Docket: A-190-16
Citation:
2017 FCA 114
|
CORAM:
|
SCOTT J.A.
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
WOODS J.A.
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
PAUL RITCHIE
|
|
Appellant
|
|
and
|
|
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
|
|
Respondent
|
REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
SCOTT J.A.
[1]
Mr. Paul Ritchie (the appellant) is appealing
from a Federal Court decision rendered by McDonald J. on May 11, 2016 (2016 FC
527) dismissing his application for judicial review against a decision of the
Canadian Human Rights Commission (the CHRC) dated March 10, 2015. The CHRC
dismissed the appellant’s human rights complaint against the respondent, the Canadian
Armed Forces (the CF), and declined to refer it to the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal (the Tribunal) on the basis that an inquiry into the complaint was not
warranted pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 (the Act).
[2]
The hearing of this appeal was set for March 8,
2017. On February 23, 2017, the respondent wrote to this Court seeking
directions with respect to its intention to file a second confidentiality
motion. By Order dated December 20, 2016, Webb J.A. of this Court had dismissed
a motion for a confidentiality order on the ground that, absent an identical
order from the Federal Court protecting the same documents, the respondent’s
motion was premature. Consequently, the respondent sought, and obtained, a Confidentiality
Order from the Federal Court. By Order dated February 17, 2017, Gagné J.
granted the relief sought and issued an Order protecting 29 documents attached
as individually numbered tabs to exhibit “A” of the confidential affidavit of
Major Philip Nicholson found in Federal Court of Appeal File No. A-190-16. On
February 22, 2017, the Attorney General’s office in Halifax and the Federal
Court Registry received an anonymous letter threatening the digital release of
the 29 documents protected by the Confidentiality Order issued by the Federal
Court.
[3]
As a result of the request for directions, this Court
held a telephone conference with both parties and issued a Direction to the
effect that the respondent’s motion for a confidentiality order would be addressed
as part of the hearing on the merits of this appeal set for March 8, 2017. On
March 7, 2017, the appellant sent an email to this Court and the respondent,
amongst other recipients, indicating that he would not participate in the
hearing set for the next day because he understood that the time set aside for
the hearing of March 8, would be devoted exclusively to the motion for a
confidentiality order rather than the hearing of the merits of his appeal. This
Court then issued a second Direction to dispel any misunderstanding and reiterated
that it intended to examine the motion for a confidentiality order as part of
the hearing of the appeal on the merits, which was set for the next day, on
March 8, 2017.
[4]
On March 8, 2017, the appellant failed to
appear. The Court suspended the hearing and attempts were made to reach the
appellant, but without success. As is the practice in such circumstances (Forner
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 136, [2016] F.C.J. No. 450 (QL)), the
Court decided that this appeal would be examined on the basis of the written
submissions filed by the parties and took the matter under reserve, including
the appellant’s motion to introduce fresh evidence under Rule 351 of the Federal
Court Rules S.O.R./98-106 (the Rules) and the respondent’s motion for a
confidentiality order pursuant to Rules 151 and 152 of the Rules.
I.
Summary of Facts
A.
The allegations of differential treatment
[5]
The appellant served in the CF between August
22, 2008, and August 22, 2012, under the Royal Canadian Navy. He submits that,
during his four years of service, he was discriminated against and harassed on
several occasions on account of his homosexuality, mainly in the context of his
training at the Naval Engineering School in Halifax, Nova Scotia. More
specifically, he recounts the following events: i) bigoted remarks and unpunished
“gay bashing” incidents; ii) an instance when he
was referred to as a “faggot” by a Commanding
Officer; iii) disparities in training support and assessments; iv) patterns of
differential treatment and duty assignments and; v) number of denials of opportunities
in the course of his military service, and incorrect course evaluations.
B.
The investigation and the decision of the CHRC
[6]
The appellant filed a complaint with the CHRC on
January 23, 2012, on the ground that he had been discriminated against by the
CF on the basis of his sexual orientation. Because of a pending grievance with
the CF on a related matter, the CHRC initially decided not to address his
complaint. Upon the appellant’s request to do so, after the grievance was
granted in part, the complaint was reactivated and was reassigned to an
investigator in September 2014.
