Docket: A-529-14
Citation:
2016 FCA 136
CORAM:
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NOËL C.J.
DAWSON J.A.
SCOTT J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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MAGDALENA
FORNER
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
SCOTT J.A.
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision of the Public Service Labour Relations Board (PSLRB) rendered by an
adjudicator (the Adjudicator) on October 31, 2014 (2014 PSLRB 95). In his
decision, the Adjudicator dismissed a grievance filed by Magdalena Forner (the
applicant) challenging the termination of her employment as a PC-02 Scientist
by the Deputy Head of Environment Canada pursuant to paragraph 12(1)(d)
of the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11. Pursuant to
section 230 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c.
22, s. 2 (the Act), the Adjudicator concluded that it was reasonable to
terminate the applicant’s employment.
[2]
This application for judicial review was set for
a hearing in Ottawa at the applicant’s request. However, the applicant failed
to appear on January 12, 2016, without having advised the Court in advance. As
a result, it was decided that this appeal would be disposed of on the basis of
the written submissions of the parties.
I.
The Facts
[3]
The facts are set out in detail in the reasons
of the Adjudicator. For the purpose of this application, the following facts
are sufficient.
[4]
In June 2009, the applicant was hired by
Environment Canada as an “atmospheric processes scientist”. At the Edmonton
office, she worked for the Meteorological Service of Canada (Prairie and
Northern Region) in the Air Quality Science Unit.
[5]
At the beginning of January 2011, the
applicant’s professional conduct started to raise criticism.
[6]
Considering that she had failed to sufficiently
improve her work performance, her employment was terminated by letter dated January
26, 2012.
II.
The Adjudicator’s decision
[7]
The applicant argued before the Adjudicator that
the decision of the Deputy Head was unreasonable because: i) the standards on
which her work performance was assessed were never clearly communicated to her;
ii) she was not given appropriate assistance, tools, guidance and monitoring to
improve her work performance; iii) she was denied a reasonable time to improve
her work performance. In essence, the applicant pleaded three of the four
factors set out in Raymond v. Treasury Board, 2010 PSLRB 23, [2010]
C.P.S.L.R.B. No. 24 at paragraph 131 [Raymond].
[8]
The Adjudicator framed the issue to be whether
the assessment that the applicant’s performance was unsatisfactory was
reasonable. In the Adjudicator’s view, this was a two-part question. First, was
the applicant’s performance unsatisfactory? Second, if so, was the assessment
reasonable (reasons at paragraph 184)? Accordingly, the Adjudicator first
considered all of the evidence adduced by the parties in order to determine
whether the applicant’s performance was unsatisfactory (reasons at paragraphs
185-199). He concluded that the applicant’s performance was unsatisfactory from
June 2011 until her termination in January 2012. The Adjudicator then went on
to find the assessment of the applicant’s performance was reasonable (reasons
at paragraphs 200-225).
[9]
He found that the evidence adduced clearly
showed that the applicant was apprised of the requirements of her position
(reasons at paragraph 213), the employer provided the appropriate assistance
and guidance to the applicant (reasons at paragraphs 216-219) and she was afforded
a reasonable amount of time to improve her performance (reasons at paragraphs
221-224). Consequently, he concluded that it was reasonable for the Deputy Head
to terminate the applicant’s employment.
III.
The standard of review
[10]
On an application for judicial review, this
Court must first consider whether the case law has established the relevant standard
of review (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190 at paragraph 62 [Dunsmuir]). It has previously been determined that
the standard of review applicable to a decision of an adjudicator of the PSLRB
reviewing a grievance challenging a dismissal under the Act, must be reviewed
under the reasonableness standard (King v. Canada (Attorney General),
2013 FCA 131, 446 N.R. 149).
[11]
The Adjudicator’s construction of section 230 of
the Act should also be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, but in this
case the margin of appreciation is narrower (McLean v. British Columbia
(Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 895 at paragraphs
37-41).
IV.
The arguments
[12]
In the instant proceeding, the applicant has
raised seven issues pertaining to the findings of facts of the Adjudicator.
[13]
The applicant has introduced, through her
affidavit and appended exhibit “A”, new evidence to challenge the Adjudicator’s
overall conclusion that it was reasonable for the Deputy Head to terminate her
employment for unsatisfactory performance.
[14]
The respondent argues that the applicant is using
her affidavit to qualify or add to the evidence adduced before the PSLRB.
[15]
The applicant also submits that the Adjudicator:
i) made his decision without regard to the evidence she adduced; ii) erred in
law by imposing a higher standard; and iii) violated the rules of natural
justice. The respondent disputes these submissions on grounds that the
Adjudicator did consider all the evidence presented. Moreover, the respondent
underlines that the applicant had the benefit of a more thorough review than
necessary because the Adjudicator examined whether the applicant’s performance
was unsatisfactory which he needn’t do and which he ought not to have done.
V.
Analysis
[16]
Before turning to the applicant’s submissions,
it is important to note that in coming to his decision, the Adjudicator unreasonably
interpreted the test set out in section 230 of the Act. Section 230 provides:
230. In the case of an employee in the
core public administration or an employee of a separate agency designated
under subsection 209(3), in making a decision in respect of an employee’s
individual grievance relating to a termination of employment or demotion for
unsatisfactory performance, an adjudicator or the Board, as the case may be,
must determine the termination or demotion to have been for cause if the
opinion of the deputy head that the employee’s performance was unsatisfactory
is determined by the adjudicator or the Board to have been reasonable.
