Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43			Appeal Heard: March 19, 2024 Judgment Rendered: December 20, 2024 Docket: 40602
Between:   Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse Appellant   and   Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A Respondent   - and -   Attorney General of Quebec, A, B, X, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners   Official English Translation   Coram: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O’Bonsawin and Moreau JJ.
Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 122)	Wagner C.J. (Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O’Bonsawin and Moreau JJ. concurring)

 

Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.

 

 

Commission des droits de la personne et

des droits de la jeunesse                                                                                 Appellant

v.

Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A                            Respondent

and

Attorney General of Quebec,

A, B, X, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and

British Columbia Civil Liberties Association                                           Interveners

Indexed as: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A

2024 SCC 43

File No.: 40602.

2024: March 19; 2024: December 20.

Present: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O’Bonsawin and Moreau JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec

                    Status of persons — Child protection — Encroachment upon child’s rights — Corrective powers of tribunal — Tribunal declaring that young person’s rights had been encroached upon in context of social intervention — Tribunal ordering corrective measures — Director of youth protection challenging measures on ground that they did not relate directly to young person’s situation referred to tribunal — Scope of corrective powers conferred on Youth Division of Court of Québec in cases of encroachment upon child’s rights — Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1, s. 91 para. 4.

                    In the context of social intervention, a young person and her parents filed an application with the Youth Division of the Court of Québec (“tribunal”) for a declaration of encroachment upon rights under s. 91 para. 4 of the Youth Protection Act (“YPA”). That provision states that where “the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected”. The tribunal identified four situations that had encroached upon the young person’s rights, and it recommended and ordered a series of corrective measures. Four of these measures were challenged by the director of youth protection for the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A (“DYP”), who took the view that they went beyond the corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA because they did not relate directly to the young person’s situation. To begin with, as regards the first two measures, the tribunal ordered that the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who worked in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health and that these units be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health. Next, as regards the other two measures, the tribunal ordered the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A (“CISSS A”) to implement a protocol within a reasonable time period to set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention and to adapt all isolation rooms so that they were safer and their walls were covered with a material that prevented injury.

                    The Superior Court allowed the DYP’s appeal in part, holding that the four impugned orders exceeded the powers conferred on the tribunal by the legislature because they applied to children other than the one whose situation had been referred to the tribunal. The Superior Court varied the impugned orders so that they applied specifically to the young person’s situation and they named her expressly. The decision was subsequently appealed by the young person, by her parents and by the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. That commission had intervened for the first time before the Superior Court to argue that s. 91 para. 4 gives the tribunal broad corrective powers allowing it to make general orders not specifically intended to correct the situation experienced by the child before it. Like the Superior Court judge, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the four impugned orders were general in nature, went beyond the situation of the child who was the subject of the proceedings and therefore had to be narrowed. However, the majority of the Court of Appeal varied two of the impugned measures, as varied by the Superior Court, so that they were ordered against the DYP rather than the CISSS A.

                    Held: The appeal should be allowed in part.

                    The legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the corrective powers needed to ensure the fullest protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, that is, protection that applies to both the present and the future and that takes account of the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon rights as well as the impact of the encroachment on the child’s psychological and physical state. The tribunal may order corrective measures whose purpose is to put an end to the situation of encroachment where it is still encroaching upon the child’s rights, to remedy the psychological or physical consequences for the child resulting from the encroachment upon rights, and to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child. A preventive corrective measure may be ordered only if the child whose rights have been encroached upon is at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again, if the corrective measure can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment and if the measure is related to the protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal.

                    The YPA must be given a large and liberal interpretation that will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions according to their true intent, meaning and spirit. Every provision of the YPA must also be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of human rights and freedoms, while bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). The starting point in any interpretive exercise is the text of the provision. In the absence of statutory definitions, what should be focused on is the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text, that is, the natural meaning that appears when the provision is simply read through as a whole.

                    In this case, consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase “the situation to be corrected” in s. 91 para. 4 leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to grant the tribunal corrective powers that allow it to redress a situation, to restore order or the normal state of affairs. However, this consideration does not make it possible to say with certainty which situation is in question. Furthermore, consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase is of little assistance in determining whether the legislature’s intention in granting the tribunal the corrective powers set out in s. 91 para. 4 was that, in exercising them, the tribunal concern itself exclusively with protecting the rights and interests of the child whose situation has been referred to it, or whether the legislature also intended that the tribunal concern itself with protecting the rights and interests of all other children who, though not the subject of the proceedings, are or may find themselves in the same situation as the child before the tribunal.

                    An analysis of the scheme of the YPA suggests that the legislature did not intend the tribunal to be able to order corrective measures aimed in whole or in part at protecting the rights and interests of children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. The tribunal’s mandate is to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. With a view to ensuring functional complementarity between social intervention and judicial intervention, the tribunal must make decisions that are in the interest of the child and that respect the child’s rights, the ultimate goal being to limit any danger to the child’s security and development, but also to prevent abuse.

                    The fact that the tribunal is called upon to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of a single child’s situation is also clear from all of the provisions relating to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. No provision of the YPA reveals an intention to depart from this logic of individualized and particularized justice that runs throughout the YPA when it comes to encroachment upon rights. The legislature did not intend to grant the tribunal powers going beyond those required to carry out the mandate assigned to it. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that other actors have been given a mandate to examine the system as a whole, to identify its shortcomings and to reform it. The proper functioning of the youth protection system depends on the actions of a range of political, social and legal actors that have been given roles, responsibilities and powers that are both distinct and complementary. There is nothing to suggest that, under the wide‑ranging reform of the YPA, the tribunal’s mandate has been broadened to allow it to take a critical look at systemic issues in child protection and to order corrective measures to reform the system for the benefit of children whose situations have not been referred to it.

                    The legislative history of s. 91 para. 4 and of other related provisions concerning encroachment upon rights confirms what the scheme of the YPA already reveals: the tribunal can deal with the situation of only one child at a time. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to authorize the tribunal to order corrective measures that would apply to children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. The legislature’s decision to omit the words “encroaching upon the rights of the young person” within the phrase “the situation to be corrected” in s. 91 para. 4 should not be interpreted as a broadening of the tribunal’s power to order corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it.

                    The YPA establishes a scheme whose purpose is to protect the interests and rights of children whose security or development is in danger, thereby helping to implement Canada’s obligations under the CRC in domestic law. The CRC weighs in favour of interpreting s. 91 para. 4 in a large and liberal manner so that the tribunal will have all the corrective powers it needs to ensure that the child whose rights have been encroached upon has the fullest and most effective protection possible. However, there is no indication that, in order to comply with the CRC, provincial and territorial legislatures must, in cases of encroachment upon rights, give courts or tribunals the mandate and powers they need to concern themselves with protecting the interests and rights of more than one child at a time. States parties to the CRC possess a margin of discretion in determining what measures are appropriate to promote the best interests of the child and to protect the child’s rights.

                    In the case of social and judicial intervention, the legislature had in mind that this fundamental purpose of protecting the children who are the most vulnerable in society would be attained through the cumulative effect of individualized and particularized interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. The recourse for a declaration of encroachment upon rights is one of the legal tools put in place by the legislature to achieve this purpose. The corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 must therefore be interpreted in a large and liberal manner to ensure the attainment of this purpose, which is clearly affirmed in the Charter of human rights and freedoms. The various types of corrective measures that can be ordered must be conceived of generously to ensure the fullest possible protection for the child whose rights have been encroached upon. Over and above correcting the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights, the tribunal must also be able to order preventive corrective measures that will follow the child through the system to ensure that the child is adequately protected in the future.

                    At least three validity criteria govern the exercise of the tribunal’s power to order preventive corrective measures under s. 91 para. 4. These criteria are based on the limits built into this enabling provision. First, for a preventive corrective measure to be ordered, the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal must be at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. This criterion will generally be met where the child is still the subject of intervention under the YPA. Second, the preventive corrective measure ordered must be able to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. Once the source of the encroachment upon rights is identified, the tribunal will be able to consider one or more corrective measures that could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. These measures will logically focus on one or more of the circumstances shown by the evidence to be at the source of the encroachment. The wide range of corrective measures that can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment will, however, be narrowed once account is taken of an additional criterion: any preventive corrective measure must, third, be related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. This requirement flows from the legislative intent discerned from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. The corrective measure must therefore be primarily intended to protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The corrective measure must be related to events experienced by the child in environments where the child has spent or might spend time, on the basis of the evidence and the context. The tribunal must confine itself to ordering a corrective measure that reflects the risk of harm faced by the child, as shown by the evidence. That being said, the order, to be valid, does not necessarily have to expressly name the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal.

                    To effectively protect the child whose rights have been encroached upon, the preventive corrective measures will sometimes have to be broad in scope. At least two types of measures can be contemplated. First, the tribunal may order a corrective measure specifically directed at persons, bodies or institutions that, in light of the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child’s rights. Second, the tribunal may order a measure that will follow the child through the system, either as an alternative to or in addition to the first type of measure, in light of the evidence in the record, the circumstances of the case and the need to protect the child for the future. Broad corrective measures will generally have the advantage of protecting the interests and rights of many other children in an indirect and incidental manner, but this is of no relevance in determining whether the measures were validly imposed. A preventive corrective measure related to the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal may very well have positive indirect and incidental consequences for a large number of children. There is nothing to prevent the tribunal from ordering a corrective measure to eliminate a systemic or institutional practice, provided that the three validity criteria are met. Lastly, the magnitude of the budgetary impact of the corrective measure is not in itself a criterion for the validity of the order. Such a validity criterion has no basis in the YPA, and its application would entail considerable practical difficulties, adding another barrier to access to justice in the youth protection system.

                    Where rights have been encroached upon, the tribunal has a power to make recommendations that it derives from the text, scheme and object of the YPA. When the circumstances do not lend themselves to stating a conclusion in the form of an order, the tribunal can still make a non‑binding recommendation anchored in the evidence concerning the encroachment upon the rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. This power to make recommendations is to be exercised with caution and allows the tribunal to point out the existence of a problem relating to an encroachment upon the child’s rights and to encourage the authorities to address it. The recommendation must be based on the situation of encroachment experienced by the child, as shown by the evidence.

                    In this case, the four corrective measures challenged by the DYP were ordered to prevent abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures from being used again, where it was established that the young person was at risk of being subjected to the identified situations of encroachment again. As regards the first two orders, the tribunal erred by not limiting the scope of these measures so that they were related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. Nothing in the evidence adduced supported the conclusion that such broad orders were necessary to protect the young person’s interests and rights in the future. The Superior Court properly intervened to narrow the scope of these orders so that they were related to the protection of the young person’s interests and rights. As for the third order, the tribunal exceeded its powers by ordering the CISSS A to implement a protocol that set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention. The order as worded was not related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. In light of the findings of fact, the order should have been directed at the rehabilitation centres for young persons with adjustment problems (“RCYPAPs”) of the CISSS A and at any other RCYPAP that would be responsible for the young person. The order should also have been made against the DYP. Finally, as regards the fourth order, which required that the isolation rooms be made safer, this corrective measure was not sufficiently anchored in the evidence and the context. The order should have been varied to direct the DYP, and not the CISSS A, to have at least one isolation room, covered with a material that prevented injury, available for the young person at all times in units A and B of the CISSS A and in the other RCYPAP units to which she would be entrusted. Other alternative orders were also available and acceptable and could therefore have been made. However, since the young person is no longer the subject of social intervention under the YPA and never will be again given that she is now an adult, no order will be made.

Cases Cited

                    Referred to: Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, 2012 QCCA 1483, [2012] R.J.Q. 1603; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22; R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9; MediaQMI inc. v. Kamel, 2021 SCC 23, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 899; Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147-0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 426; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429; Quebec (Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail) v. Caron, 2018 SCC 3, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 35; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30; Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176; R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292; Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 763; Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3; Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Assn., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 724; R. v. Audet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 171; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653; Lamothe v. Ruffo, [1998] R.J.Q. 1815; Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27; A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181; Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22; B.J.T. v. J.D., 2022 SCC 24; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789; Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 17; R. v. Appulonappa, 2015 SCC 59, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754; Protection de la jeunesse – 174220, 2017 QCCQ 9973; Protection de la jeunesse – 175726, 2017 QCCQ 10171; Protection de la jeunesse – 1610815, 2016 QCCQ 20163; Protection de la jeunesse – 202094, 2020 QCCQ 1912; Protection de la jeunesse – 212922, 2021 QCCQ 5132; Protection de la jeunesse – 2023, 2020 QCCQ 61; Protection de la jeunesse – 137151, 2013 QCCQ 17367; Protection de la jeunesse – 171278, 2017 QCCQ 2752; P. (D.) v. S. (C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; Canada (Transportation Safety Board) v. Carroll-Byrne, 2022 SCC 48; Hydro-Québec v. Matta, 2020 SCC 37, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 595; TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, 2019 SCC 19, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 144; Québec (Protection de la jeunesse) v. C.P., 2000 CanLII 11372; Protection de la jeunesse – 236587, 2023 QCCQ 12263; Protection de la jeunesse – 211624, 2021 QCCQ 2868; Protection de la jeunesse, [1985] AZ-50942189; Protection de la jeunesse – 10174, 2010 QCCA 1912, [2010] R.J.Q. 2291; Protection de la jeunesse – 18935, 2018 QCCQ 10532; Protection de la jeunesse – 211323, 2021 QCCQ 2238.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Act respecting health services and social services, CQLR, c. S‑4.2, s. 118.1.