[7]
After reviewing the evidence provided by both
parties, the investigator interviewed the appellant four times, and conducted
further interviews with nine members of the CF, including officers, instructors
and a peer from his training course. After a two-month-long investigation, the
investigator issued a report on December 11, 2014, recommending that the CHRC
dismiss the complaint. The investigator concluded that there were reasonable
explanations for allegations of differential treatment and that incidents of
alleged discrimination and harassment were “not very
serious” and remained isolated events that did not warrant further
inquiry by the Tribunal.
[8]
The CHRC forwarded the report to both parties,
specifying that each party could respond with written submissions limited to
ten pages. The CF provided its submissions endorsing the investigator’s
findings and recommendation, while the appellant provided a 7-page response,
disagreeing with the report on several issues. When invited to submit replies, the
CF did so, the appellant did not.
[9]
Following its analysis of the parties’
submissions, the evidence and the report, the CHRC informed the appellant that
his complaint would not be referred to the Tribunal for further inquiry.
C.
The decision under appeal—the Federal Court Judgment
[10]
The appellant filed an application for judicial
review in the Federal Court, challenging the decision of the CHRC not to refer
his complaint to the Tribunal. The Judge dismissed the application for judicial
review, ruling that the appellant had failed to show a breach of procedural
fairness or unreasonable findings.
[11]
The Judge concluded that the investigator’s
findings were reasonable, as they were supported by the evidence and an
adequate analysis. Although the investigation and the report were not flawless,
the Judge concluded that the decision of the CHRC to endorse the investigator’s
recommendation was entitled to a broad margin of appreciation given the factual
and policy-based nature of the mandate of the CHRC to determine whether or not
a complaint should be referred to the Tribunal for further inquiry.
[12]
The Judge also concluded that there had been no
breach of the appellant’s procedural rights on the part of the CHRC. She held
that the ten-page limit imposed by the CHRC for written submissions was not unfair.
Secondly, and with respect to the appellant’s argument that he had been
prejudiced by not having personally received a copy of the CF’s submissions and
replies, the Judge determined that it was appropriate for the CHRC to send the
CF’s submissions to the attorney who was presumed to represent the appellant
and to assume that he would forward those submissions to the appellant. The
appellant knew the case he had to meet and had a fair opportunity to respond to
the issues before the CHRC rendered its final decision. Moreover, the Judge
also rejected the appellant’s claim that the investigator was biased in the
conduct of her investigation.
[13]
The appellant, in the course of the hearing
before the Judge, referred to unsupported factual assertions and exhibits. As
this evidence was not before the CHRC when it analyzed his complaint and was
not relevant to his submissions before the Federal Court, the Judge rejected the
inclusion of these documents.
II.
Issues
[14]
This appeal raises three issues:
i)
Should this Court allow the appellant to
introduce fresh evidence?
ii) Did the Judge err in finding the decision of the CHRC to be
reasonable?
iii) Did the Judge err in finding that the CHRC had not violated the appellant’s
procedural rights?
III.
Standard of Review
[15]
On appeal from a Federal Court decision in a
judicial review proceeding, this Court must determine whether the judge of
first instance chose the appropriate standard of review and whether it was
applied correctly (Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 at paragraphs 45–47). This
Court must effectively step into the shoes of the applications judge and direct
its attention to the underlying decision, in this case, the decision of the
CHRC.
[16]
I am of the view that the Judge did not err by
adopting and applying the standard of reasonableness to the decision of the CHRC
to dismiss the appellant’s complaint, and the standard of correctness as for
the issues of procedural fairness raised by the appellant (Gandhi c. Canada
(Procureur général), 2017 CAF 26 at paragraph 10 [Gandhi]).
IV.
Positions of the parties
A.
The Appellant
(1)
The introduction of fresh evidence
[17]
The appellant submits that he was never
represented by counsel during the CHRC proceedings. He seeks to introduce in
evidence a chain of emails he exchanged with the respondent’s counsel, arguing
that they would show that he was not represented by counsel during the
proceedings before the CHRC. He submits that this evidence would support his allegation
of perjury against the respondent’s counsel and prove factual errors in the
Judge’s decision. A previous order by Stratas J.A. dated July 6, 2016, referred
the issue of whether this new evidence should be accepted to this panel.
