Date: 20110919
Docket: A-320-10
Citation: 2011 FCA 257
CORAM: BLAIS
C.J.
EVANS
J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EVANS J.A.
Introduction
[1]
Employees
in the federal public service whom the employer regards as necessary to enable
it to deliver essential services to the public are prohibited from striking
until an essential services agreement (ESA) is in place.
[2]
An ESA
identifies the essential service in which the employees are engaged, sets the
level at which the service will be delivered in the event of a strike, and
defines the numbers, types and specific positions needed to deliver it at the
designated level.
[3]
With one
exception, the components of the ESA can be agreed upon by the parties and, if
agreement is not possible, the Public Service Labour Relations Board (Board)
will determine the disputed item. The exception is the level of service. This
is an “exclusive right” of the Employer and can be neither the subject of
bargaining nor determined by the Board.
[4]
Employees occupying
positions needed to enable the employer to deliver an essential service may not
strike. The statutory ESA scheme is administered by the Board and is designed
to produce an appropriate balance between the right of employees to strike and
the right of the public to receive essential services.
[5]
The
question raised in this case is whether the Board has authority to review the
employer’s determination of the level of service to be provided by employees if
there is a strike, even though this is an “exclusive right” of the employer,
and the Board is prohibited from requiring the employer to change it.
[6]
The Attorney
General of Canada representing the Treasury Board (Employer) has made an application
for judicial review to set aside a decision of the Board (Board), dated August
19, 2010 (2010 PSLRB 88). In that decision, the Board held that it has
jurisdiction under section 36 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act,
S.C. 2003, c. 22 (Act) to determine if the Employer abused its discretion in
setting the level of the essential services to be provided during a strike by a
particular group of public service employees.
[7]
The issue
arose from a request under paragraph 40(1)(h) of the Act by the
employees’ bargaining agent, the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), that
the Employer disclose documentation relating to the bases and decision-making
process of the Employer’s decision that essential services would be provided at
the level of 100%. This request for disclosure was made following applications
to the Board under subsection 123(1) of the Act to determine the items of an ESA
on which the parties were unable to reach agreement.
[8]
In the decision under
review – one of several rendered by the Board in the course of the protracted
disputes between the parties over the content of an ESA – the Board held that section
120 of the Act did not confer on the Employer a legally absolute right to set
the level of service, and that section 36 of the Act enabled the Board to
determine whether the Employer’s exercise of its right under section 120
constituted an abuse of discretion. Sections 36 and 120 provide as follows.
|
36. The Board administers this Act
and it may exercise the powers and perform the functions that are
conferred or imposed on it by this Act, or as are incidental to the attainment
of the objects of this Act, including the making of orders requiring
compliance with this Act, regulations made under it or decisions made in
respect of a matter coming before the Board.
120. The employer has the exclusive
right to determine the level at which an essential service is to be provided
to the public, … including the extent to which and the frequency with
which the service is to be provided. Nothing in this Division is to be
construed as limiting that right.
|
36. La commission met en oeuvre la
présente loi et exerce les pouvoirs et fonctions que celle-ci lui confère
ou qu’implique la réalisation de ses objets, notamment en rendant des
ordonnances qui exigent l’observation de la présente loi, des règlements pris
sous le régime de celle-ci ou des décisions quelle rend sur les questions qui
lui sont soumises.
120. L’employeur a le droit exclusif
de fixer le niveau auquel un service essentiel doit être fourni à tout ou
partie du public, notamment dans quelle mesure et selon quelle fréquence il
doit être fourni. Aucune disposition de la présente section ne peut être
interprétée de façon à porter atteinte à ce droit.
|
The provisions of the Act relevant to this application for
judicial review are set out in Appendix “A” to these reasons.
[9]
In my opinion, the
Board’s decision is reasonable, and there is no basis on which the Court may
interfere with it.
Background
[10]
The
employees in question work as PM-01 Citizen Service Officers (CSOs) at Service
Canada Centres. Among other things, they provide advice and assistance to
members of the public claiming benefits under federal income security programs
(Employment Insurance, Canada Pension Plan, and Old Age Security/Guaranteed
Income Supplement).
[11]
Until an ESA
is in place, employees are prohibited from striking if they belong to a
bargaining unit in respect of which a notice has been served under section 122
of the Act that the employer considers that they occupy positions necessary for
the employer to provide essential services: paragraph 196(f). Such a
notice was served with respect to the CSOs at the Service Canada Centres.
