complete’ template, without a unique reference code, confirming that the application is complete. No unique reference code was sent to the anchor relative. On September 17, 2024, the anchor relative sent a subsequent web form including her brother and all three of his children. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying her of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-20737-24
20. The anchor relative in matter IMM-20737-24 is a permanent resident of Canada. The Applicants are her parents. The anchor relative submitted a complete web form to IRCC on January 12, 2024. On August 26, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC case processing agent Jacob Edelson. On the same day, August 26, 2024, Officer Edelson forwarded the email of EPIC to IRCC program assistant Sareen Gharib with the message “for training.” Officer Gharib responded to the email sent by EPIC on the same date and copied Officer Edelson. The email stated: “A-Z review complete. Application complete.” The email also contains the filled out ‘complete’ template, without unique reference codes, confirming that the application is complete. No unique reference codes were sent to the anchor relative. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying her of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-2069-25
21. The anchor relative in IMM-2069-25 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are his sister, brother-in-law, and their four children. The anchor relative submitted a web form on January 9, 2024 which included the statutory declaration form, a copy of his driver’s license, but no proof of his immigration status in Canada. On January 19, 2024, the anchor relative received an email from IRCC indicating that he had failed to provide the statutory declaration form and proof of his status in Canada. At 1PM on January 19, 2024, the anchor relative submitted a further web form containing the statutory declaration form, his driver’s license, and a copy of his Canadian passport. At 11:30PM on January 19, 2024, the anchor relative submitted another web form, containing the statutory declaration form, his driver’s license, his Canadian passport, his provincial health card, and his citizenship certificate. He also provided a letter of explanation, indicating that he was resubmitting the application originally provided on January 9, 2024.
22. On February 4, 2024, EPIC emailed Heather MacKinnon of IRCC a copy of the web form submitted on January 19, 2024 at 1pm. The email read: “Hey Heather, as requested :) heres the webform submitted on Jan 19th.” There is no indication in the CTR that either of the web forms submitted on January 19, 2024 were assessed by IRCC. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying them of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-7442-24
23. The anchor relative in matter IMM-7442-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are his brother, sister-in-law, and their four children. On January 23, 2024, the anchor relative’s brother in the Gaza Strip submitted a complete web form to IRCC. There is no indication in the CTR that his web form submission was ever assessed by IRCC. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative’s brother was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying him of the closure of the Policy. The Applicants never received unique reference codes.
Procedural History of IMM-7470-24
24. The anchor relative in matter IMM-7470-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are his parents. On January 13, 2024, the anchor relative’s father in Gaza submitted a complete web form to IRCC. On August 30, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC program assistant Sareen Gharib. On the same day, August 30, 2024, Officer Gharib responded to EPIC and stated “A-Z review complete. Application complete.” The email also contains the filled out ‘complete’ template, without a unique reference code, confirming that the application is complete. The Applicants never received unique reference codes. The CTR does not indicate if the anchor relative or the Applicants were informed about the closure of the Policy in March 2025.
Procedural History of IMM-7512-24
25. The anchor relative in matter IMM-7512-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicant is the anchor relative’s sister. On January 9, 2024, the anchor relative submitted a web form with no accompanying documents. On January 13, 2024, IRCC emailed the anchor relative and informed him that his web form submission was missing the necessary documents. On the same day, January 13, 2024, the anchor relative resubmitted his web form with the statutory declaration form, a copy of his government issued ID, proof of his Canadian status and proof of his residency in Canada. On January 18, 2024, Officer Nyemba Mukuta Pichoux of IRCC emailed the anchor relative, stating that his web form submission was the statutory declaration form, a copy of his government issued ID, proof of his Canadian status and proof of his residency in Canada. On January 19, 2024, the anchor relative resubmitted a complete web form twice, with all the same documents previously provided. On February 4, 2024, the anchor relative sent a webform enquiry to IRCC seeking confirmation of receipt of his prior web form submissions. On March 9, 2024, the anchor relative sent a further complete web form for his sister.
26. On March 9, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC case processing agent Joseph Hachey. On September 3, 2024, Officer Hachey emailed EPIC stating “Good Day, AZ REVIEW COMPLETE,” and providing a filled out ‘complete’ template without a unique reference code. No codes were issued. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying them of the closure of the Policy.
Procedural History of IMM-7588-24
27. The anchor relative in matter IMM-7588-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are his sister and nephew. On January 22, 2024, the anchor relative provided a complete web form to IRCC. On February 4, 2024, the anchor relative sent a webform enquiry to IRCC, seeking confirmation of receipt of his web form submission for the Applicants and other family members. On April 20, 2024, the anchor relative sent a further web form enquiry to IRCC. He provided a letter from his nephew’s father authorizing him to travel, Use of Representative forms indicating that the anchor would be acting as the Applicants’ authorized representative, the anchor’s identity documents, an Additional Background Information form, a Consent to Disclose Personal Information form, and the statutory declaration form.There is no indication in the CTR that the web form of the Applicants was ever assessed. The anchor relative never received unique reference codes for his family members. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying them of the closure of the Policy.
Procedural History of IMM-7725-24
28. The anchor relative in matter IMM-7725-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are her parents. On January 13, 2024, the anchor relative’s father submitted a complete web form to IRCC. On September 3, 2024, the EPIC instructions were emailed to IRCC case processing agent Jacob Edelson. On the same day, September 3, 2024, Officer Edelson responded to EPIC stating “A-Z review complete. Application complete.” Officer Edelson included the filled out ‘complete’ template, without a unique reference code, indicating that the application was complete. The Applicants never received unique reference codes. The CTR does not indicate if the anchor relative or the Applicants were informed about the closure of the Policy in March 2025.
Procedural History of IMM-9506-24
29. The anchor relative of the Applicants in IMM-9064-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are her sister, brother-in-law, and their five children. On January 16, 2024, the anchor relative provided a web form to IRCC. There is no indication in the CTR that this web form was ever assessed. On March 20, 2024, the anchor relative resubmitted the web form to IRCC with the assistance of counsel. There is no indication in the CTR that this web form was ever assessed by IRCC. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC entitled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying them of the closure of the Policy.