Act to amend the Youth Protection Act and other legislation, S.Q. 1984, c. 4, ss. 10, 12, 38, 46.

Act to amend the Youth Protection Act and other legislative provisions, S.Q. 2022, c. 11.

Act to modify the organization and governance of the health and social services network, in particular by abolishing the regional agencies, CQLR, c. O‑7.2, Sch. I.

Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12, ss. 39, 53, 80.

Civil Code of Québec, arts. 32, 186, 199.

Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C‑25, art. 5.

Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C‑25.01, arts. 17, 50.

Décret 1676‑91, (1992) 124 G.O. II, 51.

Interpretation Act, CQLR, c. I‑16, ss. 40 para. 1, 41.

Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S‑26, s. 45.

Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1, preamble [ad. 2022, c. 11, s. 1], ss. 2, 2.3 para. 1(a), 3, Chapter III, 23 to 27, 28 to 30.8 [idem, s. 16], 47.1, 51 to 51.8, 52 et seq., Chapter V, 73 para. 1, 73.1, 74.1, 74.2, 90 et seq., 91, 112, 128, 129, 133 [idem, s. 61], 133.1, 156.1 para. 1, 156.2.

Youth Protection Act, S.Q. 1977, c. 20, s. 23(d), (e).

Treaties and Other International Instruments

Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, Articles 3, 4.

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                    APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Levesque, Schrager and Hogue JJ.A.), 2022 QCCA 1653, [2022] AZ-51899040, [2022] Q.J. No. 13560 (Lexis), 2022 CarswellQue 21735 (WL), setting aside in part a decision of Poirier J., 2021 QCCS 2251, [2021] AZ-51770110, [2021] J.Q. n^o 6108 (Lexis), 2021 CarswellQue 8125 (WL), setting aside in part a decision of Roy J.C.Q., 2019 QCCQ 3916, [2019] AZ-51608758, [2019] J.Q. n^o 5507 (Lexis), 2019 CarswellQue 7385 (WL). Appeal allowed in part.

                    Catherine Gauvreau, Christine Campbell and Stéphanie Fournier, for the appellant.

                    Audrey Boctor, Julie Langlois, Vanessa Ntaganda and Mélanie Poulin, for the respondent.

                    Éric Cantin and Mario Normandin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.

                    Stéphane Pouliot and Gabrielle Gallio, for the interveners A and B.

                    Charlotte Vanier Perras, for the intervener X.

                    Karine Joizil and Simon Bouthillier, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.

                    Vincent Larochelle, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

                   English version of the judgment of the Court delivered by

                   The Chief Justice —

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
I.      Overview	1
II.    Factual Background	5
III.   Procedural and Judicial History	6
A.    Court of Québec, 2019 QCCQ 3916	6
B.    Quebec Superior Court, 2021 QCCS 2251	9
C.    Quebec Court of Appeal, 2022 QCCA 1653	11
(1)      Majority Reasons	11
(2)      Concurring Reasons	14
IV.   Issues	17
V.    Analysis	23
A.    Judicial Intervention in Cases of Encroachment Upon Rights: Scope of the Corrective Powers Conferred on the Tribunal Under Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA	23
(1)      Principles That Must Guide the Interpretive Exercise	23
(2)      Interpretation of Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA	28
(a)      Text	30
(i)       The Verb “Correct” (“Corriger”)	30
(ii)      The Words “the Situation” (“la Situation”)	33
(iii)     Conclusion	36
(b)      Scheme of the YPA	37
(i)      The Tribunal’s Mandate Is To Render Justice in an Individualized and Particularized Manner on the Basis of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to It	38
(ii)     Other Actors Are Responsible for Looking at the System as a Whole and Reforming It	43
(iii)    Conclusion on the Tribunal’s Role	50
(c)      Legislative History	52
(d)      CRC	61
(e)      Object of the Provision	64
(f)      Conclusion	71
(3)     Criteria for the Validity of Corrective Measures Ordered for Preventive Purposes	78
(a)     The Child Must Be at Risk of Being Subjected to the Situation of Encroachment Again	79
(b)     The Corrective Measures Must Be Able to Effectively Help to Prevent the Recurrence of the Situation of Encroachment	81
(c)     The Corrective Measures Ordered Must Be Related to the Protection of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to the Tribunal	87
(d)     The Budgetary Impact of the Corrective Measure Is Not a Criterion for the Validity of the Order	93
(e)     Conclusion	95
(4)     Review of the Orders	98
(a)     Orders Directed at the Individualized Treatment Units	101
(b)     Orders Directed at the CISSS A	105
(5)     Tribunal’s Power To Make Recommendations	111
B.    Right of the CISSS A To Be Heard or Duly Called	117
VI.   Disposition	122

I.               Overview

[1]                             The very idea of a child’s rights being encroached upon in the context of social intervention under the Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1 (“YPA”),^[1] provokes indignation. At such a time, the child is in an extremely vulnerable position. The child may have been sexually, physically or psychologically abused, have been neglected or abandoned, or have serious mental health or behavioural disorders. As author Laurence Ricard notes, encroachment upon the rights of such a child in the course of social intervention seems, in this context, [translation] “like twisting a knife in the wound”: How can it be explained that intervention by the youth protection system may add to the harm already suffered by a child even though the primary mission of this system is to protect them? (“Un regard sur la notion de lésion de droits en matière de protection de la jeunesse” (2021), 62 C. de D. 605, at p. 608; see also YPA, s. 2). This case illustrates, however, how difficult it can be for those involved with a child in the course of intervention under the YPA to prevent such encroachments upon rights from happening or recurring, given that the causes of these encroachments are often numerous and complex.

[2]                             This appeal provides an opportunity for this Court to consider the corrective powers conferred by the legislature on the Youth Division of the Court of Québec (“tribunal”) where persons, bodies or institutions have encroached upon a child’s rights in the course of social intervention. The tribunal’s power to intervene in this regard derives from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA, which states that where “the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected”.

[3]                             This laconic provision gives the tribunal broad powers that have at times been compared to superintending and reforming powers in the interest of the child and at times been likened to the remedial powers of courts where there has been a violation of fundamental rights. However, the exact contours of these powers remain unclear and are a subject of debate. The present case therefore affords an occasion to circumscribe their scope.

[4]                             First, the Court must interpret the passage in s. 91 para. 4 stating that the tribunal may order “the situation to be corrected”. More specifically, it must be determined whether the legislature intended that the tribunal be able to order corrective measures only to prevent the recurrence of a situation of encroachment for the child whose rights were encroached upon, or whether it intended that the tribunal also be able to order corrective measures to prevent the same situation of encroachment from occurring for any other child who might be faced with it. Second, the Court must consider a question relating to respect for the right of the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A (“CISSS A”) to be heard or duly called. The Court is being asked to determine whether, in the circumstances, the tribunal could make orders against the CISSS A.

II.            Factual Background

[5]                             On January 17, 2018, the tribunal ordered that a young person, the intervener X, be placed in a rehabilitation centre for young persons with adjustment problems (“RCYPAP”) because her security and development were in danger within the meaning of the YPA (2018 QCCQ 10492). Pursuant to that order, the young person was placed in various RCYPAP units and was also hospitalized for certain periods. During her stays in the units, the young person’s rights were repeatedly encroached upon, a fact not disputed by the respondent, the director of youth protection for the CISSS A (“DYP”). Since the tribunal’s judgment summarized below clearly lays out the facts that led to the encroachments upon rights and since these facts are not in dispute, I see no need to recount them again here in detail.

III.         Procedural and Judicial History

A.           Court of Québec, 2019 QCCQ 3916

[6]                             The issue of encroachment upon rights arose before the tribunal in the context of an application by the DYP for the review and extension of the order made in January 2018. In connection with that application, the young person and her parents, respectively, filed an application for a declaration of encroachment upon rights under s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA.

[7]                             The tribunal allowed in part the application for the review and extension of the order of January 2018, after finding that the young person’s security and development were still in danger. In deciding the applications for a declaration of encroachment upon rights, the tribunal identified four situations that had encroached upon the young person’s rights: the unjustified and unduly long suspension of psychological counselling, in violation of an order made on January 17, 2018; an educator’s unjustified refusal to allow the young person, who had run away from her family home, to take refuge at the RCYPAP to which she had been entrusted, and the inadequate support subsequently offered to her when she reported that she had been sexually assaulted after running away; the fact that the young person’s medical record was poorly kept, and the lack of care and follow‑up for more than two weeks when she had injuries to her hands; and the imposition of abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures.

[8]                              The tribunal recommended and ordered a series of corrective measures. Four of them were later challenged by the DYP, who took the view that they went beyond the corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA because they did not relate directly to the young person’s situation. The four corrective measures in question were worded as follows:

                    [translation]

                    AS CORRECTIVE MEASURES:

                    [340]        ORDERS that the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who work in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse;

                    [341]        ORDERS that the individualized treatment units be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse;

                    . . .

                    [345]        ORDERS that the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A implement a protocol within a reasonable time period that sets out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse;

                    [346]        ORDERS that the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A adapt all isolation rooms so that they are safer and their walls are covered with a material that prevents injury;

B.            Quebec Superior Court, 2021 QCCS 2251

[9]                              The appellant, the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (“CDPDJ”), intervened for the first time before the Superior Court to argue that s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA gives the tribunal broad corrective powers allowing it [translation] “to make general orders . . . not specifically intended to correct the situation experienced by the child, but rather by children who may experience the same situation” (para. 19).

[10]                          The Superior Court judge allowed the DYP’s appeal in part. With regard to the applicable standard for intervention, he found that the question at issue was a question of law, in respect of which the court could intervene unreservedly if an error had been made. Relying mainly on the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision in Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, 2012 QCCA 1483, [2012] R.J.Q. 1603, he then held that the four impugned orders exceeded the powers conferred on the tribunal by the legislature because they applied to children other than the one whose situation had been referred to the tribunal. On completing his analysis, he decided to vary the impugned orders so that they applied specifically to the young person’s situation and they named her expressly. The Superior Court judge’s decision was subsequently appealed by the CDPDJ, by the young person and by her parents, the interveners A and B.

C.            Quebec Court of Appeal, 2022 QCCA 1653

(1)          Majority Reasons

[11]                         Like the Superior Court judge, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the four impugned orders were [translation] “general in nature” (para. 78), went “beyond [the] situation” of the child who was the subject of the proceedings (para. 80) and therefore had to be narrowed. However, the majority was of the view that the orders set out at paras. 345‑46 could not be made against the CISSS A because the latter was not formally a party to the proceedings at first instance. The majority accordingly allowed the appeal in part for the sole purpose of correcting the orders set out at paras. 345‑46 of the tribunal’s judgment, which had previously been varied by the Superior Court judge, so that the orders were directed at the DYP and not the CISSS A (paras. 2 and 82‑83).

[12]                         According to the majority, the issue was [translation] “[w]hether section 91 in fine allows [the tribunal] to order institutions or public bodies to take measures that require assigning a portion of their available funds to a specific purpose” (para. 70). This was therefore a question of law that the majority answered in the negative. In the majority’s view, only a [translation] “clear and explicit” legal rule allows courts to order an allocation of public funds for specific purposes, and s. 91 in fine of the YPA does not fit this definition (para. 67; see also para. 68). This means that the tribunal does not have, under this section, a [translation] “general power of intervention or review of the decisions that institutions or bodies are required to make about their operations, organization, or premises” (para. 75).

[13]                         It follows from the above that a corrective measure may be ordered only if it is [translation] “limited to that which is necessary to correct the situation or prevent its recurrence with respect to [the] child in particular” (para. 76). Moreover, such an order must not [translation] “interfere in the management of the resources available to the institutions or bodies concerned” (para. 77). The majority thus found that even where a corrective measure addresses the situation that encroached upon the child’s rights and is limited solely to what is necessary to prevent the recurrence of that situation, the order imposing the measure might still be invalid if its budgetary impact is too significant. According to the majority, the financial impact of an order determines [translation] “whether the court is allowed to make it” (para. 81).

(2)          Concurring Reasons

[14]                         The concurring judge would have allowed the appeals in part and restored the orders made at paras. 345‑46 of the tribunal’s judgment while indicating that they should be directed against the DYP rather than the CISSS A. He would also have specified that only the isolation rooms in units A and B of the RCYPAPs of the CISSS A had to be made safer (paras. 3 and 56‑59).

[15]                         In his view, while it is true that there [translation] “must . . . be a connection between the corrective order and the child whose rights were wronged”, it is not “necessary that the remedial measure apply only to the child who has been a victim of the wrong” (para. 36). Everything depends on what is revealed by the evidence. More specifically, [translation] “[w]hen it is proven . . . that the source of the problem that led to the wrong is institutional or systemic in nature and that the wrong may have been caused by multiple people or multiple institutions or by the state of the premises, Court of Québec judges may make orders to remedy the wrongful situation at its source” (para. 38).

