Date: 20251112

Docket: IMM-8511-24

Citation: 2025 FC 1813

Ottawa, Ontario, November 12, 2025

PRESENT: The Hon Mr. Justice Henry S. Brown

BETWEEN:

A.B.

Applicant

and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Nature of the matter

[1] This is an application brought by a Palestinian male living in the Gaza Strip in the context of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza which persists notwithstanding the recent ceasefire agreement and the continued closure of the Rafah border crossing into Egypt, for judicial review of the alleged failure of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] to process his application in a sufficiently timely manner for a temporary resident visa [TRV] pursuant to s. 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].

[2] An order of mandamus may not be issued unless and until an applicant meets all legal requirements to obtain the matter in respect of which mandamus is sought. They must be entitled to the requested matter, in other words. Here, while I have every sympathy for the Applicant, given the horrible upheavals characterizing the operational context in Gaza since October 7, 2023, notwithstanding the recent ceasefire agreement, the specific conditions of the Temporary public policy to facilitate temporary resident visas for certain extended family affected by the crisis in Gaza [Policy]which the Applicant has an obligation to meet, I am not persuaded the Applicant has established a clear right to mandamus in this case. Therefore, and for the reasons which follow, this application will be dismissed.

[3] This case and two others decided today (A.A., B.B., C.C., D.D., E.E. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1811 and A.A., B.B., and C.C. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1812) raise issues in many, but not all, respects similar to those addressed in A.B. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1514 [A.B.] to which these Reasons will refer. Mandamus was not granted in A.B.

II. Facts

A. The Policy

[4] On December 22, 2023, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [Minister] announced the Policy which came into effect on January 9, 2024.

[5] The Policy was developed pursuant to s. 25.2 of IRPA to provide refuge for Palestinian nationals with relatives who are either Canadian citizens or permanent residents. These relatives act as “anchor relatives” for the Applicant’s TRV applications.

[6] The Policy allows delegated officers to exempt applicants from certain requirements. To be eligible, applicants must satisfy the conditions prescribed in Parts 1-3 of the Policy:

Part 1

1. The foreign national:

i. has submitted an application for a temporary resident visa;

ii. was in the Gaza Strip on the day they submitted their application;

iii. is a Palestinian Territory passport holder;

iv. has identified an anchor, a Canadian citizen or Permanent Resident, who meets the requirements in Annex A;

v. is the spouse, common law partner, child (regardless of age), grandchild, parent, grandparent or sibling of the anchor identified in condition iv. of Part 1;

vi. has a signed statutory declaration from the anchor identified in condition iv. of Part 1 in which the anchor attests that:

a. they have the intention to provide the support set out in Annex B for the foreign national and their family members as defined in section 1(3) of the Regulations, and

b. they have not accepted, and understand they are not to accept, any financial compensation from the foreign national and their family members;

vii. has submitted the application by electronic means (applied online) or with an alternate application format provided by the department if the foreign national or their representative indicated they are unable to apply online.

Part 2

2. The foreign national:

i. is a family member, as defined in subsection 1(3) of the Regulations, of a foreign national who has applied under this public policy and has been found to meet the conditions listed in Part 1;

ii. has submitted an application for a temporary resident visa; and

iii. has submitted the application by electronic means (applied online) or with an alternate application format provided by the department if the foreign national or their representative indicated they are unable to apply online.

Part 3

3. The foreign national

i. holds a temporary resident visa that was issued following facilitation under Part 1 or Part 2; and

ii. seeks to enter Canada as a visitor.

[7] Applicants who satisfy the above conditions are exempt from the requirements to not be financially inadmissible and to establish they would leave Canada at the end of their authorized period of stay. All other statutory and regulatory requirements apply to applications under the Policy including, as we will see, s. 12.8 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR].

[8] The application process under the Policy is divided in three stages. First, the anchor relative completes a statutory declaration form, a consent to disclose personal information form, and confirms their eligibility to act as an anchor and support the applicant for a year following their arrival in Canada.

