Date: 20180124
Docket:
IMM-2726-17
Citation: 2018 FC 67
Ottawa, Ontario, January 24, 2018
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Kane
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
LINDA OMONO IYERE
STEPHEN IRASEGHOYA IYERE (MINOR)
FAVOUR AKOMU IYERE (MINOR)
PATRICK ONOSETALE IYERE (MINOR)
|
|
Applicants
|
|
And
|
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The Applicants, citizens of Nigeria, seek judicial
review of a decision of the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board [the RAD], dated May 23, 2017 [the Decision], which found
that they were neither convention refugees nor persons in need of protection
pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27,
because they had a viable Internal Flight Alternative [IFA] within Nigeria.
[2]
For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed.
The RAD did not err in finding that the Applicants had not met the onus on them
to establish that the proposed IFA was not reasonable.
I.
Background
[3]
The Applicants, Linda Omono Iyere [Ms. Iyere] and
her three children, recount that they fled Nigeria due to a fear of retribution
from the family and kinsmen of Mr. Iyere, their husband and father, and of their
community members, due to Mr. and Ms. Iyere’s refusal to have their children
undergo rituals traditionally performed by that community; in particular, Female
Genital Mutilation [FGM] for girls over the age of thirteen and symbolic scarring
for boys over the age of fifteen.
[4]
Ms. Iyere recounts that she and her husband
repeatedly told their relatives that they refused to have their children
undergo these rituals because of their Christian faith and Mr. Iyere’s own
negative experiences. Ms. Iyere claims that their relatives stated that, if
they continued to refuse, the children would be taken by force. The local
police were not responsive to their concerns. The family then relocated to the
city of Ibadan. In Ibadan, they encountered a relative who stated that he would
disclose their location. The family then went into hiding in a church in Lagos.
While in hiding, they were informed that Mr. Iyere’s kinsmen had come looking
for them there.
[5]
The Applicants left Nigeria and arrived in Canada
on September 9, 2016. Mr. Iyere remained in Nigeria and returned to Ibadan. Ms.
Iyere recounts that she was told that Mr. Iyere’s kinsmen came looking for the
children in Ibadan and that their community association members had been told to
look for them everywhere in Nigeria.
[6]
The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] found that
Ms. Iyere’s testimony was credible and that she had a subjective fear of
persecution in Nigeria, but that her fear was not objectively well-founded. The
RPD found that the Applicants had an IFA in Port Harcourt and that they could
relocate there safely and reasonably.
[7]
The RPD found that the family’s encounter with a
relative in Ibadan was a coincidence. The RPD further found that the encounter
in Lagos did not demonstrate the ability of their community association members
to locate them anywhere in Nigeria; rather, it was possible that Mr. Iyere’s mother
provided their location, given that she is supportive of the rituals.
[8]
The RPD considered Port Harcourt’s size, as a
city of 2 million inhabitants, and its distance from Lagos, Ibadan, and Mr.
Iyere’s home town, and found it to be a valid IFA. The RPD also found that the
Applicants would not be subject to undue hardship in relocating to Port Harcourt
because Ms. Iyere and her husband had successful careers and were reasonably
well-off.
[9]
The RPD concluded that the Applicants had not
established that they faced a serious possibility of persecution throughout
Nigeria or that they would face a danger of torture, a risk to life, or a risk
of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment throughout Nigeria.
II.
The Decision under Review
[10]
The RAD conducted the appeal of the RPD’s
decision guided by the principles set out in Huruglica v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, [2014] 4 FCR 811, and independently assessed
the evidence. The RAD dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision of the
RPD.
[11]
The RAD applied the two part test to determine
the reasonableness of the proposed IFA, citing Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706, [1991] FCJ No 1256 (QL) (FCA)
[Rasaratnam], and Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589, [1993] FCJ No 1172 (QL) (FCA) [Thirunavukkarasu].
[12]
The RAD agreed with the RPD that there was less
than a mere possibility that Ms. Iyere and her children would be found if they
relocated to Port Harcourt. The RAD considered, among other things, the overall
population of Nigeria (180 million) and of Port Harcourt (2 million), the
distance between Port Harcourt and the Applicants’ home, and the information in
the National Documentation Package [NDP] indicating that the communications
infrastructure in Nigeria is generally poor.
