ORDER AND REASONS

[1] The central question on this motion for summary judgment is whether a limitation period applies to the plaintiffs’ action for declaratory relief to revoke the defendant’s citizenship under the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29.

[2] In the action, the plaintiffs seek declarations under the Citizenship Act that the defendant became a permanent resident of Canada and obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. The plaintiffs also seek declarations that the defendant is inadmissible to Canada on the basis that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he committed, or was complicit in, an act outside Canada that constitutes an offence under sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c. 24.

[3] By this motion, the defendant seeks to dismiss the action on the basis that the applicable six-year limitation period expired before the action was commenced. In response, the plaintiffs submitted that no limitation period applies to this action for declaratory relief in the statutory context of a revocation of citizenship under the Citizenship Act.

[4] For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the motion for summary judgment must be dismissed.

I. Nature of the Action

[5] By statement of claim filed on August 13, 2024, the plaintiffs, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, commenced an action seeking the following relief:

• A declaration that the defendant became a permanent resident of Canada, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the “IRPA”), by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances;

• A declaration that, pursuant to subsection 10.1(1) and section 10.2 of the Citizenship Act, the defendant obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances; and

• A declaration, pursuant to subsection 10.5(1) of the Citizenship Act, that the defendant is inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA, on the basis that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he committed, or was complicit in, an act outside Canada that constitutes an offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act.

[6] The plaintiffs claim that the defendant was born in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, part of the former Yugoslavia, and currently known as the Republic of Croatia. He is now a citizen of Canada.

[7] According to the statement of claim, the defendant made false statements on his application for permanent residence, which allowed him to obtain permanent residence in Canada in 1997 and Canadian citizenship in 2002. The plaintiffs also claim that the defendant is inadmissible to Canada because he was involved in the commission of, or was complicit in, crimes against humanity committed in the village of Sotin, now in Croatia. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim the defendant was involved in crimes of imprisonment, forcible transfer and murder. The factual allegations in the statement of claim concern the defendant’s time as part of the Serbian Territorial Defence Forces and the Sotin Police in 1991.

[8] By statement of defence filed on October 31, 2024, the defendant advised that in September 1991, he was involuntarily conscripted into what became the Serbian Territorial Defence Forces and that in October 1991, was assigned to the Sotin Police. The statement of defence makes detailed pleadings, including about the defendant’s actions in 1991 and his lack of knowledge of any of the alleged crimes.

[9] The statement of defence also pleads that the action is statute-barred because more than six years had passed since the plaintiffs’ cause of action arose.

II. The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[10] By notice of motion filed on October 1, 2025, the defendant requested an order under Rules 215(1) and 215(2)(b) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, dismissing the plaintiffs’ action as statute-barred under section 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c. C-50 (the “CLPA”) and section 39 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c. F-7. In the alternative, he requested an order under Rule 215(2)(b) and 215(3)(a) that this proceeding is subject to the six-year limitation period in those provisions and an order for a summary trial to determine the factual issue of discovery and/or discoverability by the plaintiffs.

[11] A party may bring a motion for summary judgment on all or some of the issues raised in the pleadings any time after the defendant has filed a defence but before the trial has been fixed: Federal Courts Rules, Rule 213(1).

[12] The principles applicable to summary judgment motions are well known. Under Rule 215(1), the Court shall grant summary judgment if the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence. There may be no genuine issue for trial if there is no legal basis for the claim or defence, or if the Court has the evidence required to adjudicate the dispute fairly and justly. The test on a motion for summary judgment is not whether a party cannot possibly succeed at trial; rather, it is whether the case is so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the trier of fact at a future trial. The onus is on the party seeking summary judgment to establish the absence of a genuine issue for trial, an onus that involves an evidentiary burden. See Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v Witchekan Lake First Nation, 2023 FCA 105, at paras 22-24; Canada v Bezan Cattle Corporation, 2023 FCA 95, at paras 138-139, 157; CanMar Foods Ltd. v TA Foods Ltd., 2021 FCA 7, at para 23; Cabral v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FCA 4, at para 23; Collins v Canada, 2015 FCA 281, at paras 70-71.

