Docket:
IMM-10923-12
Citation: 2013 FC 1218
Ottawa, Ontario, December 4,
2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Kane
BETWEEN:
|
B231
|
Applicant
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The applicant, B231, is a
citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Canada on August 13, 2010, along with 492
other passengers and crew on the MV Sun Sea.
[2]
The applicant asserts that
if he is returned to Sri Lanka, he will face a risk of persecution by reason of
race, nationality, membership in a particular social group and political
opinion. He also asserts that he fears the Sri Lankan armed forces and armed
groups.
[3]
The Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the “Board”) denied his claim
for protection as a Convention refugee and as a person
in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act] on October 3, 2012 .
[4]
He now seeks judicial review
of that decision pursuant to section 72 of the Act.
[5]
For the reasons that follow, the application for
judicial review is dismissed.
Background
[6]
The applicant is a 43 year old Tamil male. The
applicant indicated that his father was killed by the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam [LTTE] in 1978 because he was suspected of being an informer to the
army, due to his work as a mechanic and being forced to repair army vehicles.
The applicant apprenticed as an auto mechanic and in 1986, while purchasing
spare parts, lost his left leg when a bomb exploded near him. The applicant
indicated that he was also forced to repair LTTE vehicles at his garage in Jaffna.
[7]
The applicant fled Jaffna with his family in
1985 and eventually went to India. He returned to Sri Lanka in October 2003 and
opened a workshop in Puttur, Jaffna. The applicant claimed that he was forced
to lend his truck to the LTTE and was later summoned by the army but was let go
without a warning. He also claims that five of his friends were killed on the
street by the army and that the LTTE set off a bomb close to his workshop which
killed two army soldiers.
[8]
Fearing that he would be associated with or
suspected of the bombing, the applicant and his family fled to Colombo. The applicant claims he was extorted and that his wife was robbed by two Sinhalese
men. After 16 months in Colombo, the applicant went to Thailand, where he remained for two and a half years and registered with and obtained a
certificate from the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] as a
refugee. His wife and children remained in Colombo and eventually returned to Jaffna where they continue to live. The applicant boarded the MV Sun Sea in Thailand and arrived in Canada on August 13, 2010.
The decision
[9]
The Board concluded that the applicant was
neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to
section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Act and that his removal to Sri
Lanka would not subject him to a serious possibility of persecution, nor would
he suffer, on a balance of probabilities, a risk to life, a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture.
[10]
The Board found the applicant not to be credible
due to many inconsistencies and contradictions in his oral testimony, his Personal
Information Form [PIF], and his application for refugee protection. The Board
identified the errors, omissions, inconsistencies, and improbabilities about
the applicant’s account that he had to leave Sri Lanka because a bomb exploded
close to his workshop and killed army soldiers. The fact that the event was
omitted in the applicant’s previous interactions with immigration officials,
the lack of corroborating documentary evidence, the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the applicant’s timeline of events, and his apparent panic
and inability to offer any explanation when confronted with these
inconsistencies and omissions, led the Board to conclude that his impetus for
fleeing Sri Lanka was “a total fabrication of his imagination”.
[11]
The Board concluded that, although five people
were killed in Jaffna in April 2006, the applicant did not appear to know them
nor was he even remotely close to them. The Board also found the applicant not
to be credible on the whereabouts of his siblings, about what he did in India, and about his documents. The Board also concluded that the applicant was not wanted
by the authorities as he was able to spend extensive periods of time in Colombo.
[12]
Despite the credibility findings, the Board
acknowledged that even liars can be refugees and assessed the applicant’s
claims on the basis of the remaining credible evidence and on the over 700
pages of documentary evidence.
The applicant’s risk profile
[13]
The Board relied on the July 2010 “UNHCR
Eligibility Guidelines for assessing the international protection needs of
asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka” (the “UNHCR Guidelines”) and found that the
applicant does not fit into any of the risk categories identified by the UNHCR.
[14]
The Board specifically considered the
applicant’s profile as a male Tamil amputee, which attracts greater attention,
but noted that this would not heighten his risk of being associated with the
LTTE because he is not young, had lived with this disability since 1986, and
was born in Colombo. The Board noted that the applicant’s amputation had not
caused him any additional problems in the past. The applicant’s own evidence
was that he had been questioned about his limp but had only been detained on
one occasion and only for 15 minutes. The Board also noted other factors which
led it to find that Sri Lankan authorities were not and would not be interested
in the applicant: he continued to live for up to at least six months in Jaffna
even though he was allegedly wanted for a bombing that killed two army
personnel; he stayed in Colombo for 16 months with only minor incidents of
harassment; and, he exited Sri Lanka without incident using a genuine Sri
Lankan passport.