[12]
The first
step in the process of concluding an ESA is to identify what services are
essential. The parties could not agree on this and PSAC made an application to
the Board for a determination of the issue. In that proceeding, the Employer
took the position that every aspect of the programs on which the CSOs were
employed constituted essential services. However, in a decision dated April 28,
2009 (2009 PSLRB 55), the Board rejected this argument and identified the
aspects of the CSOs’ work that it determined related to the Employer’s delivery
of essential services. The Board directed the Employer to determine the level
at which those services were to be provided in the event of a strike.
[13]
In a
letter dated June 22, 2009, the Employer advised PSAC that it had determined
that the CSOs spent 77% of their working time on the delivery of essential
services, which would be provided at 100% during a strike. In a letter of
September 29, 2009, PSAC asked the Board to convene a case management
conference to address issues in dispute between the parties following the
Employer’s determination of the level of service. The Board arranged a hearing
to identify the types, numbers and specific PM-01 CSO positions at the Service
Canada Centres needed to enable the Employer to provide, at the level that it
had determined, the services that the Board had identified as essential.
[14]
In a
letter of February 16, 2010, PSAC queried the figure of 77% because the
Employer had provided evidence that only about 72% of CSOs’ work involved the
delivery of essential services. PSAC requested an explanation of this
difference, as well as documentation relating to the Employer’s decision to set
the level of service at 100%, and the process by which the decision was made.
[15]
The
Employer refused the request, stating that it was under no obligation to
provide information about setting the level of service, because section 120
confers on the Employer an exclusive right to determine the level in the public
interest and the Board has no jurisdiction to review its exercise. At the case
management conference, PSAC provided the Board with a copy of its request for
the disclosure.
[16]
After
considering the positions taken by the parties, the Board decided to use the
scheduled hearing to consider submissions from the parties on two questions.
First, was the information requested by PSAC arguably relevant to a decision
that the Board had jurisdiction to make? Second, does the Board have
jurisdiction to consider if the Employer complied with the Act when it
determined the level at which the essential services would be provided to the
public in the event of a strike by members of the bargaining unit?
[17]
Having heard
the parties’ representations on these questions, the Board requested further
written submissions on an additional question: does section 36 of the Act
enable the Board to inquire into the manner in which the Employer had exercised
its “exclusive right” under section 120 to determine the level of essential
services to be provided?
Decision of the Board
[18]
In its written
submissions to the Board, the Employer argued that section 120 conferred an
exclusive right on it to set the level of service, and that subsections 123(4)
and 127(4) expressly prohibit the Board from changing the level of service as determined
by the Employer. Consequently, it said, since the Employer’s right was
exclusive, its exercise was beyond the scrutiny of the Board. Accordingly, because
the Board could not review the Employer’s decision respecting the level of
service, it could not order the Employer to disclose documents related to it.
[19]
However, it appears
that in oral argument the Employer retreated somewhat from this position. Thus,
the Board noted in its reasons (para. 132):
As the
applicant [PSAC] pointed out in rebuttal, the respondent [Employer] did not
specifically dispute that the exercise of discretion under section 120 of the
Act must be used for a proper purpose or that a discretion exercised in bad
faith is a nullity.
Despite
this ambiguity in the Employer’s position, the Board set out as follows the
issues that it had to decide (para. 133):
In the end, the respondent’s position
rests principally upon the wording of section 120 of the Act. Either I
accept the respondent’s basic argument that the wording of section 120 is so
plain and unambiguous as to admit no possibility that the respondent’s exercise
of discretion using its “exclusive right” may be reviewed or I find that
administrative principles designed to prevent the abuse of discretion must
apply, to some extent at least, regardless of the wording of section 120. If
such principles apply, some authority must be able to review the respondent’s
decision if an issue of compliance with those principles arises.
[20]
The Board held that,
although “exclusive”, the Employer’s right to determine the level at which an
essential service would be provided is not absolute. The statutory language was
insufficient to rebut the presumption that Parliament does not intend to
delegate legally unlimited powers that affect the rights and interests of
individuals. The Board further held that Parliament could not be taken to have
authorized the Employer to exercise its “exclusive right” in breach of the administrative
law principles developed by the courts for reviewing the legality of the
exercise of statutory discretion by a public body or official, including the
rules against fettering and acting for a purpose not authorized by the Act.