[13] The Court of Appeal has also endorsed this Court’s summaries of the legal principles as set out in Milano Pizza Ltd. v 6034799 Canada Inc., 2018 FC 1112, at paras 25-40, and Rallysport Direct LLC v 2424508 Ontario Ltd., 2019 FC 1524, at para 42: see Witchekan Lake First Nation, at para 22; Kilback v Canada, 2023 FCA 96, at para 31; ViiV Healthcare Co. v Gilead Sciences Canada, Inc., 2021 FCA 122 at para 39.

[14] Under Rule 215(2)(b), if the Court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is a question of law, the Court may determine the question and grant summary judgment accordingly.

[15] As both parties recognized, an expired limitation period is a basis for granting summary judgment: Aziga v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FC 571, at para 17.

III. Analysis

[16] On this motion for summary judgment, the first question that must be answered is whether a limitation period in section 32 of the CLPA or section 39 of the Federal Courts Act applies in the present case to the plaintiffs’ action for declaratory relief, or to the citizenship revocation process generally. If no limitation period applies, the defendant’s motion must be dismissed.

[17] The grant and revocation of citizenship is governed by statute: Taylor v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 349, [2008] 3 FCR 324, at para 50; Galati v Canada (Governor General), 2015 FC 91, [2015] 4 FCR 3, at para 92; Citizenship Act, sections 3, 5, 7, 10, 10.1-10.7. See also Canadian Citizenship Act, SC 1946, c. 15, including paragraph 21(1)(b).

[18] Citizenship may be revoked under the Citizenship Act if a person obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, including by obtaining permanent residence in Canada in that manner and then obtaining Canadian citizenship. The revocation process, now in sections 10 and 10.1 of the Citizenship Act, involves a number of steps set out in the statute, including:

• the Minister provides written notice to the person, with contents required by subsection 10(3);
• the person has an opportunity to make written representations with respect to the matters in the notice, under subsection 10(3.1);
• the Minister must consider the person’s written representations before making a decision, under subsection 10(3.2) and may hold a hearing under subsection 10(4);
• following the receipt of the person’s written representations, the Minister may be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the person has not obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances (see subsection 10(4.1)(a)(i)). In that event, the Minister ends the revocation process;
• following the receipt of the person’s written representations, the Minister may be satisfied that the person’s personal circumstances warrant special relief under subsection 10(4.1)(a)(ii);
• if the person has requested that the case be decided by the Minister, the Minister may decide whether to revoke the person’s citizenship under subsection 10(1), if the Minister is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the person obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances;
• if the person has not requested that the case be decided by the Minister, the Minister shall refer the case to this Court under subsection 10.1(1);
• in this Court, subsection 10.1(1) requires the Minister to seek a declaration, in an action that the Minister commences, that the person has obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances;
• in the action, the Court may make the requested declaration (see subsection 10.1(1)); and
• if the Court does so, subsection 10.1(3) provides that the declaration has the effect of revoking the person’s citizenship.

[19] Section 32 of the CLPA provides:

[20] Section 39 of the Federal Courts Act provides:

[21] The defendant submitted that section 32 of the CLPA presumptively applies to all Crown “proceedings … in respect of a cause of action”, unless otherwise provided in the CLPA or another Act of Parliament. According to the defendant, there is nothing in the Citizenship Act to displace the application of section 32 under its opening phrase (i.e., “[e]xcept as otherwise provided…”). The defendant submitted that because the present “cause of action” arose “otherwise than in a province”, the present “proceedings” by the Ministers had to be “taken within six years after the cause of action arose”. Similarly, under subsection 39(2) of the Federal Courts Act, a proceeding must be taken “within six years after the cause of action arose”.

[22] The parties both confirmed that prior to 2015, no limitation period applied to the citizenship revocation process, as a result of the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Obodzinsky, 2002 FCA 518, [2003] 2 FC 657 (“Obodzinsky FCA”), at paras 45-51, reversing Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Obodzinsky, 2002 FCT 943, [2003] 2 FC 223 (TD) (“Obodzinsky TD”), at paras 9-26. See also Oberlander v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 1200, [2009] 3 FCR 358, at para 83; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Houchaine, 2014 FC 342, at para 35.

[23] In support of this motion, the defendant submitted that limitation periods apply today because Parliament materially amended the statutory citizenship revocation process in the Citizenship Act effective in 2015 and 2018. According to the defendant, these amendments undermined the reasoning used by the appeal court in Obodzinsky FCA to conclude that no limitation period applied. The plaintiffs disagreed, responding that there was nothing in the amendments to suggest that Parliament intended to change the citizenship revocation process to a regime in which limitation periods apply.

