Docket: A-232-15
Citation: 2016 FCA 124
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CORAM:
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GAUTHIER J.A.
SCOTT J.A.
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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GANDHI JEAN
PIERRE
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Appellant
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and
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CANADA BORDER
SERVICES AGENCY
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SCOTT J.A.
[1]
Gandhi Jean Pierre (the appellant) is appealing from
a decision (2015 FC 436) whereby Federal Court Judge Marie-Josée Bédard (the
Judge) dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision by the
Public Service Staffing Tribunal (the Tribunal) (2013 PSST 28). In that
decision, the Tribunal dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant under
paragraph 77(1)a) of the Public Service Employment Act, S.C.
2003, chapter 22, sections 12 and 13 (the PSEA). The relevant
legislative provisions are appended hereto.
I.
Background
[2]
In his complaint before the Tribunal, the
appellant alleged that his elimination from the internal appointment process to
staff the position of hearing officer with the Canada Border Services Agency
(CBSA) was the result of an abuse of authority on the part of the assessment
board.
[3]
As explained in the Judge’s reasons, the
Tribunal has limited jurisdiction when it is called upon to decide a complaint
filed under paragraph 77(1)(a) of the PSEA. For example, the
Tribunal can only examine the merits of a complainant’s candidacy insofar as
the circumstances of the case show that the complainant’s candidacy was
rejected because of an abuse of authority. Subsection 2(4) of the PSEA
states that “a reference in this Act to abuse of
authority shall be construed as including bad faith and personal favouritism”.
[4]
Before the Tribunal, the appellant submitted
that i) the assessment board had chosen the appellant’s referees in an
inappropriate manner, ii) the references provided by the referees were
unreliable, iii) the members of the assessment board were not impartial, iv)
the assessment board was required to reassess the appellant, and v) the referees
and the assessment board had discriminated against him on the basis of his
race, colour and ethnic origin. The Tribunal dismissed all of these
allegations, ruling that the board’s choices were justified and did not support
the conclusion that there had been an abuse of authority.
[5]
The Judge confirmed these reasons, responding in
detail and articulately to each of the appellant’s arguments.
II.
Standard of review
[6]
The role of this Court, when dealing with an
appeal from a decision rendered in an application for judicial review, is to ascertain
whether the Judge chose the appropriate standard of review and to determine
whether they were applied correctly (Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety
Canada), 2013 SCC 36 at paragraphs 45 to 47, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 [Agraira]).
To do so, this Court “steps into the shoes” of
the Judge and focuses on the administrative decision (Agraira at
paragraph 46; Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3 at
paragraph 247, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 23).
[7]
In his submissions before our Court, the
appellant made arguments similar to those presented to the Tribunal and the
Federal Court. The appellant’s arguments against the Tribunal’s decision
involve mainly the following: i) the Tribunal’s failure to comply with the
rules of procedural fairness, ii) the board’s failure to comply with the rules
of procedural fairness, and iii) errors in the Tribunal’s application of the
notions of abuse of authority as defined in the PSEA and discrimination as
defined under the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985,
chapter H-6 (the CHRA), given its assessment of the evidence on record.
[8]
The Judge correctly identified the standard of
review applicable to the first two categories of questions. Any conclusion by
an administrative decision-maker relating to an allegation of breach of
procedural fairness requires the application of the standard of correctness (Mission
Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at paragraph 79, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502 [Khela];
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at paragraph
43, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339). This standard also applies to the Judge’s conclusions
relating to the allegation of breach of procedural fairness by the Tribunal.
[9]
The Judge was also not mistaken in identifying
the standard of review applicable to the third category of questions. The mixed
questions of fact and law stemming from the Tribunal’s interpretation and
application of the PSEA are assessed according to the standard of
reasonableness (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at
paragraph 53, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir]; Agnaou v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2014 FC 850 at paragraphs 40 to 41, [2014] F.C.J.
no. 1321 (QL), affirmed by Agnaou v. Canada (Attorney General),
2015 FCA 294, [2015] F.C.J. no. 1482 (QL) (application for leave for appeal
submitted on February 16, 2016) [Agnaou]).