[9] Second, the anchor submits a crisis webform with the declaration form, the anchor’s government photo ID, proof of the anchor’s Canadian citizenship or permanent residence, and proof the anchor lives or intends to live in Canada. IRCC reviews these submissions and issues a unique reference code for each applicant.

[10] At the third stage, the anchor submits the applicant’s TRV application through the IRCC portal. Accompanying the regular TRV application is the unique reference code received at the initial application stage, the anchor’s statutory declaration, the applicant’s proof of relationship to the anchor relative, a copy of the applicant’s travel documents or passport indicating their residence in Gaza, a consent to disclose personal information form, and an additional background information form for certain applicants.

[11] Once IRCC confirms the applicant is eligible and not inadmissible, it will forward the applicant’s name to the Israeli and Egyptian governments to facilitate their exit through the Rafah border crossing so they may provide their biometric information at a collection facility. There is no collection facility in Gaza.

[12] Every individual officer must follow the provisions under the Policy. The Policy does not authorize IRCC officers to exempt applicants from conditions under the Policy, nor does it refer to s. 12.8 of the IRPR which speaks to an exemption from the provision of biometrics when their collection is impossible or not feasible, although this argument was not made in this case.

B. The Applicant’s TRV Application

[13] The Applicant is a Palestinian adult male living in Gaza. After October 2023, the Applicant was unable to continue his studies and lost his job.

[14] Applications under the Policy opened on January 9, 2024. The Applicant’s anchor relative [Anchor] submitted a crisis webform for the Applicant and for other family members on January 14, 2024. On January 18, 2024, the Applicant received confirmation the application would be processed under the Policy. He also received a biometric instruction letter and confirmation letter. These letters informed the Applicant the processing times varied, and that biometrics would be necessary to determine his admissibility to Canada.

[15] On February 14, 2024, the Anchor submitted a second webform requesting an update from IRCC on the Applicant’s application:

I would like to check on the application for super visa. The situation in Gaza is getting worse every single day, we are at risk of being killed, we lost our home which was bombed and now it is flattened, and we have no shelter, food or water. We are in great danger and the long processing time is taking a very long time, which is precious at this moment. every single moment counts and we are at risk of losing our lives every single moment.

[16] The Anchor received an automated response on February 14, 2024:

Dear Sir/Madam, Thank you for your email below. Your files have been received. We understand the current situation for you and your family is difficult. Please be assured that we are doing everything we can to assist clients under these circumstances. However, please refer to the following website for more information regarding the special program related to extended family members in Gaza. General inquiries can also be directed through the following webform or by phone at +1-613-321-4243 (M-F, 6:30 am to 7:00 pm, S-Su 6:30 am to 2:30 pm (EST)). Also, please continue to monitor your online account to see any updates regarding your application. Best regards, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.

[Emphasis added]

[17] The Anchor later attempted to call the IRCC phone line dedicated for these applications but was on the hold for hours and was unable to speak to an agent. The Anchor sent a message to the phone number listed in the IRCC portal but received a response indicating they were unable to assist the Anchor.

[18] On May 13, 2024, an entry was made in the Global Case Management System [GCMS] notes. These notes indicate the Applicant had not been issued a unique reference code and humanitarian and compassionate considerations were applied to overcome this. This entry further indicates all requirements were met except his security screening (his admissibility as opposed to his eligibility) and biometrics.

[19] On July 21, 2024, the Anchor received an email from IRCC requesting the Applicant provide additional information which was provided on August 4, 2024.

[20] The Respondent requested information on December 18, 2024 about the Applicant’s social media accounts which was submitted on the following day.

[21] The GCMS notes state the TRV should be issued to the Applicant subject to all other conditions under the Policy being met. The processing of his application per the Policy would next require him to provide his biometrics for which he would have to leave Gaza using the Rafah crossing because such facilities are not available in Gaza. While this was possible in December 2023 when the Policy was issued, the Rafah crossing was closed on May 7, 2024 and remains closed to this day. Therefore, the Applicant – through no fault of his own or of IRCC – has not obtained or sent his biometrics to IRCC.