[24] The defendant also maintained that this action was a “proceeding … in respect of a cause of action” and that the “cause of action” – which the defendant described as a set of facts that provides the basis for an action in court – arose more than six years before the Minister filed the statement of claim in this action on August 13, 2024. The defendant argued further that the limitation periods also apply to revocation proceedings generally under the Citizenship Act, referring to the process of citizenship revocation that starts with the Minister’s notice to the person. In this case, the defendant argued that the Minister started that process by letter dated August 13, 2019.

[25] In response, the plaintiff Ministers argued that the citizenship revocation process is an administrative or statutory process to which no limitation period applies. The Ministers also maintained that the action for a declaration contemplated by section 10.1(1) of the Citizenship Act was not a “cause of action” for the purposes of section 32 of the CLPA and subsection 39(2) of the Federal Courts Act.

[26] The fundamental issues on this motion are whether these statutory limitation periods apply to the plaintiffs’ action for a declaration under subsection 10.1(1) of the Citizenship Act, and, more generally, to the overall citizenship revocation process under that statute.

[27] In light of the parties’ submissions, there are two questions to be answered:

1. Did the amendments to the Citizenship Act in 2015 and 2018 change the law so that a limitation period in section 32 of the CLPA or section 39 of the Federal Courts Act applies to citizenship revocation or this action for a declaration under subsection 10.1(1)? And

2. Does the Ministers’ action for a declaration under subsection 10.1(1), or the citizenship revocation process in general, constitute a “cause of action”?

[28] I will address these questions in turn.

[29] To assess the parties’ positions on this issue, it is helpful to consider the statutory regime in the Citizenship Act, and how it has evolved, alongside Obodzinsky FCA. In doing so, I am guided by statutory interpretation principles, including the modern principle of statutory interpretation that requires a court to consider the text, context and purpose of a law: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at paras 117-118.

[30] The text of a provision is the starting point and “anchor” for statutory interpretation, particularly if the words of a statute are “precise and unequivocal”. The text plays a central role in specifying how Parliament intended to implement its purposes. See Piekut v Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, at para 45; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, at para 24; Kosicki v Toronto (City), 2025 SCC 28, at para 37; Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at para 10.

[31] The context of a provision includes its surroundings within the legislation: adjacent or neighbouring provisions that may affect the understanding of its text within the scheme and structure of the statute: Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21, at paras 107-114; Piekut, at para 44; R. v. Wilson, 2025 SCC 32, at para 131 (Jamal J., dissenting). Contextual factors outside the statute may also be considered: see Ontario (Attorney General) v Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2024 SCC 4; Wilson, at para 131 (per Jamal J.: “context includes the surrounding words, the [statute] as a whole, related statutes, and the relevant legal context”).

[32] The purpose analysis may consider both the purpose(s) of the provision and the purpose(s) of the statute as a whole: Piekut, at paras 76, 81-96, 99-101, 110, 128-129.

[33] From the time of the Federal Courts’ decisions in the Obodzinsky proceeding until May 2015, the Governor in Council could revoke a person’s citizenship under section 10 of the Citizenship Act if, on a report from the Minister, the Governor in Council was satisfied that a person had obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances: Citizenship Act, section 10; Obodzinsky FCA, at para 1.

[34] Under section 18 of the statute (as it read before 2015), the Minister could not make a report under section 10 unless the Minister had given notice to the person of the intention to do so and that person either did not request that the Minister “refer the case to the Court”, or the person did so request and the Court “decide[d] that the person … obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances”. See Obodzinsky FCA, at paras 1, 15, 47-48.

[35] The decision maker under this process was the Governor in Council, which made a decision after receiving a report from the Minister. If requested by the affected person, the Minister’s report included a decision from the Court after a reference from the Minister, which determined whether the person has obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.

[36] In Obodzinsky FCA, the Court of Appeal described the reference to the Court as follows [English translation appearing in the Federal Courts Reports]:

[15] Of course, a reference by the Minister under section 18 of the [Citizenship] Act is not an action in the ordinary or traditional sense. A proceeding initiated under section 18 is essentially an investigative proceeding used to collect evidence of facts surrounding the acquisition of citizenship, so as to determine whether it was obtained by fraudulent means. It results simply in a non-executory finding which is the basis of a report by the Minister to the Governor in Council for a decision to be taken by the latter, unlike an action, which when valid produces executory conclusions. […]

[16] A reference under section 18 of the Act involves a mandate to a judge of the Trial Division to make an informed report on a factual situation.