[10]
The standard applicable to the Tribunal’s
dismissal of the appellant’s allegations of discrimination is that of
reasonableness, because the latter is only calling into question the Tribunal’s
application of well settled legal principles, which raises mixed questions of
fact and law.
III.
Analysis
[11]
The appellant has presented us with very
detailed written arguments and cites numerous statutory provisions and judicial
or administrative cases. As noted, the Judge took care to address each of the
appellant’s allegations and dismissed all of them after an in-depth analysis.
[12]
I do not believe that it is necessary to repeat
that process here, and I will therefore limit myself to the appellant’s
arguments that I deem most convincing, on the understanding that I am persuaded
that the other allegations in no way justify the intervention of our Court.
A.
Did the Judge correctly conclude that the
Tribunal had not breached its duty of procedural fairness?
[13]
The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s dismissal
of exhibits FC‑32 and FC‑53 prevented him from supporting his
allegations of bias against Ms. Clément, in the context of the reprisals
he suffered. Exhibit FC‑32 refers to email exchanges concerning a
mediation meeting. It also confirms the destruction of notes for the
preparation of the appellant’s case in another staffing process. This exhibit
also contains the complaint settlement agreement, signed on December 11,
2009, following this mediation. Exhibit FC‑53 contains a written announcement
of Dianne Clément’s appointment to the position of Director, Pre‑Removal
Risk Assessment (PRRA) and Customer Service, as well as an email dated
July 27, 2012, in which Ms. Clément announces her retirement.
While acknowledging the fairness of the Judge’s analysis contained in
paragraphs 48 to 60 of her decision, I would nevertheless like to clarify one
point.
[14]
The appellant alleges that the Judge could not
conclude that the Tribunal was justified in refusing the submission of the
exhibit FC‑53, because the technical rules of evidence do not apply to
administrative tribunals. I am of the opinion that the choice to admit, or not
to admit, evidence constitutes a procedural option on the part of the Tribunal.
The Judge was therefore justified in exercising “some
deference” in relation to the assessment of that choice (Khela at
paragraph 89; Forest Ethics Advocacy Association v. Canada (National Energy
Board), 2014 FCA 245 at paragraph 70, [2014] 4 F.C.R. 75; Re:Sound v.
Fitness Industry Council of Canada, 2014 FCA 48 at paragraphs 37 to 44,
[2015] 2 F.C.R. 170; Commission scolaire de Laval v.
Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval,
2016 SCC 8, [2016] F.C.J. no. 8 (QL) at paragraphs 30 and 31).
[15]
Also, for the reasons stated by the Judge, the
refusal to admit these documents was inconsequential because these documents
could not in any way prove the allegation of Ms. Clément’s bias against
the appellant. Therefore, this refusal does not tarnish the fairness of the
process before the Tribunal (Agnaou at paragraph 110; Syndicat des employés professionnels de
l’Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières v. Université du Québec à
Trois-Rivières, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 471 at
paragraph 47, 1993 CanLII 162 (SCC)).
B.
Did the Tribunal correctly conclude that the
assessment board had not breached its duty of procedural fairness?
[16]
Faced with contradictory references from Cathie
Giroux (unfavourable assessment) and Sophie Kobrynsky (favourable assessment),
both of whom had been identified by the appellant on the appropriate form, the
assessment board decided to contact a third referee, Dianne Clément,
Ms. Giroux’s supervisor and the manager of the PRRA division where the
appellant worked at the time.
[17]
The appellant submits that if the board did not
consider Ms. Kobrynsky to be an appropriate referee, it should have
allowed him to provide another referee before contacting a third person on its
own initiative. In my opinion, this argument cannot be accepted. The problem
facing the board did not stem from Ms. Kobrynsky’s qualifications as an
“appropriate referee,” but rather from the need to determine whether the
unfavourable references from Ms. Giroux were the result of a personal
conflict with the appellant. There is no evidence that the board ignored or
discredited the references given by Ms. Kobrynsky.
[18]
The appellant submits that the assessment board’s
decision to contact a third reference without providing him the opportunity to
comment on this initiative or refute this referee’s claims violated his right
to be heard and to present evidence to contradict her, which negatively
impacted the transparency of the assessment process.