Procedural History of IMM-9516-24
30. The anchor relative in matter IMM-9516-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are her sister, brother-in-law, and their seven children. On January 19 and 24, 2024, the anchor relative submitted web forms to IRCC. As two of the Applicants are over-age dependents, the anchor relative submitted two separate statutory declaration forms for them in her January 24, 2024,2024 [sic], submission. There is no indication in the CTR that either of these web form submissions were assessed. On March 20, 2024, the anchor relative submitted a subsequent web form for the Applicants with the assistance of counsel. There is no indication in the CTR that this web form submission was assessed. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC titled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying them of the closure of the Policy.
Procedural History of IMM-9522-24
31. The anchor relative in matter IMM-9522-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are her brother, sister-in-law, and their four children. The anchor relative submitted complete web forms to IRCC on January 10, 2024, and on January 24, 2024. There is no indication in the CTR that either web form submissions were assessed by IRCC. On March 20, 2024, the anchor relative submitted a subsequent web form for the Applicants with the assistance of counsel. There is no indication in the CTR that this web form submission was assessed. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC titled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying her of the closure of the Policy.
Procedural History of IMM-9532-24
32. The anchor relative in matter IMM-9532-24 is a Canadian citizen. The Applicants are her sister, brother-in-law, and their four children. On January 15, 2024, and on January 23, 2024, the anchor relative submitted web forms on behalf of the Applicants. There is no indication in the CTR that either web form was assessed. On March 20, 2024, the anchor relative submitted a subsequent web form for the Applicants with the assistance of counsel. There is no indication in the CTR that this web form submission was assessed. On May 17, 2024, Applicant S.J. gave birth to a daughter, L.J., in the Gaza Strip. On March 7, 2025, the anchor relative was sent a template email from IRCC titled “Special measures for extended family in Gaza closed to new applications,” notifying them of the closure of the Policy.
[10] As the Applicants summarize the factual background to these applications, all of them submitted web forms to IRCC within a month of the Policy opening in January 2024, but none of the Applicants received either Codes based on complete submissions or refusal letters explaining why their web form submissions were deemed incomplete. Based on the information disclosed by the CTR as to the processing of their web form submissions, the Applicants submit that they fall into three categories: (a) those whose web form submissions were sent by a group within IRCC named EPIC Special Initiatives [EPIC] to an officer who deemed the submission complete, but without any Codes having been issued; (b) those whose web form submissions were sent by EPIC to an officer but were never assessed; and (c) those for whom there is no information indicating that their web form submissions were ever sent to an officer.
III. Law on Mandamus
[11] Paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [Federal Courts Act] expressly grants the Federal Court the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus. Pursuant to subsection 18(3), the remedies provided for in paragraph 18(1)(a) may be obtained only on an application for judicial review under section 18.1. Paragraph 18.1(3)(a) of the Federal Courts Act in turn provides that the Federal Court may, on an application for judicial review, order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing.
[12] The parties concur, and I agree, that the test for mandamus, as set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Apotex Inc v Canada (AG), [1994] 1 FC 742, 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA) at 766-769, aff’d Apotex Inc v Canada (AG), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1100, 1994 CanLII 47 (SCC), is as follows:
1. There must be a legal duty to act;
2. The duty must be owed to the applicant;
3. There must be a clear right to performance of that duty, meaning that:
a. The applicant has satisfied all conditions precedent giving rise to the duty; and
b. There was
i. A prior demand for performance of the duty;
ii. A reasonable time to comply with the demand unless refused outright; and
iii. A subsequent refusal which can be either expressed or implied, e.g. by unreasonable delay.
4. Where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional principles apply;
5. No other adequate remedy is available to the applicant;
6. The order sought will have some practical value or effect;
7. The Court finds no equitable bar to the relief sought; and
8. On a balance of convenience, an order of mandamus should be issued.
[13] As the test is conjunctive, all these conditions need to be satisfied in order for the Court to exercise its discretion to issue the remedy (Luo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 181 at para 10).
[14] An assessment of whether delay is unreasonable, relevant to the third condition above, is informed by Conille v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 1998 CanLII 9097 (FC), [1999] 2 FC 33 [Conille] at paragraph 23). The delay will be unreasonable if: (a) the delay has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie; (b) the applicant and their counsel are not responsible for the delay; and (c) the authority responsible for the delay has not provided a satisfactory justification (Conille at para 23).
IV. Issues
[15] Based on the parties’ submissions, the issues for the Court’s determination in this application are as follows:
- Are the Applicants’ affidavits admissible?
- Is this application for judicial review moot or futile?
- Have the Applicants met the test for mandamus?
V. Analysis
A. Are the Applicants’ affidavits admissible?
[16] The Respondent has not filed any evidence in response to this application. The evidentiary record before the Court, filed by the Applicants, consists of affidavits sworn by each of the anchor relatives, as well as the following:
- affidavit sworn on February 3, 2025, by Evaleen Margaret Helinga, an associate lawyer in the office of one of the Applicants’ counsel, attaching copies of versions of the Policy and related IRCC publications, as well as a number of news articles, press releases, and other documents identifying country conditions in Gaza [the Helinga Affidavit];
- affidavit sworn on January 23, 2025, by Jamie Liew, a Canadian immigration lawyer and professor at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, which expresses opinions on Canada’s use of temporary public policies to create special immigration measures for individuals in emergency situations, including the use of the Policy to respond to the conflict in Gaza, and attaches documentation related to those opinions [the Liew Affidavit];
- affidavit sworn on December 15, 2025, by Matthew Behrens, a coordinator with the Rural Refugee Rights Network, which provides evidence as to his work with Palestinian families in Canada trying to bring relatives to Canada on TRVs and attaches documentation related to that work [the Behrens Affidavit]; and
- affidavit sworn on December 25, 2025, by Tala Ezeddin, a legal assistant in the office of one of the Applicants’ counsel, attaching copies of an updated version of the Policy and related IRCC publications, regulatory amendments under IRPA, and a number of news articles, press releases, and other documents identifying country conditions in Gaza [the Ezeddin Affidavit].