See also paragraph 36.

[37] Later in its reasons, the Court of Appeal addressed the question of prescription (i.e., a limitation period). The motions judge had concluded that the action in revocation of citizenship must be capable of prescription (Obodzinsky TD, at para 19) but that the prescription in the Civil Code of Quebec did not apply (Obodzinsky TD, at paras 25-26). On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the question of prescription could not have been submitted to either the motions judge or the reference judge: Obodzinsky FCA, at para 45. The Court of Appeal stated [same FCR translation]:

[46] The objection based on prescription made by the respondent resulted both from a misconception and a misunderstanding of the reference procedure in which he was engaged.

[47] A careful reading of section 18 of the Act reveals the following procedure. When the Minister is informed of grounds that may justify a report to the Governor in Council, he must notify the person in respect of whom he intends to write a report to the Governor in Council. However, he can only send that report if the person in question has not asked that the matter be referred to the Trial Division within the specified deadline, or if the Court has concluded after its hearing that there was fraud, misrepresentation or deliberate concealment of material circumstances.

[48] Subsection 18(2) gives the person in question an opportunity to hear the Minister’s allegations and refute them by asking that the allegations be referred to the Court for an impartial determination of the facts made at the conclusion of a hearing. At this time, the person concerned in the report is given an opportunity to challenge and refine the allegations made against him. How then can he ask for the termination on the grounds of prescription of a reference he has himself requested for his own benefit? I think simply putting the question in this way suggests the answer, without any need to discuss principles of actual or presumed waiver of the benefit of prescription.

[49] Additionally, assuming the respondent could rely on prescription, I do not see how this could run in his favour so long as he has not made an application for reference to the Court, since the very existence of the reference, which he wishes to cut short by prescription, depends on a purely potestative condition, namely that he has himself requested a reference.

[Emphasis added.]

[38] As may be seen from this passage, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Minister’s court action for a declaration could not be the subject of a prescription because the person affected had requested that the Minister refer the matter to the Court for an impartial determination of the facts related to fraud, following a contested hearing.

[39] Effective on May 28, 2015, Parliament enacted amendments to the Citizenship Act that revised aspects of the process for citizenship revocation. Amongst other changes, Parliament revised subsection 10(1), added sections 10.1 to 10.7, and repealed section 18: see Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, SC 2014, c. 22, sections 8, 14.

[40] After the amendments, subsection 10(1) provided that, subject to subsection 10.1(1), the Minister may revoke a person’s citizenship if the Minister was “satisfied on a balance of probabilities” that the person had obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. Before revoking a person’s citizenship or renunciation of citizenship, the Minister was required to provide the person with a written notice with the specified contents: subsection 10(3). A hearing could be convoked by the Minister under subsection 10(4). The Minister’s decision had to be in writing: subsection 10(5).

[41] Under the newly-added subsection 10.1(1), if the Minister had “reasonable grounds to believe” that a person had obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, with respect to certain facts relating to inadmissibility under the IRPA, the person’s citizenship could be revoked “only if the Minister seeks a declaration, in an action that the Minister commences” that the person obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, “and the Court makes such a declaration”. Under subsection 10.1(3), a declaration under subsection 10.1(1) had “the effect of revoking a person’s citizenship”.

[42] The decision maker under this process was no longer the Governor in Council: now either the Minister made the decision to revoke citizenship, or the Minister commenced an action to obtain a declaration from this Court concerning the alleged false representation (etc.), which (if made) had the express effect under the statute of revoking the person’s citizenship by virtue of subsection 10.1(3).

[43] In 2017, with effect in January 2018, Parliament again amended the Citizenship Act provisions related to revocation: see An Act to amend the Citizenship Act, SC 2017, c. 14, sections 3-6. At that time, the default process became an action in this Court for a declaration, unless the person requested the Minister to make the decision. Specifically, effective January 24, 2018, subsection 10.1(1) provided that unless the person requests by writing that the case be decided by the Minister under paragraph 10(3.1)(b), a person’s citizenship may only be revoked if the Minister seeks a declaration that the person obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances and the Court makes such a declaration. Under subsection 10.1(3), a declaration made under subsection 10.1(1) had the express statutory effect of revoking a person’s citizenship.