[22] No decision has been rendered on the Applicant’s application. However, it is agreed the Applicant has passed both the preliminary eligibility and security screenings but has not yet provided the biometric information required by the Policy.

III. Issue

[23] The issue is whether the Applicant has met the test for an order of mandamus.

IV. Relevant legislation

[24] Section 18.1(3)(a) of the Federal Courts Act; RSC 1985, c F-7 confirms the power of the Federal Court to grant an order of mandamus:

[25] Section 25.2(1) of IRPA authorizes the Minister to exempt foreign nationals who are inadmissible or otherwise do not meet the requirements on public policy grounds:

[26] Section 12.8 of the IRPR exempts the provision of biometric data among other things where it is impossible or not feasible:

V. Submissions of the parties

A. Admissibility of the Applicant’s Evidence

(1) Affidavit of the lawyer

[27] The Applicant relies on the affidavit of a lawyer for evidence on state of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The Applicant submits these facts are so obvious this Court may assume their existence. In the alternative, the Applicant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza because these facts are “so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons”: R v Find, 2001 SCC 32 at paragraph 48.

[28] The Respondent submits the Court should only rely on the affidavit of the lawyer and its exhibits for general background information. While the Respondent submits news articles as generally inadmissible hearsay, the Respondent does concede these articles were accepted as evidence in A.B. because they provide relevant and necessary background on the evolving situation in Gaza. I do so again here. As in A.B., I find this affidavit is admissible for the purpose of providing general background information on the state of the crisis in Gaza. I will also take judicial notice of the continuing serious humanitarian crisis in Gaza for the legal reasons set out in A.B. at paragraph 41, notwithstanding the intervening ceasefire. Notably the Rafah crossing – essential in relation to biometrics – remains closed since May 7, 2024.

(2) Affidavit of the law professor

[29] The Applicant also relies on an affidavit of Dr. Jamie Liew who they offered as an expert witness. Dr. Liew is a Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa. After objections were raised and after some back and forth at the very start of the hearing, the Applicant (properly in my view) withdrew his claim the professor’s evidence should be considered as expert evidence given the lack of proper certification. After further discussion at the hearing, the professor’s affidavit was offered and accepted by the Respondent as lay evidence. It was also agreed the only relevant exhibit was that setting out a previous IRCC policy, the Temporary public policy for foreign nationals being airlifted from Afghanistan. Paragraphs 16 and 17 were agreed to be struck as impermissible opinion from a lay affiant.

B. Mandamus

[30] The Applicant seeks mandamus to compel IRCC to render a decision on the Applicant’s pending TRV application. In this connection, I again adopt Justice Little’s determinations in Wasylynuk v Canada (Royal Mounted Police), 2020 FC 962 at paragraph 76:

[76] Mandamus is an order that compels the performance of a public legal duty. The duty is typically set out in a statute or regulation. An order of mandamus is the Court’s response to a public decision-maker that fails to carry out a duty, on successful application by an applicant to whom the duty is owed and who is currently entitled to the performance of it. The test for mandamus thus requires careful consideration of the statutory, regulatory or other public obligation at issue, to determine whether the decision-maker has an obligation to act in a particular manner as proposed by an applicant and whether the factual circumstances have triggered performance of the obligation in favour of the applicant.

[31] The Applicant submits and I agree the test for mandamus is set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Apotex v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 FC 742 (FCA) which has been consistently followed since:

1. There must be a legal duty to act;

2. The duty must be owed to the applicant;

3. There must be a clear right to performance of that duty:

a. The applicant has satisfied all conditions precedent giving rise to the duty; and

b. There was

i. A prior demand for performance of the duty;

ii. A reasonable time to comply with the demand unless refused outright; and

iii. A subsequent refusal which can be either expressed or implied, e.g. by unreasonable delay.

4. Where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional principles apply;

5. No adequate remedy is available to the applicant;

6. The order sought will have some practical value or effect;

7. The Court finds no equitable bar to the relief sought; and

8. On a balance of convenience, an order of mandamus should be issued.

[Emphasis added]

[32] Notably, this Court must be satisfied on all eight factors to issue mandamus: Cheloei v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 820 at paragraph 13. I will analyse each as relevant.