[13]
The RAD considered the prevalence of FGM in
Nigeria, with reference to the country condition documents. The RAD found that
Ms. Iyere’s fear that her daughter would be taken by force and subjected to FGM
was not well-founded in light of the more recent country condition documents
that established, among other things, that the practice is contrary to national
law and the law is being enforced. The RAD found nothing to support the Applicants’
contention that the children would be taken by force if their parents refuse to
have them undergo FGM.
[14]
The RAD considered the Applicants’ allegations
that the RPD’s analysis of the reasonableness of the proposed relocation was
too brief, lacked detail, and failed to address their personal circumstances
including Ms. Iyere’s mental health. However, the RAD ultimately agreed with
the RPD that, given the particular profile of Ms. Iyere and her husband, who both
had careers, had travelled and were well-off, relocation to Port Harcourt was
not unreasonable. The RAD concluded that the Applicants were not Convention
refugees or persons in need of protection, either individually or collectively.
III.
The Issues
[15]
The only issue is whether the RAD erred in
finding that the IFA is reasonable, as this was the determinative finding of both
the RPD and the RAD.
IV.
The Standard of Review
[16]
The determination of the RAD regarding an IFA
analysis is reviewed on the standard of reasonableness: Ugbekile v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1397 at paras 12-14, 275 ACWS (3d)
360.
[17]
Where the reasonableness standard applies, the
Court considers “the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” and
“whether the decision falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”:
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190.
V.
The Applicants’ Submissions
[18]
The Applicants submit that the RAD erred in its
application of the two part test to determine the reasonableness of an IFA as
established in Rasaratnam. The Applicants submit that the RAD erred both
in its analysis of the whether there was a serious risk of persecution
throughout the country and in its analysis of whether the proposed IFA was
reasonable in their personal circumstances.
[19]
With respect to the first part of the test, the Applicants
submit that the RAD disregarded Ms. Iyere’s testimony about the breadth of her
husband’s family’s network and how they could use this network and their
community association meetings to find her children. The Applicants submit that
the RPD and RAD found Ms. Iyere to be credible and should have accepted this testimony
without additional evidence.
[20]
The Applicants also argue that the RAD was
selective in its use of the NDP evidence relating to FGM. The Applicants note
that they provided evidence that FGM is prevalent throughout Nigeria, including
in the Port Harcourt region, and that the newspaper article submitted demonstrates
that the community can use force when parents do not consent to FGM.
[21]
With respect to the second part of the test, the
Applicants submit that the RAD made factual errors which demonstrate that the
RAD did not fully analyze their particular circumstances. For example, the RAD inaccurately
stated that Ms. Iyere had a post-secondary education and that she claimed not
to speak the Esan/Ishan language.
[22]
The Applicants also argue that the RAD erred in
rejecting Ms. Iyere’s psychotherapist’s report, which noted the risks to her
mental health, a relevant personal circumstance.
[23]
In addition, the Applicants submit that the RAD
did not consider their risk of kidnapping in Port Harcourt. They now argue that
they would be more visible as strangers in Port Harcourt and more vulnerable to
kidnapping given their wealth.
VI.
The Respondent’s Submissions
[24]
The Respondent submits that the RAD applied the correct
two part test and its finding is reasonable.
[25]
The RAD did not ignore the Applicants’ fear that
Mr. Iyere’s family, community members, or kinsmen would find them in Port
Harcourt but, rather, found that there was little objective evidence regarding
the size, reach, and power of this community and that, given the size and
location of Port Harcourt combined with the poor communications infrastructure
in Nigeria, this fear was unlikely to materialize.
[26]
The Respondent notes that the RAD, like the RPD,
did not make any negative credibility findings, but rather found that the
evidence was not sufficient or probative. The Respondent further notes the
distinction between the Applicants’ subjective fear, which the RAD accepted, and
whether it is well-founded, which requires objective evidence.