[44] The defendant argued on this motion that the Federal Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Obodzinsky FCA should no longer apply, owing to the 2015 and 2018 amendments to the Citizenship Act. In effect, the defendant argued that the Court should conduct a fresh statutory interpretation analysis of section 32 of the CLPA and sections 10 and 10.1 of the Citizenship Act. The defendant observed that these amendments required the Minister to pursue the present allegations against the defendant expressly by way of action (and, immediately after the 2015 amendments, only by way of action). The defendant also relied on a change in the process – the “default” has changed from a Minister’s decision to the action in Court for a declaration. The defendant further argued that it is now the Court that makes the decision to revoke the person’s citizenship, in that the Court’s declaration has the executory effect of revoking citizenship under subsection 10.1(3).

[45] I am not persuaded by the defendant’s position.

[46] It is important to note at the outset that the defendant’s arguments are not based on express language in the 2015 and 2018 amendments to the Citizenship Act that added a limitation period. Those amendments made no express reference either to limitation periods or to the application of section 32 of the CLPA or section 39 of the Federal Courts Act.

[47] Instead, the defendant’s position is that the amendments had the effect of changing the law as it stood – that Parliament effectively overruled Obodzinsky FCA. However, in my opinion, the supposed new application of a limitation period cannot be implied from the amendments and is inconsistent with the surrounding circumstances.

[48] To begin, there has been no change in the nature of the proceeding in this Court. Throughout, the proceeding has consisted of an action for a declaration. The decisions in Obodzinsky show that the reference process involved the Minister starting an action by filing a statement of claim in this Court (or its predecessor, the Federal Court Trial Division) to seek a declaration that the person obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances: Obodzinsky FCA, at paras 9-10; Obodzinsky TD, at para 2. The process contemplated now, as the present action shows, is the same in this respect.

[49] Although the defendant emphasized the change in decision maker, I am not persuaded that the change is meaningful for present purposes. Under the reference process discussed in Obodzinsky FCA, the decision maker was previously the Governor in Council, whose decision was based on a report from the Minister. If the person requested a reference to the Court, the Minister’s report would include the Court’s declaration for consideration by the Governor in Council. The Federal Court of Appeal’s reasoning on the applicability of a prescription noted that without the Court’s decision, the Minister could not send a report to the Governor in Council: Obodzinsky FCA, at para 47, quoted above. The appeal court effectively reasoned that the defendant could not request that the Minister refer a matter for the Court’s decision and then argue that the same requested Court decision could not be made due to a prescription.

[50] However, just as it was in 2002, the current statutory process contemplates that the Minister commences an action for a declaration by the Court. Then as now, the Court serves as an “impartial determination of the facts” and gives the person (defendant) an “opportunity to challenge and refute the allegations made against him” in Court, which the appellate court identified as accruing to the benefit of the person: Obodzinsky FCA, at para 48. (The Ministerial decision process also now affords the person an opportunity to be heard in writing (and, if the Minister decides, in a hearing).)

[51] In addition, the relief sought by the Minister from the Court has remained the same: a non-executory declaratory judgment concerning whether the person (defendant) obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. The content of the Court’s determination has been consistent throughout the amendments to the Citizenship Act. The declaration addresses the facts and whether the defendant has obtained citizenship in a particular manner – through false representation, fraud or concealing material circumstances.

[52] It is the statute itself, not the Court, that decides how the content of the declaration will have an effect on the defendant (the revocation of citizenship). See Citizenship Act, subsections 10.1(1) and (3); Houchaine, at paras 12-13 and the formal Judgment in that case, paragraph 1; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Sosa Orantes, 2026 FC 159, at paras 1, 5, 40 and Judgment, paras 1-2; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Achkar, 2015 FC 605 (Judgment, para 1). While the Court’s declaration – if made – has a mandatory effect under the statute of revoking citizenship, that does not render the declaration itself executory or imply that the Court, in law, makes the decision to revoke citizenship. When the Court makes the declaration, the revocation occurs by operation of law under the statute.