(1) There is a public legal duty to act but not within a particular timeframe

[33] Section 25.2(1) of IRPA allows the Minister to develop exemptions for foreign nationals who are otherwise inadmissible and where public policy requires it. Once a policy has been developed under this section, the Applicant submits the Minister has a duty to render decisions in accordance with the policy. This duty is further informed by the statutory framework found in IRPA: Dragan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (T.D.), 2003 FCT 211 [2003] 4 FC 189 at paragraph 40.

[34] The Respondent acknowledges, and I agree, there is a legal duty to process TRV applications under the Policy. However, the Respondent submits officers do not have the discretion to depart from the express provisions of the Policy. As the Court found in A.B., I find there is a legal duty to process these applications, but no duty to process these applications within a particular timeframe: A.B. at paragraph 58.

(2) The duty is owed to the Applicant but not within a specific timeframe

[35] The Applicant claims a legitimate expectation to his application being processed and decided in a timely manner.

[36] A legitimate expectation arises where there is a “clear, unambiguous and unqualified” representation creating the expectation that certain procedures will be followed: Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at paragraphs 94-97; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1379 at paragraph 36; Canada Union of Public Employees v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at paragraph 131. These expectations may arise from promises, representations, conduct, and past practices of the administrative decision maker.

[37] The Applicant submits the test for determining whether a legitimate expectation exists is as “would a reasonable person think that the promise was serious, and should a reasonable person be entitled so to think?”: Apotex Inc. v Canada (C.A.), [2000] 4 FC 264 at paragraph 128.

[38] The Applicant submits his legitimate expectation arises from three sources: the language of the Policy, the Government of Canada website and the Minister’s representations, and the prior temporary policies developed for other emergency situations and crises. The Applicant submits the purpose of the Policy is to provide a refuge from the “volatile and unpredictable” crisis in Gaza. The Government of Canada website outlines the eligibility criteria, procedures, and Minister’s representations as to the “new measures” to provide a “pathway to safety” which would be closely monitored and adapted as required. The Applicant submits the language of the Policy reflects the seriousness of the situation in Gaza.

[39] The Applicant also identifies past temporary policies which were “created rapidly in an ad hoc manner, frequently in response to chaotic and dangerous emergency situations.” The professor refers to a number of these policies in her affidavit where Canada has processed applicants “within relatively short timeframes in response to emergency situations”:

Professor Liew notes Canada’s success in other special immigration measures to process applicants “within relatively short timeframes in response to emergency situations”. These include the issuance of 9,357 visas in a period of eight months for nationals of Türkiye and Syria affected by the earthquakes in the region; the resettlement of more than 25,000 Syrian refugees in a period of four months following the war in Syria; and most notably, the issuance of 71,000 visas under the CUAET program in 40 days in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To Professor Liew, the success of the aforementioned special immigration measures demonstrates Canada’s “expertise, experience and operational capacity to design and implement temporary resident visas and permits to persons fleeing dangerous situations.

[40] This affidavit is now that of a lay witness and I find it, and the Applicant’s other evidence, generally sufficient to support his legitimate expectations per A.B. at paragraph 63:

[63] Second, the Applicant relies on the affidavit of the law professor to substantiate her claim that prior temporary policies have been “and have been able to “process applicants ‘within relatively short timeframes in response to emergency situations.’” While this affidavit has been found inadmissible, I accept this submission based in the new background evidence previously admitted.

[41] I do note that there is no merit in a submission that IRCC is bound to maintain the same rules regardless of the operational context on the ground in Gaza. There is no authority for this proposition. Nothing suggests IRCC can reopen the Rafah border crossing. Until that occurs, under the terms of the Policy (and subject to s. 12.8 of IRPR) the Applicant is in default of meeting all its conditions and is therefore unable to obtain mandamus. This is through no fault of his or IRCC.