[21]
As for the source of
its authority to review, the Board found (para. 145) that subsection 123(3)
of the Act did not enable it to review the Employer’s exercise of discretion
under section 120, because subsection 123(3) only applied to items of an ESA that
were capable of being resolved consensually by the parties. The level of
service is not such an item because its determination is an exclusive right of
the Employer.
[22]
However, the Board
held that section 36 gave it jurisdiction to review the Employer’s decision for
abuse of discretion, as a function “incidental to the attainment of the objects
of this Act”. The Board reasoned as follows (para. 159):
… based on the Board’s own prior
findings, administering the ESA regime in accordance with the objects of the
Act requires preserving the balance between the public interest of receiving
essential services and the right of employees to strike. Abuse by the employer
of its discretion under section 120 could compromise that balance by
undercutting the integrity of a determination that is vital to the ESA
negotiation process. The result could redound to the detriment of effective
labour-management relations that, according to the preamble of the Act, “…
improve the ability of the public service to serve and protect the public
interest …”
[23]
The Board further supported
its interpretation of section 36 by noting that, if it did not have the
authority to review the Employer’s exercise of discretion, a bargaining agent wishing
to challenge its legality would have to make an application for judicial review.
It concluded (para. 166) that strong policy reasons supported the Board’s resolving
at first instance disputes over the Employer’s exercise of discretion. These
include the avoidance of undue delays in the determination of disputes, and the
Board’s superior expertise in understanding the interplay between the “level of
service” and the other components of an ESA (such as the number and types of
position required to provide the essential service at the determined level) that
are within the Board’s jurisdiction to decide if the parties cannot agree.
[24]
The Board did not
attempt to describe the precise scope of its power to review section 120
decisions for abuse of discretion. However, while it referred to several of the
grounds on which courts may impugn the exercise of discretion, the Board also
indicated that its intervention was likely to be rare. Moreover, even if it
found that the Employer had abused its discretion under section 120, the Board
could only remit the matter to the Employer to re-determine in accordance with
the Act, because subsections 123(4) and 127(4) prohibited it from requiring the
Employer to change the level of service determined by the Employer: see paras. 134-37,
and 167.
[25]
In the decision under
review, the Board declined to rule on the merits of PSAC’s disclosure request
without first affording the parties an opportunity to reach an agreement on
whether the documents requested by PSAC were arguably relevant to the propriety
of the Employer’s exercise of its right under section 120. However, when they were
unable to reach an agreement, they returned to the Board to make submissions on
disclosure.
[26]
In a decision dated
August 9, 2011 (2011 PSLRB 102), the Board ordered the Employer to disclose
specified categories of documents, even though PSAC had not alleged a specific abuse
of discretion by the Employer to which the documents sought were arguably
relevant. This decision, including, in particular, the Board’s interpretation
of the decision under review in the present proceeding, is not the subject of
the present application for judicial review, and nothing in these reasons is
intended to address the issues that it raises.
Issues
and Analysis
(i) standard of review
[27]
The principal
question in dispute in this application for judicial review is the
interpretation of section 120 of the Act. While conceding that the Board’s
interpretation of its enabling statute is normally entitled to judicial
deference, counsel for the Employer argued that the Board’s decision is
reviewable on a standard of correctness because whether the Board may review
the level of service set by the Employer in the exercise of its “exclusive
right” is a jurisdictional issue.
[28]
I do not agree. True,
in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para. 59 (Dunsmuir), the Supreme Court of Canada
left open the possibility that a specialist tribunal must correctly interpret a
provision of its enabling statute that raises a “true question of jurisdiction
or vires” because it requires the tribunal to “explicitly determine
whether its statutory grant of power gives it authority to decide a particular
matter”. However, in the same paragraph the Court also stated that few
provisions of a tribunal’s enabling statute should be regarded as “jurisdictional”
in this sense. See also Nolan v. Kerry (Canada) Inc., 2009 SCC 39, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 678 at para. 34.