[19]
Recognizing that it would have been preferable
for the board to inform the appellant that it was choosing Ms. Clément as
a referee in order for him to inform the assessment board of his concerns
regarding her impartiality, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant’s right
to make his case was nonetheless respected at the informal discussion stage. That
step is provided for under section 47 of the PSEA, which states that “[w]here a person is informed by the Commission, at any stage
of an internal appointment process, that the person has been eliminated from
consideration for appointment, the Commission may, at that person’s request,
informally discuss its decision with that person.”
[20]
The appellant submits that this discussion does
not allow candidates to truly participate in the decision, because it is held
after the decision has been taken and merely seeks to explain the decision to candidates
who were eliminated. The Tribunal ruled that the discussion had taken place
before the stage of appointing a candidate, since the assessment board can,
under subsection 48(3) of the PSEA, [translation]
“change its mind regarding the appointment of a
candidate” before the official appointment announcement. I am of the
opinion that the legislation confirms the Tribunal’s explanation, and that the
appellant’s concerns regarding Ms. Clément could therefore have been
expressed before the end of the appointment process.
[21]
In this case, this conclusion is also confirmed
by the email sent by Mr. Meniaï on March 15, 2012 (Exhibit FC‑74,
Appeal Book, Vol. 2 at page 611). In this email, Mr. Meniaï confirmed that the
informal discussion with the appellant had already taken place, but that the
appointment of the successful candidate was still to come following the
expiration of the waiting period referred to in subsection 48(2) of the
PSEA.
[22]
The appellant also submits that the board failed
to meet its duty to communicate the reasons for its decision by not responding
to his request for reconsideration. According to the appellant, that lack of
transparency constitutes a violation of the rules of procedural fairness. I
note that the [translation] “request for reconsideration” to which the appellant
is referring is a document entitled [translation]
“Corrective measures following my elimination from the
selection process . . . ” sent by the appellant to the assessment board
on March 7, 2012, after the informal discussion held on February 28,
2012.
[23]
The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s
conclusion that he received explanations from the assessment board regarding
the refusal to reassess his qualifications is contradicted by the evidence. The
document to which the appellant is referring is an email dated March 15,
2012, that Mr. Meniaï sent him, which simply acknowledges receipt of the [translation] “Corrective
measures . . .” document (Exhibit FC‑74, Appeal Book, Vol. 2
at page 611). In fact, the Tribunal’s conclusions are rather based on the
explanations provided to the appellant during the informal discussion in
response to his request to replace the references of Ms. Giroux and
Ms. Clément with other, more favourable performance assessments, and not
the document entitled [translation]
“Corrective measures . . .”.
[24]
I conclude that the appellant’s right to a
reasoned decision was not infringed upon in this case. The appellant had an
opportunity to bring forward all of his concerns during the informal
discussion, and the Tribunal’s conclusion to the effect that these concerns
were considered by Mr. Meniaï during the meeting was based on testimonial
evidence provided by Mr. Meniaï.
[25]
Moreover, I must point out that the appellant’s
position regarding his [translation] “Corrective measures . . .” document has no basis in
the PSEA, and that any expectations that he had in this regard therefore could
not result in an obligation of procedural fairness for the board (Baker v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 1999
CanLII 699).
[26]
Indeed, the PSEA offers no remedy for
re-examination or reconsideration of an appointment. Section 49 provides
that any decision by the Commission “to appoint a
person or to propose a person for appointment is final and is not subject to
appeal or review except in accordance with this Act” but no other
provision provides a right of this kind. The appellant was therefore not
actually entitled to present a request for reconsideration, and the board’s
only duty related to the response that it needed to provide to the appellant’s
concerns raised during the informal discussion. I am, of the opinion that the
concerns raised by the appellant in his document sought to support—if not
repeat—the considerations that he brought forward during the informal
discussion, and that they did not raise the need for a distinct justification.
[27]
Lastly, I agree with the Judge’s reasons at
paragraph 121 of her decision regarding the allegations of the assessment
board’s bias. The fact that the board did not respond to the appellant’s “insistent” concerns regarding the impartiality of
Ms. Giroux and Ms. Clément does not mean that the assessment board
refused to address them or showed bias itself.