[42] The Respondent further submits, and I agree, statements made in form letters, manuals, or websites are not binding and do not entitle applicants to an order of mandamus: Jia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 596 at paragraph 92 per Justice Mary Gleason (then a member of this Court, now a Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal):

[92] In addition to having no entitlement to have their applications processed in the way they wish by reason of the relevant statutory criteria, discussed above, the statements made to them in form letters, manuals or websites simply do not give rise to any representation that would bind the respondent in respect of how long IIP applications would be in process or as to the priority within which they would be considered, for several reasons.

[Emphasis added]

[43] With respect, I am satisfied the Applicant has a legitimate expectation to his application being dealt with in a timely manner. However, this expectation only arises when the Applicant meets all the conditions of the Policy and provides biometric information (which he is unable to do). As I determined in A.B., noting the operational context before Justice Gascon did not present the obstacles present in this case which I find frustrate the operation of the Policy:

[64] The Applicant also relies on, and I agree A.B.C.D. v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1296 is an example of legitimate expectations arising from a similar policy for Afghan nationals. Justice Gascon confirmed his applicant had “legitimate expectations by virtue of adopting the Policy, which contains clear, unambiguous, and unqualified representations about the expedited application process” (at para 40).

[65] The Respondent submits that no representations were made as to processing time, approvals, or who may exit Gaza. Having reviewed the record on this point, I am not persuaded any such representation was made.

[66] That said, in the circumstances, I agree with the Applicant and Gascon J. that she had a legitimate expectation her TRV application would be dealt with in a “timely manner.” Otherwise, the Policy could be nullified and promises of the Policy emptied of its effective content. However, the obligation to process her application under this Policy in a timely manner only arises when she meets the requirements of the Policy, leaves Gaza and provides her biometrics, albeit through no fault of her own she is unable to do any of this.

(3) There is no clear right to performance

[44] The Applicant submits he has a clear right to the timely processing of his TRV application. However, the Respondent submits, and I agree, the Applicant has not satisfied all conditions precedent giving rise to this duty. As discussed, a condition of the Policy requires applicants to provide their biometric information, which as presently advised I find the Applicant is unable to do until the Rafah border crossing reopens (or perhaps if s 12(8) applies in respect of biometrics).

[45] Respectfully, although through no fault of the Applicant, he has not satisfied the biometrics condition under the Policy which is fatal to his application for mandamus. I am not persuaded he is entitled to an order of mandamus.

(a) Prior demand for performance

[46] There was a prior demand for performance by the Applicant. The Applicant submits his compliance with the instructions and repeated inquiries as to the status of his application should be construed as a prior demand for performance. That said, it is not necessary to consider this issue because the Applicant has not satisfied all the conditions precedent of the Policy and is therefore not entitled to consideration for an order of mandamus.

(b) Reasonable time to comply with the demand

[47] The Applicant submits the Respondent has had reasonable time to comply with his demand as twenty-one months have passed since the initial TRV application was submitted. However, considering the Applicant has not established a clear right to performance, it is not necessary to consider this issue. It appears to me the closure of the Rafah crossing effectively stopped the clock in respect of consideration by IRCC of his visa application.

(c) Unreasonable delay

[48] The assessment of unreasonable delay is informed by the factors from Conille v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), [1999] 2 FC 33 at 43: (1) the delay has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie; (2) the Applicant and counsel are not responsible for the delay; and (3) the authority responsible for the delay has not provided a satisfactory justification.

[49] The reasonableness of the delay is a factually infused and highly contextual matter. There is no uniform length that is considered unreasonable: Almuhtadi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 712 at paragraph 37 [Almuhtadi].

[50] The Applicant submits the delay has been longer than the nature of the process requires. This application was made pursuant to a special immigration measure which was developed in response to a humanitarian crisis. The Applicant submits the nature of the process is necessarily urgent, otherwise it would not be meaningful.

[51] The Respondent submits the Applicant has not established the processing time exceeds the reasonable time the nature of the process demands. The Applicant submitted his application on January 14, 2024. The Respondent requested additional information on July 21, 2024 which was received by IRCC on August 4, 2024. Further information was requested on December 18, 2024 and received on December 19, 2024. The Respondent submits the Applicant has not shown how the above timeline is unreasonable. Further, while this Court has found delay of two to three years to be unreasonable, and while not suggesting this time represents a threshold to meet unreasonableness, the Respondent submits the Applicant has not passed this upper limit: Almuhtadi at paragraph 37.