[17] The Respondent challenges the admissibility of much of this evidence. The Respondent argues that the Liew Affidavit, as well paragraphs 33 to 36 of the Behrens Affidavit (related to evacuations from Gaza in 2021) and portions of Exhibit “A”
to the Behrens Affidavit (related to the efficacy of the Policy) are inadmissible as opinion evidence for which the Applicants have not followed the procedure for the admissibility of expert opinion under the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106. The Respondent asks that this evidence be struck or disregarded by the Court in its consideration of this application.
[18] At the hearing of the application, counsel advised the Court that, following discussions among them, the parties had agreed that the Liew Affidavit, paragraphs 33 to 36 of the Behrens Affidavit, and pages 11 and 13 to 19 of Exhibit “A”
to the Behrens Affidavit be struck as inadmissible. The Court agrees with the parties’ position, and my Judgment will so provide.
[19] In relation to material in the Helinga Affidavit and the Ezeddin Affidavit that the Applicant seeks to rely on as country condition documentation [CCD], the Respondent references authority to the effect that newspaper articles, press releases and country condition reports are generally considered to be inadmissible hearsay but may be admitted to provide general background information where necessary (Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 75 para 7; Gilead Sciences, Inc v Canada (Health), 2016 FC 856 at para 50; Isakhani v Al-Saggaf, 2007 ONCA 539 at paras 37-41). The Respondent also notes that, in A.B. at paragraphs 38 to 42 (and in other related decisions involving applicants from Gaza), Justice Brown adopted this approach with respect to similar evidence adduced by Ms. Helinga.
[20] In accordance with that approach, the Respondent identifies Exhibits “A”
, “D”
, “E”
, and “K”
to “W”
of the Helinga Affidavit, as well as Exhibits “L”
to “R”
of the Ezeddin Affidavit, as admissible for the purposes of providing the Court with necessary general background information. The Applicants have not taken issue with the Respondent’s submissions in relation to this particular evidence and have not suggested that they seek to rely on this evidence for the truth of its contents. The Court is content to adopt this approach with respect to this evidence.
[21] The remaining evidentiary issue between the parties relates to the admissibility of Exhibits “S”
to “DD”
of the Ezeddin Affidavit, which the Respondent argues are inadmissible to the extent that the Applicants are relying on them to suggest that it is within Canada’s ability to facilitate the exit of Palestinians from Gaza. The Respondent submits that such evidence is irrelevant to the issues in this particular application, which relates to the stage of the Policy involving web form submissions and issuance of a Code, rather than the later stage of applying for a TRV. The Applicants explained at the hearing that they consider this evidence to be admissible as necessary general background information and/or as evidence of prejudice they have experienced as a result of the delay in processing their web form submissions.
[22] There is conflicting jurisprudence in this Court as to whether the requirement to show prejudice forms part of the test for issuance of a writ of mandamus (see, e.g., Tousi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 671 at paras 11-17, in which Justice Turley identified this conflict and concluded that a requirement for significant prejudice should not be included in the test). However, the Respondent confirmed at the hearing that it is not arguing that the Applicants must show prejudice in order to succeed in this application.
[23] While the disputed exhibits to the Ezeddin Affidavit might be relevant to litigation resulting from IRCC’s processing of an application for a TRV under the third stage of the process contemplated by the Policy, I agree with the Respondent that the disputed exhibits to the Ezeddin Affidavit are not relevant, as background information or otherwise, to the stage of the process that is at issue in this particular application. As such, my Judgment will strike those exhibits as inadmissible.
B. Is this application for judicial review moot or futile?
[24] The Respondent submits that this application for judicial review is both moot and futile. As explained below, the Respondent’s arguments under both the principles of mootness and futility are effectively the same. However, as these principles are doctrinally distinct, I will set them out briefly before turning to the Respondent’s arguments.
[25] In Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 [Borowski], the Supreme Court explained that the doctrine of mootness is engaged where a decision of a court will not have the effect of resolving some live controversy that affects or may affect the rights of the parties. If the decision will have no practical effect on such rights, the court will decline to hear the case, although it retains a residual discretion to decide such a matter even though it is moot, applying factors set out in Borowski.
[26] Turning to futility, the law provides that judicial review is a discretionary remedy and that, even if an application proceeds and the applicant is successful on the merits, the court has the discretion to decline to provide a remedy, including where there is no utility in providing the remedy that the applicant requests (‘Namgis First Nation v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2020 FCA 122 at paras 41-42).
[27] In relation to both these principles, the Respondent argues that granting mandamus to compel IRCC to provide the Applicants with Codes would serve no useful purpose, as the sole purpose of the Code was to allow an applicant to complete an application for a TRV pursuant to the Policy. As the Policy cap of 5,000 applications has been reached and the Policy has accordingly expired, the Respondent submits that no further TRV applications can be accepted under the Policy. The Respondent argues that this matter is moot because there is therefore no live controversy between the parties, that the Borowski factors do not support a decision to decide the matter notwithstanding that it is moot, and that it would similarly be futile for the Court to impose a remedy that would have no practical effect.
[28] In response to these arguments, the Applicants submit that there are effective remedies at the Court’s disposal. The Applicants rely heavily on A.B.C.D. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1296 [A.B.C.D.], in which Justice Gascon addressed an application for mandamus in what the Applicants submit were circumstances similar to the matter at hand, albeit in connection with a different temporary policy. The applicant in A.B.C.D. applied for permanent residence [PR] under a policy that exempted eligible Afghan applicants from certain requirements of IRPA and its regulations [the Afghan Policy], employing a process in which the first step was for an applicant to submit an Expression of Interest [EOI] to Global Affairs Canada [GAC]. If GAC concluded that the applicant had a significant and/or enduring relationship to Canada, it was to refer the applicant to IRCC, which would then send the applicant an Invitation to Apply [ITA], following which the applicant could submit the formal PR application.