[53] Whether the revocation decision is to be made by the Minister or by the Court and the statute, as a matter of law, the two paths towards a decision on citizenship revocation end up in the same place: a determination is made based on whether the evidence shows, on a balance of probabilities, that the person obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances: Houchaine, at paras 12, 18 (for a Court decision); Citizenship Act, subsection 10(1) (for a Minister’s decision). The fact that it is no longer the Governor in Council that makes the decision on the basis of a report from the Minister, and is now either the Minister or a combination of a Court declaration and a statutory provision that decides whether or not to revoke, does not fundamentally alter the nature of the decision, or the Court’s role in the process. Perhaps a current action does not depend on a “purely potestative condition” (Obodzinsky FCA, at para 49, underlining added), but that does not change its essence.

[54] In this context, it is immaterial that an action for a declaration is now the default mechanism and the person has to provide a written request to the Minister to change the process to a decision by the Minister within a specified time, if so desired.

[55] This analysis of the defendant’s submissions suggests that Parliament’s amendments to the legislative text in the Citizenship Act in 2015 and 2018 were not sufficient to implement a change in the existing law – in effect, to overrule the Federal Court of Appeal’s 2002 conclusion in Obodzinsky FCA.

[56] Additional statutory interpretation principles and the legal context in which the amendments were enacted support the same conclusion.

[57] Absent clear legislative intention to the contrary, a statute should not be interpreted as substantially changing the law, including the common law. Parliament is presumed to know the law, including the common law and is unlikely to have intended any significant changes to it unless that intention is made clear: R. v D.L.W., 2016 SCC 22, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 402, at paras 20-21; see also Wilson, at para 57 (per Karakatsanis J.); Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471, at para 45. In my view, this principle applies in that Parliament is presumed to know how the courts have interpreted and applied its statutes, which in this case includes Obodzinsky FCA: D.L.W., at paras 20-21; Lizotte v Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2016 SCC 52, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 521, at para 56; Chandos Construction Ltd. v Deloitte Restructuring Inc., 2020 SCC 25, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para 29.

[58] Two additional points of legal context are as follows:

• a)The opening words of section 32 of the CLPA (“[e]xcept as otherwise provided…”) contemplate that a statute may expressly provide for a limitation period. In the Citizenship Act, Parliament has provided for an express limitation period, which only applies to summary conviction offences under the statute: see section 31. It does not mention revocation of citizenship.

• b)The parties agreed that there are no limitation periods applicable to the commission of or complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity, or inadmissibility based on them: see Oberlander, at para 83; Kanagaratnam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 885, at para 25; IRPA, sections 33-37.

[59] Against this backdrop, if Parliament intended in 2015 and 2018 to change the existing law to establish a limitation period applicable to the Minister’s action in Court for a declaration, or to citizenship revocation in general, one would expect at least two things: (a) express provisions in the amendments setting out a limitation period, and (b) transitional provisions, provided by Parliament to guide parties and the courts on the application of a new limitation/prescription regime to investigations existing before the 2015 and 2018 amendments into possible fraudulent means of obtaining citizenship, that have not yet resulted in a notice to the affected person or an action for a declaration.

[60] Yet neither of those two things exists. There was no express language in the amending legislation providing for a limitation period, and Parliament’s detailed transitional provisions did not mention how the application of the purported new limitation period would be implemented: see SC 2014, c. 22, section 40; SC 2017, c. 14, sections 19.1 to 22. In addition, I note that while the 2015 amendments to the Citizenship Act made no reference to a new limitation period for sections 10 and 10.1, Parliament did revise section 31, the provision on the limitation period for offences: see SC 2014, c. 22, section 30.

[61] The parties also provided no substantive evidence from 2015 or 2018 to show that Parliament intended its amendments to alter the longstanding law on the non-application of a limitation period, as established in Obodzinsky FCA. As noted already, there was nothing expressed in the amendments themselves. Neither party referred to any contemporaneous Ministerial statement or published explanation of the amendments that mentioned the impact of the amendments on limitation periods. See R v. Carignan, 2025 SCC 43, at para 56.

[62] The plaintiffs relied on the testimony of Professor Audrey Macklin, given to the House of Commons Committee that considered the bill that resulted in the 2015 amendments: see House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Evidence, 42-1, No 7 (14 April 2016). During her testimony, Prof. Macklin raised the possibility of adding a limitation period to the statute. However, neither party on this motion referred to any statement by the government or the Committee on the topic following her testimony. I am not prepared to infer anything about Parliamentary intent in these circumstances – the circumstances being that a witness raised a point at the committee stage, then there was silence from the Committee and its members and silence from the government on the point, and subsequently nothing explicit on the subject in the enacted amending legislation.