[52] The Applicant submits and I agree he is not responsible for the delay because his Anchor submitted the required information shortly after applications were opened. The Applicant has also responded promptly to all IRCC requests, and his Anchor has made repeated inquiries as to the status of his application.

[53] However, I am also satisfied the Respondent is not responsible for any delay either. As held in A.B., the Respondent is not responsible for delay arising where the Applicant has not satisfied the conditions of the Policy: A.B. at paragraph 70.

[54] The root cause of the Applicant’s failure to provide his biometric data is of course the changed operational context, namely the closure of the Rafah crossing which made obtaining and submitting biometrics impossible. While the Policy was workable in December 2023 when it was issued, it ceased to be workable on May 7, 2024 when the Rafah crossing was closed. It has not been workable since. Neither the Policy nor the changed operational context within which applicants deal with the biometrics issue has altered since May 7, 2024.

[55] The Applicant submits the Respondent has not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in processing. The Applicant has not received any information about the status of his application beyond confirmation receipts and his requests for additional information. The Respondent submits the above discussion on the nature of the process and the length of actual processing time is a sufficient explanation for the delay.

[56] I find no merit in this submission. The Applicant undoubtedly knows the Rafah crossing is closed and has been for one and a half years. I have no reason to doubt the Applicant also knows – because he lives in Gaza – that the closure of this crossing is the real reason his application has not been further processed. While I agree IRCC could send the 4,200 or so unprocessed applicants letters or e-mails to that effect, I am not persuaded this is something this Court needs to require IRCC to do, nor in my very respectful view is this a sufficient basis on which to issue mandamus.

(4) No adequate remedy is available, no equitable bar to relief exists, and the order will not have practical value

[57] The Applicant submits there is no alternative remedy available because the Policy was created to circumvent barriers in Canada’s immigration system. Further, the Applicant submits there is no equitable bar to relief as they have complied with the IRCC’s instructions and requests. The Respondent concedes there is no alternative remedy available and no equitable bar to relief but submits the order will not have practical value. I agree. This does not change the fact the Applicant is not entitled to mandamus because he has not met all the conditions of the Policy.

[58] While the Applicant suggests an order of mandamus would end his suffering, and I wish very much it could, in my respectful view it would not. It is in reality false hope to express otherwise. This is because the Rafah border crossing has been closed since May 7, 2024, and remains closed despite the conditions of the recent ceasefire agreement. Until that changes, it seems to me, he is and will continue to be unable to provide his biometrics (unless s 12(8) or IRPR determines otherwise).

(5) The balance of convenience favours an order of mandamus

[59] The Applicant submits the balance of convenience favours the granting of mandamus to address the “extreme risk” faced by the Applicant at no risk to the Minister.

[60] The balance of convenience assessment requires this Court to consider the prejudice to the Applicant and his family. As Justice Grant recently contemplated in Majidi v (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 680 at paragraph 28:

[28] I agree that prejudice may, in some cases, be a relevant factor in determining whether a Court should issue a writ of mandamus. I am not convinced, however, that the high bar of “significant prejudice” necessarily flows from the abuse of process context to the mandamus context, or that a new, independent criterion is necessary to consider the issue of prejudice. As noted above, the mandamus analysis is already characterized by a comprehensive framework involving the 8-part Apotex test, plus the 3-part Conille test. In my view, the question of prejudice can easily be incorporated into the present framework, most appropriately under the balance of convenience stage of the analysis. Where the question of prejudice does not belong, in my respectful view, is in the assessment of unreasonable delay. I note that my colleague Justice Turley has very recently, and coincidentally, come to precisely this conclusion in Tousi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2025 FC 671 [Tousi]. I entirely agree with Justice Turley’s conclusions on this issue, as set out at paras 13-17 of Tousi.