[16]                         It follows from the above that the tribunal may order a corrective measure of general application as long as the evidence shows that the encroachment experienced by the child resulted from [translation] “a generalized practice or situation” (para. 39). The financial impact of such a measure on the DYP should not prevent the tribunal from making corrective orders that are permitted by the YPA and required by the circumstances of a case.

IV.         Issues

[17]                         The appeal raises the following question: What is the scope of the corrective powers that the legislature intended to confer on the tribunal in s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA? More specifically, did the legislature intend that the tribunal only be able to order corrective measures to prevent the recurrence of a situation of encroachment for the child whose rights were encroached upon, or did it intend that the tribunal also be able to order corrective measures to prevent the same situation of encroachment from occurring for any other child who might be faced with it?

[18]                         The appeal also raises a secondary question regarding whether, in the circumstances, it was possible for the tribunal to make orders against the CISSS A in view of its right to be “heard” or “duly called” pursuant to art. 17 para. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C‑25.01 (“C.C.P.”).

[19]                         On the basis of my analysis, I conclude that the legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the corrective powers needed to ensure the fullest protection of the interests and rights of the child before it. In practical terms, this means that the tribunal may order corrective measures whose purpose is (1) to put an end to the situation of encroachment where it is still encroaching upon the child’s rights; (2) to remedy the psychological or physical consequences for the child resulting from the encroachment upon rights; and (3) to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child.

[20]                         In my view, any corrective measure that is ordered must protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. This means that a preventive corrective measure may be ordered only if the child whose rights have been encroached upon is at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. Where this is the case, the tribunal may order any corrective measure that can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment, provided that the measure is related to the protection of the child’s interests and rights. The budgetary impact of the corrective measure has no bearing on its validity.

[21]                         Contrary to what is suggested by the DYP, the Superior Court judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal, it is not necessary for corrective measures to specifically mention the child’s name in order for the measures to be related to the protection of the child’s interests and rights. Moreover, depending on the circumstances and the evidence adduced, it is possible for a broad corrective measure — that corrects, for example, an institutional factor at the source of the situation of encroachment — to be a measure related to the protection of the child’s interests and rights. Such corrective measures will generally have the advantage of protecting the interests and rights of many other children in an indirect and incidental manner.

[22]                         With regard to the question of the CISSS A’s right to be heard or duly called (art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P.), the appellant has not satisfied me that there is reason to intervene to restore the orders so as to direct them, as the tribunal did, against the CISSS A.

V.           Analysis

A.           Judicial Intervention in Cases of Encroachment Upon Rights: Scope of the Corrective Powers Conferred on the Tribunal Under Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA

(1)          Principles That Must Guide the Interpretive Exercise

[23]                         It is well settled that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87, quoted in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26; La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22, at para. 22).

[24]                         In this case, it is important to highlight a few principles that guide the interpretation of s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. First, the YPA must be given a large and liberal interpretation that will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions according to their true intent, meaning and spirit (see Interpretation Act, CQLR, c. I‑16, s. 41; Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 21). However, just as the text must be considered in light of the context and object, the object of a statute and that of a provision must be considered with close attention always being paid to the text of the statute, which remains the anchor of the interpretive exercise. The text specifies, among other things, the means chosen by the legislature to achieve its purposes. These means “may disclose qualifications to primary purposes, and this is why the text remains the focus of interpretation” (M. Mancini, “The Purpose Error in the Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation” (2022), 59 Alta. L. Rev. 919, at p. 927; see also pp. 930‑31). In other words, they may “tell an interpreter just how far a legislature wanted to go in achieving some more abstract goal” (p. 927). As this Court recently noted, an interpreter must “interpret the ‘text through which the legislature seeks to achieve [its] objective’, because ‘the goal of the interpretative exercise is to find harmony between the words of the statute and the intended objective . . .’” (R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, at para. 26, quoting MediaQMI inc. v. Kamel, 2021 SCC 23, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 899, at para. 39; see also Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147‑0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 426, at para. 10).

[25]                         Second, every provision of the YPA must be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12 (“Quebec Charter”), which is a source of fundamental law. It is especially important to bear in mind s. 39 of the Quebec Charter, which enshrines the right of every child “to the protection, security and attention that his parents or the persons acting in their stead are capable of providing”. While this Court has already stated in obiter, in a case that concerned neither the YPA nor the normative scope of s. 39, that this provision “do[es] not directly implicate the state at all” (Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 89), it is clear that this section applies when the state, through a director of youth protection, exercises attributes of parental authority (see, e.g., YPA, s. 91 para. 1(n); Civil Code of Québec, arts. 186 and 199). There is also no doubt that this section is relevant in interpreting the YPA’s provisions, including provisions like s. 91 para. 4 that may affect the state’s rights and obligations. Indeed, since 2022, the legislature has expressly referred to s. 39 of the Quebec Charter in the preamble to the YPA, which only confirms the interpretive value of this provision in explaining the object and purport of any provision of the YPA (see Interpretation Act, s. 40 para. 1; Quebec Charter, s. 53; Quebec (Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail) v. Caron, 2018 SCC 3, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 35, at paras. 32‑33, quoting Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789, at para. 20).

[26]                         Third, in the interpretation of any provision of the YPA, it is important to bear in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 (“CRC”), which was ratified by Canada on December 13, 1991, and by which Quebec declared itself to be bound through an order in council (see Décret 1676‑91, (1992) 124 G.O. II, 51; YPA, preamble (ad. 2022, c. 11, s. 1)). In keeping with the presumption of conformity, the YPA must be interpreted in a manner consistent with Canada’s obligations under the CRC, insofar as the text allows. While the interpretive weight of this international instrument is undeniable, I note that the analysis must remain focused on the legislature’s intention and not on the obligational content of the treaty. It is imperative to interpret first and foremost “what the legislature (federally and provincially) has enacted” rather than subordinating the result of this exercise to what the federal executive has agreed to internationally or to the international treaties by which a provincial executive has declared its intention to be bound through an order in council. This is a matter of respect for the principle of separation of powers (Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30, at para. 48; see also paras. 45‑47; Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176, at para. 60; R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at paras. 53‑54; Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 763, at para. 103, per Martin J., concurring; P.‑A. Côté and M. Devinat, Interprétation des lois (5th ed. 2021), at paras. 1301‑7).

[27]                         Finally, I note that, in the interpretation of a provision like s. 91 para. 4, which authorizes a statutory tribunal to exercise certain powers, the principle of separation of powers does not automatically limit the scope of the powers conferred on that tribunal by the legislature. Rather, the principle of separation of powers requires that full effect be given to the legislature’s intention as revealed by the interpretation of this enabling provision under the modern approach to interpretation. There is no rule whereby the legislature is presumed to intend to limit the powers it confers on a statutory tribunal on the basis of the magnitude of the budgetary impact of their exercise (see Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 15 and 28). To the extent that the reasons of the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal suggest otherwise, they are wrong in law.

(2)          Interpretation of Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA

[28]                         The starting point in any interpretive exercise is the text of the provision. In the absence of statutory definitions, what should be focused on is the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text, that is, “the natural meaning” that appears when the provision is simply read through as a whole (Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Assn., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 724, at p. 735, quoted in R. Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes (7th ed. 2022), at § 3.02[1]; see also R. v. Audet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 171, at para. 34). For ease of reference, I will reproduce the text of s. 91 here:

                    91. Where the tribunal concludes that the security or development of the child is in danger, it may, for the period it determines, order the implementation of one or more of the following measures:

                        (a) that the child remain with his family or be entrusted to one of his parents and that the child’s parents report periodically to the director on the measures they apply in their own regard or in their child’s regard to put an end to the situation in which the security or development of the child is in danger;

                        (b) that the child and the child’s parents take an active part in the application of any of the measures ordered by the tribunal;

                        (c) that certain persons designated by the tribunal not come into contact with the child;

                        (d) that the child not come into contact with certain persons designated by the tribunal;

                        (e) that the child be entrusted to other persons;

                        (e.1) that the child be entrusted to a kinship foster family chosen by the institution operating a child and youth protection centre;

                        (f) that a person working for an institution or body provide aid, counselling or assistance to the child and the child’s family;

                        (g) that the child be entrusted to an institution operating a hospital centre or local community service centre or to another body so that he may receive the care and assistance he needs;

                        (h) that the child or the child’s parents report in person, at regular intervals, to the director to inform him of the current situation;

                        (i) that the child receive specific health care and health services;

                        (j) that the child be entrusted to an institution operating a rehabilitation centre or to a foster family, chosen by the institution operating a child and youth protection centre;

                        (k) that the child attend a school or another place of learning or participates in a program geared to developing skills and autonomy;

                        (l) that the child attend a childcare establishment;

                        (l.1) that specific information not be disclosed to one or both of the parents or any other person designated by the tribunal;

                        (m) that a person ensure that the child and his parents comply with the conditions imposed on them and that that person periodically report to the director;

                        (n) that the exercise of certain attributes of parental authority be withdrawn from the parents and granted to the director or any other person designated by the tribunal;

                        (o) that a period over which the child will be gradually returned to his family or social environment be determined.

                        The tribunal may make any recommendation it considers to be in the interest of the child.

                        The tribunal may include several measures in the same order, provided those measures are consistent with each other and in the interest of the child. It may thus authorize that personal relations between the child and the child’s parents, grandparents or another person be maintained, in the manner determined by the tribunal; it may also provide for more than one environment to which the child may be entrusted and state how long the child is to stay in each of those environments.

                        Where the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected.

[29]                         In this case, special attention should be paid to the fourth paragraph, particularly the passage stating that the tribunal may order “the situation to be corrected”.

(a)           Text

(i)            The Verb “Correct” (“Corriger”)

[30]                         The verb “correct” (“corriger” in the French version) is not defined in the YPA. It is an open‑ended term with a high level of generality, especially when compared with the exhaustive and detailed list of the powers that the tribunal has where it concludes that a child’s security or development is in danger (s. 91 para. 1). Indeed, a comparative reading of the words used by the legislature to describe the tribunal’s powers where a child’s security or development is in danger (s. 91 paras. 1 to 3) and its powers where a child’s rights have been encroached upon (s. 91 para. 4) suggests that the legislature has deliberately allowed the tribunal some latitude and creativity in cases of encroachment upon rights as regards the corrective measures that may be ordered (see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 110; Ricard, at p. 632).

[31]                         When the provision is read as a whole, the verb “correct” evokes the idea of “redressing”, “rectifying” or “remedying” the situation. This ordinary meaning also finds support in some of the dictionary definitions of the equivalent French verb “corriger”. For example, Le Grand Robert de la langue française (electronic version) states that the verb “corriger” may mean [translation] “[t]o bring back to a moral or societal norm (that which departs from it)” or “[t]o bring back into line (something excessive) through opposite action.” Similarly, the Dictionnaire Larousse (online) states that “corriger” may mean [translation] “to rectify that which is deficient” or to re‑establish “what is right, proper, correct”.

[32]                         It is important to note that the ordinary meaning of the verb “correct” or “corriger” that appears when s. 91 is read is consistent with the meaning that emerges from a reading of the other two provisions that use the verb “corriger” in French with “remedy” as the English equivalent. First, s. 23(c) states that the CDPDJ “shall take the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon”. Second, s. 25.2 provides that the CDPDJ “may recommend the cessation of the alleged act or the carrying out, within the time it may fix, of any measure designed to remedy the situation”. In these two provisions, the verb “corriger” or “remedy” is also used in relation to “la situation” (“any situation” or “the situation” in English) in the context of encroachment upon rights. As in s. 91 para. 4, the verb “corriger” evokes the idea of bringing back into line or back to normal that which is not.

(ii)          The Words “the Situation” (“la Situation”)

[33]                         The word “situation” (“situation” in the French version) is not defined in the YPA and has a high level of generality as well. Moreover, when the provision is read as a whole, its ordinary meaning is ambiguous in the context. Does it refer to “the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights”, “the situation of the child whose rights have been or are being encroached upon”, or both?

[34]                         On the one hand, the use of the definite determiner “la” in s. 91 para. 4 (“la situation”, or “the situation” in English) rather than the possessive “sa” (“sa situation”, or “his situation” in English) may suggest that it is the situation of encroachment in question, that is, the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights. This interpretation would thus be consistent with one of the common meanings of the French word “situation”, that is, [translation] “[a]ll of the circumstances” that a person or thing is in, or “all of the relations” linking a person to a social environment (Le Grand Robert de la langue française; see also Dictionnaire Larousse). Similarly, the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (9th ed. (online)) indicates that the word “situation” may mean [translation] “all of the conditions in which [a person] finds themself”. The fact that the words “la situation” or “the situation” refer to the situation of encroachment is also supported by other provisions of the YPA that deal with encroachment upon rights and refer to “la situation” in French, including s. 23(c), which in English states that the CDPDJ “shall take the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon” (see also YPA, s. 74.1 para. 2).

