News of Note
Marra – Tax Court of Canada finds that the two years for a director’s derivative assessment ran from handing a resignation to the company’s lawyer, who did nothing with it
Email this ContentThe company (financed by your spouse but which has been run by a questionable character) is on shaky grounds, your spouse has suggested that you resign and the only other directors are the shady character, who is being sued for having misappropriated company funds, and his inactive spouse. What do you do?
Rip J found that in these circumstances it is sufficient to hand a written resignation to the lawyer who has acted for the company, even though he never gets around to filing the resignation in the minute book (or notifying the company's branch of the resignation, as required) – so that from the time of giving him the resignation, the two year period for barring CRA from making a derivative assessment under ITA s. 227.1(4) and ETA s. 323(5) starts running.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Marra v. The Queen, 2016 TCC 24 under ITA s. 227.1(4).
Marzen Artistic – Federal Court of Appeal confirms that a simplistic transfer pricing scheme is difficult to defend
The taxpayer, a Canadian window manufacturer which sold its windows in B.C. and the U.S., generated virtually all of its profits in its Barbadian subsidiary (SII), which essentially had no assets or employees other than its (very part-time) Barbadian managing director: the taxpayer sold windows for the U.S. market to its U.S. subsidiary ("SWI") at their retail price (i.e., the IRS was not expected to receive any income tax either); SII charged "marketing fees" to the taxpayer which were sufficient to reduce the taxpayer’s income to nil; SII paid fees to SWI for the SWI employees ("seconded" to SII) who did the marketing work at SWI’s payroll cost plus 10%; and SII paid dividends (out of exempt earnings generated from the substantial mark-up of its fees over those of SWI) to the taxpayer which essentially were equal to 100% of the profit of the consolidated group.
The Federal Court of Appeal has not found anything to reverse in the approach that Sheridan J took in the Tax Court, which was to apply s. 247(2)(c) to reduce the marketing fees to the sum of: the fees paid by SII to SWI; and those paid to its managing director (which she treated as the comparable uncontrolled price for SII’s services to the taxpayer) - so that virtually all of the consolidated profits were taxable in Canada. In response to a submission that Sheridan J had “erred in under-valuing the amounts paid by SII to SWI," (i.e., some of the Barbados profits assessed by CRA really belonged in the U.S.), Scott JA refrained from editorial comment, and instead simply noted that no evidence had been advanced at trial in its support.
Neal Armstrong. Summaries of Marzen Artistic Aluminum v. The Queen, 2016 FCA 34, under s. 247(2).
CRA considers that a Netherlands Antilles private foundation qualifies as a trust notwithstanding its separate legal personality
Although a Netherlands Antilles private foundation has separate legal personality (including a separate legal entity clause in the governing legislation) and capacity to acquire rights and liabilities (with no beneficiary liability), CRA nonetheless considers it to be a trust rather than a corporation given that it does not issue shares, the beneficiaries do not pay for their interests in the foundation, they cannot transfer their beneficial interests and they do not have a right to participate in any decisions of the foundation. Although it is still quite dissimilar to a common law trust, it is good enough that it is somewhat similar to a civil law trust.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 October 2010 Memo 2008-0289461I7 under s. 104(1).
ConocoPhillips – Federal Court finds that CRA effectively has the discretion under s. 220(2.1) to indefinitely extend the period for filing a Notice of Objection
S. 220(2.1) provides that “where any provision of this Act… requires a person to file a… document…the Minister may waive the requirement, but the person shall provide the document…at the Minister’s request.” Boswell J has found that s. 220(2.1) accords the Minister the discretion to waive the requirement to file a Notice of Objection. Thus, it was improper for CRA to peremptorily reject (on the grounds that it had no power to do so) a ConocoPhillips request that CRA waive a requirement for it to object to a reassessment which ConocoPhillips found out about well after the deadline for getting an extension to object to it.
What does this mean? Boswell J indicated that if CRA waived the requirement for filing a Notice of Objection, it was then empowered by s. 220(2.1) to request the waived document (i.e., to request ConocoPhillips to file a Notice of Objection), so that the appeals process could get back on track – and noted that “should the Minister in this case unreasonably refuse to exercise her jurisdiction and authority to waive the requirement for a notice of objection, ConocoPhillips could then challenge that refusal by way of judicial review in this Court.”
Neal Armstrong. Summaries of ConocoPhillips Canada Resources Corp. v. M.N.R., 2016 FC 98 under s. 220(2.1) and Statutory Interpretation - French and English versions.
