Date: 20180131
Docket: T-1168-15
Citation:
2018 FC 108
Ottawa, Ontario, January 31, 2018
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Pentney
BETWEEN:
|
ADVANCE
MAGAZINE PUBLISHERS, INC.
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Applicant
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and
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BANFF LAKE
LOUISE TOURISM BUREAU
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The Banff Lake Louise Tourism Bureau (“Banff”) wanted to promote tourism during the “shoulder season”, the period after the end of the
summer and before the launch of the ski season. It decided to advertise a ten-day
event in November during which restaurants in the area would serve a series of
special fixed-price meals, all under the name “Bon
Appétit Banff”. It signed up local restaurants, set up a website,
printed a number of advertisements, and required the participating restaurants
to print menus and other material under the banner “Bon
Appétit Banff”. It also applied for trademark protection for this name,
and that application gave rise to this proceeding.
[2]
Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. (“Advance”) opposed Banff’s application on the basis
that it had already registered a number of trademarks under the name “Bon Appétit”, and allowing “Bon
Appétit Banff” to be registered would likely be confusing for
individuals in the marketplace. The Trademark Opposition Board (“TMOB”) granted Banff’s application, finding that the
opponent had not filed evidence to support its claims, while Banff had filed evidence
to demonstrate a limited use of the mark. Advance launched an appeal under
section 56(1) of the Trade-Marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 [the Act],
and filed new evidence pursuant to s. 56(5) of the Act. Banff was given
notice of this proceeding but did not participate.
[3]
The question in this appeal is whether an
ordinary casual consumer, somewhat in a hurry, would look at a menu, notice or
website advertising “Bon Appétit Banff” and
likely be confused into thinking that the source of the services associated
with the “Bon Appétit Banff” trademark was one
and the same as the source of the goods or services associated with Advance’s
BON APPÉTIT trademarks. If yes, Advance’s opposition to the registration of the
Respondent’s trademark should be granted, and the TMOB decision should be
overturned.
[4]
For the reasons that follow I am granting this
appeal.
II.
BACKGROUND
[5]
On March 16, 2011, Banff filed an application to
register the mark BON APPÉTIT BANFF, based on proposed use in Canada, in
association with the following services:
Promoting events to visitors through radio
and television advertising and by distributing printed advertising materials
and e-mail newsletters; promoting the goods and services of members, namely
lodging, restaurants, shops, touristic tours and arts and sports centres
through radio and television advertising and by distributing printed
advertising materials and email newsletters; operation of a website promoting
events and goods and services of others; providing information about events via
email, by phone or in person.
[6]
This application was advertised in the
Trade-Marks Journal on December 7, 2011, and was opposed by Advance. Banff
filed a counter statement generally denying the allegations in the statement of
opposition. At the hearing before the TMOB, Advance submitted evidence
regarding its registered word mark BON APPÉTIT (registration No. TMA576328,
registered February 25, 2003), and its registered design mark BON APPETIT
DESIGN (registration No. TMA221520, registered June 24, 1977):
[7]
The goods and services covered by these
registrations are:
Online magazines and publications
distributed in electronic format via the internet; operating an internet
website which allows consumers to subscribe to consumer magazines and allows
advertisers to promote their goods and services via the internet.
[Registration No. TMA576328]
Publications,
namely a magazine.
[Registration No. TMA221520]
[8]
In addition, Advance referred to its
applications for the trademarks BON APPÉTIT and BON APPETIT DESIGN in relation
to proposed use in association with the following services and goods:
Educational services, namely conducting
classes, seminars, conferences and workshops, both on-line and in person, in
the field of food and beverage preparation, culinary arts and distribution of
training material, namely, educational and instructional materials, namely,
books, pamphlets, manuals, DVD's, videotapes, mps downloads, USB sticks,
portable memory devices, digital video.
[Application No. 1521530, filed March 24,
2011]
Stationery and stationery products, namely
notepaper, diaries, calendars, note cards … envelopes, note cards and notepaper
all containing custom imprints.