[29] The applicant in A.B.C.D. submitted his EOI, but GAC failed to process it, and ultimately IRCC took the position that the applicant could not submit a PR application under the Afghan Policy because he had not received an ITA. In response to the applicant’s application for mandamus, the respondent argued that such relief would have no practical effect, because the 18,000-person cap on the program has been met and the Afghan Policy had expired. Justice Gascon rejected this position, concluding that the applicant should not be unfairly prejudiced by the passage of time between GAC’s negligence in processing his EOI and the date on which the cap of accepted applicants under the Afghan Policy was reached. The Court was therefore prepared to direct that GAC (and IRCC if there was a referral from GAC) consider the applicant’s application under the initial version of the policy as it existed when the applicant submitted his EOI (at para 6).
[30] Justice Gascon explained the jurisprudential antecedents to his analysis, relying in particular on Saeedy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 354, and Ramizi v College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants, 2025 FC 692, and concluding that it was within the Court’s power to “turn back the clock”
and issue a direction compelling that the Afghan Policy be applied as it stood at the time of the applicant’s EOI (A.B.C.D. at para 67). The Court further reasoned that it was the respondent that was solely responsible for why there would normally be no practical effects and held that to dismiss the mandamus application based on a lack of practical effects would encourage public authorities to neglect the processing of applications under temporary programs for as long as it took the programs to expire (at para 69).
[31] Subsequently, in H.N. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1801, Justice Whyte-Novak followed the reasoning in A.B.C.D. and ordered the processing of an EOI under the Afghan Policy notwithstanding the expiry of the policy (at para 48).
[32] The Respondent argues that these authorities are distinguishable. It argues that, unlike in A.B.C.D., there is no evidence of negligence on the part of IRCC in the case at hand or evidence that the Applicants have not benefited from a fair process. The Respondent also notes that, in A.B.C.D., Justice Gascon found that the applicant was able to invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The Respondent submits that the Applicants cannot similarly claim to have had a legitimate expectation that they would received a Code because, in contrast to A.B.C.D., the cap under the Policy was publicized.
[33] I do not find these submissions compelling. While A.B.C.D. occasionally makes reference to negligence, neither it nor the case at hand involves a suit in tort. If the Applicants can satisfy the test for mandamus, as did the applicant in A.B.C.D., the analysis in that matter defeats the Respondent’s efforts to invoke the principles of mootness or futility, just as it defeated comparable arguments in A.B.C.D. As for the existence of a fair process, I will address later in these Reasons the parties’ arguments surrounding the doctrine of legitimate expectations (which relates to procedural fairness) and, again, if the Applicants are able to satisfy the mandamus test, by establishing a duty upon IRCC through the doctrine of legitimate expectations or otherwise, then the reliance of A.B.C.D. upon that doctrine does not represent a basis to distinguish it.
[34] The Respondent also argues that the application process under the Afghan Policy was unique, as Justice Gascon described it at paragraph 101 as “… an extraordinary resettlement program in the unusual context surrounding the fall of the Afghan government at the hands of the Taliban”
and commented that, “[w]hile other temporary public policies for other countries exist (e.g., Ukraine), there is no evidence that their application process is anywhere near as convoluted as the one before this Court.”
[35] However, as the Respondent notes, these comments were made in the context of the Court’s analysis as to whether to accept proposed questions for certification for appeal. In my view Justice Gascon’s conclusion that the proposed questions were highly fact-specific and therefore did not meet the test for certification does not detract from the jurisprudential application of A.B.C.D. to the Court’s determination as to whether the present application for judicial review is moot or futile.
[36] I also note the Respondent’s observation that, in A.A. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1811 [A.A.#1] at paragraph 49, Justice Brown found that A.B.C.D. had no application, because there was nothing to suggest that the operational context before Justice Gascon was comparable to that which was before the Court in A.A.#1. However, the context in A.A.#1 was indeed distinct, as that matter involved the stage of the application process under the Policy at which the applicants were seeking processing of their TRV applications. Justice Brown noted the need for the applicants to provide biometrics as required by the Policy and the applicants’ inability to do so because of the closure of the Rahah border crossing, which the Court described as a “catch-22”
resulting from the way the Policy was written and the changed operational context caused by the border closure (at para 47).
[37] In contrast, the preliminary stage of the application process under the Policy, at which the Applicants seek the Court’s intervention in the case at hand, is comparable to that which the Court was examining in A.B.C.D., involving in A.B.C.D. an assessment whether an applicant had a significant and/or enduring relationship to Canada (at para 3) and in the matter at hand what appears to be a straightforward determination (devoid of any biometric or other security-related requirements) as to whether the Applicants’ web form submissions were complete.
[38] The Respondent also argues that A.B.C.D. is inconsistent with the subsequent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Universal Ostrich Farms Inc v Canada (Food Inspection Agency), 2025 FCA 147 [Universal Ostrich], which stated that it is not the role of the Court to set, vary, or grant exemptions from governmental policy (at para 6). As the Respondent points out, Justice Brown relied on Universal Ostrich in A.B. (at para 91) and in A.A.#1 (at para 88).
[39] While this statement in Universal Ostrich is of course correct, I do not interpret that authority as representing an evolution in the law that has overtaken the reasoning in A.B.C.D. Indeed, H.N. at paragraph 23 noted that the respondent in that matter had relied on Universal Ostrich as explaining that it is not the role of the Court to change the requirements decided by the Minister and, in doing so, to effectively redraft the relevant public policy. However, Justice Whyte-Novak rejected the respondent’s position that A.B.C.D. had rewritten the Afghan Policy in respect of its caps and its termination, as Justice Gascon had held that the duty owed by GAC was to process and assess all EOIs received before the policy’s cap was reached. H.N. found that A.B.C.D. did not seek to impose any objective content onto the Afghan Policy but rather held GAC to the process established by the policy (H.N. at paras 30-31). H.N. also noted that, in A.B.C.D., the Minister had offered no evidence that the cap had already been met by the time GAC received the applicant’s EOI (H.N. at paras 30-31).
[40] I agree with the analysis in H.N. and similarly find that Universal Ostrich does not assist the Respondent in arguing that the reasoning in A.B.C.D. should not be followed in the matter at hand.