(2)
The decision of the CHRC was unreasonable
[18]
The appellant submits that the decision of the
CHRC was unreasonable since it relied on a report that shows a fundamentally
flawed investigation. According to the appellant, the investigator made
numerous factual errors in her analysis of his complaint, namely disregarding
important aspects of his complaint, such as his grievance with the CF, and did not
crosscheck witness statements with the evidence. He submits that these mistakes
reveal the fundamental imperfections of the investigation. Therefore, the
CHRC’s reliance on the investigator’s report led it to render an unreasonable
decision. The appellant takes issue with the Judge’s conclusion that he was not
owed a perfect investigation; he submits that such a conclusion results in
denying him and the Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual and Queer community
(the LGTBQ) of the full protection they are entitled to under the Act and,
consequently, he submits it is contrary to s.15 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (the Charter).
(3)
The appellant’s procedural rights
[19]
The appellant submits that his procedural rights
were violated as the investigator failed to conduct a thorough and impartial
investigation of his complaint. In addition, he submits that a breach of
procedural fairness is also shown by the documented flaws of the investigation.
In that respect, he points to: i) the lack of adequate opportunity to respond
to the CHRC’s findings, namely the 10-page limit imposed on his written
response to the investigation report; ii) the investigator’s inability to
adequately examine his complaint due to her travels abroad in the course of her
investigation; iii) the investigator’s partiality given her alleged ill motives
during what he calls a restrictive investigation and the report’s conclusion
that the CHRC did not have to determine whether he had been actually
discriminated against; and iv) the investigator’s allegedly inadequate
qualifications to conduct an investigation involving CF and LGBTQ human rights
matters. Moreover, he questions the Judge’s knowledge and expertise to review
the decision of the CHRC and argues that she used a stereotype when he was
referred to as a “homosexual” in her judgment.
[20]
The appellant also submits that email exchanges
between the investigator and a military official over unsecured public email
servers jeopardized the confidentiality of his personal information and
constitute a serious breach of his privacy rights. He alleges that the respondent’s
counsel was disingenuous and committed perjury when she mentioned that he had
been represented by counsel. He asserts that the respondent’s counsel
intentionally caused the public disclosure of his personal information when it
was filed into the Court’s registry under Rule 318 of the Rules, instead of
redacting the personal information he had previously sought through
confidential access to information requests.
B.
The Respondent
[21]
The respondent takes the position that this
Court should dismiss this appeal.
(1)
The fresh evidence
[22]
The respondent submits that the appellant failed
to meet his onus with respect to the admission of fresh evidence, given that
the evidence that he seeks to adduce is irrelevant to any issue on appeal or to
the appeal’s outcome, reflects unsupported allegations and is inadmissible in a
judicial review proceeding.
(2)
The decision of the CHRC was reasonable
[23]
The respondent argues that the CHRC exercised
its discretion in a reasonable manner when it declined to refer the complaint
for further inquiry. In the absence of fundamental flaws in the investigation
and its subsequent report, deference is owed to the CHRC’s determination, given
its policy-based mandate and the factual context of this case. It submits that,
although the investigator’s report was not flawless, reasonableness is the
applicable standard. That standard does not require absolute perfection in
relation to every step of the CHRC’s investigation, as a neutral and thorough
analysis of the complaint suffices.
(3)
There was no breach of procedural fairness
[24]
The respondent emphasizes that the CHRC’s
investigation was neutral and thorough, and the appellant was aware of the case
he had to meet, having been informed and given the opportunity to respond on
two occasions to the investigation report and to the respondent’s submissions.
The respondent submits that allegations of improper conduct against the Federal
Court Judge, the respondent and its counsel, are unsupported by the evidence;
they are vexatious and solely reflect the appellant’s personal opinion. In the
respondent’s view, there is no evidence supporting the appellant’s allegations
that the investigator was biased or lacked expertise to conduct her
investigation, as these are unsupported personal attacks.
[25]
Moreover, the respondent asks this Court to
dismiss the appellant’s allegations pertaining to an alleged breach of privacy
as that issue is not dispositive of this case, was not raised before the CHRC
and the Federal Court, and should not be entertained now by this Court. It is
the respondent’s view that in the course of his complaint, the appellant consented
to the disclosure of his personal information to concerned parties.