[Application No. 1419418, filed November 17,
2008]
[9]
Various grounds of opposition were asserted, but
the primary argument was that the marks being applied for were confusing with
the Applicant’s, contrary to ss. 12(1)(d) and 16(3)(a) and (d) of the Act,
and that Banff could not have been satisfied that it was entitled to
registration pursuant to s. 30(i) because it knew of Advance’s BON APPÉTIT and
BON APPETIT DESIGN marks when it filed its application.
[10]
At the hearing before the TMOB, Advance filed an
affidavit from a trademark searcher, which provided evidence about the particulars
of the registrations and applications outlined above, as well as introducing a
copy of the logo as it appeared on the Banff website:
[11]
Banff filed three affidavits: two from its Director
of Resort Services which describe the nature of the event that was the focal
point of the registration and the activities which had been associated with it,
and one from a paralegal who had conducted a computer search of the Trade-Marks
database to locate active trademarks comprised of the term “bon appétit”.
[12]
Following a hearing of the matter, the TMOB
granted the application. It found that while the two word marks resemble each
other, there was nothing particularly striking or unique in the phrase “bon appétit”. It also noted that there can be no
monopoly in the idea of enjoying a meal. It is important to note here that the TMOB’s
decision rests on the evidence that was presented, which demonstrated that
there had been some limited use by Banff of its mark in the Banff-Lake Louise
tourism area over a two-week span covering a number of years, whereas there was
no evidence by Advance of the nature or quality of the goods or services
delivered under its marks. Despite the similarities between the parties’ marks,
on the evidence, the TMOB concluded that the registration should be allowed.
III.
ISSUES
[13]
This appeal raises two issues:
- What is the
scope of review, in light of the new evidence?
- Is it likely
that consumers would be confused by the registration and use of the respondent’s
mark, having regard to the Applicant’s marks?
IV.
ANALYSIS
A.
What is the scope of review, in light of the new
evidence?
[14]
Advance argues that, I should conduct a de
novo hearing of the issues because it filed new evidence on this appeal.
The relevant provision is s. 56(5) of the Act:
Additional evidence
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Preuve additionnelle
|
(5) On an appeal under subsection (1),
evidence in addition to that adduced before the Registrar may be adduced and
the Federal Court may exercise any discretion vested in the Registrar.
|
(5)
Lors de l’appel, il peut être apporté une preuve en plus de celle qui a été
fournie devant le registraire, et le tribunal peut exercer toute discrétion
dont le registraire est investi.
|
[15]
The standard of review in an appeal under s. 56
depends on whether new evidence has been filed. In Mattel, Inc v 3894207
Canada Inc, 2006 SCC 22 at para 35 [Mattel], the Supreme Court of
Canada stated that if new evidence is admitted the review is a reconsideration
of both fact and law:
…Where fresh evidence is admitted, it may,
depending on its nature, put quite a different light on the record that was
before the Board, and thus require the applications judge to proceed more by
way of a fresh hearing on an extended record than a simple appeal. Section 56
suggests a legislative intent that there be a full reconsideration not only of
legal points but also of issues of fact and mixed fact and law, including the likelihood
of confusion.
[Citations omitted.]
[16]
If the Court determines that the additional
evidence would have materially affected the TMOB’s findings of fact or exercise
of discretion, the Court must consider de novo the issue to which that
additional evidence relates: Molson Breweries v John Labatt Ltd., [2000]
3 FC 145 at para 51 (FCA) [Molson Breweries]; Spirits International
BV v BCF SENCRL, 2012 FCA 131 at para 10 [Spirits International]. In
order to determine whether the new evidence would have materially affected the
TMOB’s decision, the Court must assess the quality, not the quantity, of the
evidence – considering its nature, significance, probative value, and
reliability – to determine whether the evidence adds something of significance.
(Illico Communication Inc v Norton Rose SENCRL, 2015 FC 165 at para 26 [Illico
Communications]; Mcdowell v The Body Shop International PLC, 2017 FC
581 at para 11.