[35]                         On the other hand, what is evident from reading s. 91 as a whole is that, in the case of both danger to security or development and encroachment upon rights, the tribunal has been given a series of powers to protect a vulnerable child whose situation has been referred to it. With this in mind, it therefore seems entirely plausible that the French word “situation” refers here to the state, both psychological and physical, of the child whose rights have been encroached upon. This meaning, which appears when the provision is read as a whole, also finds support in the dictionaries. Le Grand Robert de la langue française indicates that the word “situation” may refer to a person’s [translation] “[m]ental disposition” or “psychological state”. The Dictionnaire de l’Académie française indicates that the word “situation” may mean the [translation] “[s]tate of a person, of a thing at a particular time”. Moreover, one of the definitions of the term “situation” given by the Trésor de la Langue Française informatisé (online) is also to the same effect: [translation] “All of the physical or mental conditions in which a person finds themself”.

(iii)        Conclusion

[36]                         Consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase “the situation to be corrected” leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to grant the tribunal corrective powers that allow it to redress a situation, to restore order or the normal state of affairs. However, this consideration does not make it possible to say with certainty which situation is in question. Is it the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon rights? Is it the child’s psychological and physical state? Or is it both? Furthermore, consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase is of little assistance in determining whether the legislature’s intention in granting the tribunal the corrective powers set out in s. 91 para. 4 was that, in exercising them, the tribunal concern itself exclusively with protecting the rights and interests of the child whose situation has been referred to it, or whether the legislature also intended that the tribunal concern itself with protecting the rights and interests of all other children who, though not the subject of the proceedings, are or may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before the tribunal.

(b)          Scheme of the YPA

[37]                         An analysis of the scheme of the YPA sheds helpful light on the question at the centre of the disagreement between the parties, that is, whether the legislature intended that the tribunal be able to order corrective measures aimed in whole or in part at protecting the rights and interests of children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. The analysis suggests that this is not the case.

(i)            The Tribunal’s Mandate Is To Render Justice in an Individualized and Particularized Manner on the Basis of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to It

[38]                         Judicial intervention under the YPA is generally conceived of as an avenue of last resort, unless there are particular circumstances that justify prioritizing the judicial process over voluntary measures. To the extent possible, clinical teams representing the youth protection directors seek to intervene in the life of a child in difficulty and of the child’s family on a consensual basis, in accordance with the logic of de‑judicialization that informs the youth protection system. However, where consensus is not possible, the YPA provides for intervention by the tribunal (see, e.g., ss. 47.1, 51 to 51.8, 52 et seq., and Chapter V “Judicial Intervention”; see also Ricard, at pp. 612‑13; R. Joyal and M. Provost, “La Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse de 1977: une maturation laborieuse, un texte porteur”, in R. Joyal, ed., L’évolution de la protection de l’enfance au Québec: des origines à nos jours (2000), 179, at p. 181).

[39]                         The scheme of the YPA shows that the legislature intended the tribunal’s intervention to be guided by the logic of individualized and particularized justice based on the interests and rights of the particular child whose situation has been referred to it. With a view to ensuring functional complementarity between social intervention and judicial intervention, the tribunal, like the representatives of the youth protection directors, must make decisions that are “in the interest of the child and respect his rights” (s. 3 para. 1), the ultimate goal being [translation] “to limit any danger to the child’s security and development, but also to prevent abuse” (E. Bernheim and M. Coupienne, “Faire valoir ses droits à la Chambre de la jeunesse: état des lieux des barrières structurelles à l’accès à la justice des familles” (2019), 32 Can. J. Fam. L. 237, at pp. 262‑63, citing L. Mercier, “Contexte d’autorité et judiciarisation: régression ou redéfinition novatrice de la pratique sociale professionnelle?” (1991), 40:2 Service social 43, at p. 49; see also YPA, ss. 47.1, 51 to 51.8 and 52 et seq.; R.F., at paras. 41 and 59, citing Lamothe v. Ruffo, [1998] R.J.Q. 1815 (Sup. Ct.), at p. 1822; Ricard, at pp. 612‑13 and 636). Since every child is unique, these matters are considered on a case‑by‑case basis. This is an intrinsically contextual analysis that must take into account, “[i]n addition to the moral, intellectual, emotional and material needs of the child, his age, health, personality and family environment and the other aspects of his situation” (s. 3 para. 2; see also Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, at paras. 38 and 44; A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, at paras. 89‑90; Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at para. 97; B.J.T. v. J.D., 2022 SCC 24, at para. 53).

[40]                         The fact that the tribunal is called upon to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of a single child’s situation is also clear from all of the provisions relating to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, including those in Chapter V of the YPA, which delineates the scope of judicial intervention. For example, s. 73 para. 1 provides that the tribunal “shall hear the case of a child”. Section 74.1 para. 1 states that the director or the CDPDJ “may refer to the tribunal the case of a child whose security or development is considered to be in danger”. In addition, with regard to encroachment upon rights, the YPA provides that the CDPDJ “shall take the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon” (s. 23(c)). For this purpose, it may “refer to the tribunal any situation where it has reason to believe that the rights of the child have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions” (s. 74.1 para. 2; see also s. 25.3). Similarly, “[a] child or his parents may apply to the tribunal where they disagree” with a decision made in their case (s. 74.2). The legislature has expressly provided for just one exception to this rule. After taking into consideration the opinions of the parties, the tribunal may deal with the individual situations of several children at the same time if they have the same parent and if, in doing so, there is no risk of prejudice to any of them. However, even in such circumstances, in keeping with the individualized and particularized conception of judicial intervention that imbues the entire YPA, the tribunal must make “separate orders for each child in accordance with section 91”(s. 73.1).

[41]                         I note that no provision of the YPA reveals an intention to depart from this logic of individualized and particularized justice that runs throughout the YPA when it comes to encroachment upon rights. To give the tribunal the power to order preventive corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it, the legislature could have granted the CDPDJ the power to apply to the tribunal for corrective measures in the public interest, as the legislature did for the Human Rights Tribunal in cases of discrimination (see Quebec Charter, s. 80; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789, at paras. 102‑5). Similarly, it could have indicated that the tribunal, in its decisions, must concern itself with the “interests of children”, as it did in describing the responsibilities of the Minister of Health and Social Services (see, e.g., YPA, s. 28 (ad. 2022, c. 11, s. 16)). But it did not do so. In short, it appears that the legislature did not intend to grant the tribunal the power to order corrective measures “that transcend the case before it” (Bombardier, at para. 102).

[42]                         Finally, even if it were to be concluded, as the CDPDJ suggests (A.F., at para. 50; transcript, at pp. 21‑22), that the combined effect of ss. 23(b), 25.2 and 25.3 is to depart from this logic of individualized and particularized justice by allowing the tribunal to make broad orders to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it but have been investigated by the CDPDJ, this would be of only limited relevance in this case. This is because the tribunal was dealing in the present case with a single child’s situation, which had not been investigated by the CDPDJ. This is a very different scenario, which it is important to distinguish.

(ii)          Other Actors Are Responsible for Looking at the System as a Whole and Reforming It

[43]                         The conclusion that the tribunal must render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it is also supported by the fact that other actors have been given a mandate to examine the system as a whole, to identify its shortcomings and to reform it, taking into consideration the interests of children who are the subject of intervention under the YPA. In this context, it is all the more plausible that the legislature intended to limit the tribunal’s role.

[44]                         Consideration of the scheme of the YPA shows that the Quebec legislature views the protection of the province’s young people as a collective responsibility. It has created a youth protection system whose proper functioning depends on the actions of a range of political, social and legal actors that have been given roles, responsibilities and powers that are both distinct and complementary.

[45]                         The first actor responsible for looking at the system as a whole and reforming it is the Minister of Health and Social Services. The Minister may, with the government’s prior approval, give binding directives to institutions to ensure that the objectives of social intervention are achieved (s. 133.1). These directives may be based on, among other things, recommendations issued by the CDPDJ (s. 23(e)). The Minister is also tasked with laying before the National Assembly, every five years, a study measuring the impact of the YPA on the stability and living conditions of children and, if necessary, recommending amendments to the YPA (s. 156.2). In addition, the Minister may request that the CDPDJ carry out studies and research on any question related to its competence, including the promotion and protection of the rights of children (s. 23(a) and (f)).

[46]                         Next, there is the CDPDJ, a central aspect of whose statutory mandate is to examine the youth protection system and collaborate with political actors in reforming it. For example, every five years, the CDPDJ must “report to the Government on the carrying out of this Act and on the advisability of amending it” (s. 156.1 para. 1; see, e.g., CDPDJ, Rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse (article 156.1 de la LPJ) (2020)). The CDPDJ may also, of its own motion, carry out studies and research on any question related to its competence by taking an overall look at the youth protection system and make recommendations accordingly to various government departments that have an influence on the system (s. 23(e) and (f); see Ricard, at pp. 633‑35; L. Lemonde and J. Desrosiers, “Le droit à un recours effectif lors de la violation des droits fondamentaux des mineurs privés de liberté” (2002), 62 R. du B. 205, at pp. 215‑16).

[47]                         It is worth noting that a recent legislative reform carried out partly in response to the recommendations of the Special Commission on the Rights of the Child and Youth Protection (Laurent Commission) is consistent in every respect with this collaborative approach among various actors, some of whom primarily have [translation] “their attention focused on the system”, while others have their attention “focused on the child” in question whose situation has been referred to them (R.F., at para. 43; see An Act to amend the Youth Protection Act and other legislative provisions, S.Q. 2022, c. 11; National Assembly, Journal des débats, vol. 46, No. 21, 2nd Sess., 42nd Leg., December 8, 2021, at pp. 1091‑93 (L. Carmant)).

[48]                         Among other measures in that reform, the legislature clarified and expanded the powers of the Minister of Health and Social Services so that the Minister can look critically at the system and contribute to the development of public policies for reforming it. In Chapter III, entitled “Body and Persons Entrusted With Youth Protection”, there is now a division devoted to the Minister’s role. It states that the Minister is “by virtue of office the Government’s adviser on all issues relating to youth protection or to children and families in vulnerable situations” and that the Minister “must be consulted whenever a ministerial decision is made involving the interests of children or the respect of their rights in relation to youth protection” (YPA, s. 28). In addition, with “a view to studying, improving or defining standards and obligations applicable to the responsibilities or to the social intervention of the director in order to, among other things, reduce response times”, the Minister may now, by regulation, implement a pilot project on a range of matters (YPA, s. 133 (ad. 2022, c. 11, s. 61); see National Assembly, Journal des débats de la Commission de la santé et des services sociaux, vol. 46, No. 22, 2nd Sess., 42nd Leg., April 5, 2022, 15 h (L. Carmant)).

[49]                         The tribunal’s corrective powers with respect to encroachments upon rights have remained unchanged, as has the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under this wide‑ranging reform of the YPA, the tribunal’s role is limited to rendering justice in an individualized and particularized manner. There is nothing to suggest that the tribunal’s mandate has been broadened to allow it to take [translation] “a critical look at systemic issues in child protection” (Ricard, at p. 635) and to order corrective measures to reform the system for the benefit of children whose situations have not been referred to it. The actors responsible for focusing their attention on the system are the Minister of Health and Social Services and, in certain cases, the CDPDJ. Further, the Minister and the CDPDJ are now supported in this role by new actors, including the National Director of Youth Protection and the panel of directors chaired by the National Director (YPA, ss. 23 to 27 and 28 to 30.8 (ad. 2022, c. 11, s. 16); Instaurer une société bienveillante pour nos enfants et nos jeunes: rapport de la Commission spéciale sur les droits des enfants et la protection de la jeunesse (2021), at pp. 379‑81; Journal des débats, December 8, 2021, at pp. 1091‑93 (L. Carmant)).

(iii)        Conclusion on the Tribunal’s Role

[50]                         In light of the scheme of the YPA, the tribunal’s mandate is to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. The tribunal is not the actor chosen by the legislature to look critically at the youth protection system as a whole and to reform it. That role is instead entrusted to others: the Minister of Health and Social Services, the CDPDJ and especially, since 2022, the National Director of Youth Protection.

[51]                         It must be recognized that the legislature did not intend to grant the tribunal powers going beyond those required to carry out the mandate assigned to it. If the legislature’s intention, in matters of encroachment upon rights, had been to distance itself from this vision of individualized and particularized judicial intervention that imbues the entire YPA and to authorize the tribunal to make orders that apply to children whose situations have not been referred to it, the legislature would have done so in explicit terms. For example, it could have clearly conferred on the tribunal the power to make orders in the public interest, or it could have expressly stated that the tribunal, in making its decisions, must take into account not only the interests of the child before it but also the interests of children. It did not so, however.

(c)           Legislative History

[52]                         Section 91 para. 4 (formerly s. 91 para. 2) was added to the YPA in 1984 as part of a legislative reform enacted in response to the report of the Special Parliamentary Commission on Youth Protection chaired by Jean‑Pierre Charbonneau (see An Act to amend the Youth Protection Act and other legislation, S.Q. 1984, c. 4 (“Act to amend the YPA (1984)”), s. 46). That commission had a mandate to study the new youth protection system that had been in place since the coming into force of the Youth Protection Act, S.Q. 1977, c. 20. It was to recommend [translation] “legislative and regulatory amendments” to address difficulties in the implementation of the 1977 YPA and, from an overall perspective, to improve the functioning of the youth protection system (Rapport de la Commission parlementaire spéciale sur la protection de la jeunesse (1982), at p. xiii; see also p. 9; National Assembly, Journal des débats, vol. 27, No. 69, 4th Sess., 32nd Leg., March 13, 1984, at pp. 5123‑42 (P.‑M. Johnson, C. Sirros and J.‑P. Charbonneau); Ricard, at pp. 614‑15).