[27]
The Respondent acknowledges that the RAD erred
in stating Ms. Iyere’s level of education and language spoken, but submits that
this does not impact the reasonableness of the decision. The evidence revealed
that Ms. Iyere had a clothes-trading and tailoring business, her husband was an
engineer, the family had travelled outside Nigeria, and they were considered to
be well-off.
[28]
The Respondent further submits that the RAD did
not err in its treatment of the psychotherapist’s report. The Respondent points
out that the Applicants did not raise any specific errors on the part of the
RPD regarding its treatment of the report in their appeal to the RAD. The Respondent
also notes that the report does not address the impact on Ms. Iyere’s mental
health in the proposed IFA location. Moreover, there is no evidence that Ms.
Iyere’s general anxiety and depression would rise to the level of being a
significant hardship such that the IFA is unreasonable.
[29]
With respect to the claimed risk of kidnapping,
the Respondent submits that the Applicants did not provide sufficient evidence of
conditions that would jeopardize their lives or safety in the proposed IFA, as
required by Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2001] FCR 164 at para 15, 266 NR 380 (FCA) [Ranganathan].
VII.
Did the RAD err in finding that the proposed IFA
is reasonable?
A.
The jurisprudence
[30]
The two part test for an IFA was set out in Thirunavukkarasu
and reflects the principles previously established in Rasaratnam. First,
the decision-maker must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there
is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the proposed IFA.
Second, the conditions in the proposed IFA must be such that it would not be
unreasonable, upon consideration of all the circumstances, including the personal
circumstances of the claimant(s), for the claimant(s) to seek refuge there.
[31]
As noted in Thirunavukkarasu at paragraph
14:
[14] An IFA cannot be speculative or
theoretical only; it must be a realistic, attainable option. Essentially, this
means that the alternative place of safety must be realistically accessible to
the claimant. Any barriers to getting there should be reasonably surmountable.
The claimant cannot be required to encounter great physical danger or to
undergo undue hardship in travelling there or in staying there. For example,
claimants should not be required to cross battle lines where fighting is going
on at great risk to their lives in order to reach a place of safety. Similarly,
claimants should not be compelled to hide out in an isolated region of their
country, like a cave in the mountains, or in a desert or a jungle, if those are
the only areas of internal safety available. But neither is it enough for
refugee claimants to say that they do not like the weather in a safe area, or
that they have no friends or relatives there, or that they may not be able to
find suitable work there. If it is objectively reasonable in these latter
cases to live in these places, without fear of persecution, then IFA exists and
the claimant is not a refugee.
[Emphasis added]
[32]
There is a high onus on a refugee claimant to
demonstrate that a proposed IFA is unreasonable: Ranganathan at para 15.
In Ranganathan, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the passage in Thirunavukkarasu
set out above, adding at paragraphs 15-17 the rationale for the high
threshold:
[15] We read the decision of Linden
J.A. for this Court as setting up a very high threshold for the
unreasonableness test. It requires nothing less than the existence of
conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in
travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires
actual and concrete evidence of such conditions. The absence of relatives in a
safe place, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other factors, can only
amount to such condition if it meets that threshold, that is to say if it
establishes that, as a result, a claimant's life or safety would be
jeopardized. This is in sharp contrast with undue hardship resulting from loss
of employment, loss of status, reduction in quality of life, loss of
aspirations, loss of beloved ones and frustration of one's wishes and
expectations.
[16] There are at least two reasons why
it is important not to lower that threshold. First, as this Court said in Thirunavukkarasu,
the definition of refugee under the Convention “requires claimants to be unable
or unwilling by reason of fear of persecution to claim the protection of their
home country in any part of that country”. Put another way, what makes a person
a refugee under the Convention is his fear of persecution by his home country
in any part of that country. To expand and lower the standard for assessing
reasonableness of the IFA is to fundamentally denature the definition of
refugee: one becomes a refugee who has no fear of persecution and who would be
better off in Canada physically, economically and emotionally than in a safe
place in his own country.
[17] Second, it creates confusion by
blurring the distinction between refugee claims and humanitarian and
compassionate applications. These are two procedures governed by different
objectives and considerations […]
[33]
In Argote v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2009 FC 128 at para 12, [2009] FCJ No 153 (QL), the Court
reiterated that the onus is on an applicant to establish with objective
evidence that the relocation to the IFA is unreasonable, noting at paragraph
12:
[…] Whether the relocation to the IFA is
unreasonable is an objective test and the onus is on the applicants to
establish on objective evidence that the relocation to the IFA is unreasonable.
It is not for the Board to prove that it is reasonable, as the applicants
suggest. [...]
[34]
In Valasquez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2010 FC 1201, [2010] FCJ No 1496 (QL), relied on by the
Applicants, Justice O’Reilly summarized the approach and principles from the
jurisprudence at paragraph 15:
[15] The concept of an IFA is an
inherent part of the Convention refugee definition because a claimant must be a
refugee from a country, not from a particular region of a country (Rasaratnam
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706 at para
6). Once an IFA has been proposed by the Board, it must consider the viability
of the IFA according to the disjunctive two part test set out in Rasaratnam.
The claimant bears the onus and must demonstrate that the IFA does not exist or
is unreasonable in the circumstances. That is, the claimant must persuade
the Board on a balance of probabilities either that there is a serious
possibility that he or she will be persecuted in the location proposed by the
Board as an IFA, or that it would be unreasonable to seek refugee in the
proposed IFA given his or her particular circumstances.
[Emphasis added]
[35]
As highlighted in Ranganathan and
subsequent jurisprudence, a refugee claimant cannot seek the refugee protection
of another country where there is a place within their own country - even if it
may not be ideal or their personal preference - which offers safety from the
risk they claim and is not unreasonable in all the circumstances. The refugee
claimant bears the onus of establishing with objective evidence that the IFA is
unreasonable; i.e., that there is a serious possibility of the claimant being
persecuted in the proposed IFA or that the conditions in the proposed IFA make
it unreasonable, taking into consideration all the circumstances, including
their personal circumstances, for them to relocate to the proposed IFA. The
high threshold set in Ranganathan (“nothing less
than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of
a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area”)
applies to both parts of the test.
B.
The RAD did not err in finding that the IFA is
reasonable
[36]
The RAD applied the correct test and did not err
in finding that the Applicants had not met the onus on them to establish on a balance
of probabilities that the IFA in Port Harcourt is not reasonable.
[37]
With respect to the first part of the test, the
RAD’s analysis of whether the family was at a serious risk of persecution
throughout the country focused on whether it was likely they would be found in
the proposed IFA. At the RPD hearing, Ms. Iyere estimated the size of their community
(i.e., those that would be tracking them down), saying that there were “more than about 10 thousand because it is a big community,”
and made general statements that the community is “all
over the place.” However, Ms. Iyere did not provide any objective evidence
to establish the reach or authority of Mr. Iyere’s family or kinsmen or how they
could use their community association meetings and members to find the
Applicants. Contrary to the Applicants’ submissions, the fact that their
testimony was found to be credible with respect to their fear does not
alleviate the need to provide sufficient objective evidence. As noted in Figueroa
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2016 FC 521 at paragraph
54, 266 ACWS (3d) 435:
[54] In this matter the Applicants were
found to be credible, however, this does not overcome the need for objective
evidence that the proposed IFA is not viable. In Alvarez, the applicants
were also found to be credible, but the Court said:
This sets a very high threshold for
the unreasonableness test, as Létourneau J.A. observed in Ranganathan at
paragraph 15: “It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which
would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily
relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete
evidence of such conditions.” To accept anything less would be to allow persons
to seek protection in Canada simply because they would be better off
physically, economically and emotionally here than in a safe place in their own
country: Ranganathan, at paragraph 16.
[38]
The RAD reasonably found that the encounters
in Ibadan and Lagos were coincidental and/or due to information provided by Mr.
Iyere’s mother and that these encounters did not establish that the Applicants’
community had the capacity to locate them throughout Nigeria.
[39]
The RAD reasonably concluded, based on the geographic
factors and the country condition documents and the other evidence provided, that
there was less than a mere possibility of the Applicants being found in Port
Harcourt and facing the risks they claimed.