[41] The Respondent also draws the Court’s attention to the decision in Tabingo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 377 [Tabingo], affirmed in Tabingo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 191 [Tabingo FCA]. As explained below, the Respondent argues that these authorities are inconsistent with a conclusion that IRCC retains a public duty to issue Codes or consider TRV applications under the Policy, following its expiry, and are therefore supportive of the Respondent’s effort to invoke the doctrines of mootness and futility and its position that the Applicants cannot in any event establish the existence of a legal duty to act as is necessary to satisfy the test for mandamus.
[42] The applicants in Tabingo had been waiting many years for their PR applications to be processed, but new legislation (IRPA, ss 87.4(1)) purported to cancel their applications without further consideration if a selection decision had not been made by a certain date. The applicants sought an order of mandamus, and the Federal Court (per Rennie J, as he then was) found that such relief was not available, reasoning that there was no legal duty to process the applications because the legislation had cancelled them (at paras 139-140). In Tabingo FCA, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld this decision and, in relation to a certified question, found that the applicants were not entitled to mandamus, because ss 87.4(1) had automatically terminated their applications, after which the Minister had no legal obligation to continue to process them (at para 100).
[43] The Respondent submits that, just as there was no legal duty to act in Tabingo because the applications have been terminated by law, IRCC has no present legal duty to continue to process the Applicants’ requests for Codes, or to subsequently process future TRV applications under the Policy, because the Policy (which has the force of law pursuant to section 25.2 of IRPA) expired once the cap had been reached.
[44] I am not convinced that this authority assists the Respondent. As explained in Tabingo FCA, the appellants had argued that, when they submitted their PR applications, they had a vested right to have those applications processed to completion and considered under the statutory provisions and regulations in effect when the applications were submitted (at para 75). However, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that, while the appellants had the right to have their applications considered in accordance with IRPA, they did not have the right to the continuance of the provisions of IRPA that affected their applications or to have the applications considered under the provisions that were in effect at the time of submission (at para 76). Parliament has the authority to enact laws with retrospective effect, and the Court was satisfied that ss 87.4(1) was sufficiently clear to terminate the appellants’ applications retrospectively (at paras 77-78).
[45] As such, the reasoning and result in Tabingo, as affirmed in Tabingo FCA, turned on the enactment of retrospective legislation, which is distinguishable from the present matter. Indeed, Tabingo FCA distinguished authorities, upon which the appellants sought to rely, that are more similar to the case at hand in that they did not involve the application of retrospective legislation. For instance, in Choi v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1991 CanLII 13601 (FCA), [1992] 1 FC 763 (CA) [Choi], Canadian authorities provided incorrect information to the applicant that caused him prejudice when the applicable regulations subsequently changed before he submitted his application for immigration to Canada. However, this legislative change did not have retrospective effect, and the Court in Choi ordered the situation to be remedied by treating the applicant as though he had submitted his application before the regulatory change (Tabingo FCA at para 79).
[46] I am satisfied that the reasoning in A.B.C.D. applies in the case at hand and defeats the Respondent’s mootness and futility arguments.
C. Have the Applicants met the test for mandamus?
[47] I have set out the test for mandamus earlier in these Reasons. In arguing that the Applicants have not satisfied the test, the Respondent submits that there are four conditions of the test the Applicants have failed to meet. The Respondent asserts that: (a) there is no current legal duty upon IRCC to act; (b) IRCC does not owe the Applicants such a duty; (c) a mandamus order would have no practical value or effect; and (d) the balance of convenience does not favour issuing such an order. I will canvass below the Applicant’s submissions on each element of the test, focusing in particular on those that the Respondent argues have not been met.
(1) Public legal duty to act / duty owned to the Applicants
[48] The Applicants submit that the Minister (and therefore IRCC) have a public legal duty to process applications submitted under the Policy. Although the Minister has discretion whether to create public policy exemptions under section 25.2 of IRPA, once a policy has been created, the process of decision-making thereunder may be subject to judicial review (Smith v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 228 at para 25). The Applicants argue that the Minister therefore has a duty to render decisions, in accordance with the Policy, on applications made under the Policy. The Applicants similarly submit that this duty is clearly owed to them, as the parties who provided the web form submissions under the Policy.
[49] In response, the Respondent asserts its position that, given that the Policy has expired, there is no longer a public legal duty to act. This is materially the same argument that the Court has rejected in analysing the mootness and futility issue and therefore does not require any further analysis. I am satisfied that the Applicants were owed a legal duty by the Minister (and therefore IRCC) to process and assess their web form submissions in accordance with the Policy.
[50] The Applicants also advance arguments to the effect that the requisite legal duty owed to them arises through the doctrine of legitimate expectations, based on representations made in material published on the IRCC website, related to the Policy and the process that would be followed thereunder. The Respondent disputes the application of this doctrine. As I have found above that the creation of the Policy gives rise to a legal duty to make decisions on submissions thereunder, it is not strictly necessary for the Court to address the parties’ legitimate expectations arguments. However, I will do so, as the parties have devoted considerable attention to those arguments.
[51] The Supreme Court of Canada explained the doctrine of legitimate expectations as follows in Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 (at paras 94-97):
[94] The particular face of procedural fairness at issue in this appeal is the doctrine of legitimate expectations. This doctrine was given a strong foundation in Canadian administrative law in Baker, in which it was held to be a factor to be applied in determining what is required by the common law duty of fairness. If a public authority has made representations about the procedure it will follow in making a particular decision, or if it has consistently adhered to certain procedural practices in the past in making such a decision, the scope of the duty of procedural fairness owed to the affected person will be broader than it otherwise would have been. Likewise, if representations with respect to a substantive result have been made to an individual, the duty owed to him by the public authority in terms of the procedures it must follow before making a contrary decision will be more onerous.