V.
Analysis
A.
Should this Court consider the fresh evidence that
the appellant wants to introduce pursuant to Rule 351 of the Federal Courts
Rules?
[26]
The appellant seeks to introduce a chain of
emails exchanged with the respondent’s counsel as new evidence in an attempt to
demonstrate that the respondent’s counsel committed perjury by stating that he
was represented by counsel. He submits that it would show that he did not
retain counsel during the CHRC’s proceedings, and that the Judge imported these
factual errors into her judgment.
[27]
Under Rule 351 of the Rules, this Court can
grant leave to introduce fresh evidence on appeal only in limited
circumstances. To meet this onus, the appellant must demonstrate that the new
evidence “could not have been discovered earlier through
reasonable diligence, is practically conclusive of an issue on appeal and, of
course, is credible.” (Gap Adventures Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 2012 FCA
101, 433 N.R. 267 at paragraphs 6-11; Assessor for Seabird Island Indian
Band v. BC Tel, 2002 FCA 288, [2003] 1 F.C.R. 475 at paragraph 28; Amchem
Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1992] S.C.J.
No. 110 (QL), 192 N.R. 390).
[28]
The evidence the appellant seeks to introduce
has no bearing on the outcome of this case, neither as for the issue of reasonableness
of the decision nor as for procedural fairness. Since the fresh evidence is not
practically conclusive for any issue under appeal, the appellant has not met
the onus to introduce new evidence before this Court (Canada (Attorney
General) v. Baltruweit, 2003 FCA 324 at paragraph 10).
[29]
Therefore, that evidence will not be accepted.
B.
Did the Judge err in finding the decision of the
CHRC to be reasonable?
(1)
The alleged errors in the investigation report
are not determinative
[30]
I must reject the appellant’s submission that
the decision of the CHRC is unreasonable. Incorrect or vague facts, which are
inconsequential to a determination of whether discriminatory acts actually
occurred, cannot, on their own, result in a finding that a decision is
unreasonable (Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), 1994 CanLII
3463 (FC), [1994] 2 F.C. 574 (T.D.), affirmed (1996), 205 N.R. 383 (F.C.A.); Phipps
v. Canada Post Corporation, 2016 FCA 117, 484 N.R. 7 at paragraph 7 [Phipps]).
Absent the demonstration that a decision under review was essentially based on
incorrect facts, there is no reviewable error warranting this Court’s
intervention. As this Court has previously stated in Tahmourpour v. Canada
(Solicitor General), 2005 FCA 113, 332 N.R. 60 [Tahmourpour], minor
imperfections in an investigation and its report are not sufficient grounds to
overturn a decision:
[39] Any judicial review of the Commission’s
procedure must recognize that the agency is master of its own process and must
be afforded considerable latitude in the way that it conducts its
investigations. An investigation into a human rights complaint cannot be held
to a standard of perfection; it is not required to turn every stone. The Commission’s
resources are limited and its case load is heavy. It must therefore balance the
interests of complainants in the fullest possible investigation and the demands
of administrative efficacy: see, for example, Slattery v. Canada (Human
Rights Commission) at para. 55; Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual
Report for 2001 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services,
2002), p. 33.
[31]
The investigator was required to conduct a
thorough and neutral investigation. Absolute perfection is not the standard.
The investigator’s efforts in assessing the appellant’s complaint met this
standard and the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the investigator’s
impartiality and methodology are questionable.
[32]
I accept that the investigation report contains
factual mistakes, but these are not material and they did not lead to
fundamentally flawed conclusions. For instance, the report mistakenly states
that the appellant was posted in British Columbia for training (Appeal Book,
Vol. 2 p. 510, Investigation Report p. 4), when he was in fact based in Halifax.
[33]
As a second example of an alleged error, the
appellant’s submission that the investigator erred in finding that he was “released from service at his own request in 2012” (ibidem).
According to the appellant, he was released from the CF because of his
homosexuality. This could be a significant error if the record supported such a
finding. The evidence of record, however, tells a different story.
[34]
The record reveals that the appellant was, in
fact, released at the end of his mandatory service period in 2012. The
documents of record show that, in June 2011, the appellant submitted a request
for a voluntary release from the CF, signalling a wish to terminate his
service. Shortly thereafter, on July 27, 2011, the appellant attempted to
withdraw that request, but he was nonetheless eventually released as per his
initial request for a voluntary release.
[35]
Given that the appellant had sought to leave the
CF of his own initiative a year earlier, it can reasonably be asserted that the
CF’s decision to release him at the expiration of his mandatory service period relates
not to discrimination, but to his own earlier request to terminate his service.
Consequently, when read in this context, the investigator’s statement that the
appellant was released in 2012 at “his own request”
does not constitute a factual error per se.
[36]
Other alleged errors are summarized in paragraph
32 of the Judge’s decision. In my view, these factual errors are not
fundamental errors that make the decision of the CHRC unreasonable, as the
allegedly erroneous factual findings cannot affect the outcome of the decision
of the CHRC decision even if the facts were proven to be incorrect.
[37]
In any event, the pleading process afforded the
appellant an opportunity to raise and eventually correct these alleged factual
errors before the CHRC made its final determination. The investigation report
is but one element of the record. The submissions and additional evidence of
the parties were also considered by the CHRC when it made its final
determination. Ultimately, the CHRC took into account the reasonable
explanations provided by the CF regarding the various allegations of harassment
and discrimination, exercised its discretion and followed the investigator’s
recommendation not to refer the complaint for further inquiry before the Tribunal.
Deference must be afforded to the CHRC in the absence of tangible evidence
pointing towards an unreasonable outcome (Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2005 FCA 404, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 392 at paragraph 38 [Sketchley]).
(2)
The reliance of the CHRC on the investigation
report was reasonable
[38]
In the early stages of a complaint, the investigative
role of the CHRC is not to determine whether discrimination has occurred.
Rather, its role upon assigning a complaint to an investigator is to determine
if further inquiry by the Tribunal is called for. This is a highly fact-and
policy-driven process. A broad margin of appreciation and a high degree of
deference must be afforded to the CHRC when this kind of decision is reviewed (Bergeron
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 160, [2015] F.C.J. No 834 (QL) at
paragraph 45; Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities)
v. Jagjit Singh Farwaha, 2014 FCA 56, 455 N.R. 157 at paragraphs 90–99; Sketchley).
[39]
Deference must be afforded to the CHRC when it
assesses whether the probative value of the evidence gathered by the
investigator and whether the submissions of the parties warrant further inquiry
before the Tribunal (Colwell v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 5,
387 N.R. 183 at paragraph 14 [Colwell]). In contradistinction to what
happened in Tahmourpour at paragraph 40, a case cited by the appellant, the
investigator did not fail to investigate “obviously
crucial evidence”. On the contrary, the investigator’s findings reflect
a thorough and detailed analysis. When considering the investigator’s report as
a whole, there is no justification for this Court to revisit the Judge’s
determinations, as the record supports the reasons and the outcome of the decision
of the CHRC (Colwell at paragraph 15).
[40]
Having carefully examined each of the
conclusions set out in the investigator’s 22-page report, I have not been able
to identify a single reviewable error. Reasonable explanations were provided by
the CF for each incident where discrimination was alleged by the appellant or as
to findings of differential treatment. According to the investigator, these
acts did not relate to the appellant’s sexual orientation or could not be
viewed as a pretext for discrimination. In other instances where harassing and
discriminatory acts were documented, the investigator found that these events
were not serious enough to warrant further inquiry and were isolated events
(see summary of findings: Appeal Book, Vol. 2 pp. 527–528, Investigation Report
pp. 21–22 at paragraphs 197–198).
[41]
The investigator’s recommendation was made in
the light of “all the circumstances of the complaint”
(Appeal Book, Vol. 2 p. 528, Investigation Report p. 22 at paragraph 203) and
reflects an overall consideration of potential patterns of discrimination or
harassment. Since it was not the role of the investigator to determine if there
had been actual instances of discrimination, but rather if further inquiry was
warranted, she was not required to determine, on the basis of a careful
application of a legal test, whether a prima facie case of
discrimination had been made out in view of the relevant case law of the
Tribunal. While each alleged incident was analyzed separately and treated as an
innocuous event, the investigator’s report summary and recommendation justify a
conclusion determining that, taken together, the overall effect of these
incidents did not reflect a pattern of discrimination and/or harassment.