[17]
While such new evidence can “undermine the factual substratum of the Board’s decision and
thus rob the decision of the value of the Board’s expertise”, this does
not “eliminate the Board’s expertise as a relevant
consideration”: Mattel at para 37; see also Molson Breweries at
paras 46-51.
[18]
This requires an assessment of whether the
evidence which is filed on the appeal is: (i) new, in that it adds
relevant additional information beyond that which was before the TMOB; (ii)
probative and reliable, in that it addresses an issue relevant to the legal
issues in dispute and is otherwise reliable given the usual legal tests; and
(iii) whether it would have materially affected the TMOB’s findings of fact or
exercise of discretion (Spirits International; Gemological Institute
of America v Gemology Headquarters International, 2014 FC 1153 at
para 25; Illico Communication at para 24).
[19]
My task on the final part of this analysis,
whether the new evidence would have materially affected the findings of fact or
exercise of discretion by the TMOB, is made easier by the final paragraph of its
decision:
I would add that had the opponent provided
evidence to support the pleadings in the statement of opposition…, that is,
evidence establishing that its magazine had acquired a substantial reputation
(and further, that the magazine focuses on food and dining), then the outcome
of this proceeding would likely have favoured the opponent.
[20]
As I have observed above, the decision under
appeal rested largely on the evidence filed by Banff, in contrast to the
absence of evidence about use of the marks by Advance. In connection with this
appeal, Advance has filed substantial new evidence in an affidavit from Betty
Wong Ortiz, the Director of Strategy and Operations of its Bon Appétit
division. The substance of this evidence will be dealt with in the next part of
my decision, but, in summary, it establishes that the Bon Appétit division of
Advance has undertaken the following activities for at least the past ten
years:
- Published and
sold a magazine under the banner Bon Appétit, of which millions have been
sold in Canada;
- Operated a
website with an extensive Canadian reach, as demonstrated by over 60
million visits by unique Canadian visitors over the period;
- Established an
extensive presence on social media, with a significant number of Canadian
followers, as well as a substantial number of “views”
of its YouTube videos by Canadians;
- Licenced the use
of its mark by the Home Shopping Network, and a number of well-known
retailers as well as a home appliance manufacturer.
[21]
As will be detailed below, the affidavit also includes
examples of articles concerning tourist attractions in various Canadian cities,
food festivals and events, as well as advertisements placed by several Canadian
tourism authorities.
[22]
This evidence is obviously both new, in the
sense that it was not presented before the TMOB, and relevant, in the sense
that it provides a factual basis for Advance’s arguments relating to the test
for confusion under the Act. It also bears the hallmarks of reliability,
in that it is provided by a senior official who has access to the relevant
information and it includes copies of the magazine, excerpts of various
published articles, and screen shots from the website, as well as data about
Canadians’ use of the website and social media platforms. The concluding
paragraph of the decision, quoted above, makes it evident that this type of
evidence would have affected the TMOB’s findings of fact and exercise of
discretion. In light of my conclusions on this point, I must conduct a de
novo review, relying on the evidence old and new, in relation to the issue
of whether the application for registration should be granted.
B.
Is it likely that consumers will be confused by
the respondent’s mark?
[23]
In accordance with s. 6(2) of the Act,
the use of one trademark causes confusion with another if the use of both
trademarks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the
goods have the same source:
[When mark or name confusing]
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[Quand une marque ou un nom crée de la confusion]
|
(2) The use of a trade-mark causes
confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same
area would be likely to lead to the inference that the goods or services
associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or
performed by the same person, whether or not the goods or services are of the
same general class.
|
(2)
L’emploi d’une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec une autre marque
de commerce lorsque l’emploi des deux marques de commerce dans la même région
serait susceptible de faire conclure que les produits liés à ces marques de
commerce sont fabriqués, vendus, donnés à bail ou loués, ou que les services
liés à ces marques sont loués ou exécutés, par la même personne, que ces
produits ou ces services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale.
|
[24]
The legal test is well known, as set out by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Masterpiece Inc v Alavida Lifestyles Inc,
2011 SCC 27 at para 40 [Masterpiece]:
At the outset of this confusion analysis, it
is useful to bear in mind the test for confusion under the Trade-Marks Act. In Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 S.C.R.