CRA doubts the GST free-supply rule provides ITCs to holdcos providing free management to operating subs which generate interest/dividends
A 2004 Interpretation (54669) indicated that a holding corporation supplying management services to related corporations with operating businesses or other exclusive commercial activity could claim ITCs to recover the GST on the expenses incurred in such management activities under the “free supply” rule in ETA s. 141.01(4).
More recently, CRA has substantially qualified this view by confirming that it would consider that “where a person provides property or a service to a person for no consideration but receives interest or dividend revenue from that person it is unlikely that ITCs would be available.” Based on an earlier comment, CRA's rationale might be that although the direct purpose of the management services is to further the operating business (which arguably is all that matters), the indirect purpose of promoting financial returns to the holding corporation (e.g., dividends) should govern.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 26 February 2015 CBA Roundtable, Q. 34 under ETA s. 141.01(4).
Hedges – Federal Court of Appeal finds that marihuana sales were not zero-rated drug supplies
The zero-rating of controlled drugs in Sched. VI, Part I, s. 2(d) would apply to dried marihuana if it is viewed as a drug which may only be sold to a consumer under an "exemption" from Health Canada. After noting the Crown’s concession that marihuana is a “drug,” Rennie JA found that "Authorizations to Possess" (ATPs) issued by Health Canada were not such exemptions, so that marihuana did not come within this carve-out for drugs which could only be sold with an exemption. He also was not impressed by the “illogic” of arguing that over-the-counter drugs were taxable because they could be legally sold without exemption (or prescription), whereas sales of marihuana were zero-rated because exemptions were required – even though in the case before him of an unlicensed and illegal producer, no ATPs (incorrectly argued to be “exemptions”) had in fact been obtained.
The findings in this case suggest that licensed (as contrasted to illegal) producers also are required to charge GST or HST to consumers with ATPs.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Hedges v. The Queen, 2016 FCA 19, under ETA, Sched. VI, Part I, s. 2.
Income Tax Severed Letters 3 February 2016
This morning's release of 18 severed letters from the Income Tax Rulings Directorate is now available for your viewing.
CRA considers that employment severance is not CEE
Canadian exploration expenses are defined to include an “expense incurred…in drilling” etc. CRA considers that a severance payment made to a terminated exploration employee is not CEE (or CDE) as “a severance payment is an expense made by the corporation at the moment of cessation of employment and does not constitute an amount paid for services rendered.” This conclusion is not overwhelmingly correct, as the employee would not be owed any severance if he had not performed any services (see also Lo).
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 8 December 2015 T.I. 2015-0616321E5 F under Reg. 1201(1) - Canadian exploration and development overhead expense.
Gill – Tax Court of Canada finds that the requisite intention for GST-rebate purposes to purchase a new home as a primary residence is determined at the time of agreement rather than closing
One of the requirements for the GST rebate for new homes is that “at the time the particular individual becomes liable…under an agreement of purchase and sale of the complex…[with] the builder…the particular individual is acquiring the complex… for use as the primary residence of the particular individual or a relation… .” The French version of ETA s. 254 seems to indicate that the relevant time for determining this primary-residence intention is the closing, whereas the English version (evincing a recurring standard of ETA drafting) has so far been interpreted as pointing more to the time of signing the purchase agreement.
Smith J has interpreted the French version as pointing to the time of signing the purchase agreement (which under Art. 1785 of the Civil Code can be styled as a “preliminary contract”), as “this interpretation accords a common meaning to the two versions of the provision.”
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Gill v. The Queen, 2016 CCI 13, under ETA s. 254(2)(b).
CRA indicates that the s. 110(1.1) election is not available if employee stock options on Target shares are purchased by the purchaser rather than surrendered to Target
An employee can claim a s. 110(1)(d) deduction for a stock option benefit realized by the employee on the cash settlement of a stock option if among other things the employer elects under s. 110(1.1) that neither it nor any person not dealing at arm’s length with the employer will take a deduction for the amount.
CRA considers that the election and, therefore, the s. 110(1)(d) deduction, is not available where at the same time as an arm’s length third party purchases all the shares of the employer, it also purchases all the employee stock options. It considers that the employer can only make the election if it or a person with whom it did not deal at arm’s length made the s. 7(1)(b) payment to the employee – whereas here, it is the third party who made that payment, and CRA considers the third party to not be an eligible payer because it dealt at arm’s length with the employer prior to its acquisition of the employer’s shares.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 7 December 2015 T.I. 2015-0585171E5 F under s. 110(1.1).