[Emphasis added]

[61] I agree with the Applicant that he and his family have experienced significant prejudice as a result of the delay:

The delay in the processing of this application has resulted in significant prejudice to the Applicant and their Canadian family member. According to the Affidavit of the Applicant’s Anchor Relative, the Applicant undertook all the steps necessary to apply for a visa in the belief that the application would be processed quickly and that the pathway would be her means of exiting Gaza. The Applicant has been waiting for a preliminary decision and instructions on how to leave Gaza for more than eighteen months in a deteriorating security and humanitarian situation. They are financially dependent on the anchor relative, but even with her assistance, they barely have enough food and water to sustain themselves. The delay in processing their application has prolonged the risk to the Applicant's life and safety in Gaza, in a deadly warzone. The prejudice the Applicant has suffered is a heightened risk to his life.

[62] I also accept the Anchor has suffered significant physical, emotional, and financial prejudice as they have spent thousands of dollars on application fees, preparation for the Applicant’s arrival, and sending funds to their family abroad which is often lost in transit.

[63] The Respondent submits the balance of convenience favours not granting mandamus. The Minister has a statutory duty to maintain the integrity of Canada’s immigration system, and with respect, I agree. This duty is served by the IRCC carefully and diligently reviewing all applications. With respect, simply granting mandamus where biometrics have not been provided would entail risks and could be contrary to the interests of justice. That of course is for the Minister to ponder.

[64] The Respondent also submits matters of foreign affairs and Canada’s national interests are squarely within the purview of the Executive and not the Courts. The Respondent relies on Canada v Boloh 1(A), 2023 FCA at paragraph 66, which may constrain judicial protection of Charter rights of Canadians abroad, and by the same token, restrain the ability of foreign nationals to obtain non-Charter judicial relief as they request here.

[65] It is also clear, absent Charter-relief, this Court cannot set, vary or grant exemptions to government policies - see A.B.:

[9] While I have every sympathy for the Applicant, given conditions of the Policy, and the Applicant’s obligation to meet all of its conditions, I am unable to order mandamus. To do so would require the Court to rewrite the Policy, which is beyond the powers of the Court, and may only be done by the Minister. Indeed, the Federal Court of Appeal has just recently held “it is not the role of this Court to set, vary, or grant exemptions from governmental policy.”

…

[91] Very regrettably, and while I have every sympathy for the situation the Applicant and others like her find herself in, the Policy requires them to exit Gaza and deliver biometrics in approved manner to the Minister. To hold otherwise would be to impermissibly rewrite the Ministerial Policy. In effect, and with respect, the Applicant asks the Court to rewrite the Policy. That is not permitted on an application for mandamus, nor generally. Indeed, this law was very recently considered and confirmed in Universal Ostrich Farms Inc. v Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2025 FCA 147 at paragraph 6: “it is not the role of this Court to set, vary, or grant exemptions from governmental policy.” While this general proposition is correct, it is of course subject to Charter considerations; no Charter issues were advanced in this case.

C. Declaratory relief

[66] In addition to the order of mandamus, the Applicant requested declaratory relief. It is not necessary to address these submissions because the Applicant has not established his right to mandamus.

VI. Conclusion

[67] The Applicant has failed to meet several tests for the issuance of mandamus. Therefore, this application for mandamus must and will be dismissed.

VII. Certified Question

[68] Neither party proposes a question for certification, and I agree none arises.

VIII. Costs

[69] At the hearing, the Applicant abandoned his request for costs. Properly so: this is not a case for costs.

JUDGMENT in IMM-8511-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. No question of general importance is certified.

3. There is no Order as to costs.

"Henry S. Brown"

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-8511-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:	A.B. v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING:	NOVEMBER 3, 2025
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	BROWN J.
DATED:	NOVEMBER 12, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Debbie Rachlis	FOR THE APPLICANT
Gregory George, Teresa Ramnarine, Giancarlo Volpe	FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Debbie Rachlis Law Barrister and Solicitor Toronto, Ontario	FOR THE APPLICANT
Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario	FOR THE RESPONDENT