[53]                         Section 91 para. 4 was incorporated into the YPA at the same time as s. 74.1 para. 2, which provided that the CDPDJ’s predecessor, the Comité de la protection de la jeunesse (“Committee”), could also refer to the tribunal (formerly the Youth Court) “any situation where it has reason to believe that the rights of the child have been wronged by persons, bodies or establishments”. These two provisions were part of the legislative response to the Special Parliamentary Commission’s recommendation to grant powers to the Committee so that it could [translation] “apply to the Court on the basis of rights being encroached upon, and not only where security or development is in danger” (Rapport de la Commission parlementaire spéciale, at p. 544). In its report, the Special Parliamentary Commission criticized the fact that the 1977 YPA gave the Committee a power to investigate encroachments upon rights (s. 23(b) (formerly s. 23(d))) and made it responsible for taking “the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon” (s. 23(c) (formerly s. 23(e))) without adequately equipping it, from a legal standpoint, to perform its role. In short, the Commission found it deplorable that the 1977 YPA did not provide for referral to the tribunal in cases of encroachment upon a child’s rights. In enacting ss. 91 para. 4 and 74.1 para. 2, the legislature was thus attempting to [translation] “fil[l] a gap” in the articulation of the powers of the Committee and the tribunal to deal with encroachments upon rights (Ricard, at p. 615).

[54]                         With regard to s. 91 para. 4 specifically, the Special Parliamentary Commission had recommended adding the following paragraph at the end of s. 91:

                        [translation] Where the Court concludes that the rights of a young person in difficulty have been encroached upon by persons, bodies or institutions acting pursuant to the Act respecting assistance to children and youth in difficulty, it may, in the judgment determining that rights have been encroached upon, order that the situation encroaching upon the rights of the young person be corrected. [Emphasis added.]

                    (National Assembly, Proposition législative: annexe IV au rapport de la Commission parlementaire spéciale sur la protection de la jeunesse (1982), s. 1085)

The legislature followed that recommendation but decided to omit the words “encroaching upon the rights of the young person” in the wording of s. 91 para. 4.

[55]                         Therefore, what the members of the Special Parliamentary Commission had in mind was that the tribunal would correct the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights. Moreover, the wording of the recommendation suggests that the tribunal must concern itself with the interests and “the rights of the young person” whose situation has been referred to it, rather than the interests and rights of other children who are not before it. The question that naturally then arises is whether the legislature’s decision to omit the words “encroaching upon the rights of the young person” in the wording of s. 91 para. 4 reflects its intention to broaden the tribunal’s corrective powers so that it can order corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it.

[56]                         The legislative debates surrounding the enactment of the new version of s. 91 in 1984 shed no light on the question, since s. 91 para. 4 was not specifically discussed during those debates (see National Assembly, Standing Committee on Social Affairs, “Étude détaillée du projet de loi 60 — Loi modifiant la Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse et d’autres dispositions législatives (3)”, Journal des débats: commissions parlementaires, No. 4, 4th Sess., 32nd Leg., March 22, 1984, at pp. 109‑10). That being said, it can be seen from the context surrounding the addition of s. 91 para. 4 that the legislature probably considered it unnecessary to specify that “the situation” the tribunal may order to be corrected is “the situation encroaching upon the rights of the young person”. It was reasonable for the legislature to think that this could be inferred, by necessary implication, from ss. 23(c) and 74.1 para. 2. These provisions stated, respectively, that the Committee had to take “the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon” and that it could “refer to the Court any situation where it has reason to believe that the rights of the child have been wronged”. In my view, the legislature’s decision to omit the words “encroaching upon the rights of the young person” should not be interpreted as a broadening of the tribunal’s power to order corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it.

[57]                         I pause here to elaborate on this last point and respond to an argument made by the CDPDJ. Sections 91 para. 4 and 74.1 para. 2 were inserted into the YPA at the same time as the provisions broadening the Committee’s power to investigate encroachments upon rights so that it could do so in respect of a group of children (s. 23(b)), granting the Committee the power to make recommendations following an investigation into an encroachment upon rights (s. 25.2), and specifying that the Committee could refer the matter to the Youth Court if its recommendation was not implemented within the time fixed (s. 25.3) (see Act to amend the YPA (1984), ss. 10, 12, 38 and 46). These additions addressed the Special Parliamentary Commission’s recommendation that the Committee’s investigative powers be strengthened and clarified by drawing inspiration from the investigative powers already granted to Quebec’s Commission des droits et libertés de la personne (Rapport de la Commission parlementaire spéciale, at pp. 544 and 547; Proposition législative, ss. 113, 129 and 130). It was hoped that the Committee, in exercising its powers to investigate and make recommendations, could deal with [translation] “collective problems” rather than strictly individual situations. In short, the legislature wanted the Committee’s investigative role to relate to [translation] “group problem[s]” as well, such as those affecting “a group of children in a given reception centre in a given situation” (see National Assembly, Standing Committee on Social Affairs, “Étude détaillée du projet de loi 60 — Loi modifiant la Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse et d’autres dispositions législatives (2)”, Journal des débats: commissions parlementaires, No. 3, 4th Sess., 32nd Leg., March 21, 1984, at p. 45 (P.‑M. Johnson)).

[58]                         The CDPDJ argues that the combined effect of ss. 23(b), 25.2 and 25.3 is to authorize the tribunal to make broad orders to protect the interests and rights of a group of children whose situation has not been referred to it but has been investigated by the CDPDJ, and who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before the tribunal. The legislative history shows that this is not the case. The CDPDJ’s interpretation of ss. 23(b), 25.2 and 25.3 cannot be reconciled with the language of ss. 23(c), 74.1 para. 2 and 91 para. 4, which clearly indicates that only the situation of a single child is referred to the tribunal in a case involving encroachment upon rights. Presumably, if the legislature had intended to extend the tribunal’s jurisdiction or corrective powers to the situation of a group of children in respect of which the CDPDJ had investigated, it would have indicated this explicitly in the YPA’s provisions on judicial intervention (Chapter V). In particular, it would have specified this in ss. 74.1 and 91 para. 4, which were examined by a parliamentary committee and then incorporated into the YPA at the same time as ss. 23(b), 25.2 and 25.3. But it did not do so.

[59]                         In this context, it must be concluded that the provisions relied upon by the CDPDJ are not intended to authorize the tribunal to deal with the situation of a group of children or to order corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of a group of children whose situation has not been referred to it but has been investigated by the CDPDJ. On the contrary, these provisions describe the steps that the CDPDJ must take before applying to the tribunal, after having investigated (s. 23(b)) and decided to make a recommendation subject to a time limit (ss. 25.2 and 25.3). In any event, I reiterate that even if the CDPDJ’s interpretation were to be accepted, this would be of very limited assistance in this appeal, because the tribunal was dealing in this case with a single child’s situation, which had not been investigated by the CDPDJ. This is a very different scenario, which it is important to distinguish.

[60]                         In short, I am of the view that the legislative history of s. 91 para. 4 and of other related provisions concerning encroachment upon rights confirms what the scheme of the YPA already reveals: the tribunal can deal with the situation of only one child at a time. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to authorize the tribunal to order corrective measures that would apply to children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. Lastly, the tribunal must correct the situation at the source of the encroachment upon the child’s rights, but the legislative history does not indicate whether the tribunal can also seek to remedy the impact of the encroachment on the child’s psychological or physical state.

(d)          CRC

[61]                         Article 3 of the CRC makes it clear that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in “all actions concerning children” (Article 3(1)). Its aim is also for states parties to undertake “to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well‑being” (Article 3(2)). To this end, states must ensure that “the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision” (Article 3(3)).

[62]                         The CDPDJ is correct in stating that the CRC weighs in favour of interpreting s. 91 para. 4 in a large and liberal manner so that the tribunal will have all the corrective powers it needs to ensure that the child whose rights have been encroached upon has the fullest and most effective protection possible (see United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 (2003): General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, November 27, 2003, at para. 24; United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concept Note: General Comment on Children’s Rights to Access to Justice and Effective Remedies, 2024 (online), at paras. 4‑7 and 16).

[63]                         That being said, it is undeniable that states parties to the CRC possess a margin of discretion in determining what measures are appropriate to promote the best interests of the child and to protect the child’s rights (see CRC, Article 4; J. Tobin, “Article 4. A State’s General Obligation of Implementation”, in J. Tobin, ed., The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Commentary (2019), 108, at pp. 111‑12). I agree with the DYP that there is no indication that, in order to comply with the CRC, provincial and territorial legislatures must, in cases of encroachment upon rights, give courts or tribunals the mandate and powers they need to concern themselves with protecting the interests and rights of more than one child at a time (see R.F., at para. 39, quoting United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14, May 29, 2013, at para. 32).

(e)           Object of the Provision

[64]                         The YPA establishes a scheme whose purpose is to protect any child whose security or development is or may be in danger (s. 2 para. 1). As the CDPDJ noted, in doing so, the YPA [translation] “gives life” to s. 39 of the Quebec Charter (transcript, at p. 27). It also helps to implement Canada’s obligations under the CRC in domestic law.

[65]                         The recourse for a declaration of encroachment upon rights is one of the legal tools put in place by the legislature to achieve this fundamental purpose of the YPA of protecting the interests and rights of children whose security or development is in danger. In establishing this recourse and granting corrective powers to the tribunal, the legislature had the objective [translation] “of ensuring that any state intervention in relation to a child [covered by the YPA] is carried out in a manner that respects the child’s rights” (Ricard, at pp. 616‑17; see also p. 609; YPA, s. 3). The legislature was therefore seeking to provide additional protection to a vulnerable child whose right to protection had already been encroached upon by their parents or by the persons acting in their stead at the time of the intervention by the director of youth protection in the child’s life (Ricard, at pp. 616 and 619). Through this oversight and judicial review mechanism, the legislature also sought to ensure that the director of youth protection and the other persons, bodies or institutions called upon to interact with the child in the course of social intervention could be held accountable (see V. P. Costanzo and M. Paré, “Les réponses judiciaires au non‑respect des droits de l’enfant dans l’intervention sociale: Utilité ou futilité du recours en lésion de droits?” (2023), 33:2 N.P.S. 135, at pp. 153 and 156; C. Brodeur, “Chronique — Le non‑respect des ordonnances par la direction de la protection de la jeunesse: contexte juridique et survol de la jurisprudence”, Repères, June 2022 (online), at pp. 7‑8).

[66]                         The corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 must be interpreted in a large and liberal manner to ensure the attainment of this purpose of protecting children, which is clearly affirmed in the Quebec Charter and the CRC (Quebec Charter, s. 39; CRC, Article 3; see also Civil Code of Québec, art. 32; Interpretation Act, s. 41; Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 21). The various types of corrective measures that can be ordered must be conceived of generously to ensure the fullest possible protection for the child whose rights have been encroached upon. By “full protection”, I mean protection that applies to both the present and the future and that takes into account the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon the child’s rights as well as the impact of the encroachment on the child’s psychological and physical state.

[67]                         In this regard, I am of the view that the interpretation proposed by the CDPDJ — to the extent that it focuses exclusively on rectifying the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon rights — undermines the tribunal’s ability to protect the interests and rights of the child before it in a given case. Indeed, such an interpretation is incompatible with the possibility of ordering corrective measures to remedy the negative impact of an encroachment upon rights on the child’s psychological or physical state. In some respects, the CDPDJ’s interpretation also seems to limit the type of preventive corrective measures that may be ordered. Over and above correcting the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights, the tribunal must also, in my opinion, be able to order preventive corrective measures that will follow the child through the system to ensure that the child is adequately protected in the future.

[68]                         With regard to the question at the centre of the disagreement between the parties — that is, whether the tribunal may order corrective measures to prevent children whose situations have not been referred to it from finding themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the one that encroached upon the rights of the child before it — I am of the view that the purpose clause in the French version of the YPA allows this question to be answered in the negative. Its first paragraph states that the YPA “a pour objet la protection de l’enfant dont la sécurité ou le développement est ou peut être considéré comme compromis” (“[t]he purpose . . . is to protect children whose security or development is or may be considered to be in danger”) (s. 2). Since 2022, the purpose clause has stated as well — relying on the wording of s. 2.3 para. 1(a) of the version of the YPA in force at the relevant time — that the YPA “a aussi pour objet de mettre fin à la situation qui compromet la sécurité ou le développement de l’enfant et d’éviter qu’elle ne se reproduise” (“also aims to put an end to and prevent the recurrence of situations in which the security or the development of a child is in danger”) (s. 2 para. 1).

[69]                         Section 3 provides as follows:

                    3.  Decisions made under this Act must be in the interest of the child and respect his rights.

                    In addition to the moral, intellectual, emotional and material needs of the child, his age, health, personality and family environment and the other aspects of his situation must be taken into account.