824, Binnie J. restated the traditional approach, at para. 20, in the following
words:
The test to be applied is a matter of
first impression in the mind of a casual consumer somewhat in a hurry who sees
the [mark], at a time when he or she has no more than an imperfect recollection
of the [prior] trade-marks, and does not pause to give the matter any detailed
consideration or scrutiny, nor to examine closely the similarities and differences
between the marks.
[25]
Subsection 6(5) of the Act states:
What to be considered
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Éléments d’appréciation
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(5) In determining whether trade-marks
or trade-names are confusing, the court or the Registrar, as the case may be,
shall have regard to all the surrounding circumstances including
|
(5) En
décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la
confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de
toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, y compris :
|
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of
the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to which they have become
known;
|
a) le
caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux, et
la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus;
|
(b) the length of time the trade-marks
or trade-names have been in use;
|
b) la
période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont été
en usage;
|
(c) the nature of the goods, services
or business;
|
c) le
genre de produits, services ou entreprises;
|
(d) the nature of the trade; and
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d) la
nature du commerce;
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(e) the degree of resemblance between
the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas
suggested by them.
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e) le
degré de ressemblance entre les marques de commerce ou les noms commerciaux
dans la présentation ou le son, ou dans les idées qu’ils suggèrent.
|
[26]
The confusion analysis is to be done on the
basis of the rights obtained by registration, not on the particular form of use
of the mark in the market at one particular point in time (Masterpiece
at paras 42-59). While all of the surrounding circumstances must be considered,
as a practical matter, the degree of resemblance between the marks can be
determinative: “the degree of resemblance, although the
last factor listed in s. 6(5), is the statutory factor that is often likely to
have the greatest effect on the confusion analysis” (Masterpiece
at para 49).
[27]
By way of introduction to my analysis under s.
6(5), I would observe that Banff has adopted the entirety of Advance’s
registered word mark, and has simply added “Banff”
at the end. It is clear that the first part of a word mark is often the most
important aspect for comparison, in particular if it is what is most
distinctive about the mark (Masterpiece at paras 63-64; Conde
Nast Publications Inc v Union des éditions modernes (1979), 46 CPR (2d) 183
(FCTD) at p 188).
[28]
I find that the resemblance is striking between
the two versions of “bon appétit”, and while I
am not to focus solely on the current usage, neither is it to be ignored. As
the Supreme Court stated in Masterpiece at para 59:
[a]ctual use is not irrelevant, but it
should not be considered to the exclusion of potential uses within the
registration. For example, a subsequent use that is within the scope of a
registration, and is the same or very similar to an existing mark will show how
that registered mark may be used in a way that is confusing with an existing
mark.
See also Absolute
Software Corp v Valt X Technologies Inc, 2015 FC 1203 at para 37.
[29]
With that introduction, I will turn to the
factors enumerated in s. 6(5).
(1)
Inherent and acquired distinctiveness
[30]
This factor requires consideration of both the
inherent distinctiveness of the mark and the extent to which the mark has
acquired distinctiveness through use in the marketplace. The general approach
was described in Mattel at para 75:
“Distinctiveness is of the very essence and
is the cardinal requirement of a trade-mark.”: Western Clock Co. v. Oris
Watch Co., [1931] Ex. C.R. 64, per Audette J., at p. 67. The word
“Barbie” is an everyday expression not originated by the appellant, and on that
account would normally receive less protection “than in the case of an invented
or unique or non-descriptive word” (like Kleenex), per Rand J. in
General Motors, at p. 691, to which one might add: “No person is
entitled to fence in the common of the English or French languages and words of
a general nature cannot be appropriated over a wide area”: K. Gill and R.S.
Joliffe, Fox on Canadian Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition (4th
ed. (loose-leaf)), at p. 8-56. I accept, as discussed earlier, that BARBIE has
now acquired a strong secondary meaning associated with the appellant’s doll
products, and on that account has achieved considerable distinctiveness. While
the mark as registered is just the plain word BARBIE, its use in advertising
and packaging is accompanied with distinctive designs and graphics.