[63] Finally, both parties made submissions about policy issues arising in the context of citizenship revocation process and limitation periods, going to the purposes of each. However, these submissions did not address evidence related to Parliament’s intent or purpose in enacting the 2015 and 2018 amendments. Having concluded that the 2015 and 2018 amendments did not undermine the reasoning in Obodzinsky FCA, and seeing no evidence from legislative sources, there is no legal basis for the Court to consider the parties’ broader policy arguments.

[64] For these reasons, the defendant’s submissions on the effect of the 2015 and 2018 amendments do not succeed. I conclude that the amendments to the Citizenship Act in 2015 and 2018 did not change the law in Obodzinsky FCA and the limitation periods in section 32 of the CLPA and section 39 of the Federal Courts Act do not apply to citizenship revocation or this action for a declaration under subsection 10.1(1).

[65] I turn to the second question arising from the parties’ submissions.

[66] Section 32 of the CLPA and subsection 39(2) of the Federal Courts Act apply to “proceedings … in respect of any cause of action …”

[67] The defendant submitted that the overall revocation process in sections 10 and 10.1 of the Citizenship Act constitutes such a “proceeding” and that the Ministers’ action for declaratory relief is a “cause of action”. He argued that a “cause of action” is only a set of facts that provides the basis for an action in court (citing Markevich v Canada, 2003 SCC 9, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 94, at para 27; The Manchester Ship Canal Company Limited v. United Utilities Water Limited, [2019] EWHC 1495 (Ch), at paras 78-80).

[68] In response, the plaintiffs argued that the statutory citizenship revocation process does not constitute a “cause of action”. According to the Ministers, “cause of action” in the limitations context refers to the traditional understanding of an action commenced to pursue a claim for injury, loss or damage (citing Grant Thornton LLP v New Brunswick, 2021 SCC 31, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 704, at para 38; Olivier c. Canada (Procureur général), 2013 QCCA 70, at paras 107-108). The plaintiffs characterized citizenship revocation in the Citizenship Act as a multi-step, “neutral”, “restorative” process that does not involve a claim to remedy injury, loss or damage. The plaintiffs relied on cases that characterized the Court’s role in the citizenship revocation process as “essentially an investigative proceeding used to collect evidence of facts surrounding the acquisition of citizenship, so as to determine whether it was obtained by fraudulent means”: Obodzinsky FCA, at para 15, quoted in Houchaine, at para 11; see also Achkar, at paras 26-27.

[69] The plaintiffs also argued that because the Minister’s action is for declaratory relief, it attracts no limitation period (citing Secure Energy (Drilling Services) Inc. v Canadian Energy Services L.P., 2023 FC 906 (“Secure Energy FC”), at paras 61-67, aff’d 2025 FCA 76 (“Secure Energy FCA”), at para 67; Calwell Fishing Ltd. v Canada, 2016 FC 312, at paras 118-140). The defendant countered that these cases were distinguishable and in reply, invited the Court not to follow Secure Energy FC and Calwell Fishing. The defendant argued that, unlike a bare declaratory judgment, a declaration under the Citizenship Act is not discretionary and is also executory (or involves consequential relief) as a result of subsection 10.1(3).

[70] In my view, neither the present action by the Minister for declaratory relief, nor the revocation process as a whole, constitutes a “cause of action” under section 32 of the CLPA and subsection 39(2) of the Federal Courts Act.

[71] At its core, the statutory revocation process is an administrative process involving the person and the Minister, with a discrete role for this Court. After initiating the process through a notice to the person, the Minister must consider the person’s written representations and may be called upon to determine any of (i) whether the person has not obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances; (ii) whether the person’s personal circumstances warrant special relief; and (iii) whether to revoke the person’s citizenship. The Minister may also have to decide whether to convoke a hearing.

[72] The Court’s role in the revocation process is carefully stipulated. In an action by the Minister, the Court may or may not make a declaration sought by the Minister on whether the person the person has obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. The Court does not declare or make a decision with respect to revocation: that effect is mandated by operation of law in subsection 10.1(3).