[15]
The Board analyzed the country condition
documents and noted that the situation had improved even for those who were
previously identified as LTTE supporters. In its analysis, the Board
acknowledged that Sri Lanka has made meaningful, effective, and durable
changes, but that the situation is still far from perfect and that the groups
identified in the UNHCR Guidelines would still be at risk. The Board also
analyzed contrary evidence submitted by the applicant, including a June 12,
2012 report by Amnesty International (the “Amnesty International Report”), and
concluded that, while it states that the MV Ocean Lady and MV Sun Sea
were LTTE human smuggling operations, it is not evidence that all the
passengers onboard those ships were associated with the LTTE. The Board also
found that the Amnesty International Report disclosed what is already known;
that people associated with the LTTE are at risk in Sri Lanka.
[16]
The Board also considered whether the compelling
reasons exception provided by subsection 108(4) of the Act applied.
[17]
Section 108 provides:
108. (1) A claim for refugee
protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a
person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances:
(a) the
person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country
of nationality;
(b) the
person has voluntarily reacquired their nationality;
(c) the
person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the
country of that new nationality;
(d) the
person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the person
left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed
refugee protection in Canada; or
(e) the
reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist.
Cessation of
refugee protection
(2) On
application by the Minister, the Refugee Protection Division may determine
that refugee protection referred to in subsection 95(1) has ceased for any of
the reasons described in subsection (1).
Effect of
decision
(3) If the
application is allowed, the claim of the person is deemed to be rejected.
Exception
(4) Paragraph
(1)(e) does not apply to a person who establishes that there are
compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or
punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country
which they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous
persecution, torture, treatment or punishment.
|
108. (1) Est rejetée la demande d’asile
et le demandeur n’a pas qualité de réfugié ou de personne à protéger dans tel
des cas suivants :
a) il se réclame de nouveau et
volontairement de la protection du pays dont il a la nationalité;
b) il recouvre volontairement sa
nationalité;
c) il acquiert une nouvelle nationalité
et jouit de la protection du pays de sa nouvelle nationalité;
d) il retourne volontairement s’établir
dans le pays qu’il a quitté ou hors duquel il est demeuré et en raison duquel
il a demandé l’asile au Canada;
e) les raisons qui lui ont fait demander
l’asile n’existent plus.
Perte de l’asile
(2) L’asile visé au paragraphe 95(1) est
perdu, à la demande du ministre, sur constat par la Section de protection des
réfugiés, de tels des faits mentionnés au paragraphe (1).
Effet de la décision
(3) Le constat est assimilé au rejet de
la demande d’asile.
Exception
(4) L’alinéa (1)e) ne s’applique pas si
le demandeur prouve qu’il y a des raisons impérieuses, tenant à des
persécutions, à la torture ou à des traitements ou peines antérieurs, de
refuser de se réclamer de la protection du pays qu’il a quitté ou hors duquel
il est demeuré.
|
[18]
The Board noted that the compelling reasons
exception only applies when there has been a determination that the claimant
was a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection and also that the
conditions that led to such a finding no longer exist.
[19]
The Board referred to the “UNHCR’s Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status” (the “UNHCR Handbook”)
which elaborated on the notion of compelling reasons and which noted that “it
is frequently recognized that a person who – or whose family – has suffered
under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to repatriate.”
[20]
The Board found the applicant’s allegations of
past persecution to not be credible, and that there was no credible basis to
find compelling reasons to accept his claim.
Returning Refugees
[21]
The Board accepted that the risk of detention
increases for those returnees with: outstanding arrest warrants, a criminal
record, connection to LTTE, a history of illegal departure from Sri Lanka,
involvement with media or non-governmental organisations, and a lack of an ID
card or other documents. However, the Board found that the applicant did not
fit into any of these groups.
[22]
The Board noted that the UNHCR assists Tamil
refugees who wish to return to Sri Lanka and suggested that the UNHCR would not
do so if they perceive a serious chance of persecution upon return. The Board
also referred to other documentary evidence regarding the treatment of
returning refugees.
Sur Place Claim
[23]
The Board relied on the UNHCR Handbook and concluded
that the applicant is not a sur place refugee.
[24]
The Board noted that a sur place claim
may succeed where an applicant was not a refugee when he departed his country
but, due to a change in circumstances in the country of origin since departure,
or due to the applicant’s activities since departure, the applicant could be at
risk upon return.