[31]
Inherent distinctiveness depends on the extent
to which a trademark is an everyday word or a non-descriptive, distinctive word
(Mattel at para 75; TLG Canada Corp v Product Source International
LLC, 2014 FC 924 at para 59 [TLG Canada]). Where a trademark is a
unique or created name, such that it refers to only one thing, it will be
inherently distinctive and given a wide scope of protection (Tommy Hilfiger
Licensing Inc v Produits de Qualité IMD Inc, 2005 FC 10 at para 53; Distribution
Prosol PS Ltd v Custom Building Products Ltd, 2015 FC 1170 at para 36 [Prosol].
[32]
In contrast, a descriptive or suggestive word or
phrase will be viewed as a weak mark and given relatively less protection; thus
where a mark refers to many things or is a common reference in the market, or
is merely descriptive of the goods or services, it will be given less
protection (TLG Canada at para 59; EAB Tool Company Inc v Norske
Tools Ltd, 2017 FC 898 at para 30).
[33]
The TMOB decision refers to the affidavit filed
by Advance, which presented “dictionary definitions for
the term ‘bon appétit.’ The literal meaning is ‘good appetite,’ however, the
connotation is ‘enjoy your meal.’” On the basis of this, the TMOB found
that the mark possesses “a fairly low degree of
inherent distinctiveness as it is a common phrase comprised of two French
words.” No other evidence on this point has been introduced, and I agree
with the TMOB that the terms are not particularly unique. Indeed, they are often
used at the opening of a meal.
[34]
Advance argues that the consideration of
inherent distinctiveness must be made in the context of the particular goods or
services, and points to the decision in Masterpiece at para 108, where
the term “masterpiece” was found to be a common
general word, but somewhat distinctive in its use in the retirement residence
industry. Advance contends that the term “bon appétit”
is not inherently descriptive of the character or quality of the goods or
services associated with its registrations and applications, namely on-line and
print publications, operation of a website and social media activity,
educational and training materials, etc.
[35]
I find that the terms are suggestive, but not
particularly unique. They are two ordinary words, commonly associated with food
or dining, but not unique or invented. However, there is no evidence that the
term is commonly used in the market. I agree with the TMOB that the affidavit
filed on this point did not establish that the term had become commonplace in
the Canadian market. This does not end the analysis, however; I must consider
the second aspect of this factor: whether the term has acquired distinctiveness.
[36]
On the evidence before me, Advance has
established a strong presence in the Canadian market, both through
long-standing distribution and sales of its print publication and through
significant on-line and social media presence and activity. The affidavit of Ms.
Wong Ortiz, on which there was no cross-examination, provides the factual
foundation on this point which was missing before the TMOB.
[37]
The evidence on the reach into the Canadian
market of the various components of Advance’s goods and services reflects wider
trends over the past decade. While its print publication had ten-year total Canadian
sales of 4.1 million copies to retailers and 1.36 million to customers, the
annual figures show a decline in print sales over that period. The highest
monthly totals in evidence are from 2006, when over 46,000 magazines were sold
to retailers, of which over 22,000 were sold to customers. By 2015 this had declined
to sales of over 22,000 magazines to retailers, of which 2,900 were sold to
customers. In contrast, Advance’s on-line reach through its “Bon Appétit” website and social media presence has
shown a steady and continuous growth in Canada during the same period. There
are various ways of measuring this, but a few examples will make the point.
Since 1997, there have been over 60 million “unique
visits” to the website from Canada. As Ms. Wong Ortiz explains, “unique visitors” refers to different individuals
annually and does not track repeat visits in any given year by the same unique
visitor. Another approach simply measures the number of visitors per month from
Canada, and this shows over two million unique visits per month from Canada.