[73] I agree that the Minister’s action in this Court is a “proceeding” for the purposes of the language in the two limitation provisions. However, it is “not an action in the ordinary or traditional sense”: Obodzinsky FCA, at para 15. The Court’s role is to make a declaration on whether citizenship was obtained by fraud. The declaration is “essentially factual in nature” (Obodzinsky FCA at para 36), recognizing that the Court’s determination on the central factual questions will be shaped by the applicable law on intention and other issues related to representations: see Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Mahendran, 2024 FC 30; Achkar, at paras 30-32; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Zakaria, 2014 FC 864. The determination will affect the citizenship status of the person under the statute, by operation of law under subsection 10.1(3). However, the declaratory “remedy” sought by the plaintiffs is expressly mandated by statute, confined in scope, and non-executory.

[74] I agree with the plaintiffs’ position that the declaration that must be requested by the Minister has the characteristics of declaratory relief that is properly requested and granted in a court: (a) the court has jurisdiction to hear the issue, (b) the dispute is real and not theoretical, (c) the party raising the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution, and (d) the responding party has an interest in opposing the declaration being sought. The declaration also has practical utility and serves to resolve a live controversy. See Shot Both Sides v Canada, 2024 SCC 12, at paras 65-69; S.A. v Metro Vancouver Housing Corp., 2019 SCC 4, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 99, at para 60; Secure Energy FCA, at paras 53-56.

[75] The Supreme Court has stated that a declaration is a “narrow remedy but one that is available without a cause of action and whether or not any consequential relief is available”: Ewert v Canada, 2018 SCC 30, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 165, at para 81; Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623, at para 143. The Federal Courts have applied this principle beyond constitutional and Indigenous proceedings: Secure Energy FCA, at paras 54-64; Secure Energy FC, at paras 61-67; Calwell Fishing, at paras 118-140. In these decisions, the result was that no limitation period applied: Secure Energy FCA, at para 67; Secure Energy FC, at para 71; Calwell Fishing, at para 140.

[76] In my view, the Supreme Court’s statement applies in the present statutory context. The declaratory relief sought under subsection 10.1(1) of the Citizenship Act exists without a “cause of action” as that term is used in the two statutory limitations provisions. While there is a “set of facts that provides the basis for an action in court” (Markevich, at para 27), that is only so in an abstract sense. The facts do not give rise to a standalone basis for an action in the Court. Instead, the action is narrow, it can only be commenced by one person (the Minister) and it can only seek specified, non-executory relief. In addition, the action fulfils a specific role within a statutory scheme that is principally administrative in nature and is aimed at determining whether or not to revoke the status of citizen granted to a person by the statute for which the Minister is responsible. Accordingly, an action commenced by the Minister for declaratory relief under subsection 10.1(1) does not constitute a “cause of action” under section 32 of the CLPA and subsection 39(2) of the Federal Courts Act.

[77] The statutory revocation process as a whole could fall within a wide description of “proceedings”. However, even if the two options for a revocation decision are considered together, the process does not constitute a “cause of action”. I have already concluded that one option (involving a Minister’s action in this Court for a declaration) does not constitute a “cause of action” for present purposes. For the other option, a Minister’s decision under subsection 10(1) does not fall within the defendant’s description of a “cause of action” as it does not involve an action in court. Considering both options together, it must follow that the citizenship revocation process as a whole is not a “cause of action” even as the defendant described it. It may also be observed that it would be incongruous for a limitation period to be inapplicable to one but applicable to the other: see similarly, Markevich, at para 34.

[78] While it is true that citizenship revocation does not involve injury, loss, or damage that arises in a typical contract or tort claim, it is unnecessary on this motion to assess whether injury, loss, or damage is a necessary element of a “cause of action” for the purposes of the limitation provisions in the statutes.

[79] For these reasons, I conclude that the declaration sought under subsection 10.1(1) of the Citizenship Act is not a “cause of action” for the purposes of section 32 of the CLPA and section 39 of the Federal Courts Act. More generally, the Ministers’ action is not statute-barred because neither provision applies to the statutory revocation process in the Citizenship Act.

IV. Conclusion

[80] Because the limitation periods in section 32 of the CLPA and section 39 of the Federal Courts Act do not apply, there is no legal basis to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action as the defendant contended on this motion.

[81] The defendant’s motion for summary judgment must therefore be dismissed. The plaintiffs did not seek an order for costs if successful. Accordingly, there will no costs order.

ORDER in T-2071-24

1. The motion for summary judgment is dismissed.

2. There is no costs order.

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: