SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
City of Montréal
Appellant
and
Montreal Port
Authority
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney
General of Canada,
Federation
of Canadian Municipalities
and
City of Toronto
Interveners
And Between:
City of Montréal
Appellant /
Respondent on cross‑appeal
and
Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation
Respondent /
Appellant on cross‑appeal
‑ and ‑
Attorney
General of Canada,
Federation
of Canadian Municipalities
and
City of Toronto
Interveners
Official English Translation
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish,
Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 50)
|
LeBel J. (McLachlin C.J. and
Binnie, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
concurring)
|
______________________________
Montréal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority, 2010 SCC 14,
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 427
City of Montréal Appellant
v.
Montreal Port Authority Respondent
and
Attorney
General of Canada,
Federation of
Canadian Municipalities and
City of Toronto Interveners
- and -
City of
Montréal Appellant/Respondent
on
cross‑appeal
v.
Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation Respondent/Appellant
on
cross‑appeal
and
Attorney
General of Canada,
Federation of
Canadian Municipalities and
City of Toronto Interveners
Indexed as: Montréal (City) v. Montreal Port
Authority
2010 SCC 14
File Nos.: 32881, 32882.
2009: December 16; 2010: April 15.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel,
Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of
appeal
Municipal law — Taxation — Real property tax —
Payments made by federal Crown corporations in lieu of real property tax —
Municipality establishing variable‑rate property tax system — New system
taking into account losses of income resulting from abolition of occupancy tax
on commercial and professional premises — Two federal Crown corporations that
did not previously make payments in lieu of occupancy tax deducting amount
equivalent to that tax from their payments — Validity of decisions of these
corporations regarding calculation of their payments in lieu of real property
taxes — Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M‑13 — Crown
Corporation Payments Regulations, SOR/81‑1030.
Crown law — Immunity from taxation — Real property
tax — Payments made by federal Crown corporations in lieu of real property tax
established by municipalities — Validity of decisions of two Crown corporations
regarding calculation of their payments in lieu of real property taxes.
Administrative law — Judicial review — Standard of
review — Statutory discretion — Discretion to be exercised by federal Crown
corporation in determining what tax rate it will use in calculating payments to
be made in lieu of real property taxes established by municipality — Two Crown
corporations fixing tax rate they considered appropriate — Applicable standard
of review — Whether rules governing payments in lieu of taxes have been
interpreted and applied in way that creates basis for application for judicial
review.
Before 2003, the City of Montréal collected property
taxes on all taxable immovables within its territory, together with an
occupancy tax on occupants of non‑residential immovables who engaged in
commercial or professional activities. As Crown corporations included in
Schedule III to the Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act (“PILT Act ”),
the MPA and the CBC made payments in lieu in respect only of the City’s
property taxes. In 2003, following the municipal amalgamations that took place
on the island of Montréal, the City abolished the occupancy tax and established
a variable‑rate property tax that would enable it, inter alia, to
recover the income it would lose after abolishing the former tax. Over the
next few years, the MPA and the CBC refused to pay the amounts claimed by the
City, which were calculated using one of the rates applicable to non‑residential
immovables. In their opinion, one result of the reform of the City’s municipal
taxation system was to have them make PILTs that actually included amounts in
lieu of the occupancy tax. Since they had a broad discretion under the PILT
Act and the Crown Corporation Payments Regulations, the two
corporations fixed tax rates they considered appropriate and deducted amounts
equivalent to the portion of the property tax increase that resulted from the
abolition of the occupancy tax. The MPA also excluded the value of silos and
piers at the port of Montréal from the basis for calculating its PILTs. The
Federal Court allowed the City’s applications for judicial review. It held
that the discretion given to federal Crown corporations to set the appropriate
rate when calculating PILTs did not authorize them to disregard the tax rate
generally applicable to owners of non‑residential immovables, and that
the MPA and the CBC could not deduct the equivalent of the tax abolished by the
City in calculating their PILTs. The court did rule in the MPA’s favour on
excluding the piers from the basis for calculating its PILTs, but not on
excluding the silos. The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the Federal Court’s
decisions and dismissed the applications for judicial review, but it corrected
the tax rate used by the CBC, which was the rate for residential immovables
consisting of fewer than six dwellings.
Held: The appeals should
be allowed and the CBC’s cross‑appeal dismissed.
Because government property is immune from taxation, no
provincial legislation may impose tax liability on property belonging to the
federal Crown. In an attempt to uphold this principle, a system was
established under the PILT Act and the Regulations in which
municipalities expect to receive payments in respect of federal government
property but the payments are made within the statutory and regulatory
framework established by Parliament. Thus, the PILT Act and the Regulations
are designed to reconcile different objectives: tax fairness for
municipalities and the preservation of constitutional immunity from taxation.
The PILT Act and the Regulations reserve a
decision‑making power for Crown corporations that involves determining
what tax rate they will use in calculating their PILTs, and the appropriate
standard of review for their decisions is reasonableness. This standard is
particularly suited to reviewing the exercise of a statutory discretion, since
exercising it can lead to the adoption of varying opinions and solutions, and
on reviewing a decision of this nature, the court must show deference to the
administrative decision‑maker.
In these appeals, neither the transparency nor the
intelligibility of the decisions of the two Crown corporations is in issue,
since they made management decisions and clearly explained the basis for them
to the City. However, there is a fundamental flaw in their interpretation and
application of the PILT Act and the Regulations. The relevant
statutory and regulatory provisions require that the tax rate be calculated as
if the federal property were taxable property belonging to a private owner, and
it is assumed that Crown corporations begin by identifying the tax system that
applies to taxable property in the municipality in order to fix the rate.
Their calculations cannot be based on a fictitious tax system, but must be
based on the system that actually exists at the place where the property in
question is located. Since the occupancy tax was abolished in 2003, the MPA
and the CBC could not reintroduce it in their calculations for an indefinite
period of time or indirectly force the municipality to maintain a tax system it
had changed. The two corporations had to calculate their effective rates
having regard to the fact that the business occupancy tax no longer existed.
The decisions of the MPA and the CBC were consistent neither with the
principles governing the application of the PILT Act and the Regulations
nor with Parliament’s intention. The way they exercised their discretion led
to an unreasonable outcome that justified the exercise of the Federal Court’s
power of judicial review.
The same conclusion applies with respect to the MPA’s
silos. Although silos are containers, they cannot be considered to be
reservoirs, which are excluded from the basis for calculating PILTs pursuant to
Schedule II to the PILT Act. Silos are structures used to store dry
plant products, not liquids. The MPA’s interpretation is consistent neither
with the words of the statute nor with Parliament’s intention. It must
therefore be concluded that the MPA’s interpretation is unreasonable.
It is not necessary to comment on the CBC’s cross‑appeal
concerning the basis adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal for calculating
that corporation’s PILTs. The conclusion in the appeal that the CBC’s decision
was unreasonable suffices to dispose of the cross‑appeal.
Cases Cited
Referred to: Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339; Westbank
First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1999] 3 S.C.R.
134; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2
S.C.R. 817; Art Hauser Centre Board Inc. v. Canadian Union of Public
Employees, Local 882, 2008 SKCA 121, 311 Sask. R. 272; Casino Nova
Scotia v. Labour Relations Board (N.S.), 2009 NSCA 4, 273 N.S.R. (2d) 370.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting municipal taxation, R.S.Q., c. F-2.1, ss. 244.29 [ad. 2000, c. 54, s. 82], 244.30 [idem].
Act to again amend various legislative provisions
respecting municipal affairs, S.Q. 2000,
c. 54, s. 82.
Act to amend the Municipal Grants Act, S.C. 1957, c. 10, s. 1 “effective rate”.
Act to amend the Municipal Grants Act, S.C. 2000, c. 8.
Appropriation Act, No. 7, 1949, S.C. 1949, c. 42.
Constitution Act, 1867,
s. 125 .
Crown Corporation Payments Regulations, SOR/81‑1030 [am. SOR/2001‑494], ss. 2, 5, 6,
7(1), 12.1, 14, 15.
Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F‑7, ss. 18 , 18.1 .
Municipal Grants Act,
S.C. 1951, c. 54, ss. 2, 4.
Municipal Grants Regulations, SOR/50‑54.
Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M‑13, ss. 2 “effective rate”, “property
value”, “real property tax”, “taxing authority”, 2.1, 3(1), 4(1), 9(1)f),
g), 11.1, 15, sch. II, item 10, III, IV.
Authors Cited
Canada. Public Works and Government Services
Canada. Draft Discussion Paper — 1998 Consultation on the Government of
Canada’s Municipal Grants Program and Related Legislation. Ottawa: The
Department, 1998.
Canada. Report of the Joint Technical Committee
on Payments in Lieu of Taxes. Ottawa: The Committee, 1995.
Issalys, Pierre, et Denis Lemieux. L’action
gouvernementale — Précis de droit des institutions administratives, 3e
éd. Cowansville, Québec: Yvon Blais, 2009.
Régimbald, Guy. Canadian
Administrative Law. Markham: LexisNexis, 2008.
APPEALS and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the
Federal Court of Appeal (Létourneau, Noël and Trudel JJ.A.), 2008 FCA 278, 389
N.R. 305, 73 R.P.R. (4th) 159 (p. 204), 301 D.L.R. (4th) 202, 51 M.P.L.R.
(4th) 1, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1319 (QL), 2008 CarswellNat 4330, setting aside
two decisions of the Federal Court, 2007 FC 701, 61 R.P.R. (4th) 168, 314
F.T.R. 250, 36 M.P.L.R. (4th) 205, [2007] F.C.J. No. 949 (QL), 2007
CarswellNat 3494, and 2007 FC 700, 314 F.T.R. 226, 37 M.P.L.R. (4th) 53, [2007]
F.C.J. No. 948 (QL), 2007 CarswellNat 3598. Appeals allowed and cross‑appeal
dismissed.
Luc Lamarre and Vincent
Jacob, for the appellant City of Montréal/respondent on cross‑appeal.
Gilles Fafard and Guy
Régimbald, for the respondent the Montreal Port Authority.
Sylvie Gadoury and Judith
Harvie, for the respondent Canadian Broadcasting Corporation/appellant on
cross‑appeal.
Nathalie Benoit
and René LeBlanc, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Stéphane Émard‑Chabot and Marie‑France Major, for the intervener the
Federation of Canadian Municipalities.
Diana Dimmer and Angus
MacKay, for the intervener the City of Toronto.
English version of the judgment of the Court delivered by
LeBel J. —
I. Introduction
[1]
These two appeals concern the validity of decisions made by two federal
Crown corporations, the Montreal Port Authority (“MPA”) and the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (“CBC”), regarding the calculation of the payments in
lieu of real property taxes (“PILTs”) they make to the City of Montréal. For
the reasons that follow, I find that those decisions were unreasonable. I
would therefore allow the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Federal Court
of Appeal dismissing the City’s applications for judicial review, and restore
the Federal Court’s judgments quashing the respondents’ decisions. I would
also dismiss the CBC’s cross‑appeal concerning the basis adopted by the
Federal Court of Appeal for calculating its PILTs.
II. Origins of the
Cases
[2]
These appeals arise out of the municipal amalgamations that took place
on the island of Montréal starting in 2000. Following a series of events that
I will not discuss, those amalgamations combined most of the municipalities on
the island into the City of Montréal. They also resulted in a major
restructuring of Montréal’s municipal taxation system.
[3]
Before 2003, the City of Montréal collected property taxes on all
taxable immovables within its territory. To the general property tax, it added
a surtax on non‑residential immovables. It also imposed an occupancy tax
on commercial and professional premises. However, that business tax was
imposed prior to the amalgamations in only 10 of the 28 municipalities that
were to become part of the City. As authorized by provincial legislation, the
City abolished the business tax effective at the start of the 2003 fiscal
year. It changed its property tax to recover the amounts it would lose after
abolishing the business tax. It created a property tax system under which
rates varied depending on the purposes for which immovables were used. Immovables
classified as non‑residential were subject to a property tax rate that
was calculated using variable rates based on the classification of property.
[4]
In 2003 and the following years, the City asked the MPA and the CBC to
make PILTs calculated using one of the rates applicable to non‑residential
immovables. The respondents refused to pay the amounts claimed by the City.
The Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M‑13 (“PILT
Act ”), required them to make PILTs because of their status as Crown
corporations. Until that time, they had made payments corresponding to the
property tax on the taxable value of the immovables they owned in Montréal but
had made no PILTs in respect of the business tax. The changes made to the
property tax significantly increased the payments requested by the City (2008
FCA 278, 389 N.R. 305, at para. 16, per Létourneau J.A.). The
MPA decided to reduce its payment in lieu by an amount equivalent to the
portion of the property tax increase that resulted from the abolition of the
business tax, and to exclude the value of silos and piers at the port of
Montréal from the basis for calculating its PILTs. In its opinion, the silos
and piers were not immovables in respect of which it had to make PILTs. The
CBC excluded the amounts corresponding to the City’s recovery of the proceeds
of the abolished business tax and calculated a PILT based on Montréal’s tax
rate for the residual category of property, that is, 1.9522% in 2003 rather
than the 4.1722% claimed by the City. It also maintained that it was entitled
to effect compensation between its PILTs and amounts the City of Montréal owed
it for overpayments. The City disagreed with those decisions and challenged
them by applying to the Federal Court for judicial review under ss. 18 and
18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F‑7 . It
argued that the respondents’ decisions were unlawful and unreasonable.
III. Judicial History
A. Federal Court
[5]
Martineau J. allowed the appellant’s applications for judicial
review and quashed the respondents’ decisions concerning the calculation of
their PILTs (2007 FC 700, 314 F.T.R. 226, and 2007 FC 701, 61 R.P.R. (4th)
168). He did rule in the MPA’s favour on excluding the piers from the basis
for calculating its PILTs, but not on excluding the silos.
[6]
Martineau J. applied the case law on judicial review as it stood
prior to Dunsmuir and Khosa (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339). In his opinion, the relevant
standard of review was correctness. Applying that standard, he found that the
respondents’ decisions were arbitrary and capricious and had even been made
without jurisdiction. He noted that the increase in the property tax rate did
not change the nature of the tax. The discretion given to Crown corporations
to set the appropriate rate when calculating PILTs did not authorize them to
disregard the tax rate generally applicable to owners of non‑residential
immovables in the municipality. In the MPA’s case, Martineau J. also
found that the silos were not exempt federal property and that they had to be
considered in calculating its PILTs, but he excluded the piers from this
calculation.
[7]
Martineau J. referred the matters back to the respondents to have
them set their PILTs for 2003 and 2004 on the basis of effective rates
corresponding to the tax rates applicable to their property as classified. He
added that the MPA and the CBC could not deduct the equivalent of the business
tax abolished by the City of Montréal in making their calculations. The
respondents appealed that judgment to the Federal Court of Appeal.
B. Federal Court of
Appeal (Létourneau, Noël and Trudel JJ.A.)
[8]
Létourneau J.A., writing for a unanimous Court of Appeal,
intervened, setting aside the Federal Court’s decisions and dismissing the
City’s applications for judicial review (2008 FCA 278, 389 N.R. 305). He
applied the standard of correctness to determine whether the respondents had an
administrative discretion in setting the amounts of their PILTs. He found that
they did have such a discretion and that they had exercised it reasonably. In
his opinion, the impugned decisions were consistent with the purpose and the general
scheme of the PILT Act and with Parliament’s intent. However, he
corrected the tax rate used by the CBC, which was actually the rate for
residential immovables consisting of fewer than six dwellings. He held that
the use of that rate was unjustified and that the CBC’s PILTs had to be
calculated in the same manner as the MPA’s. He ruled in the MPA’s favour with
regard to the silos and held that they were not to be included in the
calculation of its PILTs.
IV. Analysis
A. Issues
[9]
In these appeals, the appellant asks that the decisions of
Martineau J. be restored. The CBC, in its cross‑appeal, asks this
Court to vary in part the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal by
authorizing the CBC to return to its original basis for calculating its PILTs,
that is, using the tax rate for residential immovables consisting of fewer than
six dwellings, which was the residual rate provided for in the City of
Montréal’s by‑laws.
[10] The
appellant makes various arguments in support of its appeals. In particular, it
submits that the regulations made under the PILT Act include an unlawful
delegation of the regulatory powers conferred on the Governor in Council.
There is no need to consider this argument, since the validity of the
regulations has not been challenged and since the instant cases can be decided
without considering it. The CBC submits that it may effect compensation
between its PILTs and overpayments allegedly collected by the City. As will be
seen, there is no need to consider this issue in the context of these appeals.
I will limit my analysis to the issues that actually have a bearing on the
outcome of these cases.
[11] To
begin with, the nature of the proceedings brought by the appellant must be
borne in mind. As they are applications for judicial review, I must identify
the standard of review to be applied in reviewing the impugned decisions to
determine whether they are valid. For that purpose, I will consider the system
for setting PILTs, the legal nature of PILTs, and the powers conferred on Crown
corporations and administrators of federal property for determining what
amounts should be paid. I will also summarize the development of municipal
taxation in Quebec and discuss the reform by the City of Montréal of the
taxation system applicable within its territory. However, this analysis must
be prefaced by a brief review of the constitutional principles relating to the
immunity from taxation of the federal and provincial governments in Canada.
B. Immunity of Government Property from
Taxation
[12] One
basic principle must be borne in mind throughout this analysis.
Section 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that property of
the Government of Canada or a provincial government is not liable to taxation
by the other level of government. No provincial legislation may impose tax
liability on property belonging to the federal Crown. The proper functioning
of the federal system requires that each level of government respect the
other’s immunity from taxation (Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia
Hydro and Power Authority, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 134, at paras. 4 and 17).
C. System of Payments
in Lieu of Taxes
[13] Despite
the importance of this principle, however, the federal government was of course
aware that its property forms part of the territorial fabric of the provinces
and municipalities. As owners of real property, the federal government and its
agents receive a range of municipal services that go well beyond the mere
supply of goods like water or electricity.
[14] For
this reason, the federal government created a system to compensate Canadian
municipalities. In short, it wanted its administrators and agents to act as
good residents of the municipalities where federal property is located.
[15] To
ensure that this was done, the federal government gradually established a
system of payments to be made in lieu of the taxes Canadian municipalities
generally collect from their ratepayers. Under this system, municipalities
cannot sue the federal Crown or its agents to collect municipal taxes or
PILTs. However, they can contest decisions by the federal Crown or its agents
regarding the amounts to be paid by bringing the appropriate proceeding in the
proper forum, that is, by applying to the Federal Court for judicial review. The
appeals now before this Court originated in such a proceeding, not in an action
to recover taxes. Thus, the issue is whether the rules governing PILTs have
been interpreted and applied in such a way as to create a basis for an
application for judicial review. I will therefore turn now to the statutory
and regulatory scheme that structures the system of payments in lieu in issue
here.
[16] The
development of the current system began in 1950. Regulations concerning
municipal grants established an initial legal framework for voluntary payments
by the federal government to municipalities (The Municipal Grants
Regulations, SOR/50‑54). Those regulations were made under the 1949
appropriation Act (The Appropriation Act, No. 7, 1949, S.C. 1949,
c. 42). In 1951, Parliament passed legislation that included the
provisions of the Municipal Grants Regulations of 1950 (The Municipal
Grants Act, S.C. 1951, c. 54). Under this Act , the Minister of
Finance of Canada was responsible for determining the “accepted” value of
federal property and the amount of the grants to be paid (ss. 2 and 4 ).
In 1957, the 1951 Act was amended to introduce methods for calculating the
grants that would subsequently be included in the statute and regulations in
force today. The amendments introduced, in particular, the concept of the
“effective rate” of tax, which the Minister was to use in calculating the
grants to be paid in lieu of taxes (An Act to amend the Municipal Grants Act,
S.C. 1957, c. 10). Moreover, that the Minister would have a discretion in
fixing the effective rate was recognized in the very definition of the term:
“effective rate” was defined in the Act as “. . . the rate of tax
that, in the opinion of the Minister, would be applicable to any federal
property in a municipality if that property were taxable property” (s. 1 ).
[17] In
1967, a federal Cabinet directive asked Crown corporations to pay municipal
grants on a basis consistent with the principles established in the Municipal
Grants Act (Record of Cabinet Decision, March 21, 1967, A.R.
No. 32881, vol. 5, at p. 94). In the directive, it was
acknowledged that Crown corporations should retain some discretion in
calculating their payments.
[18] The
legal framework for payments in lieu has since been amended several times. The
statute applicable to the instant cases was enacted and the applicable
regulations made in the early 2000s. I will discuss them now.
D. Legal Framework for
Payments Made in Lieu of Municipal Taxes
[19] There
are two aspects to the statutory and regulatory scheme established by the
Government of Canada for payments in lieu. On the one hand, the PILT Act,
as amended by the Act to amend the Municipal Grants Act, S.C. 2000,
c. 8, applies to payments in respect of “departmental” property owned
directly by the federal Crown and to the calculation of those payments. On the
other hand, the same Act provides that regulations may be made respecting
payments in lieu by Crown corporations and agents of the Crown. Such
regulations have been made, and they apply in the instant cases (Crown
Corporation Payments Regulations, SOR/81‑1030 (“Regulations”),
as amended by SOR/2001‑494).
[20] It
is clear from the PILT Act that Parliament intended to uphold the immunity
of federal Crown property from taxation. Section 15 of the Act provides
that “[n]o right to a payment is conferred by this Act .” Parliament therefore
did not intend to give municipalities the status of creditors of the Crown for
payments in lieu of taxes. Instead, it has, through the PILT Act,
established a system in which municipalities expect to receive payments but the
payments are made within the statutory and regulatory framework that Parliament
established without renouncing the principle of immunity from taxation. Thus,
the PILT Act is designed to reconcile different objectives — tax
fairness for municipalities and the preservation of constitutional immunity
from taxation — that can be attained only by retaining a structured
administrative discretion where the setting of the amounts of payments in lieu
is concerned. For the purpose of establishing those amounts, the PILT Act
must define the relationship between the system for setting payments in lieu,
on the one hand, and the provincial and municipal tax systems, which can vary
from place to place in Canada, on the other.
[21] The
PILT Act establishes a system for compensation to be paid in lieu of
municipal taxes, but those payments do not constitute debts to the provinces or
municipalities. The system remains voluntary in the sense that it does not
limit the Crown’s immunity from taxation. The PILT Act applies to
property of the Crown and of Crown corporations (s. 2). It confirms the
principle that amounts are to be paid in lieu of real property taxes, frontage
or area taxes, and business occupancy taxes. The term “real property tax” is
defined as follows in s. 2 of the PILT Act:
a tax of
general application to real property or immovables or any class of them that is
(a) levied
by a taxing authority on owners of real property or immovables or, if the owner
is exempt from the tax, on lessees or occupiers of real property or immovables,
other than those lessees or occupiers exempt by law, and
(b) computed by applying a rate to all or part of the
assessed value of taxable property; . . .
[22] The
reference point used in the PILT Act is the real property tax
established by a “taxing authority”, which is defined in s. 2 as “(a) any
municipality, province, municipal or provincial board, commission, corporation
or other authority that levies and collects a real property tax . . .
pursuant to an Act of the legislature of a province”. According to the PILT
Act, a payment in lieu corresponds to the product of the effective rate
applicable to the federal property in the taxation year and the property value
of the property (s. 4(1) ). The two concepts applicable to that
calculation — the effective rate and the property value — are defined in the PILT
Act. Section 2 provides that “property value” means a value that, “in
the opinion of the Minister, would be attributable by an assessment authority
to federal property . . . as the basis for computing the amount of
any real property tax that would be applicable to that property if it were
taxable property”. The PILT Act thus confers on the Minister a
discretion to be exercised in determining the property value that will apply in
calculating payments in lieu. The existence of this discretion is also clear
from the definition of the second factor, the “effective rate”: “. . . the rate
of real property tax . . . that, in the opinion of the Minister,
would be applicable to any federal property if that property were taxable
property.” Moreover, s. 2(3) excludes a long and varied list of federal
properties from the basis for computing the payment amounts. In particular,
item 10 of Schedule II to the PILT Act excludes reservoirs and certain
other facilities. The MPA argues that the silos at the port of Montréal can be
considered reservoirs for the purposes of that provision. The Minister is
authorized to make payments that are consistent with this legal framework
(s. 3(1) ). The PILT Act establishes an advisory panel that is
responsible for advising the Minister on the settlement of any dispute with a
taxing authority over the property value or effective rate of tax applicable to
any property (s. 11.1 ). Such disputes are not within the jurisdiction of
the judicial or administrative authorities that would be responsible for
settling them under the relevant provincial law.
[23] The
PILT Act provides that regulations may be made respecting payments made
by Crown corporations in lieu of real property taxes and business occupancy
taxes (s. 9(1)(f) and (g)). Finally, Schedules III and IV
to the PILT Act list the federal Crown corporations and agents of the
federal Crown to which the Regulations apply. The CBC and the MPA
appear in Schedule III. Only the corporations listed in Schedule IV make
payments in lieu of business occupancy taxes.
[24] The
Regulations (as amended by SOR/2001‑494) adapt the provisions of
the PILT Act to the situation of the Crown corporation. The Regulations
provide that the corporations included in Schedule III of the PILT Act must
make payments in lieu of real property taxes (ss. 5 and 6) and that the
ones included in Schedule IV must make payments in lieu of business occupancy
taxes (ss. 14 and 15). A payment in lieu of a real property tax must be
not less than the product of the effective rate of tax and the property value
of the property (s. 7(1)). The Regulations provide that the
effective rate or property value is the rate or value that the corporation
would consider applicable or attributable to its property if that property were
taxable property in the municipality (s. 2). By virtue of s. 12.1 of
the Regulations, the procedure for referring a dispute about the tax
rate or property value applicable to a property to the advisory panel created
under s. 11.1 of the PILT Act also applies to Crown corporations.
E. Development of the City of Montréal’s Tax System
[25] It
is common ground that, prior to 2003, the CBC and the MPA — two corporations
included in Schedule III to the PILT Act, but not in Schedule IV — made
payments in lieu in respect only of the City’s property taxes. In 2003, as I
mentioned above, major changes were made to Montréal’s municipal taxation
structure.
[26] Before
2003, as I have noted, the City imposed property taxes and a business occupancy
tax. However, the new City as of that time included several municipalities
that had not previously imposed a business occupancy tax. In fact, that tax
was collected in only 10 of the City’s 28 sectors. Where the tax was in
effect, it was imposed on occupants of non‑residential immovables who
engaged in commercial or professional activities. Moreover, the property tax
itself had certain distinctive features. The City first imposed a general
property tax on all taxable immovables and then added a surtax on non‑residential
immovables.
[27] In
light of these disparities, the City concluded that it had to thoroughly review
its taxation structure to harmonize the differing tax systems within its
territory and improve efficiency. In 2000, the Quebec National Assembly had
changed the legislative framework for municipal taxation by enacting
legislation that authorized municipalities to adopt between two and five
different property tax rates based on the categories to which immovables
belonged (Act respecting municipal taxation, R.S.Q., c. F‑2.1,
s. 244.29 (added by S.Q. 2000, c. 54, s. 82)). The amendments
did not change the legal nature of the tax, which remained a property tax on
immovables located within municipalities. However, Quebec municipalities could
from that time on adjust the tax rate by applying different rates to the
various categories of immovables established by the legislation: non‑residential
immovables, immovables consisting of six or more dwellings, serviced vacant
land, industrial immovables, and immovables that were unclassified and
therefore part of the “residual” category (s. 244.30).
[28] The
City exercised those regulatory powers. For 2003 and the following fiscal
years, it abolished its business occupancy tax and changed its property tax
structure. It established a variable‑rate property tax that would enable
it, inter alia, to recover the income it would lose after abolishing the
business occupancy tax.
F. Position of the CBC
and the MPA
[29] The
respondents refused to take account of these reforms in calculating their
PILTs. They submit that their effective rate has to be reduced by an amount
equivalent to the portion of the property tax increase that corresponds to the
amount of the former business occupancy tax. In their opinion, they were
reasonable in exercising the discretionary decision‑making power they
have under the PILT Act and the Regulations where the calculation
of their PILTs is concerned. The City disputes this position and submits that
the PILTs were not calculated in accordance with the relevant statutory and
regulatory provisions. This dispute is at the heart of these cases. To
resolve it, I will begin by considering the legal nature of the respondents’
decisions and the standard of review applicable to them in the context of an
application for judicial review under ss. 18 and 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act .
G. Legal Nature of the
Respondents’ Decisions and Applicable Standard of Review
[30] In
this Court, the parties engaged in a lively discussion about the nature of the
respondents’ decisions regarding the determination of their effective rates of
tax. The respondents’ discretion was central to that discussion. The
appellant argued that the discretion invoked by the two corporations is limited
in scope, whereas the corporations argued that it is broad in scope and gives
them great latitude in calculating their PILTs.
[31] The
respondents made their decisions pursuant to the Regulations. The
administrative act they are required to perform involves determining what tax
rate they will use in calculating their PILTs. As we have seen, that
calculation depends on two factors: the effective rate and the property value
of the corporations’ property. The property value of the respondents’ property
is not in issue in either case. The respondents are not challenging the values
established by the taxing authority, the City of Montréal. Aside from the
specific issue of the silos in the MPA’s case, the only point in issue relates
to the tax rate to be used in calculating the respondents’ PILTs.
[32] As
in the PILT Act itself, the Regulations clearly reserve a
decision‑making power for Crown corporations. The definition of
“effective rate” quoted above refers to the rate that a corporation would
consider applicable to an immovable taxed in the municipality if it belonged to
a private owner. This provision thus confirms that Crown corporations have the
power to choose the relevant tax rate for each of their properties. In the language
of Canadian administrative law, such a decision is considered discretionary (Baker
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,
at para. 52; P. Issalys and D. Lemieux, L’action
gouvernementale — Précis de droit des institutions administratives (3rd ed.
2009), at p. 63; G. Régimbald, Canadian Administrative Law
(2008), at pp. 175‑76).
[33] However,
in a country founded on the rule of law and in a society governed by principles
of legality, discretion cannot be equated with arbitrariness. While this
discretion does of course exist, it must be exercised within a specific legal
framework. Discretionary acts fall within a normative hierarchy. In the
instant cases, an administrative authority applies regulations that have been made
under an enabling statute. The statute and regulations define the scope of the
discretion and the principles governing the exercise of the discretion, and
they make it possible to determine whether it has in fact been exercised
reasonably.
[34] Under
the PILT Act and the Regulations, the calculation of PILTs is not
limited to a mechanical application of municipal assessments and the tax rates
adopted by municipalities. First of all, as I have already mentioned, the PILT
Act upholds the principle that the federal Crown is immune from taxation.
The confirmation that the Crown has a decision‑making power in respect of
departmental property and that Crown corporations have such a power in respect
of the property they manage gives effect to this principle. Next, the system
of payments in lieu must be adaptable to a fiscal and legal environment that
varies from one province or municipality where federal property is located to
another.
[35] There
are also practical reasons why managers of Crown property must retain a
decision‑making power where the assessment of that property and the tax
rates applicable to it are concerned. First, disagreements with taxing
authorities about property assessments can occur. As we know, federal
properties are very diverse, and can even be quite distinctive, if not unique
or almost unique in Canada. The assessment exercise can accordingly give rise
to significant technical problems related to the application of the principles
of property assessment and can sometimes lead to inevitable, although
legitimate, disagreements with municipalities. Second, choosing the effective
rate of tax may be difficult at times, particularly where the choice depends on
how the property is classified and the provincial legislation provides for the
possibility of applying different rates depending on the nature of the property
involved. Finally, managers of federal property must retain some latitude so
that they can react to protect federal government interests should
municipalities use their taxing powers in bad faith to specifically target
federal Crown property. The creation of the advisory panel provided for in the
PILT Act to resolve this type of dispute confirms that such problems are
plausible and that Parliament’s intent was to safeguard the principle that the
federal Crown is immune from taxation.
[36] The
conclusion that such a decision‑making power exists resolves the question
of the appropriate standard of review. In the instant cases, the appropriate
standard is reasonableness, which is particularly suited to reviewing the
exercise of a statutory discretion. Where such a discretion exists, exercising
it can lead to the adoption of varying opinions and solutions depending on the
application of the relevant legal principles to the facts of the case, and on
reviewing a decision of this nature, the court must show deference to the
administrative decision‑maker (Khosa, at paras. 59‑60, per
Binnie J.).
[37] The
decisions challenged by the appellant relate to the management of federal Crown
property. They involve acts of administration in respect of which the courts
should, as a general rule, remain deferential. I readily acknowledge that it
is not the role of judges to manage Crown property. In light of this principle,
let us now return to the circumstances in which the discretion was exercised
and how it was exercised in order to determine whether the respondents’
decisions were reasonable or reviewable by the Federal Court.
[38] The
concept of “reasonableness” relates primarily to the transparency and
intelligibility of the reasons given for a decision. But it also encompasses a
quality requirement that applies to those reasons and to the outcome of the
decision‑making process (Dunsmuir, at para. 47); see also,
for example, Art Hauser Centre Board Inc. v. Canadian Union of Public
Employees, Local 882, 2008 SKCA 121, 311 Sask. R. 272, at
para. 33, per Jackson J.A.; Casino Nova Scotia v. Labour
Relations Board (N.S.), 2009 NSCA 4, 273 N.S.R. (2d) 370, at para. 30,
per Fichaud J.A.
[39] Neither
the transparency nor the intelligibility of the corporations’ decisions is in
issue. The respondents made management decisions and clearly explained the
basis for those decisions to the City. And they reiterated those explanations
in argument before this Court. In substance, they submit that they have a
broad discretion under the PILT Act and the Regulations. They
did not calculate their PILTs in the manner requested by the City for 2003 or
subsequent years. They note that since they are not included in Schedule IV of
the PILT Act, they never made PILTs in respect of the business occupancy
tax. In their opinion, one result of the reform of Montréal’s municipal
taxation system was to have them make PILTs that actually included amounts in
lieu of the business occupancy tax. In this situation, the corporations, in
fixing the tax rates they considered appropriate, could, and even had to,
deduct from their PILTs amounts equivalent to the portion of the property tax
increase that resulted from the abolition of the business tax. As well, the
MPA considered the silos at the port of Montréal to be reservoirs that were
excluded from the basis for calculating its payments in lieu.
[40] However,
there is a fundamental flaw in this interpretation and application of the PILT
Act and the Regulations. As I have indicated, the two corporations
certainly have a discretion. It is clear from the definition of “effective
rate” that Crown corporations have to decide on the appropriate tax rate.
However, they cannot base their calculations on a fictitious tax system they
themselves have created arbitrarily. On the contrary, those calculations must
be based on the tax system that actually exists at the place where the property
in question is located. The PILT Act and the Regulations require
that the tax rate be calculated as if the federal property were taxable
property belonging to a private owner. In s. 2 of the Regulations and
the corresponding provision of the PILT Act, it is assumed that the
corporations begin by identifying the tax system that applies to taxable
property in the municipality in order to establish the property value and
effective rate of tax. They cannot do so on the basis of a system that no
longer exists.
[41] In
these appeals, the relevant tax system is well established. The business
occupancy tax had been abolished in 2003. Under Quebec municipal legislation,
municipalities had the power to impose variable‑rate property taxes. The
City exercised that power. The respondents therefore had to calculate their
effective rates having regard to the fact that the business occupancy tax no
longer existed. They could not reintroduce that tax in their calculations for
an indefinite period of time or indirectly force the municipality to maintain a
tax system it had changed as it was authorized to do under provincial law.
Indeed, the respondents’ position would in practice mean that they would, in
establishing the amounts of their PILTs, be entitled — not only now, but also
10 or 20 years from now — to make increasingly complex and illusory theoretical
calculations based on taxes that had long since disappeared.
[42] The
respondents’ position is also contrary to the objective of the PILT Act and
the Regulations. Parliament intended Crown corporations and managers of
federal property to make payments in lieu on the basis of the existing tax
system in each municipality, to the extent possible as if they were required to
pay tax as owners or occupants.
[43] This
intention to deal with municipalities fairly and equitably can be seen in the
statement of the PILT Act’s purpose set out in the Act itself.
Section 2.1 reads as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to provide for the fair and equitable
administration of payments in lieu of taxes.
Although the Act
confirms both the principle that federal property is immune from taxation and
the voluntary nature of payments in lieu, the intention was that the
calculation of such payments would be consistent with the objective of equity
and fairness in dealing with Canadian municipalities.
[44] This
interpretation is confirmed by the history of the creation of the current
system of payments in lieu. In 1995, a joint technical committee made up of
representatives of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the Treasury
Board Secretariat and the Department of Public Works and Government Services
Canada considered the question of municipal grants or payments in lieu of
taxes. Its report recommended that the calculation of such payments be brought
into line with current principles of property taxation:
As required
by the Municipal Grants Act, the values and rates used to calculate the
payments should be those which would apply to federal properties if they were
taxable, and should be determined in the context of the assessment and taxation
legislation, policies and practices current in the province or territory in
question . . . .
(Report of the Joint Technical Committee on Payments in Lieu of Taxes,
December 28, 1995, at p. 5)
[45] A
Parliamentary paper tabled by the Minister of Public Works and Government
Services before the adoption of the current statutory and regulatory scheme
expressed the same intention as regards the method for calculating PILTs:
The
determination of a grant by multiplying the “effective rate” by the “property
value” ensures that federal payments in lieu of taxes are comparable in amount
to the local taxes paid by other property owners within the municipality.
(Draft Discussion Paper — 1998 Consultation on the Government of
Canada’s Municipal Grants Program and Related Legislation (May 1998), at
p. 5)
[46] Thus,
the purpose of the PILT Act is to establish a system of payments in lieu
that reflects the actual tax situation in the places where federal property is
located. The evidence shows that the Department of Public Works and Government
Services calculated its PILTs for “departmental” property in Montréal as
proposed by the City, as it did not reduce the amounts to take the abolition of
the business occupancy tax into account.
[47] The
respondents’ decisions were consistent neither with the principles governing
the application of the PILT Act and the Regulations nor with
Parliament’s intention. The way they exercised their discretion led to an
unreasonable outcome that justified the exercise of the Federal Court’s power
of judicial review.
[48] The
same conclusion applies with respect to the MPA’s silos. Although silos are
containers, they cannot be considered to be reservoirs. They are structures
used to store dry plant products, not liquids. Parliament did not see fit to
exclude them from the basis for calculating PILTs. The MPA’s interpretation is
not consistent with the words of the statute, with Parliament’s intention or
with any of the ordinary meanings of the words used in Schedule II to the PILT
Act. It must therefore be concluded that the MPA’s interpretation is
unreasonable.
[49] Moreover,
I do not consider it necessary to comment on the CBC’s cross‑appeal. My
conclusion that the CBC’s decision was unreasonable suffices to dispose of its
cross‑appeal. The solution the CBC advocates — which, moreover, was
rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal — is supported neither by the Regulations
nor by the tax by‑laws of the City of Montréal.
V. Conclusion
[50] For
these reasons, I would allow the appellant's appeals, with costs in the appeal
concerning the CBC and without costs in the appeal concerning the MPA. I would
restore all the conclusions of the judgments rendered by Martineau J. of the
Federal Court, but in respect only of the 2004 taxation year in the case of the
MPA. I would refer the matters back to the respondents to recalculate the
payments they make in lieu of real property taxes. I would dismiss the CBC's
cross-appeal with costs.
APPENDIX
Payments in
Lieu of Taxes Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M‑13
2. (1) In this Act ,
. . .
“assessed value” means the value established for any real property or
immovable by an assessment authority for the purpose of computing a real
property tax;
“assessment authority” means an authority that has power by or under
an Act of Parliament or the legislature of a province to establish the assessed
dimension or assessed value of real property or immovables;
. . .
“effective rate” means the rate of real property tax or of frontage or
area tax that, in the opinion of the Minister, would be applicable to any
federal property if that property were taxable property;
. . .
“federal property” means, subject to subsection (3),
. . .
(b) real
property and immovables owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada that are, by
virtue of a lease to a corporation included in Schedule III . . .
under the management, charge and direction of that corporation,
. . .
“property value” means the value that, in the opinion of the Minister,
would be attributable by an assessment authority to federal property, without
regard to any mineral rights or any ornamental, decorative or non‑functional
features thereof, as the basis for computing the amount of any real property
tax that would be applicable to that property if it were taxable property;
2.1 The purpose of this Act is to provide for the fair and
equitable administration of payments in lieu of taxes.
3. (1) The Minister may, on receipt of an application
in a form provided or approved by the Minister, make a payment out of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund to a taxing authority applying for it
(a) in
lieu of a real property tax for a taxation year, and
(b) in
lieu of a frontage or area tax
in respect of
federal property situated within the area in which the taxing authority has the
power to levy and collect the real property tax or the frontage or area tax.
4. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and 5(1) and
(2), a payment referred to in paragraph 3(1)(a) shall not exceed the
product of
(a) the
effective rate in the taxation year applicable to the federal property in
respect of which the payment may be made, and
(b) the
property value in the taxation year of that federal property.
9. (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations
for carrying out the purposes and provisions of this Act and, without
restricting the generality of the foregoing, may make regulations
. . .
(f) respecting
any payment that may be made in lieu of a real property tax or a frontage or
area tax by any corporation included in Schedule III or IV and, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, providing that any payment that may
be made shall be determined on a basis at least equivalent to that provided in
this Act ;
(g) respecting
any payment that may be made in lieu of a business occupancy tax by every
corporation included in Schedule IV;
11. (1) Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament or
any regulations made thereunder,
(a) every
corporation included in Schedule III . . . shall, if it is exempt
from real property tax, comply with any regulations made under paragraph 9(1)(f)
respecting any payment that it may make in lieu of a real property tax or a
frontage or area tax; and
. . .
15. No right to a payment is conferred by
this Act .
Crown Corporation
Payments Regulations, SOR/81‑1030
2. In these Regulations,
. . .
“corporation effective rate” means the rate of real property tax or of
frontage or area tax that a corporation would consider applicable to its
corporation property if that property were taxable property;
“corporation property value” means the value that a corporation would
consider to be attributable by an assessment authority to its corporation
property, without regard to any mineral rights or any ornamental, decorative or
non‑functional features thereof, as the basis for computing the amount of
any real property tax that would be applicable to that property if it were
taxable property.
3. (1) On the coming into force of these Regulations, no
corporation included in Schedule III . . . to the Act that is exempt from real
property tax or a business occupancy tax shall enter into a special arrangement
with a local government, province or other authority to pay an amount in lieu
of such a tax that would be less than the amount that it would pay in
accordance with these Regulations.
7. (1) Subject to
subsection (2), a payment made by a corporation in lieu of a
real property tax for a taxation year shall be not less than the product of
(a) the corporation effective rate in the taxation year
applicable to the corporation property in respect of which the payment may be
made; and
(b) the corporation property value in the
taxation year of that corporation property.
Appeals allowed. Cross‑appeal dismissed.
Solicitors for the appellant City of
Montréal/respondent on cross‑appeal: Brunet, Lamarre,
Montréal.
Solicitors for the respondent the Montreal Port
Authority: de Grandpré Chait, Montréal.
Solicitor for the respondent Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation/appellant on cross‑appeal: Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation — Legal Department, Montréal.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of
Canada: Department of Justice, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the intervener the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities: Lang Michener, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the intervener the City of
Toronto: City of Toronto, Ontario.
A motion to amend judgment was granted on May 21, 2010. The
judgment on this motion amended para. 50 of both versions of the reasons. The
amendments are included in these reasons.