[40]
The RAD acknowledged that the country condition
documents reveal that FGM remains prevalent throughout Nigeria, including the Port
Harcourt region. However, the RAD found that the documents relied on by the
Applicants did not demonstrate that girls would be taken by force for FGM if both
of their parents opposed the practice. The RAD reasonably gave little weight to
the newspaper article submitted by the Applicants, which it found to be more of
an opinion piece than objective reporting and which referred to practices in
another state. Moreover, the article did not support the Applicants’ submission
that children are forced to undergo rituals against their parents’ wishes.
[41]
The Applicants raised additional arguments at
the hearing of the judicial review, which were not made to the RAD, including
that the poor communications infrastructure in Nigeria would pose other risks
because the Applicants would not be able to contact the police if needed and
that because Ms. Iyere works in the public as a tailor and clothes-trader, it
is more probable that people from her community will find her. The RPD and RAD
were not provided with any evidence by the Applicants which would have objectively
supported these new submissions or those previously made, that the IFA in Port
Harcourt was unreasonable because they would remain at risk, because their
family is so powerful that they will use other means to find them, or that they
face a higher risk of kidnapping in Port Harcourt.
[42]
With respect to the second prong of the test,
which focuses on whether relocation to the proposed IFA would be reasonable in all
the circumstances, including the personal circumstances of the Applicants, the
same high threshold applies. The onus is on the Applicants to provide objective
evidence to establish that the IFA is not reasonable for them.
[43]
As the Respondent notes, the factual errors made
by the RAD regarding Ms. Iyere’s education and language spoken are not material
to its assessment of the IFA. The RAD’s reference to Ms. Iyere’s post-secondary
education was made in relation to whether it would be unreasonable for the
family to relocate to Port Harcourt. Although the RAD misstated Ms. Iyere’s
level of education, the RAD’s analysis of Ms. Iyere’s career as a tailor and clothes-trader,
her husband’s career as an engineer, and the couple’s financial status were
factually accurate. The RAD’s analysis demonstrates that it considered the family’s
personal circumstances.
[44]
With respect to the psychotherapist’s report
regarding Ms. Iyere, the Applicants did not make submissions to the RAD about
how the RPD erred in its treatment of this evidence. Nonetheless, the RAD
considered the report, albeit briefly.
[45]
The RAD found that the psychotherapist’s opinion
with respect to Ms. Iyere returning to Nigeria overstepped the
psychotherapist’s jurisdiction and commented that the Report should be a
summary of Ms. Iyere’s condition and not opinions beyond the jurisdiction of
the psychotherapist.
[46]
In my view, this is not an entirely accurate or fair
statement of the contents or purpose of the psychotherapist’s report. The
Report did summarize Ms. Iyere’s condition as of November, 2016. However, it
is the role of the RAD to attach the appropriate weight to this and other
evidence. The RAD did not err in its treatment of the report or in its conclusion
that the IFA was reasonable in all the circumstances.
[47]
The jurisprudence has cautioned that the
recounting of events to a psychologist or a psychiatrist does not make these
events more credible and that an expert report cannot confirm allegations made
by a claimant. For example, in Rokni v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1995] FCJ No 182 (QL), 53 ACWS (3d) 371 (FCTD), and Danailov
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 1019 (QL),
44 ACWS (3d) 766 (FCTD), the Court noted that opinion evidence is only as valid
as the truth of the facts upon which it is based. The same caution was noted by
Justice Phelan in Saha v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2009 FC 304 at para 16, 176 ACWS (3d) 499: “It is
within the RPD’s mandate to discount psychological evidence when the doctor
merely regurgitates what the patient says are the reasons for his stress and
then reaches a medical conclusion that the patient suffers stress because of
those reasons.”
[48]
In Czesak v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2013 FC 1149 at paragraphs 37-40, 235 ACWS (3d) 1054,
Justice Annis noted concerns about psychological reports that advocate in the
guise of an opinion and “propose to settle important
issues to be decided by the tribunal.” Justice Annis found that in such
cases, without some way to probe the opinion, little weight should be attached
to it.
[49]
The RAD is entitled to scrutinize psychological
reports and discount opinions on the issues that it or the RPD, as the decision-maker,
should make and to consider that the account provided by a refugee claimant to
their psychologist or psychiatrist is their own account.