[29]
Since Dunsmuir was decided, this Court has
consistently reviewed on a standard of reasonableness the interpretation by labour
boards and adjudicators of provisions of their enabling legislation, and has declined
to characterize them as jurisdictional: see, for example, Public Service
Alliance of Canada v. Canadian Federal Pilots Association, 2009 FCA 223,
[2010] 3 F.C.R. 219; Canada (Attorney General) v. Professional Institute of
the Public Service of Canada, 2011 FCA 20, 414 N.R. 256; Amos v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2011 FCA 38, 417 N.R. 74; Public Service Alliance of
Canada v. Senate of Canada, 2011 FCA 214.
[30]
More
recently, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have delivered the coup de
grâce to the notion of an abstract category of a priori
“jurisdictional” provisions in a specialist adjudicative tribunal’s enabling
statute, the interpretation of which is subject to correctness review. In Smith
v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160 at para. 36 (Smith),
the Court rejected the argument that the meaning of “costs” in an enabling
statute was a jurisdictional question, because the tribunal had “the authority
to make the inquiry”, that is, to interpret the word “costs”.
[31]
Since all
adjudicative administrative tribunals, including the Board, are presumed to
have authority to interpret their own legislation, they have “the authority to
make the inquiry” as to the meaning of its provisions. Hence, it follows from Smith
that the interpretation of a provision in such a tribunal’s enabling statute
cannot be subject to review for correctness because the provision is
“jurisdictional” in the Dunsmuir sense.
[32]
I do not agree with
the submission of counsel for the Employer that it is material to the standard
of review that
the Board characterized as “jurisdictional” the question of whether it could review
for abuse of discretion the Employer’s exercise of its right to set the level
of essential services.
[33]
None of
this to say, of course, that a specialist adjudicative tribunal’s
interpretation of every provision of its “home” statute attracts judicial
deference. Dunsmuir identified two specific exceptions to the general
rule that tribunals’ interpretation of their enabling legislation is reviewable
only for unreasonableness. First, a tribunal must correctly decide questions of
general law that raise issues of central importance to the legal system as a
whole and are outside the tribunal’s specialized area of expertise (paras. 55
and 60). Second, judicial deference does not apply to a tribunal’s
interpretation of a statutory provision demarcating the jurisdiction of two
administrative tribunals (para. 61). In addition, it is implicit in the Supreme
Court’s previous jurisprudence, considered in R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22,
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 at paras. 49-77, that a reviewing court must determine on
the correctness standard whether a tribunal’s enabling statute empowers it to
decide constitutional challenges to the validity of its legislation.
[34]
These
exceptions do not apply to the present case. Since it is not disputed that the
Board has the authority to interpret the relevant provisions of the Act, the
Court may only intervene if satisfied that the Act cannot reasonably be
interpreted to permit the Board to decide if the Employer abused its discretion
under section 120 by exercising it in breach of an administrative law
principle.
[35]
That
reasonableness is the applicable standard of review in the present case is
further strengthened by the following three considerations: first, the strong
preclusive clause in section 51 of the Act; second, the considerable judicial
deference historically afforded to labour boards in the performance of their
functions because of their extensive expertise in labour relations and the
importance of minimising delays in the resolution of labour disputes; and,
third, the relevance of the Board’s labour relations expertise to the
interpretation of the statutory provisions governing ESAs which require it to balance
the right of employees to strike and the public’s right to receive essential
services.
(ii) was the Board’s decision unreasonable?
[36]
The
Employer argued in its memorandum of fact and law that the Board had no
jurisdiction to review the exercise of the Employer’s determination of the
level of essential services to be provided in the event of a strike. However,
as appears to have happened at the Board hearing, the Employer conceded in oral
argument before the Court that the power under section 120 was not absolute and
could not lawfully be exercised in bad faith or otherwise contrary to the Act. I
understood counsel also to agree that, if the Employer’s discretion is not
absolute, section 36 enables the Board to review its exercise in the context of
a section 123 application to determine disputed components of an ESA.
[37]
I have not
found it easy to identify the precise basis on which the Employer is now
attacking the Board’s decision. However, according to counsel, the Employer is concerned
by the Board’s failure to define with sufficient specificity which of the
principles of administrative law apply to the Board’s review of the exercise by
the Employer of its right to set the level at which essential services would be
provided. Counsel suggested that the duty of procedural fairness, for example,
was inapplicable.