[38]
In regard to social media, again there are a
number of different ways of measuring the reach into the Canadian market
through activity on social media. There are tens of thousands of Canadian “followers” of the Facebook and Twitter accounts held
by Bon Appétit, and well over one million “likes”
from Canadians for various articles and stories. Other channels measure the
number of subscribers from Canada, and these show over ten thousand Canadian
users, particularly focused on food, recipes, cooking, and restaurant
recommendation features. It is estimated that 200,000 Canadians annually viewed
videos presented by Bon Appétit on YouTube over the past decade.
[39]
In addition, Bon Appétit has licensed its trademark
and logo in Canada to outlets such as the Home Shopping Network, Electrolux
Major Appliances, and another (un-named) company that creates on-line travel
packages. The trademark was also licenced to Terlato Wines International, a
company that distributes wine through an on-line wine shop. In addition to wine
sales, this company created promotional events, featuring gourmet meals and
wines selected by renowned chefs.
[40]
In regard to the magazine and website, Ms. Wong
Ortiz’ affidavit shows a number of feature articles on Canadian cities, with a
particular focus on dining and other tourist attractions. This includes travel
and restaurant guides for Montréal, Toronto, Québec City, Vancouver, and
Niagara-on-the-Lake. Advertisements were placed in the magazine by several
Canadian tourism bureaus, including Nova Scotia, Ontario, Québec, Tourism
Canada, as well as tourism organizations from Toronto and Montreal. In
addition, the magazine carried feature stories on particular culinary events
held in various cities in North America. Overall, Bon Appétit’s main focus is
on tourism, dining, specialty food and drink, food preparation, along with
other tourist activities.
[41]
While there is no evidence of actual recognition
in the marketplace by consumers, I find that it is reasonable to infer from the
evidence referred to above that the Applicant’s use of “bon
appétit” for its goods and services has acquired distinctiveness through
its various activities in print and on-line, particularly given the evidence of
sales and reach into the Canadian market. As Justice Rothstein notes in Masterpiece
at para 92:
In cases of wares or services being marketed
to the general public, such as retirement residences, judges should consider
the marks at issue, each as a whole, but having regard to the dominant or most
striking feature of the trade-mark. They should use their own common sense,
excluding influences of their “own idiosyncratic knowledge or temperament” to
determine whether the casual consumer would be likely to be confused.
[42]
In many cases the acquired distinctiveness of a trademark
is demonstrated by the reach of its presence in the market through both
storefront presence and advertising. Consumer awareness can be demonstrated
through surveys, or simply inferred from widespread advertising and the number
of stores displaying the banner. Here, Advance sought to demonstrate its
presence in the market through evidence of the sales of the magazine and the on-line
presence through a website and social media vehicles. I find that the evidence
of on-line and social media presence and activity is as useful and compelling
as evidence of storefront presence and more traditional forms of advertising in
print, radio or television.
[43]
In assessing customer awareness or reach into
the marketplace through a website or social media presence, merely posting a
website or putting content into a social media platform may not be indicative
of any particular reach into the market which would support an argument of
acquired distinctiveness through use in Canada: see UNICAST SA v South Asian
Broadcasting Corporation Inc, 2014 FC 295 at paras 27-31; Cathay Pacific
Airways Limited v Air Miles International Trading BV, 2016 FC 1125 at para
56. In this case, the more telling evidence relates to the number of visits or
activity on the website or social media platforms: see TSA Stores, Inc v Registrar
of Trade-Marks, 2011 FC 273 [TSA Stores]. This is valuable because it
demonstrates both Canadians’ awareness of the material and their desire to take
some steps to seek it out, which itself reflects a certain recollection or
awareness. The on-line impact of the brand is evident because it requires
Canadians to take steps to engage, either through visiting the website or
taking steps to “follow” it or to “like” a feature article or photograph on one or more
social media platforms. This can be equally valuable in supporting an analysis
of acquired distinctiveness under the Act: see TSA Stores; Teaja
Holdings Ltd v Jana Beverages Ltd, 2017 TMOB 64 at para 21.
[44]
On the basis of all of the evidence presented, I
find that Advance has established that its BON APPÉTIT registered and
applied-for marks have acquired a degree of distinctiveness in the Canadian
market.