C.
Could the Tribunal reasonably dismiss the
allegation of abuse of authority by the assessment board?
[28]
The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s
decision is unreasonable for numerous reasons that he described before us
several times as [translation] “the whole endeavour”. In my opinion, his main
argument challenges the Tribunal’s finding of fact under the pretext that it
ignored certain pieces of conclusive evidence or overemphasized certain
evidence that did not warrant as much attention.
[29]
Before dealing with the main arguments raised by
the appellant, and as the Judge did in paragraphs 69 and 70 of her
decision, I must note that the standard of reasonableness does not allow this
Court to re-examine the evidence presented by the appellant by re-weighing its
probative value (Dunsmuir at paragraph 47).
[30]
Thus, the fact that another member of the
Tribunal could have, in a case similar to ours, come to a different conclusion
than the one reached by the Tribunal in this case does not necessarily make the
decision before us unreasonable. The appellant referred us to Gabon v.
Deputy Minister of Environment Canada (2012 PSST 29) where the Public
Service Staffing Tribunal upheld a complaint of abuse of authority. However,
that case differs from the present appeal because in that case, the Tribunal
allowed the complaint mainly because the appointment process was vitiated by
several errors: i) the guidelines provided to candidates with regard to
referees lacked clarity; and ii) the reference check guide was directed at
supervisors and managers, but the referees were not required to have held such
positions. The assessment board had accepted the unfavorable assessment of a
supervisor without taking the necessary precautions under the circumstances.
However, in the present case, the assessment board took precautions regarding
the unfavorable assessment from Ms. Giroux, one of the appellant’s
referees.
[31]
Moreover, it is not for this Court, any more
than it is for the Tribunal, to reassess the merit of the appellant’s candidacy
for the hearing officer position. The Tribunal is only tasked to determine
whether the appellant had shown that the assessment board had committed an
abuse of authority in the appointment process in question. The appellant does
not challenge the manner in which the Tribunal identified the legal principles
applicable to the notion of abuse of authority, and I am of the opinion that
the criteria set out by the Tribunal to decide on the appellant’s complaint
were founded in law.
(1)
Adequacy of the Tribunal’s reasons
[32]
The appellant submits that the Tribunal failed
to consider some of the evidence (such as his decisions as a PRRA officer, the
evidence presented to the Public Service Commission, or the evidence submitted
to support the context of reprisals that the appellant said he suffered) or
failed to address certain arguments or legal precedents. I conclude that these
objections relate to the adequacy of the Tribunal’s reasons.
[33]
On this subject, the Supreme Court stated in Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),
2011 SCC 62 [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, that:
[16] Reasons may not include all the
arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing
judge would have preferred, but that does not impugn the validity of either the
reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis. A decision-maker is not
required to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however
subordinate, leading to its final conclusion (Service Employees’
International Union, Local no. 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn.,
1973 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, page 391).
[34]
Thus, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal’s
reasons meet the criteria set out in Dunsmuir insofar as this Court is
able to understand the basis for its decision and to determine that its
conclusions are among the possible, acceptable outcomes. I conclude that the [translation] “flaws”
identified by the appellant do not call into question the reasonableness of the
Tribunal’s decision.
(2)
Selection and reliability of referees
[35]
The appellant submits that it was unreasonable
for the Tribunal to conclude that the assessment board did not behave in an
abusive manner in contacting Ms. Clément and taking into account her
references [translation] “without the appellant’s knowledge or approval”.
[36]
He also argues that the information provided by
Ms. Clément was protected under the Privacy Act, R.S.C. (1985),
chapter P‑21 (the PA), and that she was not authorized to disclose
it to the CBSA without his consent. The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s
conclusion that this disclosure was justified under paragraph 8(2)(a)
of the PA runs counter to the principle that exceptions found in the PA must be
interpreted narrowly. I am of the opinion that paragraph 34 of the
Tribunal’s reasons deals reasonably with the appellant’s argument. The
knowledge of the appellant’s performance gained by Ms. Clément while
supervising him constituted information that was [translation] “collected” for
the purpose of his performance assessment. Use of this information in an
appointment process for which the appellant himself applied constitutes, logically,
a use consistent with the purposes of the performance assessment. Moreover,
contrary to what the appellant submits, paragraph 8(2)(a) does not
limit communication within a single institution—quite the opposite.