[70]                         It is true that the YPA establishes a youth protection system whose fundamental mission, as the appellant states, is to protect vulnerable children in Quebec (A.F., at para. 58). That being said, the wording of s. 2, namely the YPA’s purpose clause, and that of s. 3 lead to the conclusion that, in the case of social and judicial intervention, the legislature had in mind that this goal would be attained through interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. It is through the cumulative effect of individualized and particularized interventions that the legislature hopes to achieve the fundamental purpose of Quebec’s youth protection system, which is to protect “the children” who are the most vulnerable in society. This observation is important given the fact that purpose statements in a statute are the “first, ‘most direct and authoritative evidence’ of the legislative purpose” (Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 17, at para. 130, quoting R. v. Appulonappa, 2015 SCC 59, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754, at para. 49) and also given the fact that, in an interpretive exercise, it is important to consider the general purpose of both the provision and the statute while bearing in mind the means chosen by the legislature to achieve these general objectives (see Breault, at para. 26, quoting MediaQMI inc., at para. 39; see also 9147‑0732 Québec inc., at para. 10; Mancini, at pp. 927 and 930‑31).

(f)            Conclusion

[71]                         A large and liberal interpretation of s. 91 para. 4, which ensures the attainment of the general purpose of protecting children while taking into consideration the text, the statutory scheme and the context, leads me to conclude that the legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the powers needed to ensure full protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. By this I mean protection that applies to both the present and the future and that takes account of the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon rights as well as the impact of the encroachment on the child’s psychological and physical state. What this means in practical terms, in my view, is that the tribunal may order corrective measures with the following purposes: (1) to put an end to the situation of encroachment where it is still encroaching upon the child’s rights; (2) to remedy the psychological or physical consequences for the child resulting from the encroachment upon rights; and (3) to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child. The tribunal can thus order a wide range of corrective measures so as to render justice in a flexible and creative manner in each case.

[72]                         It follows from the above that a preventive corrective measure may be ordered only if the child whose rights have been encroached upon is at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. The fact that other children whose situations have not been referred to the tribunal might benefit from the preventive corrective measure is not sufficient, on its own, to allow the tribunal to order it.

[73]                         Contrary to what the CDPDJ argues, this conclusion is not absurd, unreasonable or incompatible with the general purpose of protecting vulnerable children that infuses the YPA (A.F., at paras. 57‑58). Rather, it accurately reflects the means chosen by the legislature to guarantee the protection of the interests and rights of children who are the subject of social intervention under the YPA. In the case of the tribunal, these means are centred around individualized and particularized justice. The fact that the CDPDJ would prefer other means that it considers more effective for achieving this general purpose of protecting vulnerable children in Quebec — for example, granting the tribunal the power to make orders in the public interest or in the interest of children who are the subject of intervention under the YPA — is not sufficient to characterize as absurd or unreasonable the interpretation that is called for when the text of the provision, the statutory scheme, the context and the object are considered.

[74]                         Moreover, as we will see in greater detail in the next section, the fact that the tribunal may order corrective measures only to protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it does not mean that the order, to be valid, necessarily has to name that child expressly. To hold otherwise would be an error of law. Nor does it mean that a corrective measure cannot have the indirect and incidental effect of protecting the interests and rights of other children who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. Finally, it also does not mean that the tribunal cannot order corrective measures to eliminate a systemic or institutional practice. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent the tribunal from ordering such a corrective measure, provided that the child whose rights have been encroached upon is at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again, that the corrective measure can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment and that the measure is related to the protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. I will come back to this.

[75]                         I would note here that my proposed interpretation of s. 91 para. 4 is consistent with the judicial interpretations of s. 91 para. 4 that have been adopted thus far. There are already instances where the tribunal will order corrective measures to put an end to a situation of encroachment that is still ongoing at the time a declaration of encroachment upon rights is made. This will be the case, for example, where the situation of encroachment results from an absence of psychological counselling that the child’s state makes necessary and where this absence of counselling continues at the time of the hearing. In such a case, the tribunal will order the corrective measures needed to put an end to the absence of counselling (see, e.g., Protection de la jeunesse – 174220, 2017 QCCQ 9973, at paras. 41‑51 and 68‑69).

[76]                         Similarly, if the encroachment upon rights has had negative physical or psychological consequences for the child, the tribunal may sometimes order measures that can remedy those consequences or improve the child’s state. For example, the tribunal will occasionally order the provision of social services that have become necessary because of the negative consequences of the encroachment upon rights for the child, or it will order the director of youth protection to cover the costs of therapy that has become necessary as a result of a situation of encroachment caused by the director of youth protection (see, e.g., Protection de la jeunesse – 175726, 2017 QCCQ 10171, at paras. 111, 113 and 135; Protection de la jeunesse – 1610815, 2016 QCCQ 20163, at paras. 17‑18, 67‑75 and 105; Protection de la jeunesse – 202094, 2020 QCCQ 1912, at paras. 109‑18, 123‑24 and 130‑31; M. Provost, Youth Protection Law in Québec (2023), at pp. 287‑89). Similarly, there may be grounds for ordering the person, body or institution that encroached upon the child’s rights to apologize in writing to the child and their family with a view to offering some form of solace and restoring the relationship of trust with the youth protection system (see Protection de la jeunesse – 212922, 2021 QCCQ 5132, at paras. 701‑2).

[77]                         Finally, it is also common for the tribunal to order corrective measures to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child whose rights have been encroached upon. It is recognized in the jurisprudence that even where the situation of encroachment has ended by the time of the hearing, this does not preclude the tribunal from making preventive orders to ensure that the situation of encroachment does not recur for the child whose situation has been referred to it (Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at paras. 20‑26; Ricard, at p. 632). For example, the tribunal may order, as a corrective measure, that training be given to a youth worker to impress upon them the importance of respecting certain fundamental principles governing social intervention under the YPA to ensure that, in the future, the worker will be better able to establish and maintain a relationship of trust with the child and the child’s parents (Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 21; S. Papillon, “Le jugement en matière de lésion de droits de la Chambre de la jeunesse: où en sommes‑nous?” (2015), 56 C. de D. 151, at p. 176). Similarly, the tribunal may order that its judgment be served on actors responsible for taking an overall look at the system and participating in its reform (see, e.g., Protection de la jeunesse – 2023, 2020 QCCQ 61, at paras. 331 and 456; Protection de la jeunesse – 137151, 2013 QCCQ 17367, at paras. 85‑87 and 93) or may recommend that the CDPDJ investigate a problematic situation with a view to making the necessary recommendations to the Minister of Health and Social Services (see, e.g., Protection de la jeunesse – 171278, 2017 QCCQ 2752, at paras. 73‑74 and 80).

(3)          Criteria for the Validity of Corrective Measures Ordered for Preventive Purposes

[78]                         In light of the disagreement that exists on this question between the parties and between the judges of the Court of Appeal, I believe it is essential to set out three criteria for determining the validity of corrective measures ordered for preventive purposes. These criteria are based on the limits built into s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA by the legislature. Without purporting to be exhaustive, they will serve in the future both to guide the tribunal when it contemplates ordering such corrective measures and to support the appellate courts called upon to review the validity of these measures.

(a)           The Child Must Be at Risk of Being Subjected to the Situation of Encroachment Again

[79]                         First, for a preventive corrective measure to be ordered, the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal must be at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. To hold otherwise would amount to recognizing that the tribunal has the power to make orders in the public interest or in the interest of children who are the subject of social intervention under the YPA. However, this is not what the legislature intended.

[80]                         I note that this criterion is flexible and easily met, in view of the imperative of protecting children from any risk of harm that infuses the YPA (see Bernheim and Coupienne, at p. 262, citing P. (D.) v. S. (C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141, at pp. 176‑78). While mere conjecture unsupported by the evidence is not enough to conclude that the child is at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again, this criterion will generally be met where the child is still the subject of intervention under the YPA. However, if the child is no longer the subject of intervention at the time the tribunal decides the application for a declaration of encroachment upon rights and if nothing in the evidence suggests that the child might be so again before reaching the age of majority, the criterion will not be met. No preventive corrective measure can then be ordered. In every case, the question of whether a child is at risk of being subjected to the same situation of encroachment in the future is a contextual determination that will depend on the tribunal’s assessment of the evidence.

(b)          The Corrective Measures Must Be Able to Effectively Help to Prevent the Recurrence of the Situation of Encroachment

[81]                         Second, the preventive corrective measure or measures ordered must be able to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment.

[82]                         To this end, the tribunal must begin by focusing increased attention on the circumstances that gave rise to the encroachment upon rights, the number and nature of which will vary from case to case. As Dickson C.J. stated in another context, the tribunal should look first to the past so that it can then make preventive orders that can effectively prevent a situation from recurring in the future (see Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (“CN”), at p. 1145; see also Ricard, at p. 620). At this stage, the tribunal must [translation] “try to understand the source of the encroachment” (Ricard, at p. 620). Again, this is a highly factual determination that will depend on the evidence adduced.

[83]                         Understanding the source of an encroachment upon rights will be easy in cases where the encroachment results from only one act or omission by an individual. For example, in the case at bar, it was easy for the tribunal to determine the source of the encroachment upon the young person’s right to security and protection on July 27, 2018. The encroachment was caused by a CISSS A educator who unjustly refused to allow the young person, who had run away, to take refuge at the RCYPAP to which she had been entrusted.

[84]                         In other cases, understanding the source of an encroachment will be more difficult, especially when institutional and individual factors are present. This will be the case where the act or omission by an individual that contributed to an encroachment upon rights is closely linked to institutional factors (Ricard, at p. 632). By “institutional factor”, I mean any factor that relates primarily to the functioning of a legal person, institution or body, such as training, a protocol or an internal practice (see, by analogy, CN, at pp. 1139 and 1143; R. W. Zinn, The Law of Human Rights in Canada: Practice and Procedure (loose‑leaf), at § 1:6). The infringement of the young person’s right to receive health care with continuity and in a personalized manner is a good example. The tribunal noted that the encroachment upon this right originated both in a series of individual acts or omissions by health care personnel and youth workers and in institutional factors, primarily the institution’s poor medical record‑keeping.

[85]                         Once the source of the encroachment upon rights is identified, the tribunal will be able to consider one or more corrective measures that could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. These measures will logically focus on one or more of the circumstances shown by the evidence to be at the source of the encroachment. In this regard, I emphasize that, at the stage of presenting testimonial and documentary evidence, the parties play an important role in assisting the tribunal to determine innovative corrective measures based on best practices.

[86]                         Finally, I note that the aim here is not to determine the corrective measure that will be the most effective in preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child. Rather, it is to identify the corrective measures that can be expected to be effective in helping to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. It is not uncommon for a wide range of corrective measures to be available to the tribunal. However, this range of measures will be narrowed once account is taken of an additional criterion: the corrective measures must be related to the protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal.

(c)           The Corrective Measures Ordered Must Be Related to the Protection of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to the Tribunal

[87]                         Third, any preventive corrective measure must not only be effective but also be related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. This requirement flows from the legislative intent discerned from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA, which is that the tribunal be able to order corrective measures only to protect the interests and right of the child whose situation has been referred to it. Its effect is to limit the range of preventive corrective measures deemed effective by the tribunal to those that seek first and foremost to protect the interests and rights of the child before it, so as to provide a practical remedy for the encroachment upon the child’s rights (see Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 25). The corrective measure must be primarily intended to protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal (see C.A. reasons, at para. 76). It must be related to events experienced by the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal in environments where the child has spent or might spend time, on the basis of the evidence and the context.

[88]                         At this stage, to order a corrective measure whose scope is related to the protection of the child’s interests and rights, the tribunal must confine itself to ordering a corrective measure that reflects the risk of harm faced by the child, as shown by the evidence. As the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal noted, the tribunal must avoid the trap of intellectual shortcuts and generalizations not supported by the evidence. For example, if the tribunal wishes its order to be directed specifically at persons, bodies or institutions, it must limit itself to naming those that, in light of the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child’s rights. Moreover, if the tribunal is of the view that there is a risk that other persons, bodies or institutions may expose the child to the same situation of encroachment in the future, but that the evidence does not allow it to identify them, it may make an order that will follow the child through the system. However, it may not make an order directed at all persons, bodies or institutions in the judicial district concerned or in Quebec.

[89]                         To effectively protect the child whose rights have been encroached upon, the preventive corrective measures will sometimes have to be broad in scope. This will be the case where the evidence shows that a corrective measure directed strictly at one or more identifiable individuals would not serve to protect the child effectively in the future.

[90]                         When broad corrective measures are required, at least two types of measures can be contemplated. First, the tribunal may order a corrective measure specifically directed at persons, bodies or institutions that, in light of the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child’s rights. This will include the persons, bodies and institutions that, according to the evidence, were at the source of the situation of encroachment experienced by the child and that the child might interact with or spend time at in the future. Second, the tribunal may order a measure that will follow the child through the system. Such a corrective measure may be ordered either as an alternative to or in addition to the first type of measure, in light of the evidence in the record, the circumstances of the case and the need to protect the child for the future. While everything is a question of context, it can be expected that, in many cases, a hybrid corrective measure — combining the two types of measures — will be what guarantees the fullest and most effective protection for the child in the future.