[95] The specific conditions which must be satisfied in order for the doctrine of legitimate expectations to apply are summarized succinctly in a leading authority entitled Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada:
The distinguishing characteristic of a legitimate expectation is that it arises from some conduct of the decision-maker, or some other relevant actor. Thus, a legitimate expectation may result from an official practice or assurance that certain procedures will be followed as part of the decision-making process, or that a positive decision can be anticipated. As well, the existence of administrative rules of procedure, or a procedure on which the agency had voluntarily embarked in a particular instance, may give rise to a legitimate expectation that such procedures will be followed. Of course, the practice or conduct said to give rise to the reasonable expectation must be clear, unambiguous and unqualified. [Emphasis added.]
(D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at §7:1710; see also Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, at para. 29; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 68.)
[52] Where a legitimate expectation has been created in accordance with this doctrine, which expectation does not conflict with a statutory duty, the Court may grant appropriate procedural remedies to respond to the expectation (C.U.P.E. v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 (CanLII), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 at para 131).
[53] To invoke this doctrine, the Applicants rely on what the Hellinga Affidavit describes as public-facing instructions for applicants under the Policy, published on the IRCC website, attached as Exhibit “G”
to the affidavit [the Instructions]. The Applicants emphasize the following elements of the Instructions (directed at either an applicant or their representative such as an anchor relative), under the heading, “After you submit the web form”
:
After you submit the web form
We’ll review your web form submission to make sure you included all the required information and documents. If your submission meets the requirements, we’ll send you a letter, by email, with your unique reference code.
Important: After you get your reference code, you should submit a completed TRV application quickly, as the code will not guarantee you a space. If all available spaces are filled before you submit your complete application, your application will not be processed under this temporary public policy.
The unique reference code does not guarantee that the TRV application will be approved.
If your submission does not meet the requirements, we’ll send you a letter by email explaining why your submission was rejected.
[Applicants’ emphasis]
[54] The Applicants submit that the emphasized elements of the Instructions constitute clear, unambiguous, and unqualified representations: (a) that if an Applicant’s web form submission meets the requirements of the Policy (i.e., if it is complete in that it included all the required information and documents), IRCC will issue a Code to the Applicant; and (b) that if the web form submission does not the meet the requirements (i.e., if it is incomplete), IRCC will send the Applicant a letter by email explaining why the submission was rejected.
[55] The Applicants further argue that it is clear from the evidence in this application that each of them provided a complete web form submission and that, pursuant to the doctrine of legitimate expectations, IRCC therefore had a duty to assess their submissions for completeness and (being complete) to issue each of them a Code.
[56] The Respondent does not take any position on whether the Applicants’ web form submissions were complete. Rather, it argues that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply, because the Applicants have identified no representation that they would be issued Codes within a particular time frame or that the processing of submissions for the issuance of Codes would continue after the Policy expired in accordance with its published terms. In support of this position, the Respondent emphasizes the following portions of the Instructions, which it submits make clear that IRCC was providing no guarantee that a TRV application would be processed under the Policy or that a TRV would be issued:
After you submit the web form
We’ll review your web form submission to make sure you included all the required information and documents. If your submission meets the requirements, we’ll send you a letter, by email, with your unique reference code.
Important: After you get your reference code, you should submit a completed TRV application quickly, as the code will not guarantee you a space. If all available spaces are filled before you submit your complete application, your application will not be processed under this temporary public policy.
The unique reference code does not guarantee that the TRV application will be approved.
If your submission does not meet the requirements, we’ll send you a letter by email explaining why your submission was rejected.
[Respondent’s emphasis]
[57] The Respondent also relies on the following information provided in the Frequently Asked Questions section of IRCC’s website, emphasizing IRCC’s advice to applicants under the Policy that those seeking a Code must wait for IRCC to contact them, that there was no promise that a decision would be made within a specific time, that applicants would be sent a Code only if there were spaces left under the Policy, and that issuance of a Code did not guarantee a space under the Policy:
I submitted a crisis web form for the Gaza special measures and haven’t received a response. What should I do?
You should wait for us to contact you.
If there are spaces left under these special measures for extended family members in Gaza,
• we’ll send you a unique code to complete your application for a temporary resident visa (TRV).
o Make sure you check your junk or spam folder for messages.
o If you receive a code, make sure you complete your application quickly with all of the required documents and information, as a code doesn’t guarantee you a space.
…
If your web form submission doesn’t meet the requirements, we’ll email you a letter explaining why it was rejected. If you were unable to apply under the special measures, you may still apply under any of our existing immigration programs.
[Respondent’s emphasis]
[58] The Respondent further draws the Court’s attention to the following wording of responses that certain of the Applicants’ anchor relatives received from IRCC upon submitting their web forms, stating that their submission did not guarantee a spot to apply for a TRV:
Rest assured that we have received your web form and that we will respond to you as soon as possible.
Please note that the submission of this web form does not guarantee you a spot through this special measure to apply for a temporary resident visa.
We are currently reviewing the web forms in the order we received them.
[59] I agree with the Respondent that the totality of these communications does not support a conclusion that IRCC represented that every person submitting web forms would receive a Code within a certain timeframe or that processing of submissions for the issuance of Codes would continue after the Policy expired. However, this is not what the Applicants argue. They do not assert that they had a legitimate expectation that their submissions would be processed within a particular timeframe. While the Applicants do take the position that IRCC was required to process their submissions within a reasonable timeframe, they rely for that assertion not upon the doctrine of legitimate expectations but upon the jurisprudence applicable to that element of the mandamus test, to which I will turn shortly.
[60] Nor do the Applicants argue that IRCC represented that processing of submissions for the issuance of Codes would continue after the Policy expired. I understand the Applicants’ position to be that IRCC was obliged to process web form submissions within a reasonable time and issue Codes if the Policy had not yet expired at that time. The potential for IRCC to now be obliged to process the Applicants’ web form submissions, determine whether they are complete, and (if complete) issue Codes, notwithstanding that the Policy has expired, flows from the Court’s remedial jurisdiction pursuant to the principles identified in A.B.C.D. and canvassed earlier in these Reasons.