[42]
The decision of the CHRC reflects a justifiable,
transparent and intelligible conclusion which is defensible in the light of the
applicable facts and law (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008]
1 S.C.R. 190 at paragraph 47). Moreover, it is not this Court’s role to reweigh
the probative value of the evidence or crosscheck witness statements with other
pieces of evidence as argued by the appellant. Rather, this Court must
determine whether the CHRC committed a reviewable error (Phipps, at
paragraph 7). Consequently, the decision of the CHRC to rely on the
investigation report and to decline to refer the appellant’s complaint to the
Tribunal for further inquiry was reasonable, as it fell within the possible and
acceptable outcomes.
C.
Did the Judge err in finding that the CHRC had
not violated the appellant’s procedural rights?
[43]
This Court very recently reiterated that it is
not a breach of procedural fairness for the CHRC to limit the written
submissions of a party to ten pages (Gandhi).
[44]
The law is well settled; an administrative
decision maker is the master of its own procedure (Baker v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R.
817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at paragraph 27; Sketchley at paragraph 119).
[45]
The appellant was afforded two opportunities to
present his submissions, once after the investigator released her report and a
second time, during the pleading phase. He opted to only provide submissions on
the first of these occasions. Furthermore, he submitted a 7-page response, even
though he was entitled to a total of 10 pages. These choices made by the
appellant contradict his assertion that the page restriction limited his
ability to respond to the report, as he failed to make full use of the 10-page
limit and respond with another 10-page response during the pleading phase. I
cannot conclude that the appellant suffered a prejudice as he had the
opportunity to present his most compelling arguments in his submissions.
Moreover, it was reasonable to forward correspondence to Mr. Ritchie’s counsel,
as he had indicated that he was represented. The CF’s submission was not only
brief but merely agreed with the investigator’s findings and was not sufficient
to vitiate the Commission’s decision. Furthermore, the appellant was well aware
of the case to be met and had sufficient opportunities to respond to the investigator’s
report before a final decision was rendered.
[46]
The appellant also raises a number of
allegations of bad faith or ill motives on the part of the respondent’s counsel
that constitute, in his view, breaches of procedural fairness. However, I
concur with the respondent that zealous advocacy does not constitute wrongful
conduct (Dove v. Canada, 2016 FCA 231). Nothing in the record supports
the appellant’s allegations. The same holds for the appellant’s allegation that
the investigator was biased and unqualified to conduct her investigation, or
even that she and the Judge did not possess the necessary expertise to handle
this case. The appellant has failed to produce any evidence of improper
qualifications or expertise in this regard. In view of the record, no
reasonable person would suspect bias on the part of the investigator. Unless
proven otherwise, it is also assumed that investigators appointed by the CHRC
and judges have the necessary knowledge, experience and qualifications to
examine matters covered by the Act.
[47]
As for the appellant’s allegation that his
personal information was intentionally disclosed publicly by the respondent’s
counsel, the appellant seems to confuse the confidentiality afforded to access
to information requests under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. A-1, and the disclosure of evidence in the normal course of
litigation. For instance, in the absence of a confidentiality order, no party
involved in public litigation has an expectation of privacy in relation to Court
documents (see paragraphs 8(2)(b),(c), and (e) of the Privacy
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21).
[48]
A last ground raised by the appellant in the
context of his procedural fairness argument is that the email communications
between the investigator and the CF constitute a breach of his privacy rights.
If the appellant wishes to argue, as he attempts to do in his Memorandum of Fact
and Law, that the investigator’s email communications with the CF are not in
accordance with the Privacy Act, he must present this argument through
appropriate legal avenues. That issue cannot now be entertained by this Court
since it was not raised before the CHRC.
[49]
For the foregoing reasons, I propose that this
appeal be dismissed with costs.
"A.F. Scott"
“I agree.
Yves de Montigny J.A.”
“I agree.
J. Woods J.A.”
Email this Content