[91]                         It follows from the above that the wording of a corrective measure does not necessarily have to name the child whose rights have been encroached upon for that order to be sufficiently related to the protection of the child’s interests and rights. To hold otherwise would be an error of law. To verify whether an order has been validly made under s. 91 para. 4, one must “look to the substance of the order and not merely to its wording” (CN, at p. 1145). Therefore, although the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal was correct in stating that a measure can [translation] “relat[e] to the child whose rights were wronged, even if her name is not included in the order” (para. 46), such a measure must, to be valid, be directed only at persons, bodies or institutions that, in light of the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child’s rights.

[92]                         Moreover, the fact that a preventive corrective measure benefits a large number of children because of the way it is worded is of no relevance in determining whether the measure was validly imposed. A preventive corrective measure related to the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal may very well have positive indirect and incidental consequences for a large number of children (see Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360, at para. 63). I would add that this is particularly true where the corrective measure must be broad in scope in order to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child.

(d)          The Budgetary Impact of the Corrective Measure Is Not a Criterion for the Validity of the Order

[93]                         Lastly, I am of the view that the magnitude of the budgetary impact of the corrective measure is not in itself a criterion for the validity of the order. I agree with the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal that the majority erred in stating that a corrective measure that was necessary to prevent a child from being subjected to a situation of encroachment again would nonetheless be invalid if the budgetary impact of the measure were too significant. The majority also noted [translation] “the importance of raising the issue of approximate costs for those seeking or contesting [preventive] orders [made under s. 91 para. 4] so that the court hearing such applications may assess the impact of the order and, accordingly, whether the court is allowed to make it” (para. 81).

[94]                         In addition to the fact that such a validity criterion has no basis in the YPA, its application to preventive orders made under s. 91 para. 4 would entail considerable practical difficulties. Indeed, it would be unduly burdensome to ask the parties to deal with the issue of the approximate costs of the orders being debated. This could well lengthen and complicate the proceedings, whether by encouraging the parties to produce expert evidence on the issue or by prompting speculative debates on it. In every case, it would only add another barrier to access to justice in the youth protection system, a situation that would be contrary to the protection of the interests and rights of vulnerable children and their families (see Bernheim and Coupienne, at pp. 276‑78).

(e)           Conclusion

[95]                         In summary, at least three validity criteria govern the exercise of the tribunal’s power to order preventive corrective measures under s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. These criteria are based on the limits built into this enabling provision. For a preventive corrective measure to be ordered, the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal must be at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. If this is the case, the corrective measure chosen by the tribunal must be among the limited range of measures that can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment and that are also related to the protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The magnitude of the budgetary impact of the corrective measure is not in itself a criterion for the validity of the order.

[96]                         Where a broad preventive measure is necessary, it may take a variety of forms. For example, it may be limited to the persons, bodies and institutions that, according to the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child’s rights; it may follow the child through the system; or it may be a hybrid of these two forms of measures.

[97]                         It can be expected that, in many cases, a relatively wide range of preventive corrective measures will be available to the tribunal. If so, it will be up to the tribunal to choose the corrective measure or measures it considers to be the most appropriate to protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, having regard to the evidence in the record and the submissions of the parties concerned. Such a discretionary decision is generally entitled to deference. Unless the tribunal made a palpable and overriding error in assessing the evidence or it is shown that the tribunal did not exercise the discretion conferred by s. 91 para. 4 judiciously, the preventive measure ordered by the tribunal must be upheld and an appellate court cannot intervene (see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at paras. 10 and 36; Barendregt, at paras. 100‑104; Canada (Transportation Safety Board) v. Carroll‑Byrne, 2022 SCC 48, at para. 41; Hydro‑Québec v. Matta, 2020 SCC 37, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 595, at para. 33). On the other hand, where the appellate court finds an error in the tribunal’s interpretation of s. 91 para. 4, the error must be reviewed on a standard of correctness. For example, if the tribunal erred by clearly seeking to make orders that would benefit children other than the one whose situation had been referred to it, this would constitute an error of law (see Housen, at para. 8; Vavilov, at para. 37; TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, 2019 SCC 19, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 30; Carroll‑Byrne, at para. 41).

(4)          Review of the Orders

[98]                         The four corrective measures challenged by the DYP were ordered to prevent abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures from being used again. In the tribunal’s view, those restraint and isolation measures infringed the young person’s right to have any use of control measures against her be minimal, exceptional and guided by a procedure (Act respecting health services and social services, CQLR, c. S‑4.2, s. 118.1).

[99]                         With regard to the abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures, the tribunal found, among other things, that the young person — who was dealing with significant mental health disorders — had been subjected to more than a hundred restraint measures over a period of about five months because of acts that were dangerous to her or others, and that she had suffered injuries as a result of those restraint measures. On one occasion in particular, her head was completely covered with a sweater to prevent her from spitting in the intervention officers’ faces, which caused her to hyperventilate. The tribunal stated that, during the same period, more than a hundred withdrawal measures, lasting from less than a minute to more than seven hours, had also been used against the young person. The tribunal noted that she had [translation] “spent an unreasonable amount of time isolated in a tiny, often dingy, concrete room” (para. 302), in which she had sometimes beat her head against the walls. These are facts that the DYP does not dispute, as she limits the debate to the lawfulness of the corrective measures ordered.

[100]                     At the time the tribunal decided the applications for a declaration of encroachment upon rights, it was established that the young person was at risk of being subjected again to the situations of encroachment identified by the tribunal. At that time, the tribunal declared that the young person’s security and development were still in danger (at para. 330), extended the order of January 17, 2018, requiring that she be placed at an RCYPAP (at para. 331), and entrusted her situation to the DYP (para. 338). In reviewing the four impugned orders, I will therefore focus special attention on the other two validity criteria set out above.

(a)           Orders Directed at the Individualized Treatment Units

[101]                     The tribunal ordered that “the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who work in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health” (para. 340) and that these units “be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health” (para. 341). Finding that these orders were not sufficiently related to the protection of the young person’s interests and rights, the Superior Court judge varied their wording. He narrowed the scope of the first order by specifying that only the youth workers, educators and intervention officers [translation] “who will be responsible for X in the individualized treatment units” could receive the mental health training (paras. 65 and 76). He narrowed the second order by specifying that only the individualized treatment units [translation] “that will be responsible for X” could obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health (para. 76; see also paras. 65‑66). The judges of the Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. I agree with their decision, apart from endorsing the suggestion that the order, to be valid, necessarily had to name the child expressly.

[102]                     The young person stayed in just one individualized treatment unit (“ITU”), ITU B, which is a rehabilitation unit for young people with mental health and behavioural disorders. A minimum of three educators are in the unit during the day to look after the young people. The tribunal concluded that, in that unit, the young person had not received all the supervision and support needed from the youth workers [translation] “because the unit was then very ‘lively’ and the various youth workers were overwhelmed” (para. 301). The tribunal also found that when restraint measures were necessary, they were implemented by security guards from a private company who had very little experience and were not trained to meet the specific needs of young people with mental health disorders. When the educators left the unit around 11:00 p.m., security guards took over for the night. Their mandate was to supervise the young people and ensure their safety. Further, the tribunal noted that the turnover of security guards was high, since most of them were police technology students who were only there on a short‑term basis. However, nothing in the judgment suggests that these findings of fact concerning ITU B could be generalized to other identifiable ITUs where the young person might spend time in the future.

[103]                     In that context, while it was reasonable to believe that, by targeting all “individualized treatment units”, the corrective measures ordered would both be able to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment, the tribunal nonetheless erred by not limiting their scope so that they were related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. Nothing in the evidence adduced supported the conclusion that such broad orders were necessary to protect the young person’s interests and rights in the future. In this sense, the orders exceeded the tribunal’s powers.

[104]                     I agree with the judges of the Court of Appeal that the Superior Court properly intervened to narrow the scope of these orders so that they were related to the protection of the young person’s interests and rights. I would note, however, that there was no reason why the Superior Court could not also have achieved this objective by varying the wording of the two orders in another way. I will provide two examples that illustrate the range of preventive corrective measures available. First, the Superior Court judge could have transformed the order for mental health training into a hybrid corrective measure directed specifically at the youth workers, educators and intervention officers from ITU B, as well as any other youth worker, educator and intervention officer from any other ITU that would be responsible for the young person in the future. Second, the judge could also have ordered that, in the event of a transfer to another ITU (other than ITU B), the young person could be taken charge of only by an ITU (1) where the youth workers, educators and intervention officers responsible for the young person would have mental health training, and (2) that would have support from a health professional specializing in mental health.

(b)          Orders Directed at the CISSS A

[105]                     The tribunal ordered the CISSS A to implement a protocol within a reasonable time period to set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention. The tribunal also ordered the CISSS A to adapt all isolation rooms so that they were safer and their walls were covered with a material that prevented injury. Finding that these orders were also not sufficiently related to the protection of the young person’s interests and rights, the Superior Court judge varied them to make them relate specifically to the young person. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court judge’s decision to expressly limit the orders to the young person’s situation. The concurring judge of the Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court judge should not have intervened to narrow in this way the scope of the order to implement a protocol setting out the steps to be taken when a child spits. He also held, with regard to the order requiring that the isolation rooms be made safer, that it should have been limited to the isolation rooms in units A and B. For my part, I cannot agree with the reasons of either the majority or the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal.

[106]                     With regard to the order to implement a protocol establishing the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention, this is a corrective measure that was ordered in connection with an incident experienced by the young person when she resided in an intensive supervision unit (“ISU”), ISU A. While she was in a state of personality disorganization, restraint measures were used to take her to the withdrawal block. While being moved, the young person refused to cooperate and spat in the face of one of the officers. The educator on site then used an article of clothing to completely cover the young person’s head and thus prevent her from spitting on the officers. The tribunal noted that, at the time, the head of ISU A believed that the officers had [translation] “the right to cover a young person’s head during transport to avoid being spit on” (para. 215). The tribunal found that none of the intervention units of the RCYPAPs of the CISSS A — including the RCYPAPs where the young person had spent time in the past and those where she might spend time in the future — had a protocol establishing the steps to be taken when a child spits. In this case, the young person spent time in four different RCYPAP units over a period of about 14 months (one ISU, one ITU, one regular rehabilitation unit and one intensive supervision rehabilitation unit) (para. 2); she exhibited self‑destructive and difficult behaviour at each of those RCYPAPs (paras. 23, 26, 89, 95 and 110); and there may have been obstacles to her spending time at certain RCYPAPs (paras. 52 and 99). There was therefore a real risk that she would spend time at one or more of those RCYPAPs. However, certain variables undermined the foreseeability and consistency of such stays. The tribunal also found that the internal memos that prohibited covering a child’s head were not complied with by everyone. Moreover, similar incidents had occurred in other RCYPAP units of the CISSS A where the young person had spent time in the past and/or might spend time in the future. The DYP testified that this was an unacceptable practice that should not be used again (para. 223). The tribunal noted that, months after the incident, alternative measures to protect the security guards were still not in place.

[107]                     In that context, the tribunal exceeded its powers by ordering the CISSS A to implement a protocol that set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention. It is certainly possible that such a corrective measure would effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. However, the order as worded was not related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. The measure should have been more specific and circumscribed by reference to the evidence and the context. The tribunal did not confine itself to ordering a measure that reflected the risk of harm faced by the young person, because that measure would apply to all CISSS A service centres, including: local community service centres; hospital centres; child and youth protection centres; residential and long‑term care centres; and rehabilitation centres (see An Act to modify the organization and governance of the health and social services network, in particular by abolishing the regional agencies, CQLR, c. O‑7.2, Sch. I). Yet it is clear from the tribunal’s findings of fact that only the RCYPAPs where the young person had spent time and where she might spend time in the future could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon her rights. As an appellate court, the Superior Court owed deference to those findings of fact made by the tribunal (Québec (Protection de la jeunesse) v. C.P., 2000 CanLII 11372 (Que. C.A.)). It was not out of the question that the young person might spit when receiving services from a local community service centre or a hospital centre. However, there was nothing to indicate that the young person was at risk of having her rights encroached upon again in those other service centres. Consequently, in light of the evidence and the context, the scope of the order made by the tribunal went beyond protecting the interests and rights of the young person whose situation had been referred to it.

[108]                     It was therefore appropriate to vary the order made by the tribunal. As the judges of the Court of Appeal wrote, the Superior Court judge was clearly correct in intervening to narrow the scope of the order. However, the proposed variation missed the mark. The order made by the Superior Court judge had the same problem as the one made by the tribunal: it was overbroad. Even with the more specific words [translation] “when X spits”, the order failed to recognize that, according to the findings of fact, the situation of encroachment and its recurrence were tied — and limited — to the RCYPAPs where the young person had spent time and might spend time in the future. In light of the findings of fact, the order should have been directed at the RCYPAPs of the CISSS A and at any other RCYPAP that would be responsible for the young person. It would have been a hybrid order. By being directed at “any other RCYPAP that would be responsible for the young person”, the order would have followed the young person through the system if she spent time at other RCYPAPs that were part of other CISSSs (other than the CISSS A). Of course, the evidence and the context did not provide a basis for ordering all Quebec CISSSs outright to implement a protocol. However, an RCYPAP would have had to implement a protocol if two conditions were met: (1) the young person had to spend time at that RCYPAP, and (2) the RCYPAP did not already have a protocol in place. Alternatively, I note that, among the range of available measures, it would also have been acceptable for the tribunal to order that, in the event of a transfer, the young person could be transferred only to an RCYPAP where a protocol was already in place.