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230. Saisi d’un grief individuel portant sur
le licenciement ou la rétrogradation pour rendement insuffisant d’un
fonctionnaire de l’administration publique centrale ou d’un organisme
distinct désigné au titre du paragraphe 209(3), l’arbitre de grief ou la
Commission, selon le cas, doit décider que le licenciement ou la
rétrogradation étaient motivés s’il conclut qu’il était raisonnable que
l’administrateur général estime le rendement du fonctionnaire insuffisant.
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[17]
The Adjudicator first proceeded to determine
whether the applicant’s performance was unsatisfactory, he then examined the
issue of the reasonableness of the assessment of the Deputy Head, using three
criteria taken from Raymond that were raised by the applicant. Since the
Deputy Head had determined that the applicant’s performance was unsatisfactory,
the Adjudicator should have restricted his discussion to the issue of whether
the Deputy Head’s decision was reasonable instead of proceeding to a two-step
analysis as he did.
[18]
The Adjudicator thus failed to follow a
well-settled line of cases decided by the PSLRB on the applicable test (See Raymond;
Plamondon v. Deputy Head (Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade), 2011 PSLRB 90, [2011] C.P.S.L.R.B. No. 89; Mazerolle v. Deputy
Head (Department of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 PSLRB 6, [2012]
C.P.S.L.R.B. No. 6; Reddy v. Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions, 2012 PSLRB 94, [2012] C.P.S.L.R.B. No. 88). He should not
have made an independent analysis of the applicant’s performance.
[19]
That being said, the decision of the Adjudicator
is still reasonable as there was sufficient evidence, in my view, to come to
the conclusion that the Deputy Head’s decision was reasonable (reasons at
paragraphs 208-225).
[20]
The level of deference owed to the Adjudicator’s
decision depends on the context. Where the decision is mostly factual, the
range of defensible outcomes is wide. In an application for judicial review of
a decision of the PSLRB, this Court cannot go beyond the evidence that was
adduced before the Adjudicator. This Court does not normally accept new
evidence (Bernard v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2015 FCA 263, [2015] F.C.J.
No. 1396 at paragraphs 31-32, Connolly v. Canada (Attorney General),
2014 FCA 294, [2014] F.C.J. No. 1237 at paragraphs 6-7).
[21]
Having carefully reviewed the record, the
applicant has failed to point to evidence in the record that would show that
the Adjudicator has made errors in his findings of facts that render his
decision unreasonable. The applicant has also failed to provide the exhibits
that were introduced before the Adjudicator or to clearly identify the evidence
in the record on the basis of which she challenges the findings of the Adjudicator.
Rather, she relies on her affidavit and the timeline of events appended thereto
which were not before the Adjudicator.
[22]
As I turn to the Adjudicator’s decision in light
of the applicant’s remaining claims: i) that the standards according to which
she was being assessed were never clearly communicated to her and ii) that she
was not given appropriate assistance or afforded a reasonable period of time to
improve her performance, I must reject those submissions. Firstly, it is clear
from the decision of the Adjudicator that the evidence adduced showed that the
applicant was informed on numerous occasions of what was expected in terms of
performance (reasons at paragraphs 211-213). Secondly, the Adjudicator pointed
to evidence that, starting in June 1, the applicant’s manager was meeting with
her on almost a daily basis (reasons at paragraph 216). Finally, the Adjudicator’s
finding that the applicant was afforded a reasonable period of time to improve
her performance is reasonable as it is based on the evidence (reasons at
paragraphs 222-224).
[23]
The submission of the applicant that the
Adjudicator imposed a higher standard must also fail. It is clear from the
decision that the Adjudicator did not apply an elevated standard of proof. The
use of the phrase “clearly unreasonable” in
paragraph 184 of his reasons was in fact corrected when the Adjudicator wrote
immediately thereafter that the test was quite simply to determine “…[W]hether or not the assessment that the grievor’s
performance was unsatisfactory, by Ms. Mintz and Ms. Best, and accepted by the
deputy head was reasonable”.
[24]
Furthermore, in Communications, Energy and
Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd.,
2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458, Justice Abella for the majority reiterated:
[54] The board’s decision should be
approached as an organic whole, without a line-by-line treasure hunt for error
(Newfoundland Nurses, at para 14). In the absence of finding that the
decision, based on the record, is outside the range of reasonable outcomes, the
decision should not be disturbed.
[25]
In my opinion, when viewed as a whole, the
Adjudicator applied the proper standard of proof to the decision of the Deputy
Head.
[26]
I must also reject the applicant’s submission that
the Adjudicator rendered his decision without taking into consideration that
some of the evidence adduced was missing from the file. The letter written by
the Senior Legal Counsel from the PSLRB in response to enquiries made by the
applicant clearly shows that there were no exhibits missing from the file
(Exhibit C, Maier’s affidavit, respondent’s record at page 65).
[27]
I cannot accept the applicant’s position that
the Adjudicator arrived at his decision in violation of the rules of natural
justice because he failed to point to the evidence on which his decision is
based. In fact, the Adjudicator’s decision is replete with references to the
evidence that was adduced during the course of the hearing (reasons at
paragraphs 208, 211, 213, 214, 216, 218 and 224).
[28]
Finally, for the sake of completeness, I must
add that the applicant in her submissions is seeking relief that cannot be
granted by this Court in an application for judicial review. This Court does
not have the authority to grant the corrective measures the applicant seeks
from her former employer.
VI.
Conclusion
[29]
I conclude that the decision of the Adjudicator
was reasonable.
[30]
For these reasons, I would dismiss this application
for judicial review, with costs.
"A.F. Scott"
“I agree.
Marc Noël C.J.”
“I agree.
Eleanor R. Dawson
J.A.”