[37]
Moreover, the Tribunal clarified, in paragraph 44
of its reasons, that an abuse of authority within the meaning of
paragraph 77(1)(a) would be shown if it were clear that the
information provided to the assessment board by the referees was unreliable,
whether because of a clear bias on their part or for any other reason. The bias
of a referee in itself does not necessarily show that an assessment board
abused its authority; the board in question must be witness to an element that
calls into question the reliability of the information provided by a referee.
[38]
The appellant argues that the references
provided by Ms. Giroux and Ms. Clément were unreliable for several
reasons, and that the assessment board abused its authority by placing more
emphasis on them. As a corollary, the appellant contends that the assessment
board’s decision not to [translation]
“retain” the references provided by
Ms. Kobrynsky was the result of several errors, and that it was
unreasonable for the Tribunal not to address this.
[39]
The appellant argues that Ms. Giroux’s and
Ms. Clément’s references could not be reliable because of those two
referees’ bias against him. He alleges that this bias is substantiated in
particular by i) his personal conflict with Ms. Giroux; ii) the absence of
evidence to support the statements from Ms. Giroux and Ms. Clément;
and iii) the affidavit from Darin Jacques, contradicting Ms. Giroux’s and
Ms. Clément’s assessment of the appellant’s work. According to the
appellant, the Tribunal should have concluded that the assessment board had
abused its authority when it took into account the references from
Ms. Giroux and Ms. Clément, despite their bias. He submits that the
Tribunal’s opposite conclusion is attributable to its failure to place the
necessary weight on the evidence provided by the appellant.
[40]
While it is true that some of Ms. Giroux’s
statements, recorded in the interview notes collected by Ms. Raymond, may
suggest personal differences with the appellant (mentions of [translation] “macho”
and [translation] “problems with women in authority”), otherwise, nothing
supports the appellant’s allegations. Ms. Raymond explained in her
testimony before the Tribunal that she had not expressed herself adequately in
her email dated December 16, 2011, when she wrote that Ms. Giroux had
[translation] “indeed had some personal problems with the candidate on a
day-to-day basis”. Ms. Giroux also stated in her testimony that she
did not have any personal problems with the complainant. In addition, the appellant
himself stated in his “Summary” of the informal
discussion that Ms. Giroux’s [translation]
“macho” and [translation]
“problems with women in authority” references
were [translation] “not considered in the assessment of his candidacy”
(Exhibit FC‑78, Appeal Book, Vol. 3, p. 764). I also want to
emphasize that if the appellant had any concerns regarding Ms. Giroux’s
ability to provide an impartial reference about him, there was nothing
preventing him from expressing this apprehension from the outset when filling
out the appropriate form. The appellant did not do so, which could reasonably
confirm the board’s assessment. Thus, despite the statements in the interview
notes and the email dated December 16, 2011, it was reasonable for the
Tribunal to conclude that the assessment board had adequately assessed the
situation. This conclusion is supported by evidence and cannot be considered
unreasonable under the circumstances.
[41]
The appellant submits that the statements made
by Ms. Giroux and Ms. Clément were not supported (or were even contradicted)
by specific and precise factual examples. However, it is not accurate to claim that
there was no evidence supporting the two referees’ statements. The performance
assessments carried out by Ms. Giroux before the competition and to which
the appellant refers, while encouraging, clearly indicate shortcomings
requiring improvement (Exhibits FC‑28 and FC‑29). As well, the
Tribunal confirmed that the board had taken into account the examples provided
by the two referees, which were more numerous and detailed than those provided
by Ms. Kobrynsky. A careful review of the other evidence referred to by
the appellant does not allow me to conclude that it proves his allegations of
bias.