[61] Consistent with the Court’s analysis in A.B.C.D. (at paras 37-45), I find that the IRCC communications upon which the parties rely in the present matter support a conclusion that the Applicants had a legitimate expectation that IRCC would process their web form submissions and determine whether each Applicant had met the requirements of that stage of the Policy (i.e. that the Applicant’s submission was complete) so as to be entitled to issuance of a Code. This finding supports a conclusion that IRCC had a public legal duty to act and that such duty was owed to the Applicants, thus satisfying those conditions of the mandamus test.
(2) Clear right to performance of the duty
[62] Establishing a clear right to the performance of the relevant duty requires the Applicants to demonstrate that they have satisfied all conditions precedent to that performance, as well as: (a) a prior demand for performance; (b) a reasonable time to comply with the demand (in the absence of an outright refusal); and (c) an express refusal or an implied refusal through unreasonable delay.
[63] The Applicants have not advanced submissions expressly related to their satisfaction of all conditions precedent to IRCC’s performance of its duty. However, neither has the Respondent taken the position that this element of the mandamus test has not been met. Consistent with my above analysis of the existence of the duty, it arises as a result of an Applicant having provided a web form submission with accompanying documents to IRCC in accordance with the Policy. Such submission gives rise to the duty upon IRCC to assess the submission for completeness in accordance with the Policy, with a Code be issued to the Applicant if the submission is assessed as complete.
[64] The Applicants argue that they demanded IRCC’s performance of its duty through the submission of their web forms. They also note that all but two of the Canadian anchor relatives implored IRCC to urgently issue Codes to the Applicants given the dire conditions in Gaza. The Respondent has not argued that this particular condition was not met. I find that this condition is satisfied.
[65] As for having afforded IRCC a reasonable amount of time to comply with the demand, the Applicants submit that this condition has been met as approximately two years have passed from the time of their web form submissions to the finalization of their materials in support of this application for judicial review, without receiving a substantive response from IRCC. They submit that the passage of this period of time represents unreasonable delay and therefore an implied refusal.
[66] As explained earlier in these Reasons, a delay will be unreasonable if: (a) the delay has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie; (b) the applicant and their counsel are not responsible for the delay; and (c) the authority responsible for the delay has not provided a satisfactory justification (Conille at para 23).
[67] The Applicants submit that they bear no responsibility for the delay, and that the Minister has not provided any explanation for the delay, in processing their web form submissions. As for whether the delay has been longer than the process required, they emphasize that their web form submissions under the Policy were not TRV applications that would require inadmissibility assessment or the completion of biometrics. Rather, to process a web form submission (consisting of a statutory declaration of 2 to 3 pages and the anchor relative’s Canadian identity documents) and to decide whether to issue a Code to an Applicant, an IRCC officer was required only to review the submission for completeness. In that context, the Applicants submit that a delay of two years is far longer than what was reasonably required to perform that work.
[68] The Applicants also draw a comparison between this delay and the length of time it took IRCC to assess web form submissions and issue Codes in a couple of the matters in which Justice Brown considered applications for judicial review of subsequent TRV applications. In A.A.#1, the anchor relative submitted a web form on January 9, 2024, and received a Code on March 22, 2024. In A.A. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1812 [A.A.#2], the anchor relative submitted a web form on January 9, 2024, and received a Code on January 12, 2024.
[69] The Respondent has not argued that the Applicants or their counsel are responsible for the delay in processing the web form submissions. Nor has the Respondent offered any evidence or argument in an effort to justify the period of delay, other than noting that, between the commencement of the Policy on January 9, 2024, and the date when the 5,000 TRV application cap was met in March 2025, IRCC received thousands of requests and issued thousands of Codes where the requirements were met. The Respondent emphasizes that many TRV applications have been processed, some of them have been finalized, and as such a significant amount has been accomplished under the Policy.
[70] In support of their argument that the delay has been approximately two years, the Applicants assert that they all provided web form submissions, with the proper documentation, within a month of the launch of the Policy on January 9, 2024. While I accept that this assertion is largely accurate, I note that (as reflected in the procedural histories of the individual Court files set out earlier in these Reasons) there were a few supplementary web form submissions that were made somewhat later in 2024 (including up to September 17, 2024), for instance to include additional family members or to provide additional documentation.
[71] As such, the Applicants cannot assert universally that they have faced a delay of approximately two years in the processing of their web form submissions. Moreover, I interpret the Respondent’s overall position surrounding the effect of the Policy’s expiry as indicating that IRCC ceased processing web form submissions once the cap was met in March 2025. Also, while the processing time frames of approximately three days to three months evident in A.A.#1 and A.A.#2 are not irrelevant, they represent only two examples and are not particularly instructive in establishing the yardstick for how long it was reasonable for IRCC to take to process web form submissions.
[72] However, I accept that in most cases more than the year had elapsed from the time of an Applicant’s web form submission to the time when IRCC stopped processing submissions and, even in the isolated case of the anchor relative who resubmitted a web form on September 17, 2024, over a year had passed from the time of the original submission and a period of several months had passed from the time of the resubmission. When one considers the simplicity of the required assessment, i.e. ensuring only that the information and documentation submitted is complete, I am satisfied that the delay for all the Applicants was longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie.
[73] The resulting conclusion that the delay has been unreasonable is also supported by the evidence available from the CTR that, for several of the Applicants, their web form submissions were sent on dates in 2024 by EPIC to an officer who then deemed the submission complete on the same date, but without any Codes having been issued by the time the Policy expired several months later. As previously noted, the CTR also indicates that, for other Applicants, their web form submissions were sent by EPIC to an officer but were never assessed and, for the remainder, there is no information indicating that their web form submissions were ever sent to an officer. Together, this evidence from the CTR supports a conclusion that the fact that the Applicants did not receive Codes was not a function of the time that it reasonably took IRCC to process a large volume of submissions but rather resulted from some (albeit unidentified) process failure on the part of IRCC.
[74] Based on the above analysis, I find that the Applicants have established an implied refusal of their web form submissions, by demonstrating an unreasonable delay, and therefore that they have a clear right to the performance of IRCC’s duty, satisfying this condition of the mandamus test.