[25]
The Board was of the opinion that there was
insufficient evidence suggesting that the applicant would be treated
differently from any other returnees, given his complete lack of association
with the LTTE in the past. In addition, the applicant was not personally
identified as a passenger on the MV Sun Sea nor did a passenger list
exist.
The Issues
[26]
The applicant submits that the decision is
unreasonable because the Board erred: in its credibility findings; in
selectively relying on evidence that the conditions of Tamils in Sri Lanka are
improving and in failing to consider the more recent evidence; in failing to
consider the applicant’s status as a UNHCR refugee; in failing to conduct a
proper analysis of changed country conditions; and, in failing to assess the
applicant’s full risk profile as an amputee with scarring.
Standard of review
[27]
Although the applicant raised an allegation of
procedural fairness, only questions of mixed fact and law have been raised, as
all the issues concern the Board’s assessment of the applicant’s risk profile.
[28]
The standard of review for the Board’s assessment and
findings of credibility, risk and the sur place claims is
reasonableness.
[29]
When reviewing a decision where the standard of reasonableness applies, the role of the
Court on judicial review is to determine whether the Board’s decision “falls
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect
of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190).
There may be several reasonable outcomes and “as long as the process and the
outcome fit comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and
intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view
of a preferable outcome” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,
2009 SCC 12 at para 59, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339).
[30]
The credibility findings of the Board are to be
given significant deference (Lin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
FC 1052 at para 13, [2008] FCJ No 1329). Boards and tribunals are
ideally placed to assess the credibility of refugee claimants (Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 160 NR 315, [1993] FCJ No 732 at para 4 (FCA)).
Credibility
[31]
The applicant submits that even though a refugee
claimant is found to not be credible, the Board must still fully consider and
assess the documentary evidence demonstrating risk to similarly situated
individuals, given that his claim is based on his profile and the treatment of
similarly situated individuals in Sri Lanka today (Maimba v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 226 at para 22, 70 Imm
LR (3d) 305 [Maimba]; Kanesaratnasingham v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 48 at para 8, [2008] FCJ No 61).
[32]
The respondent argues that the Board’s negative
credibility findings are relevant to the circumstances surrounding why he left Sri Lanka and his perceived risk profile. If the applicant’s story is not credible, the
applicant can not simply point to the country conditions in Sri Lanka to support his risk without acknowledging that he does not fit within the
categories of those who are at risk. In other words, the respondent submits
that the applicant must link the country conditions and possible risks to his
particular situation.
[33]
Although the Board reasonably found the
applicant to lack credibility and provided many examples to support its finding,
the negative credibility findings are not determinative.
[34]
As Justice Kelen held in Maimba, above
at para 22, there are instances where the Board ought to consider the risk
profile of a person claiming refugee protection despite finding that the claimant
lacks credibility:
22 Having
reviewed the evidence and the applicant's submissions in this regard, the Court
concludes that the Board erred in its assessment of the documentary evidence.
The case law is clear that when assessing an applicant's objective risk of harm
in returning to their country of origin, there may be instances where, having
accepted the applicant's identity, the objective documentary evidence is such
that the claimant's particular circumstances make him a person in need of protection
despite the fact that the Board has found the claimant lacks credibility: see
Kandiah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 181,
[2005] F.C.J. No. 275 (QL) per Martineau J. However, Mr. Justice Martineau also
states that such assessments are to be made on a case-by-case basis depending
on the nature of the evidence presented in the particular case.
[35]
The Board clearly acknowledged this noting that
“a person can be a refugee and a liar at the same time”. Moreover, the Board
conducted a full analysis of the situation in Sri Lanka for Tamils and assessed
whether or not the applicant’s particular profile would put him at risk if he
were to return.
Did the Board misstate or selectively rely on evidence?
[36]
The applicant submits that the Board’s
conclusions about who is at risk in Sri Lanka is over-simplistic and does not
correspond with reality (Rayappu v The Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration (24 October 2012), Ottawa IMM-8712-11 (FC)). The applicant
referred to some documentary evidence that suggests that there have been
classes of persons who are suspected of being affiliated with the LTTE – Tamil
males from the North, persons with visible scarring, and failed asylum seekers.
[37]
The applicant also submits that the Board
completely misinterpreted some of the evidence including the report of the
International Crisis Group [ICG]. Rather than indicating that the Sri Lankan
government is taking responsibility for its human rights violations, the
applicant submits that the ICG report criticizes efforts on the part of the
government to exonerate itself from human rights atrocities committed by its
forces during the civil war. The applicant also notes another report by the ICG
states that the current Sri Lankan government has rejected the conciliatory
approach of prior governments and has adopted the insurgents’ brutal and
oppressive methods.
[38]
The applicant submits that although the Board is
not required to refer to every piece of evidence, it must consider the evidence
that directly contradicts its ultimate findings (Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ No
1425 [Cepeda-Gutierrez]) and did not do so.
[39]
The applicant noted, in particular:
•
the Board conflated the Tamil community with the
LTTE by stating that the Tamil community has failed to speak out against the
atrocities of the LTTE;
•
regarding the UNHCR Guidelines, the Board
ignored recommendations that all asylum seekers be considered on a case-by-case
basis, given that the improved situation in Sri Lanka is still evolving, and
ignored the UNHCR advice that the most recent country condition evidence should
be relied on;
•
the Board unreasonably discredited evidence
critical of the Sri Lankan Government because it came from TamilNet; and,
•
the Board unreasonably discounted the Amnesty
International Report because of a statement from the Sri Lankan Ministry of
Defence that Amnesty International had taken money from an organization
allegedly to be a front for the LTTE.
[40]
The applicant submits that the Board’s
statement that “the situation is not perfect for Tamils” does not constitute a
balanced assessment of the evidence.
[41]
The respondent submits that the Board considered
a variety of sources, including those that were critical of the current
government’s approach towards Tamils, and noted that many returning Sri Lankan
refugees were questioned and subsequently released.
[42]
The respondent addressed the particular examples
cited by the applicant noting:
•
the Board did not conflate the Tamil community
with the LTTE. Rather, the Board was making a commentary on the fact that the
Tamil community leaders who had supported the LTTE had not spoken out against
the atrocities committed by the LTTE and that both sides of the conflict must
take responsibility for their past activities if reconciliation is to be
successful;
- the Board’s distrust of TamilNet is based on a
bulletin issued by the US Department of State, which linked the
organization to the LTTE and it was open to the Board to make this comment;
- the Board reasonably found the
Amnesty International Report to have stretched the evidence and that not
everyone on board the MV Sun Sea is thought to be LTTE; and,
- the Board fully understood that
the situation in Sri Lanka is not perfect, but assessed the applicant’s
profile based on all the evidence.
The Board did
not selectively rely on or misstate the evidence
[43]
Despite the applicant’s careful scrutiny of the
Board’s decision, I do not agree that the Board selectively relied on
documentary evidence to the exclusion of other evidence painting a bleaker
picture of risk. The Board thoroughly considered the documentary evidence
concerning the situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka and acknowledged the ongoing
concerns, particularly for Tamils who fit a certain profile. The Board,
however, reasonably concluded that the applicant’s particular profile would not
put him at risk if he were to return to Sri Lanka.
[44]
The Board addressed the contrary evidence but
found, for several reasons, that it was not persuasive and chose to “prefer the
documents and guidelines prepared by the UNHCR”.
[45]
The applicant strongly argued that the Board
erred in failing to heed the advice of the UNHCR that the more recent country
condition evidence should be considered.
[46]
I agree with the applicant that the UNHCR is the
foremost authority on the risks faced in the country of origin.
[47]
Therefore, the Board was justified in relying on
the 2010 UNHCR Guidelines which remained unchanged at the date of the hearing
and decision. The Board noted that the previous version of the UNHCR Guidelines
in 2009 called for protection for young male Tamils more generally but had been
superseded by the 2010 UNHCR Guidelines, which note risks to particular people
or categories of people and call for an individualised assessment.
[48]
The relevant parts of the UNHCR Guidelines are:
The
Guidelines contain information on the particular profiles for which
international protection needs may arise in the current context. Given the
cessation of hostilities, Sri Lankans originating from the north of the country
are no longer in need of international protection under broader refugee
criteria or complementary forms of protection solely on the basis of risk of
indiscriminate harm. In light of the improved human rights and security
situation in Sri Lanka, there is no longer a need for group-based protection
mechanisms or for a presumption of eligibility for Sri Lankans of Tamil
ethnicity originating from the north of the country. It is important to
bear in mind that the situation is still evolving, which has made the drafting
of these Guidelines particularly complex.
(at
page 1)
[49]
With respect to the status of recognized refugees:
The status of recognized refugees
should be reviewed only if there are indications, in an individual case, that
there are grounds for cancellation of refugee status which was wrongly granted
in the first instance; revocation of refugee status on the grounds of Article
1F of the 1951 Convention; or cessation of refugee status on the basis of
Article 1C(1-4) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention). UNHCR considers that the current situation in Sri Lanka, although
significantly improved in the last twelve months, does not yet warrant
cessation of refugee status on the basis of Article 1C(5) of the 1951
Convention.
All claims by asylum-seekers
from Sri Lanka should be considered on their individual merits in fair and
efficient refugee status determination procedures and taking into account
up-to-date and relevant country of origin information. UNHCR considers that,
depending on the particular circumstances of the case, some individuals with
profiles similar to those outlined below require a particularly careful
examination of possible risks…
(at page 3)
[…]
At the time of writing, the greatly
improved situation in Sri Lanka is still evolving. UNHCR recommends that all
claims by asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka need to be considered on the basis of
their individual merits in fair and efficient refugee status determination
procedures taking into account up-to-date and relevant country of origin
information. Particular attention is drawn to the profiles outlined in
these Guidelines.
(at page 13)
Emphasis added
[50]
Although the applicant disagrees with the way
the Board has treated the contrary evidence, the Board’s analysis of that
evidence was thorough, balanced and unimpeachable under a reasonableness
standard of review.
[51]
The Board did exactly what the UNHCR advised –
an individual assessment based on the documentary evidence while acknowledging
the mixed evidence and identifying that it preferred to rely on the UNHCR
Guidelines. The Board found that the applicant would not be at risk.
[52]
It is also worth noting that although the
applicant submits that new UNHCR Guidelines were issued a month after the
decision was released, the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines continue to call for an
individual assessment and continue to note that there are particular risk
profiles, including those with suspected ties to the LTTE.
Did the Board err in not considering the applicant’s status as a
UNHCR refugee?
[53]
The applicant submits that the Board failed to
consider his status as a UNHCR refugee and that this error is fatal to the
decision.
[54]
The applicant also argues that the respondent
has attempted to supplement the Board’s decision by referring to the expiry of
the refugee status certificate and by providing reasons that the Board
omitted. The applicant submits that while the certificate has an expiration
date, the refugee status does not expire unless there has been a cessation
proceeding. The applicant also submits that he should have been questioned
about the UNHCR certificate in order to ascertain the basis on which he was
granted refugee status.
UNHCR status
was considered
[55]
The applicant noted the extensive jurisprudence
which highlights the importance of UNHCR refugee status and which requires a
visa officer or the Board to consider the status.
[56]
In Ghirmatsion v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 519 at paras 54-55 and 57-58, 389 FTR
165 [Ghirmatsion], Justice Snider noted:
54 The Applicant
has been recognized as a Convention refugee by UNHCR, as evidenced by a
"blue card" issued August 31, 2009. As I understand it, the blue
identity card shows that the bearer has been individually assessed and is
officially acknowledged by this UN body as a refugee. The Applicant submits
that the Officer erred by failing to give any consideration to the UNHCR status
as a factor relevant to her determination.
55 In carrying
out her responsibilities, the Officer is guided by Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC) Guideline OP 5, "Overseas Selection and Processing of
Convention Refugees Abroad Class and Members of the Humanitarian-protected
Persons Abroad Classes" (August 13, 2009) (OP 5 or the Guidelines). OP
5 makes extensive reference to the UNHCR and the relationship between the
duties of a visa officer and the UNHCR. The Guidelines set out the general
context of the CIC/UNHCR relationship in section 6.53:
The office of the
UNHCR is a humanitarian and non-political organization with a mandate to
protect refugees and promote solutions to their problems. Solutions may include
voluntary repatriation, local integration and, in a minority of cases,
resettlement in a third country.
Local UNHCR offices
identify persons in need of resettlement and refer them to visa offices.
The factors that
the UNHCR takes into consideration when it refers a case for resettlement are
described in detail in the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, a copy of which can be found
in all visa offices. The officer should be familiar with these factors. The
text of the handbook is also available from the UNHCR Web site at
http://www.unhcr.org/.
The office of the
UNHCR is an extremely important partner in Canada's resettlement program. Solid
working relations between Canadian visa offices and local UNHCR offices are
vital to the success of the program. Officers should ensure that their local
UNHCR office understands the Canadian resettlement program and be proactive in
requesting referrals of appropriate cases [French version omitted] […]
[…]
57 There is no
reference in the CAIPS notes or the decision to the Applicant's status with the
UNHCR. I recognize that UNHCR status as a refugee is not determinative; the
Officer's mandate is to assess the Applicant's credibility and to determine the
merits of his claim under the applicable Canadian laws. Nevertheless, OP 5
recognizes the importance and relevance of the UNHCR in the processing of
applications under the Refugee Abroad Class. In my view, the Applicant's status
as a UNHCR refugee was a personal and relevant consideration. In the case of Cepeda-Gutierrez
v. Canada (The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 157 FTR 35,
[1998] F.C.J. No. 1425 (QL) (FCTD), at paragraph 17, Justice Evans (as he was
then) was faced with the failure of a decision-maker to consider a highly
personal and relevant document. He provided the following oft-quoted guidance:
[T]he more
important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the
agency's reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence
that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact "without regard to the
evidence": Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993),
63 F.T.R. 312 (F.C.T.D.). In other words, the agency's burden of explanation
increases with the relevance of the evidence in question to the disputed facts.
Thus, a blanket statement that the agency has considered all the evidence will
not suffice when the evidence omitted from any discussion in the reasons
appears squarely to contradict the agency's finding of fact. Moreover, when the
agency refers in some detail to evidence supporting its finding, but is silent
on evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion, it may be easier to infer that
the agency overlooked the contradictory evidence when making its finding of
fact.
58 The evidence
of the UNHCR designation was so important to the Applicant's case that it can
be inferred from the Officer's failure to mention it in her reasons that the
decision was made without regard to it. This is a central element to the
context of the decision. The Officer, faced with a UNHCR refugee, should have
explained in her assessment why she did not concur with the decision of the UNHCR.
The Officer was not under any obligation to blindly follow the UNHCR
designation; however, she was obliged to have regard to it. Unless a visa
officer explains why a UNHCR designation is not being followed, we have no way
of knowing whether regard was had to this highly relevant evidence.
My emphasis
[57]
Several points in Ghirmatsion should be
noted.
[58]
First, Justice Snider found that the UNHCR
status was not determinative and, in that case the visa officer, and in this
case, the Board had to make its own assessment in accordance with Canadian
law. The Board did make such an assessment.
[59]
Second, unlike Ghirmatsion, the Board
specifically mentioned the applicant’s UNHCR status, noting that the applicant
“remained in Thailand for two and a half years and got registered with the
UNHCR as a refugee”.
[60]
Third, the Board made strong negative
credibility findings against the applicant, which he does not challenge. Such
credibility issues inevitably undermine the findings of the UNHCR. Coupled with
the principle that a UNHCR designation is not determinative, the Board’s
conclusion demonstrates that it replaced the UNHCR refugee designation with its
own determination of the applicant’s risk profile, which it is entitled to do.
[61]
Fourth, the Board considered whether compelling
reasons existed, and would not have done so but for the fact that the applicant
had raised his UNHCR status. There was no other reason to refer to the
exception in subsection 108(4) of the Act except to address the UNHCR
refugee status of the applicant.
[62]
The Board noted that the exception only applies
when there has been a determination that the person was a Convention refugee or
a person in need of protection and that the conditions that led to such a
finding no longer exist.
[63]
The Board also referred to and considered the
UNHCR Handbook regarding compelling reasons.
[64]
As noted above, the 2010 UNHCR Guidelines
provide that the improved conditions do not warrant cessation of refugee
status, but that an individual assessment should be conducted. In this case,
the Board conducted an individual assessment.
[65]
In addition, as noted by the respondent, the
applicant was questioned about his UNHCR status at the hearing and indicated
that he made the same allegations to the UNHCR as he did to the Board.
[66]
The applicant also referred to several other
cases, including Elyasi v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 419, [2010]
FCJ No 484, and Kidane v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2011 FC 520, [2011] FCJ No 651 [Kidane],
which establish that UNHCR status is relevant and must be considered by the
Officer or Board. Kidane is almost identical to the decision in Ghirmatsion
and reinforces the need to consider the UNHCR status. Justice Snider noted
at paras 31-33:
[31] There is no reference in the
CAIPS notes or the decision to the Applicant’s status with the UNHCR. I
recognize that UNHCR status as a refugee is not determinative; the Officer’s
mandate is to assess the Applicant’s credibility and to determine the merits of
her claim under applicable Canadian laws. Nevertheless, OP 5 recognizes the
importance and relevance of the UNHCR in the processing of applications under
the Refugee Abroad Class. In my view, the Applicant’s status as a UNHCR refugee
was a personal and relevant consideration.
[32] The evidence of the UNHCR
designation was so important to the Applicant's case that it can be inferred
from the Officer’s failure to mention it in her reasons that the decision of
the Officer was made without regard to it (Cepeda-Gutierrez
v Canada (The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ No 1425 (QL)(FCTD), at para 17).
This is a central element to the context of the decision. The Officer, faced
with a UNHCR refugee, should have explained why her assessment did not concur
with that of the UNHCR. She was not under any obligation to blindly follow the
UNHCR designation; however, she was obliged to have regard to it. Unless a visa
officer explains why a UNHCR designation is not being followed, we have no way
of knowing whether regard was had to that highly relevant evidence.
[33] This error by the Officer is a
sufficient basis on which to overturn the decision. I wish, however, to repeat
that the UNHCR determination is not determinative; the Officer must still carry
out her own assessment of the evidence, including the evidence of the UNHCR
Refugee status.
[67]
Justice Snider noted twice in Kidane that UNHCR status as a
refugee is not determinative and that the Officer’s mandate is to assess the
applicant’s credibility and to determine the merits of the claim under the
applicable Canadian law.
[68]
There is no dispute about the principles.
[69]
In the present case, the principles were applied.The Board’s reasons read as a whole establish that the applicant’s
status as a UNHCR refugee was considered and that a rigorous assessment of his
application on its merits in accordance with Canadian law was conducted. This
is what the jurisprudence calls for and this is what the Board undertook.
Did Board err in not considering changed country conditions?
[70]
The applicant submits that the Board did not
consider the totality of the evidence concerning the changing conditions of Sri Lanka (Valtchev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776 at para
27, [2001] FCJ No 1131). Rather, the applicant argues that the Board simply
relied on the fact that the UNHCR Guidelines have ceased to recommend refugee
status for all Tamil males from the North.
[71]
The applicant argues that the Board failed to
meaningfully assess whether the improved country conditions it relied on were
durable and noted that the jurisprudence has highlighted the need to do so.
[72]
In Chowdhury v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 290 at para 14, 70 Imm LR (3d) 161, Justice
Mosley stated:
[14] When coming to that decision, the RPD member must,
however, have a view as to the stability and probability of continuation of the
change in country conditions which resulted in the finding of a lack of risk.
To do otherwise would put into harm’s way those who flee the persecution of one
side of an ongoing dispute. While the period in which their group is in the
ascendance might be safe, the fragility of that safety is one issue which the
RPD must consider in coming to their decisions. It does not appear from the
decision that the member in the instant case directed her mind to that
question.
The Board considered the changed country conditions
[73]
The Board turned its mind to the issue of
durability of the changed conditions and cited Yusuf v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 179 NR 11, [1995] FCJ No 35 at para 12
(FCA) [Yusuf] and Alfarsy v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FC 1461 at para 56, [2003] FCJ No 1856 [Alfarsy].
[74]
In Yusuf, the Court of Appeal noted that
there is no test to gauge a durable change and that this is a factual
determination; moreover, the focus is on assessing the applicant’s current
risk. In Alfarsy, Justice Russell noted at para 56:
[56] The Member noted
that, in addition to matters that directly impacted upon the Applicants, there
was evidence of change in Tanzania, in terms of the relationship between the
CCM and the CUF. The question remains whether this change was "fundamental
and durable enough to eliminate any doubt of a possible risk of
persecution." I believe that is a question that the Member had to consider
and, in fact, did consider by balancing the probabilities on the evidence
presented. The fact that the Applicants disagree with the conclusions reached
by the Member does not make that conclusion wrong. There was no reviewable
error in this regard.
[75]
The Board conducted a thorough and rigorous
analysis of Sri Lanka’s ameliorating country conditions, in so doing it relied
on several objective sources in addition to the UNHCR Guidelines. The Board
readily acknowledged that the current situation in Sri Lanka is not perfect for
Tamils, especially for those suspected of ties with the LTTE.
[76]
The Board’s conclusion that the applicant would
not be at risk in Sri Lanka is reasonable, in light of its conclusions that:
the government has never suspected the applicant of any association with LTTE;
many Tamils, including many (but not all) ex-LTTE affiliates and combatants,
have been released by the Sri Lankan government and no longer fear persecution;
and the socio-political situation in Sri Lanka has calmed since 2010, as
evidenced by the return of tourism and significant improvements in the lives of
Tamil minority civilians.
[77]
Furthermore, the Board did not rely only on the
fact that the applicant was able to exit Sri Lanka using his own genuine travel
documents. Rather, the Board’s finding that the applicant would not be at risk
in Sri Lanka is based on a range of considerations.
Did Board err in failing to consider the applicant’s risk as an
amputee?
[78]
The applicant submits that the Board erred in
speculating that his amputated leg would not put him at greater risk.
[79]
The applicant argues that, because he had never
been required to show his medical records in the past should not lead to the
conclusion that he would not be at risk upon his return as a failed refugee. In
fact, his medical record would create suspicion because it reveals that he lost
his leg during the civil war, due to shelling, in Jaffna.
The Board considered the applicant’s cumulative risk profile
including that he was an amputee
[80]
The Board considered the risk profile of the
applicant as an amputee with significant scarring. The Board acknowledged that
authorities “look at young Tamils with injuries with extra attention”
[my emphasis]. However, the Board also noted that the applicant does not fit
the risk profile of Tamils who would be suspected of having links to the LTTE
because he was not born in the North and is not young, and in any event, his amputation
has never caused him trouble. The applicant’s evidence was that he had never
been asked to show his medical documents nor had he been questioned for longer
than 15 minutes. The Board also noted that Sri Lankan authorities have been
releasing detainees with physical disabilities suffered during the conflict.
[81]
The applicant’s document, Freedom from Torture,
Report, “Out of the Silence: new Evidence of Ongoing Torture in Sri Lanka
2009-2011” (7 November 2011), indicates that individuals with scarring may be
detained separately, however, this does not establish a greater risk to the
applicant in light of the Board’s conclusion that “there is evidence that known
former LTTE registered members and supporters, have been released from
government detention and rehabilitation programs, and are living and working in
their home communities”.
[82]
The applicant also cites a footnote in the UNHCR
Guidelines, which states that “those most likely to be of interest to
authorities at the checkpoints are young Tamil males originating from the north
and east of the country, particularly those with: […] scarring consistent with
wounds sustained in hostilities” This passage does not, however, establish the
applicant’s risk profile; the Board conducted an individualized assessment and
found that the applicant would not be at risk, including because he is not
young.
[83]
I do not find the Board’s conclusion – that the
applicant would not be at risk due to his amputation – to be speculative. The Board took into account the evidence and found that the
applicant, despite his amputation, does not fit the profile of Tamils who would
be subjected to a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of
probability, torture in Sri Lanka.
[84]
The Board also considered that, in almost 20 years
that the applicant has lived with the disability, his amputation has never put
him at risk of being suspected of LTTE membership, even during the civil war.
Adding these two facts together, the Board drew a reasonable inference that the
applicant’s loss of a leg would not put him at risk if he were to return to Sri Lanka.
[85]
The Board assessed the applicant’s
individualised risk, as a male Tamil returning as a failed refugee and a
passenger on the MV Sun Sea, and as an amputee, and reasonably concluded
that he did not fit any of the profiles that would put him at risk if he were
returned.
Conclusion
[86]
The Board assessed the applicant’s claim in the
context of the extensive documentary record, provided reasons for preferring
the UNHCR Guidelines over other country condition evidence, addressed the
applicant’s status as a UNHCR refugee, and reasonably found that the applicant
would not be at risk based on an assessment of his risk factors individually
and cumulatively.
[87]
The Board reasonably found that the removal of
the applicant to Sri Lanka would not subject him to a serious possibility of
persecution, nor would he suffer, on a balance of probabilities, a risk to
life, a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of
torture and, therefore, he was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in
need of protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Act.
Proposed certified question
[88]
The applicant proposed the following two
alternative questions for certification, in the event the decision turns on
whether the Board properly considered the applicant’s status as a UNHCR refugee
in the assessment of his claim.
What
value if any should a UNHCR refugee determination have in the Canadian refugee
determination process?
OR
When
confronted with a UNHCR refugee, is it possible for the RPD to come to a
reasonable decision when it is not apparent that it had regard for the UNHCR
designation (in) its actual assessment of the claim or clearly articulate why
it did not concur with that status?
[89]
The respondent submits that neither question is
appropriate for certification; the issue must arise from the case, address
issues of general importance and be dispositive.
[90]
The respondent notes that the jurisprudence has
established that UNHCR status is a factor to be considered but is not
determinative. In addition, the respondent submits that the Board considered
the applicant’s UNHCR status, conducted an assessment of the applicant’s risk
on the merits as well as considered the compelling reasons exception pursuant
to section 108. The respondent also notes that the assessment for the purposes
of sections 96 and 97 differs from the broader test used by the UNHCR as the
latter may include humanitarian and compassionate considerations.
[91]
As noted above, I have found that the Board did
in fact consider the applicant’s UNHCR status, therefore the questions proposed
would not be dispositive in this case as these findings are based on the facts.
This Court has established that UNHCR status must be considered but is not
determinative and that the decision maker must conduct an assessment of the
claim for protection on its merits.
[92]
If further guidance is needed from the Court
about whether further deference is owed to a UNHCR status, a question could be
proposed in a future case.