[38]
As was
pointed out from the Bench during the hearing, however, it would be
inappropriate for the Court to attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of
the scope of the Board’s power to review the Employer’s exercise of discretion
under section 120 for abuse of discretion, particularly since PSAC has not
alleged a breach of any specific administrative law principle in the Employer’s
setting the level of service at 100%. The applicability of any of these
principles, including the duty of fairness, to a section 120 determination is
to be worked out by the Board on a case by case basis, subject to judicial
review in this Court.
[39]
As is
apparent from the following (para. 139), the Board was alert to the importance
of context in determining the scope of its power to review.
If the Board has the
authority to review the respondent’s actions under section 120 of the Act … it
will have to consider the specific circumstances surrounding an allegation that
discretion has been abused and will have to define in more concrete terms how
to exercise its review authority in those circumstances. Issues such as the
burden of proof and the standard of proof would be among the important matters
to be decided. In my view, a review would be an unusual and exceptional
occurrence. There should be no expectation that employer determinations under
section 120 are to be routinely subject to scrutiny by a reviewing authority.
[40]
In my
opinion, it cannot be said that the Board’s decision was unreasonable because, in
a case in which no allegation of abuse had yet been made, it did not define
precisely the scope of its power to review decisions made under section 120.
[41]
In view of
counsel’s concessions, it is not necessary to say more about the decision under
review in the present application. Nonetheless, I want to make it clear that in
my view the Board’s reasons are thoughtful and thorough, and provide no basis
for impugning the reasonableness of its decision that it has statutory
authority to review the Employer’s decision of the level of service for abuse
of discretion.
Conclusions
[42]
For these
reasons, I would dismiss the Attorney General’s application for judicial review
with costs.
“John
M. Evans”
“I
agree
Pierre
Blais C.J.”
“I
agree
Eleanor
R. Dawson J.A.”
APPENDIX
“A”
|
Public
Service Labour Relations Act,
S.C. 2003, c.
22
36. The Board
administers this Act and it may exercise the powers and perform the functions
that are conferred or imposed on it by this Act, or as are incidental to the
attainment of the objects of this Act, including the making of orders
requiring compliance with this Act, regulations made under it or decisions
made in respect of a matter coming before the Board.
40.(1) The
Board has, in relation to any matter before it, the power to
…
(h)
compel, at any stage of a proceeding, any
person to produce the documents and things that may be relevant;
…
51.(1) Subject
to this Part, every order or decision of the Board is final and may not be
questioned or reviewed in any court, except in accordance with the Federal
Courts Act on the grounds referred to in paragraph 18.1(4)(a), (b)
or (e) of the Act.
…
(3) Except as
permitted by subsection (1), no order, decision or proceeding of the Board
made or carried on under or purporting to be made or carried on under this
Part may, on any ground, including the ground that the order, decision or
proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Board to make or carry on or
that, in the course of any proceeding, the Board for any reason exceeded or
lost its jurisdiction,
(a)
be questioned, reviewed, prohibited or
restrained; or
(b)
be made the subject of any proceedings in
or any process of any court, whether by way of injunction, certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise.
120. The
employer has the exclusive right to determine the level at which an essential
service is to be provided to the public, or a segment of the public, at any
time, including the extent to which and the frequency with which the service
is to be provided. Nothing in this Division is to be construed as limiting
that right.
123.(1) If the
employer and the bargaining agent are unable to enter into an essential
services agreement, either of them may apply to the Board to determine any
unresolved matter that may be included in an essential services agreement.
The application may be made at any time but not later than
(a)
15 days after the day a request for
conciliation is made by either party; or
(b)
15 days after the day the parties are
notified by the Chairperson under subsection 163(2) of his or her intention
to recommend the establishment of a public interest commission.
(2) The Board
may delay dealing with the application until it is satisfied that the
employer and the bargaining agent have made every reasonable effort to enter
into an essential services agreement.
(3) After
considering the application, the Board may determine any matter that the
employer and the bargaining agent have not agreed on that may be included in
an essential services agreement and make an order
(a)
deeming the matter determined by it to be
part of an essential services agreement between the employer and the
bargaining agent; and
(b)
deeming that the employer and the
bargaining agent have entered into an essential services agreement.
(4) The order
may not require the employer to change the level at which an essential
service is to be provided to the public, or a segment of the public, at any
time, including the extent to which and the frequency with which the service
is to be provided.
