Docket: IMM-3316-16
Citation: 2017 FC 146
Ottawa,
Ontario, February 9, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Brown
BETWEEN:
|
WEIHAO YAN
|
Applicant
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT
AND REASONS
I.
Nature of the Matter
[1]
This is an application for judicial review by
Weihao Yan [the Applicant], pursuant to s. 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the IRPA], of a decision made
by the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board,
dated May 8, 2016, in which the Applicant was found to be neither a
Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection under sections 96 and 97
of the IRPA [the Decision]. Leave was granted November 8, 2016.
II.
Facts
[2]
The Applicant is a 21-year-old citizen of China.
He alleges fear of persecution on the ground of religion, namely, as a member
of the Church of Almighty God (also known as the Church of Eastern Lightening)
[Almighty God/Eastern Lightening]. He alleges he has been a member for two
years. The Almighty God/Eastern Lightening religion is viewed as an “evil cult” in China; its practice there is illegal
and is repressed by Chinese government authorities.
[3]
The Applicant alleges that he became a member of
Almighty God/Eastern Lightening in October 2013 after losing a friend in a
motorcycle accident and seeing another motorcycle accident resulting in death
shortly thereafter. He alleges he became increasingly depressed, pessimistic
and disappointed with human life. His friend spoke to him about Almighty
God/Eastern Lightening after the first accident, but the Applicant declined the
invitation. After the second accident, his friend spoke with him again. The
Applicant decided to attend a service.
[4]
The Applicant’s refugee claim arises from an
event that allegedly occurred in March 2014, at which time several Public
Service Bureau [PSB] officers raided the house church at which he was attending
an Almighty God/Eastern Lightening service and arrested three members. The
Applicant was able to escape. While in hiding, the Applicant alleges that the
PSB came to his house looking for him. They interrogated his parents as to his
religious activity and whereabouts and ordered he report the next day. After
the Applicant failed to report, the PSB returned to his home and left a summons
for him. The Applicant alleges he was terminated from his job. He decided to
leave China.
[5]
The Applicant obtained a U.S. student visa with
the assistance of a smuggler, who travelled with the Applicant to the U.S.
After remaining in the U.S. for an unstated amount of time, the Applicant allegedly
entered Canada illegally by walking through a park from Seattle to Vancouver.
He then flew to Toronto and claimed refugee status there. The Applicant
conducted these travels using his own passport. He claims to have travelled to
Canada from the U.S. after staying there only one day, but the objective evidence
is only that he arrived in the U.S. on June 10, 2014 and signed his Basis
of Claim [BOC] form in Toronto six weeks later. Since fleeing, the Applicant
alleges the PSB has come looking for him three times, most recently in February
2016.
[6]
The Minister filed a Notice of Intervention at
the RPD stage, stating that significant portions of the Applicant’s BOC
narrative resembled those of three other files, thereby giving rise to serious
credibility concerns. These other narratives were included as exhibits and are
contained in the Certified Tribunal Record, but are not at issue in this
judicial review.
III.
Decisions
i) RPD Decision
[7]
On March 2, 2016, the RPD Panel found the
Applicant was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection.
The determinative issues were the Applicant’s credibility and his identity as a
member of the Church.
[8]
The Panel made several negative inferences.
First, it drew a negative inference from the Applicant’s ability to leave China
on his own passport. It considered the treatment of Almighty God/Eastern
Lightening members, the documentary evidence concerning exit and entry law and
the Golden Shield Project (the national computer network of policing in China,
to which airport authorities are connected) and noted the systematic corruption
in China. The Panel found, on a balance of probabilities, that the Applicant
was able to leave China on his own passport without any difficulty because he
was not wanted by the PSB.
[9]
Second, the Panel drew a negative inference from
the Applicant’s illegal entry into Canada and his failure to claim in the U.S.,
finding it unreasonable and implausible that the Applicant, fearing arrest in
China, would take the chance of being arrested for illegally entering Canada.
It found the Applicant had failed to provide a reasonable explanation for his
actions.
[10]
Third, the Panel found the summons issued to the
Applicant was consistent with a criminal summons and drew a negative inference
from the PSB’s failure to issue a coercive summons following the Applicant’s
failure to report. The Panel also drew negative inferences from the Applicant’s
lack of spontaneity when responding to questions about his introduction to the
religion, his inability to answer questions about the basic tenets of the
religion and his inability to recount the substance of his initial conversation
with his friend. The Panel assigned little weight to the supporting documentary
evidence, finding it could attest to the Applicant’s participation in church
activities but not to his motivation. The Panel also assigned little weight to
the Applicant’s letter of termination.