[109]                     With regard to the order requiring that the isolation rooms be made safer, this corrective measure was ordered in response to the injuries suffered by the young person during periods of isolation. The tribunal judge visited the withdrawal blocks in ISU A and ITU B. Further to that visit, she noted that the rooms in both units were [translation] “small” and that there were “bare floors and bare walls”, which were “made of concrete” (para. 184). She noted that in ITU B, the walls were [translation] “in a sorry state” and the paint on them was “dingy” (para. 184). She observed that the isolation rooms were so small that [translation] “[a] child who is in there can only sit or lie on the floor” (para. 184). Moreover, the tribunal found that during the young person’s many periods of isolation in ISU A and ITU B, she had injured herself by banging her head against the concrete walls or hitting them with her hands hard enough to require medical care. However, nothing in the judgment supports the conclusion that these findings of fact could be generalized to all rehabilitation units at all RCYPAPs of the CISSS A — which the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal properly noted.

[110]                     In that context, while the corrective measure ordering the CISSS A to make all of the isolation rooms safer would undoubtedly have helped to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment, it nevertheless exceeded the tribunal’s powers because it was not sufficiently anchored in the evidence and the context. As regards the order that should have been made, the one proposed by the Superior Court judge and affirmed by the majority of the Court of Appeal cannot be upheld, because it is imprecise. As for the order suggested by the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal, it is not sufficiently anchored in the tribunal’s findings of fact. While in the abstract there was nothing to prevent the tribunal from ordering the CISSS A to make all of the isolation rooms in units A and B safer, here the findings of fact do not indicate that all of the isolation rooms in those units had to be made safer to ensure that the young person had access to a safe isolation room at all times. Indeed, the tribunal made no finding of fact concerning the number of isolation rooms per unit or their occupancy level. Similarly, there is no finding of fact from which inferences on this point can be drawn. I am therefore of the view that the tribunal’s order should have been varied to direct the CISSS A to have at least one isolation room, covered with a material that prevented injury, available for the young person at all times in units A and B and in the other units that would become responsible for her. The DYP and the CISSS A would then have had to assess whether, to comply with that order, it was necessary to make more than one, or even all, of the isolation rooms in the units in question safer. Alternatively, I note that, among the range of available measures, it would also have been acceptable for the tribunal to order that, in the event of a transfer, the young person could be transferred only to an RCYPAP where at least one safe isolation room — whose walls were covered with a material that prevented injury — was available.

(5)          Tribunal’s Power To Make Recommendations

[111]                     Where the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been encroached upon by persons, bodies or institutions, it may intervene to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment (see Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 22). In such circumstances, it may be appropriate for the tribunal to make a non‑binding recommendation if it considers this to be warranted in light of the evidence. I will explain.

[112]                     It is true that the Court of Québec is a statutory tribunal and that, in cases involving encroachment upon rights, it can make only decisions or orders that are provided for by statute (see YPA, ss. 90 et seq.). It cannot, of course, exceed that jurisdiction. However, its power to make recommendations is anchored in the YPA: it flows from the text, scheme and object of that statute. Its existence is expressly contemplated by s. 91 para. 2 of the YPA. While a power of this kind is not referred to in s. 91 para. 4, which deals specifically with encroachment upon rights, a large and liberal interpretation of the provision, in keeping with the proper approach to remedial legislation, leads me to conclude that the power nevertheless applies in circumstances where rights have been encroached upon. Support for the existence of this power can also be found in a practice that is well established in the Quebec jurisprudence on encroachment upon rights (see, e.g., Protection de la jeunesse – 236587, 2023 QCCQ 12263, at paras. 8 et seq.; Protection de la jeunesse – 211624, 2021 QCCQ 2868, at para. 96; see also Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 26). Indeed, in this case, the Superior Court judge expressed the view that [translation] “the conclusions of a general nature” arrived at by the tribunal “could be stated as recommendations” (para. 8). Moreover, although this Court is not bound by a party’s admissions on a question of law, I take note of two admissions. First, counsel for the respondent admits that the tribunal [translation] “can make recommendations” in a case involving encroachment upon rights (transcript, at pp. 94‑95). Before the Superior Court, the respondent had herself asked that recommendations be substituted for the impugned orders, that is, the ones set out at paras. 340‑41 and 345‑46 of the tribunal’s judgment (Sup. Ct. reasons, at para. 11). Second, the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec admits that the tribunal is not precluded from [translation] “making recommendations” in a case involving encroachment upon rights (I.F., at para. 60). These two admissions corroborate what the jurisprudence already tells us: where rights have been encroached upon, the tribunal has a power to make recommendations that it derives from the text, scheme and object of the YPA.

[113]                     The tribunal’s power to make recommendations is particularly useful where the circumstances do not lend themselves to stating a conclusion in the form of an order under s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. According to author Mario Provost, [translation] “the validity of orders that are broader in scope is open to question. . . . Since the Act has not expanded the power of this statutory tribunal, some argue that conclusions of a general nature should be ‘recommended’ rather than ‘ordered’” (Droit de la protection de la jeunesse (3rd ed. 2022), at p. 289; M. Provost, “La protection de la jeunesse”, in T. Gagné‑Dubé et al., eds., Droit de la famille québécois (loose‑leaf), at ¶54‑310). This is correct. Where the three criteria for the validity of a corrective measure ordered for preventive purposes are not all met, the tribunal still has the power to make a recommendation anchored in the evidence concerning the encroachment upon rights. This power to make a recommendation thus allows the tribunal to point out the existence of a problem relating to an encroachment upon the child’s rights and to encourage the authorities to address it.

[114]                     It is obviously preferable for the tribunal to be cautious in exercising its power to make recommendations. As author Jean‑François Boulais correctly observes, [translation] “if the recommendation is not followed, it is the judge’s moral authority that is undermined” (Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse, texte annoté (5th ed. 2003), at p. 445). Indeed, when the authority named in the recommendation [translation] “disregards the recommendation[,] . . . the Court’s credibility is affected” (Protection de la jeunesse, [1985] AZ‑50942189 (Que. Y.C.), at p. 2). That being said, the tribunal has all the discretion it needs to develop a recommendation based on the situation of encroachment experienced by the child whose situation has been referred to it, as shown by the evidence. Because the Youth Division of the Court of Québec is the judicial tribunal that has the most intimate knowledge of the youth protection system and that participates in its implementation on a daily basis, it is particularly well placed to exercise this power to make recommendations (see Costanzo and Paré, at pp. 151 and 153‑54).

[115]                     It is therefore true, in this case, that the tribunal’s concerns as reflected at paras. 340‑41 and 345‑46 of its judgment could have been expressed as recommendations. At the time it rendered its judgment, the tribunal did have the power to make non‑binding recommendations based on those concerns, provided that these recommendations were anchored in the evidence. This was an available and acceptable option at the time.

[116]                     I add that the tribunal was clearly concerned about the situation experienced by the young person during her time in various CISSS A units. After having an opportunity to hear the parties, various professionals from the rehabilitation, security and psychosocial services sectors, as well as the DYP, the tribunal concluded that some of the encroachments upon the young person’s rights resulted from institutional or systemic problems that affected other children in Quebec’s youth protection system. The authorities concerned — in keeping with the mission assigned to them by the YPA of protecting children whose security or development is or may be in danger — would be well advised to take note of the tribunal’s conclusions and to consider what action they can take to ensure that the encroachments upon rights experienced by the young person are not experienced by others.

B.            Right of the CISSS A To Be Heard or Duly Called

[117]                     A secondary question arises with respect to art. 17 C.C.P., which gives the CISSS A the right to be heard or duly called. Like its predecessor, art. 5 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C‑25, art. 17 C.C.P. codifies a fundamental principle of natural justice: the maxim audi alteram partem. The first paragraph states that “[t]he court cannot rule on an application, or take a measure on its own initiative, which affects the rights of a party unless the party has been heard or duly called.”

[118]                     After raising the question themselves while the case was under advisement and requesting submissions from the parties, the judges of the Court of Appeal all expressed the view that the orders could not be made against the CISSS A because it was not [translation] “formally party to the proceedings” at first instance (para. 50; see also para. 82). In their opinion, to hold otherwise would violate the [translation] “principle that courts make orders against properly summoned parties” and would be an error of law (para. 52; see also para. 82). The Court of Appeal therefore found that the guiding principle of art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P. had been violated. On that basis, it varied the two orders so that they were made against the DYP rather than the CISSS A (paras. 54 and 83).

[119]                     The CDPDJ does not agree. It asks this Court to restore the orders against the CISSS A. According to it, even if the Court were to find that the CISSS A should have been joined to the proceedings as a party or impleaded party, the Court of Appeal still erred in intervening because, it says, the CISSS A was not significantly prejudiced by that omission. The intervener X agrees with the CDPDJ’s argument. As for the interveners A and B, they also maintain that the Court of Appeal erred in intervening, but for different reasons: they take the view that the CISSS A was a party to the proceedings through the DYP and that the expression “director of youth protection” was sufficient to clearly identify and designate the CISSS A.

[120]                     The DYP has not made any argument on this question. That being said, she asks that we dismiss the appeal and thus that we not vary the Court of Appeal’s disposition. It should be noted, however, that before the Court of Appeal, the DYP, like the CDPDJ, requested that the orders be maintained against the CISSS A (C.A. reasons, at para. 51: [translation] “All the parties requested that the orders be maintained against the [CISSS A]” (emphasis added)).

[121]                     I cannot accept the position put forward by the CDPDJ. Even if it is assumed that a breach of the right to be heard or duly called (and therefore of art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P.) can be remedied by showing an absence of prejudice — a question that should be left for another day — I am unable to infer that the CISSS A was not prejudiced. The appeal record as it stands is rather scanty on this point. First, it does not allow us to address the legal question of whether absence of prejudice may be a relevant consideration where a court of law is determining whether there has been a breach of the audi alteram partem rule and, if so, what remedy it should grant (if any). Second, the appeal record also does not allow us to address the question of whether the CISSS A was prejudiced. The Court does not have full submissions on these questions or even a complete picture of the proceedings at first instance. In the circumstances, it is enough to say that the CDPDJ has not satisfied me that the CISSS A was not prejudiced. I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s choice to intervene so that the orders were made against the DYP (paras. 54 and 83). That being said, while I agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeal, I do not fully endorse its reasons. According to that court, [translation] “[i]t is an error of law to make orders against a person who is not [formally] party to the matter” (para. 52; see also paras. 50 and 82). In my view, it should instead have been found that it is an error of law to make orders against a person “unless the party has been heard or duly called” (art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P.). Finally, because this was a case in which a young person’s interests were at stake and because the decision rendered would affect the interests of the CISSS A, the tribunal could have required the attendance of the CISSS A and heard it after it was called (art. 50 C.C.P.).

VI.         Disposition

[122]                     I would allow the appeal in part. If not for the fact that the young person reached the age of majority during the appeal proceedings, I would have restored the order made at para. 345 of the tribunal’s judgment, with two exceptions: first, the order would have been directed at the DYP rather than the CISSS A, and second, the scope of the order would have been limited to the RCYPAPs of the CISSS A and the other RCYPAPs to which the young person would be entrusted. I would also have varied the wording of the order made at para. 346 to direct the DYP, and not the CISSS A, to have at least one isolation room, covered with a material that prevented injury, available for the young person at all times in units A and B of the CISSS A and in the other RCYPAP units to which she would be entrusted. These are the orders “that the tribunal should have made” at paras. 345‑46 of its judgment, although I recognize that other alternative orders were available and acceptable and could therefore have been made (YPA, s. 112; see also ss. 128 and 129; Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S‑26, s. 45; Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 27). However, since the young person is no longer the subject of social intervention under the YPA and never will be again given that she is now an adult, no order will be made (Protection de la jeunesse – 10174, 2010 QCCA 1912, [2010] R.J.Q. 2291, at para. 94 in limine; Protection de la jeunesse – 18935, 2018 QCCQ 10532, at paras. 22‑23; Protection de la jeunesse – 211323, 2021 QCCQ 2238, at para. 24; Protection de la jeunesse – 211624, at para. 79). No recommendation will be made either. Given the circumstances of this appeal, no costs should be awarded.

                    Appeal allowed in part, without costs.

                    Solicitors for the appellant: Bitzakidis, Clément‑Major, Fournier, Montréal.

                    Solicitors for the respondent: IMK, Montréal; Étude légale du CISSS A.

                    Solicitors for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec: Bernard, Roy (Justice‑Québec), Direction du contentieux, Montréal.

                    Solicitors for the interveners A and B: Pringle & Associés, Laval.

                    Solicitor for the intervener X: Centre communautaire juridique de la Rive-Sud, Longueuil.

                    Solicitors for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association: McCarthy Tétrault, Montréal.

                    Solicitor for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Larochelle Law, Whitehorse.