(3) No other adequate available remedy
[75] The Applicants submit that there is no other remedy available to them under the Canadian immigration system. They emphasize that the Policy was implemented to respond to the particular circumstances surrounding the crisis in Gaza, by using the Minister’s discretionary power to remove the barriers that the regular immigration process would impose upon applicants from Gaza. The Respondent has not argued that the Applicants have another adequate available remedy. I find that the Applicants have met this condition.
(4) Practical effect of order sought
[76] The Applicants submit that granting mandamus will have a practical effect, because it will require IRCC to assess their web from submissions and, if complete, issue Codes under the Policy, allowing the Applicants to submit TRV applications under the Policy.
[77] The Respondent argues that such an order would have no practical effect, because the Policy has expired and therefore no new TRV applications can be accepted into processing under the Policy. This is of course materially the same argument by the Respondent that the Court has rejected in analysing the mootness and futility issue and therefore does not require any further analysis.
[78] I find that the Applicants have met this condition of the test.
(5) No equitable bar to the relief sought
[79] The Applicants submit that there is no equitable bar to the relief they seek. They argue that they come to the Court with clean hands, bearing no responsibility for the delay. The Respondent has not argued that there is an equitable bar to the requested relief. I find that the Applicants have met this condition.
(6) Balance of convenience
[80] Finally, the Applicants submit that the balance of convenience weighs heavily in favour of granting mandamus, as they face extreme risk in Gaza and there is no risk to IRCC in processing their submissions. The Respondent disputes this assertion.
[81] The parties’ arguments under this final condition of the mandamus test are comparable to those advanced in A.B.C.D. (at para 73). In assessing the balance of convenience in that matter, Justice Gascon noted that relief was sought not merely due to an unnecessary delay in an application process but rather because the applicant’s application was stuck at the very beginning of the applicable process because of gross governmental negligence in the implementation of a program that no longer existed. The Court reasoned that, if it did not grant the relief sought by the applicant in some fashion, he would never have the benefit of a fair process and the possibility of seeing the light at the end of the tunnel, i.e, an ITA enabling him to finally apply for PR (at para 74).
[82] I have addressed earlier in these Reasons the Respondent’s argument that A.B.C.D. is distinguishable in that there is no evidence of negligence on the part of IRCC in the case at hand or evidence that the Applicants have not benefited from a fair process. As previously explained, I do not find those submissions compelling. I have accepted the Applicants’ legitimate expectations arguments, which go to procedural fairness. Moreover, it is not necessary to characterize the circumstances confronting the Applicants as representing negligence to conclude that, as in A.B.C.D., the balance of convenience favours the Court granting relief that will afford the Applicants an opportunity to seek the benefits of the Policy that they took steps to access shortly after its promulgation.
VI. Conclusion and Relief
[83] As I have concluded that the Applicants have met the conditions of the applicable test, this application will be granted and the Court will issue an order in the nature of mandamus. It is therefore necessary to consider the details of that relief.
[84] The Applicants request that the Court issue a writ of mandamus framed as follow:
-
IRCC must assess the Applicants’ web form submissions within 30 days of this Court’s decision under the Temporary public policy to facilitate temporary resident visas for certain extended family affected by the crisis in Gaza;
-
provided that the web form submissions are complete, IRCC must issue Unique Reference Codes within 3 days to the Applicants;
-
provided that the Applicants are issued codes, IRCC must process and determine their applications for temporary resident visas within 30 days of the reception of their applications under the Temporary public policy to facilitate temporary resident visas for certain extended family affected by the crisis in Gaza;
[85] In addition to its arguments opposing the Applicants’ overall request for mandamus, which have been addressed earlier in these Reasons, the Respondent objects to the details of the above paragraph (iii) of the requested relief. The Respondent emphasizes that, even assuming that the Applicants were issued Codes such that they could submit TRV applications, they would still have to meet all eligibility and security requirements under such applications.
[86] The Respondent also relies on the decisions in which Justice Brown dismissed applications seeking mandamus on TRV applications submitted under the third stage of the Policy (A.B.; A.A.#1; A.A.#2; and A.B. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1813). In those matters, the applicants sought to compel IRCC to make a decision on a pending TRV or to do so within a particular number of days. Justice Brown held that such relief was unavailable because, as the applicants had not met all the conditions of the Policy (such as the submission of biometrics), IRCC’s duty to process their applications had not yet accrued.
[87] The Applicants have provided no compelling response to the Respondent’s position on this aspect of the requested relief. At the present time, the Applicants have of course not submitted TRV applications, because they have not yet received Codes. There is no basis for the Court to know whether the Applicants under such applications (if submitted following the issuance of Codes) might meet all the conditions to the IRCC’s duty to determine those applications. Nor is there a basis, taking into account security and other eligibility requirements, for the Court to conclude that such applications could reasonably be processed and determined by IRCC within 30 days of their receipt.
[88] I recognize that the Court in A.B.C.D. issued a Judgment that, in addition to requiring processing of the applicant’s EOI to IRCC under the Afghan Policy, also required the processing and determination of his PR application within 30 days of its receipt. Although there may have been evidence or argument in that matter that supported that result, the Court’s reasons do not explain a basis for the conclusion that that latter stage of relief was appropriate. In the case at hand, there is no basis for the Court to impose such relief.
[89] I am satisfied that paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the Applicants’ requested relief are appropriate and, with the benefit of some re-articulation, my Judgment will grant relief materially in those terms. As for paragraph (iii), my Judgment will order that, provided that an Applicant is issued a Code and submits an application for a TRV under the Policy, IRCC shall process that application under the Policy. Also, similar to the relief granted in A.B.C.D., my Judgment will provide that, when performing its obligations under the Judgment, IRCC shall apply the Policy as it was in force at an earlier time (which I will set as being prior to the expiry of Parts 1 and 2 of the Policy on March 6, 2025). Together these provisions will effect the result contemplated by the above Reasons. However, without the Applicant having at this stage satisfied the conditions for determination of a TRV application, my Judgment will not order such determination or impose a deadline for same.
[90] Finally, I note that neither party has proposed a question for certification for appeal, and none is stated.
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