[11]
The Applicant appealed this decision to the RAD.
ii) RAD Decision
[12]
On July 13, 2016, the RAD upheld the finding of
the RPD and determined that the Applicant was neither a Convention refugee nor
a person in need of protection. The RAD did not accept the Applicant’s evidence as credible either
with respect to his passage through China’s exit controls on his own passport while
wanted by the PSB, or his allegation of being wanted by the police. The
Applicant disagrees with the result and seeks judicial review.
[13]
The RAD’s reasons are set out below together
with the Court’s analysis.
IV.
Issues
[14]
The issue is whether the RAD decision is
reasonable.
V.
Standard of Review and Legal Principles
[15]
In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9
at paras 57, 62 [Dunsmuir], the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
standard of review analysis is unnecessary where “the
jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of
deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question.”
A decision by the RAD reviewing a finding by the RPD is to be reviewed by this
Court on the standard of reasonableness. The Federal Court of Appeal has stated
in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, that
the RAD is to review the RPD’s findings on the standard of correctness, but may
defer to the RPD on credibility findings “where the RPD
enjoys a meaningful advantage”.
[16]
In Dunsmuir, above at para 47, the
Supreme Court of Canada explained what is required of a court reviewing on the
reasonableness standard of review:
A court conducting a review for reasonableness
inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to
the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review,
reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is
also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[17]
The starting point for assessing credibility is that
the applicant is presumed to tell the truth: Maldonado v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 FC 302 (FCA). This presumption is
rebuttable; where the evidence is inconsistent with the applicant’s sworn
testimony, the presumption may be rebutted: Su v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2015 FC 666 at para 11, Fothergill J [Su],
citing Adu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 53
ACWS (3d) 158, [1995] FCJ No 114 (FCA).
[18]
Relevant authorities on the assessment of credibility
and plausibility are summarized as follows. First, the RPD has broad discretion
to prefer certain evidence over other evidence and to determine the weight to
be assigned to the evidence it accepts: Medarovik v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 61 at para 16, Tremblay-Lamer J; Pushpanathan
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 867 at para 68,
Blais J. Second, the Federal Court of Appeal confirms that findings of fact and
determinations of credibility fall within the heartland of the expertise of the
RPD: Giron v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 143
NR 238 (FCA). Third, the RPD is recognized to have expertise in assessing
refugee claims and is authorized by statute to apply its specialized knowledge:
Chen v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 805 at
para 10, O’Reilly J; see Siad v Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 FC
608 at para 24 (FCA), where the Federal Court of Appeal said that the RPD, “… is uniquely situated to assess the credibility of a
refugee claimant; credibility determinations, which lie within “the heartland
of the discretion of triers of fact”, are entitled to considerable
deference upon judicial review and cannot be overturned unless they are
perverse, capricious or made without regard to the evidence”. Third, it is
well-established that the RPD may make credibility findings based on
implausibility, common sense and rationality, although adverse credibility
findings “should not be based on a microscopic
evaluation of issues peripheral or irrelevant to the case”: Haramichael
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1197 at para 15,
Tremblay-Lamer J, citing Lubana v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FCT 116 at paras 10-11, Martineau J [Lubana]; Attakora
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] FCJ No 444 (FCA).
Fourth, the RPD may reject uncontradicted evidence if it “is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case
as a whole, or where inconsistencies are found in the evidence”: Lubana,
above at para 10. Fifth, the RPD is entitled to conclude that an applicant is
not credible “because of implausibilities in his or her
evidence as long as its inferences are not unreasonable and its reasons are set
out in ‘clear and unmistakable terms’”: Lubana, above at para 9.
[19]
The Supreme Court of Canada instructs that
judicial review is not a line-by-line treasure hunt for errors; the decision
should be approached as an organic whole: Communications, Energy and
Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd, 2013
SCC 34. Further, a reviewing court must determine whether the decision, viewed
as a whole in the context of the record, is reasonable: Construction Labour
Relations v Driver Iron Inc, 2012 SCC 65; see also Newfoundland and
Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011
SCC 62.
VI.
Analysis
A.
Finding that exit from China on own passport not
plausible
[20]
The RAD reviewed the most recent documentary
evidence and noted the fact of corruption in China. On
the facts in this case, the RAD distinguished Zhang v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 533, Dawson J, as she then was, Sun
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 387, de
Montigny J and Ren v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2015 FC 1402, Boswell J. In my view, the RAD acted reasonably in this respect because
the country condition information before this RAD was more up to date and was
not before the Court in the earlier decisions, specifically in regard to China’s
exit controls and the Golden Shield. In my respectful view, decisions
concerning China’s exit controls based on earlier or different country
condition evidence, while important for the principle that each case must be
determined on the evidence, are not determinative of subsequent applications
such as this. These determinations are both fact-driven and findings in respect
of which the RPD and RAD are entitled to a degree of deference given they are
both specialized tribunals. In this case, more recent evidence supported the
RAD’s determinations in this respect.