[50]
In the present case, the psychotherapist’s report
was not offered to buttress the credibility of the Applicants’ allegations, but
to describe Ms. Iyere’s mental health to support the Applicants’ argument that
this personal circumstance is relevant to the second prong of the assessment of
the IFA.
[51]
The psychotherapist’s report did not support
this argument. The Report is dated November 28, 2016, shortly after Ms. Iyere
arrived in Canada. The Report did not focus on the IFA because it had not been
proposed at that time. The psychotherapist describes Ms. Iyere’s condition and
symptoms based on the tests and interview conducted. The Report notes that she
has anxiety and depression and that she reports sleeplessness and other
cognitive impacts due to worrying about her children. In the conclusion, under
the title “Clinical Impressions,” the psychotherapist states:
Based on my observations and evaluations
Mrs. Iyere is exhibiting symptoms consistent with generalized anxiety disorder
and major depressive disorder. I believe that Mrs. Iyere’s return to Nigeria
could cause her mental and physical stress symptoms to increase considerably,
and her psychological and emotional state to deteriorate.
[52]
The psychotherapist’s opinion does not overstep
the role of the psychotherapist as a mental health professional. As the decision-maker,
it is the role of the RAD to consider the Report and determine the extent to
which it is relevant to the reasonableness of the proposed IFA.
[53]
In Olalere v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2017 FC 385, 279 ACWS (3d) 615, Justice Russell found
that a proposed IFA was not reasonable based on the RAD’s failure to consider
the psychological evidence in assessing the reasonableness of the IFA.
[54]
Justice Russell noted at paragraph 52 that the
preponderance of the jurisprudence of this Court is that psychological evidence
must be considered in assessing whether the IFA is reasonable. He added the
following at paragraph 54:
54 However, in addition to Okafor,
above, which says that “psychological evidence is central to the question of
whether the IFA is reasonable and cannot be disregarded,” Justice Brown found
in Asif v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1323 at para 33
[Asif] that the determinative issue in the IFA analysis was dependent on
the assessment of the psychologist report, indicating that psychologist reports
are relevant in an IFA analysis. Justice Brown ultimately dismissed the
application because the RAD was reasonable in finding various issues with the
report including that it had: crossed the line separating expert opinion from
advocacy; made findings of credibility that should have been reserved for the
panel; made very serious conclusions regarding the applicant’s psychological
health after only one interview; and spoke to the lack of available resources
in Pakistan without providing any evidence. However, in the present case, the
RAD fails to engage the report at all, let alone provide reasonable reasons for
its dismissal. Asif was also decided after Okechukwu and thus
also after Kanthasamy.
[55]
Justice Russell also acknowledged that the jurisprudence
has noted the need for caution in assessing psychological reports which are
based on accounts provided by an applicant, but found, on the facts of the case
before him, that the error of the RAD was in failing to deal with the
psychologist’s report.
[56]
In the present case, the RAD did not fail to deal
with the psychotherapist’s report, despite the lack of submissions made by the
Applicants on this issue. Rather, the RAD quickly concluded that the Report was
not sufficient to establish that the proposed IFA was unreasonable.
[57]
The jurisprudence has established that for an
IFA to be found to be unreasonable there must be actual and concrete evidence
of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of the claimant (see Ranganathan
at para 15). The psychotherapist’s report does not address the extent to which
Ms. Iyere’s anxiety and depression would worsen if relocated to Port Harcourt.
This was not even an issue at the time the Report was prepared. The Report more
generally spoke of the impact on Ms. Iyere’s if returned to Nigeria, due to her
worry about her children being subjected to FGM and other rituals.
[58]
With respect to the fear of being kidnapped, the
RAD reasonably concluded that the Applicants had not provided clear and
concrete evidence of conditions which would jeopardize their life and safety as
required by Ranganathan. The country condition documents about the
prevalence of kidnappings in the Niger Delta, including Port Harcourt, do not
constitute concrete evidence. Their assertion at the hearing that they would
stand out in Port Harcourt as new arrivals and be targets for kidnapping is unsupported
by any evidence. Moreover, the risk of kidnapping they now assert is not
different from their past circumstances, given that they claim that it is their
wealth which makes them vulnerable.
Email this Content