(2)
Length of time in use
[45]
As indicated above, the evidence shows a
considerable reach into Canada which has evolved in concert with the rest of
the consumer marketplace from print to on-line, but has been relatively
continuous over the past several decades. There is evidence of sales of the
magazine dating back to February 1970, as well as to an on-line presence and
activity by Canadians since 1997. Banff’s evidence is that the Bon Appétit
Banff event began in 2011 and has continued since that time. As the evidence
clearly demonstrates that Advance’s use of its mark long pre-dates the use by
Banff of the mark it applied to register, this factor favours Advance.
(3)
The nature of the goods, services or business
[46]
A comparison of the Applicant’s registrations
with the Respondent’s registrations and the goods and services covered by its
applications shows several areas of overlap: both refer to printed material and
on-line materials; both refer to promoting goods and services; both refer to
food and beverages. The new evidence before me confirms that Advance provides
information to consumers on a variety of topics relating to tourism, dining,
drinking, and food preparation, and that this has regularly featured
information pertaining to Canada. Some of this information relates to
particular Canadian cities, and some of it relates to particular culinary
events.
[47]
I accept Advance’s argument that there is
nothing in Banff’s application that is not already done under their
registrations and applications. The overlap is obvious, and this factor also
favours Advance.
(4)
The nature of the trade
[48]
This factor is described in various ways, but it
refers to the nature of the business as it is normally conducted: what type of
store or marketing channel is used to target what type of consumer? In Mattel
(at para 86) Justice Binnie notes that “[t]he nature
and kind of customer who would be likely to buy the respective wares and
services has long been considered a relevant circumstance [citations omitted].”
The greater the similarity between the nature of the parties’ trades, the
higher the risk of confusion.
[49]
Here, both parties are in the same general line
of business, which can be described generically as promoting food, dining, and
tourism in the Canadian and international markets. The fact that “Bon Appétit Banff” is currently focused on a
particular geographic location is not the governing consideration, because
Banff did not choose to apply for a registration which was restricted to the
Banff – Lake Louise tourism region. As a matter of law, Advance is entitled to
protection for the benefits of its registrations throughout Canada, as
confirmed in Masterpiece:
[27] While it is not entirely clear
that the Federal Court of Appeal’s reasons should be read as suggesting that
geography is relevant, I would take this opportunity to dispel any doubt on this
point.
[28] The Canadian trade-marks regime is
national in scope. The owner of a registered trade-mark, subject to a finding
of invalidity, is entitled to the exclusive use of that mark in association
with the wares or services to which it is connected throughout Canada.
…
[31] In order for the owner of a
registered trade-mark to have exclusive use of the trade-mark throughout
Canada, there cannot be a likelihood of confusion with another trade-mark
anywhere in the country.
[50]
I find that this factor favours Advance.
(5)
The degree of resemblance between the
trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by
them
[51]
Case law has established that the degree of
resemblance is often the most important circumstance in the confusion analysis.
The other factors become more significant once the trademarks are found to be
identical or very similar (Masterpiece at para 62; Prosol at para
77). Resemblance is the quality of being either like or similar (Masterpiece
at para 62) and this requires a comparison of the trademarks in their totality,
rather than dissecting them into their constituent elements or laying them
side-by-side to compare and observe differences or similarities. The easiest
way to approach this is to identify the dominant or striking feature of the
marks; this will often be the first part of a word mark (Masterpiece
paras 63-64).
[52]
In this case, Banff has adopted the entirety of Advance’s
registered word mark, and added “Banff”. While
it may be true that to many Canadians the word “Banff”
conjures up ideas of mountains, skiing, and holiday adventures, it is primarily
simply a geographic location. It is accepted that geographic locations are
generally weak marks (see London Drugs Ltd v International Clothiers Inc,
2014 FC 223 at paras 49-50). I find that Banff is simply a geographic location
that, as a modifier of bon appétit, does little to distinguish the mark as a
whole from the Applicant’s registered trademarks.