[21]
In my view, it was also reasonable for the RAD
to conclude there was insufficient evidence that the
smuggler had bribed any border control officials, that it was highly
implausible the smuggler would know who to bribe and that it was not plausible
that the Applicant was able to exit China on his own passport given China’s
exit controls. In my respectful view, this finding is reasonable not only
because it is supported by updated country condition evidence, but because it
is grounded in common sense, rationality and the record. I note that the RAD
decision in this respect has support in by Zeng v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1060, O’Keefe J, Su, above,
and Cao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 315, Noël J.
B.
Failure to claim or explain stay in the U.S.
[22]
The RAD also drew a negative inference from the
Applicant’s failure to claim in the U.S. and the risk he took in entering
Canada illegally. It found the Applicant had not provided an adequate
explanation for why he did not or could not claim in the U.S. In conclusion,
the RAD agreed with the RPD and found the Applicant’s failure to claim asylum
in the U.S. undermined both the credibility of his allegations and his
subjective fear. These conclusions are supported by the evidence and, in
particular, by the lack of evidence respecting when exactly the Applicant
entered Canada. I pause to note that this lack of evidence is, of course,
entirely a consequence of the Applicant’s decision to enter the country
illegally. In any event, the onus was on the Applicant to prove the date he
entered Canada if he wanted the RAD to find he only spent a day in the U.S.; he
failed to meet his burden in this respect.
C.
Summons submitted not plausible
[23]
The RAD found the RPD failed to adequately
explain why it determined the summons submitted by the Applicant was a criminal
summons. The RAD reviewed the matter afresh, with the benefit not only of the
country condition evidence but its own expertise and, in my respectful view,
reasonably found the summons offered by the Applicant was inconsistent with a
criminal summons. Instead, the RAD found the summons was consistent with a
Public Security Summons (non-coercive summons). In light of the objective
evidence and the Applicant’s allegations, the RAD determined that it was
reasonable to expect a coercive summons to have been issued by the PSB after
the Applicant’s failure to report. The RAD reasonably concluded that the absence
of a coercive summons undermined the genuineness of the summons tendered by the
Applicant; in my view, the RAD reasonably assigned it little weight. The RAD
also agreed with the RPD’s assessment of the other documents submitted and
determined that, in any case, the termination letter did not overcome the
totality of the adverse credibility findings made against the Applicant’s claim.
I am not persuaded that the RAD acted unreasonably in these respects.
D.
Credibility findings at the hearing
[24]
It is also relevant that the RAD deferred to the
RPD on its assessment of the Applicant’s lack of spontaneity and related
adverse credibility finding. It agreed with the RPD and found the Applicant’s
failure to discuss important elements of his first conversation with his
friend, namely, the significance of traffic fatalities to the religion,
undermined his credibility. The RAD also found the Applicant’s knowledge and
practice to be inconsistent with his alleged religious profile, further undermining
his credibility on this ground. The RAD acknowledged the RPD’s analysis on the sur
place claim would have benefitted from further reasoning but found that the
RPD did, in fact, consider the Applicant’s activities in Canada. The RAD
concluded that:
Having found that he was not a practitioner
in China and having no evidence of desire to begin the practice in Canada, the
RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities and in the context of the findings
noted above, that the [Applicant] engaged in Christian activities in Canada
only for the purpose of furthering a fraudulent refugee claim.
[25]
Again, these findings centre on credibility, in
respect of which deference is owed to the RAD as matter lying at the heartland
of its jurisdiction. In my respectful view, the RAD’s findings on credibility
on this point are reasonable.
E.
The sur place claim
[26]
An overall finding that an Applicant’s evidence
lacks credibility may form the basis of the RAD’s decision to discount evidence
relied upon in establishing a sur place claim. Moreover, the RPD did
consider the Applicant’s activities in Canada, but found them undermined by his
vague and hesitant testimony. I am unable to fault the RAD’s conclusion that
the evidence was insufficient for a sur place claim.
[27]
Judicial review concerns the totality of the
reasons which are to be examined as an organic whole. Considering the findings
outlined above, I have concluded that the RAD’s decision falls within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law, per Dunsmuir.
VII.
Certified question
[28]
Neither party proposed a question to certify and
in my view none arises.
VIII.
Conclusions
[29]
Therefore, with respect, judicial review must be
dismissed. No question will be certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS that judicial review
is dismissed, no question is certified, and there is no order as to costs.
“Henry S. Brown”