127.(4) The
order may not require the employer to change the level at which an essential
service is to be provided to the public, or a segment of the public, at any
time, including the extent to which and the frequency with which the service
is to be provided.
196. No
employee shall participate in a strike if the employee
…
f)
is included in a bargaining unit for which
the process for resolution of a dispute is conciliation and in respect of
which a notice to enter into an essential services agreement has been given
under section 122 by the employer or the bargaining agent for the bargaining
unit, and no essential services agreement is in force in respect of the
bargaining unit;
|
Loi sur les
relations de travail dans la fonction publique
L.C. 2003, ch. 22
36. La
Commission met en œuvre la présente loi et exerce les pouvoirs et fonctions
que celle-ci lui confère ou qu’implique la réalisation de ses objets,
notamment en rendant des ordonnances qui exigent l’observation de la présente
loi, des règlements pris sous le régime de celle-ci ou des décisions qu’elle
rend sur les questions qui lui sont soumises.
40.(1) Dans le
cadre de toute affaire dont elle est saisie, la Commission peut :
[…]
h)
obliger, en tout état de cause, toute
personne à produire les documents ou pièces qui peuvent être liés à toute
question dont elle est saisie;
[…]
51.(1) Sous
réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, les ordonnances et les
décisions de la Commission sont définitives et ne sont susceptibles de
contestation ou de révision par voie judiciaire qu’en conformité avec la Loi
sur les Cours fédérales et pour les motifs visés aux alinéas 18.1(4)a),
b) ou e) de cette loi.
[…]
(3) Sauf
exception prévue au paragraphe (1), l’action – décision, ordonnance ou
procédure – de la Commission, dans la mesure où elle est censée s’exercer
dans le cadre de la présente partie, ne peut, pour quelque motif, notamment
celui de l’excès de pouvoir ou de l’incompétence à une étape quelconque de la
procédure :
a)
être contestée, révisée, empêchée ou
limitée;
b)
faire l’objet d’un recours judiciaire,
notamment par voie d’injonction, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de quo
warranto.
120.
L’employeur a le droit exclusif de fixer le niveau auquel un service
essentiel doit être fourni à tout ou partie du public, notamment dans quelle
mesure et selon quelle fréquence il doit être fourni. Aucune disposition de
la présente section ne peut être interprétée de façon à porter atteinte à ce
droit.
123.(1) S’ils
ne parviennent pas à conclure une entente sur les services essentiels,
l’employeur ou l’agent négociateur peuvent demander à la Commission de
statuer sur toute question qu’ils n’ont pas réglée et qui peut figurer dans
une telle entente. La demande est présentée au plus tard :
a)
soit quinze jours après la date de
présentation de la demande de conciliation;
b)
soit quinze jours après la date à laquelle
les parties sont avisées par le président de son intention de recommander
l’établissement d’une commission de l’intérêt public en application du
paragraphe 163(2).
(2) La
Commission peut attendre, avant de donner suite à la demande, d’être
convaincue que l’employeur et l’argent négociateur ont fait tous les efforts
raisonnables pour conclure une entente sur les services essentiels.
(3) Saisie de
la demande, la Commission peut statuer sur toute question en litige pouvant
figurer dans l’entente et, par ordonnance, prévoir que :
a)
sa décision est réputée faire partie de
l’entente;
b)
les parties sont réputées avoir conclu une
entente sur les services essentiels.
(4)
L’ordonnance ne peut obliger l’employeur à modifier le niveau auquel un
service essentiel doit être fourni à tout ou partie du public, notamment dans
quelle mesure et selon quelle fréquence il doit être fourni.
127.(4)
L’ordonnance ne peut obliger l’employeur à modifier le niveau auquel un
service essentiel doit être fourni à tout ou partie du public, notamment dans
quelle mesure et selon quelle fréquence il doit être fourni.
196. Il est
interdit au fonctionnaire de participer à une grève :
[…]
f)
s’il appartient à une unité de négociation
pour laquelle le mode de règlement des différends est le renvoi à la
conciliation, que l’employeur ou l’agent négociateur de l’unité de négociation
a donné l’avis au titre de l’article 122 en vue de la conclusion d’une
entente sur les services essentiels et qu’aucune entente de ce genre n’est en
vigueur à l’égard de cette unité de négociation;
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