[53]
This part of the analysis should not focus
entirely on the current display of the mark, since what is granted by
registration of a word mark is the right to display it using any font, design
or feature that the owner chooses (Masterpiece at para 55; Pizzaiolo
Restaurants Inc v Les Restaurants La Pizzaiolle Inc, 2016 FCA 265 at paras
26-33). In this case, I find that the way that Banff has displayed its mark
gives great prominence to the words “bon appétit”,
and it displays them in a manner very similar to the way that Advance has used
them in both its print and on-line materials. Both parties use somewhat
stylized fonts, both use lower case first letters for each word, and both use
the accented “e” in “appétit”.
The addition of the word “Banff” is not
prominent and does not significantly alter the sound or the idea conveyed by
the mark.
[54]
I find that that there is a striking similarity
between the two marks in appearance, sound and in the idea suggested by them.
This factor also favours Advance.
(6)
Surrounding Circumstances
[55]
This leaves for consideration whether there are
any other relevant surrounding circumstances or considerations which would tip
the balance in favour of Banff. I can find none on the evidence before me,
considering both the evidence that was placed before the TMOB and the new
evidence filed on this appeal.
(7)
Conclusion on Confusion
[56]
I find that the term “bon
appétit” has acquired distinctiveness through widespread activity in the
market and that there is strong resemblance between Advance’s registered trademarks
as well as their applications, and that applied for by Banff. Considering all
of the evidence and the factors enumerated in the Act, I find that an ordinary
casual consumer, somewhat in a hurry, would look at a notice or website
advertising “Bon Appétit Banff” and likely
conclude that it was linked to, or authorized by, the Applicant and its “Bon Appétit” magazine or website.
[57]
Therefore, I find that Advance’s objections
under ss. 12(1)(d), 16(3)(a) and (b) of the Act are well-founded in
light of the evidence and considering the various relevant dates for these
provisions (see American Retired Persons v Canadian Retired Persons
(1998), 84 CPR (3d) 198 at pp 206-09 (FCTD) for a discussion of the material
dates in opposition proceedings).
[58]
In view of my findings on the confusion issue,
it is not necessary to address Advance’s argument relating to s. 30(i) of the Act
and whether it is appropriate to draw adverse inferences from objections to
answering questions in cross-examination on an affidavit. The TMOB discussed
this point in the decision under appeal and cast some doubt on whether such an
inference could be sufficient to meet the test set out in s. 30(i) as it has
been interpreted by decisions of this Court, but I make no comment on this
point.
[59]
Given my conclusion on the confusion issue, it
is also not necessary to address the other grounds of objection advanced under
ss. 2, 22, and 50 of the Act.
C.
Costs
[60]
Advance has been successful in this appeal and
in the normal course costs would follow. In exercise of my discretion in
relation to costs under Rule 400 of the Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106,
there are several considerations here. First, this appeal succeeded largely
because of the new evidence that was filed by Advance, but there is no
explanation for why this evidence was not put before the TMOB. This proceeding
could easily have been avoided had the evidence, which was readily available
and, though somewhat voluminous, not obviously burdensome to prepare, been put
before the TMOB. Against this, however, is the fact that Banff did not
discontinue their application for registration even after receiving this new
evidence from Advance, nor did it appear before me to present any arguments. Advance
submits that it incurred extra costs since it was forced to continue with its
appeal in order to vindicate the rights which its registration provides to it
under the Act.
[61]
Having considered the submissions of counsel for
Advance and the factors noted above, I hereby award costs to Advance, payable
by Banff. If the parties are unable to agree on the amount, they may make
submissions to me within ten days.
V.
CONCLUSION
[62]
I find that Advance has established a likelihood
of confusion between its registered and applied for trademarks, and the mark
applied for by Banff, having regard to the evidence that was filed before the TMOB
and the new evidence filed on this appeal. Advance’s objections based on ss.
12(1)(d), 16(3)(a) and (b) of the Act are well-founded.
[63]
The appeal is allowed and the TMOB’s decision is
set aside. The Registrar of Trademarks is directed to refuse the registration
of the application by Banff.
[64]
Costs are awarded to Advance, payable by Banff.
If the parties are unable to agree on the amount, they may make submissions to
me within ten days.