[42]
The appellant also submits that Ms. Clément
had insufficient knowledge of his performance, and that her statements about
him constituted hearsay in that they did not derive from personal observations,
but rather from observations reported by the appellant’s “coaches”. The appellant believes that the Tribunal,
failing to dismiss this evidence as hearsay, should have given it little
probative value. This, however, is a misunderstanding of the role of the
Tribunal. It was the board’s responsibility to weigh the references provided by
each of the referees based on the integrity of their respective statements. The
fact that the assessment board gave greater weight to Ms. Giroux’s and
Ms. Clément’s versions did not constitute an abuse of authority, and the
Tribunal dealt with the issue reasonably by refraining from reassessing the
evidence available to the board. That being said, in paragraph 41 of its
reasons, the Tribunal also noted why, in its estimation, Ms. Clément could
reasonably act as a referee. This conclusion is based on evidence available to
the Tribunal and is therefore reasonable.
[43]
Overall, I conclude that the Tribunal’s decision
pertaining to the board’s assessment of the reliability of the references from
Ms. Giroux and Ms. Clément is reasonable.
[44]
The appellant also submits that the references
from Ms. Kobrynsky were discredited by the board to the extent of her
being de facto disqualified as a referee. In my opinion, as the Judge
explains in paragraphs 73 to 81 of her reasons, the board’s conclusion
weighing this reference against the other references from Ms. Giroux and
Ms. Clément stems from an intelligible exercise. The Tribunal’s analysis
in this regard is also reasonable.
[45]
The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s
conclusion that Ms. Raymond had no favourable bias toward Ms. Giroux
runs counter to the evidence.
[46]
The appellant stated before us that Ms. Raymond’s
bias led to the striking out of some of her statements in response to an access
to information request that he had filed. The appellant submits that this
information was concealed in order to undermine his ability to meet his burden
of proof, and that the alleged violation of the Access to Information Act,
R.S.C. (1985), chapter A-1 [the AIA] constitutes a violation of public
order and interest.
[47]
Like the Judge, I conclude that the evidence
referred to by the appellant is clearly insufficient to substantiate his
allegations of bias. I therefore agree with the Judge’s statements in
paragraphs 122 to 128 of her reasons. In any event, the links that the
appellant is trying to establish between Ms. Raymond’s alleged bias and
how his access to information request was treated are purely speculative.
(3)
Allegations of discrimination made by the
appellant
[48]
The appellant believes that the Tribunal
correctly identified the principles of law applicable to prima facie
evidence of discrimination. However, he challenges the Tribunal’s application
of these principles and submits that the Tribunal imposed a heavier burden of
proof on him than necessary. According to the appellant, having shown i) that
he possessed three characteristics likely to provide prohibited grounds of
discrimination (race, colour and ethnic background); ii) that Ms. Giroux,
his immediate superior, and Ms. Clément, his director, had refused to
extend his employment as a PRRA officer; and iii) that they had given
favourable references to seven other PRRA officers who otherwise had none of
the appellant’s inherent characteristics; is sufficient to demonstrate prima
facie evidence of discrimination. Moreover, according to the appellant, it
is not reasonable to attribute the insufficient evidence of systemic
discrimination to him when the respondent was in the best position to provide
him with this evidence.
[49]
However, I am of the opinion that such is not
the case. With all due respect for the concern expressed by the appellant
regarding the increased stigmatization and ostracism experienced by racialized
persons (visible minorities) following the rejection of allegations of
discrimination similar to those he made, I want to emphasize that the Tribunal
needed to decide the appellant’s complaint on the basis of the available and
relevant evidence offered to it.
[50]
In this regard, I agree with the Judge’s
reasoning, which is found in paragraphs 144 to 157 of her reasons.
Contrary to what the appellant claims, the Tribunal did not fail to take any
relevant and determining evidence into account. As well, the burden to produce
sufficient evidence of discrimination was incumbent upon the appellant, and any
insufficiency of evidence must be attributed to him.
IV.
Conclusion
[51]
Because the standards of review were correctly
applied by the Judge, and because there are no errors in the Tribunal’s
decision justifying our intervention, I propose that this appeal be dismissed
with costs set at $1,500.00, including taxes and disbursements.
“A.F. Scott”
“I agree.
Johanne Gauthier J.A.”
“I agree.
Yves de Montigny, J.A.”
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