Docket: IMM-5728-15
Citation:
2016 FC 1171
Ottawa, Ontario, October 24, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Diner
BETWEEN:
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ARTI WALIA
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Background
[1]
This is an application for judicial review under
subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001,
c-27 [the Act] to review the refusal of a work permit for a live-in-caregiver.
The Visa Officer [Officer] further found that the Applicant had misrepresented
her work experience contrary to paragraph 40(1)(a) of the Act. For the reasons
explained below, I am dismissing this judicial review application.
[2]
The Applicant, a 37-year old citizen of India,
in her initial (2013) work permit application, provided documentation outlining
her education and training, including a six month nanny training course and a
Nursey Teachers’ Training Certificate, and a letter from her purported
employer, a school, which indicated that she had worked there as a teacher.
[3]
On March 11, 2015, the application was denied
because the Applicant failed to satisfy the language requirement. The Applicant
challenged this decision on judicial review and, on consent from the Minister,
the matter was returned to the visa office for reconsideration. That
reconsideration took place before this Officer, who ultimately interviewed the
Applicant on May 26, 2015. Prior to the interview, the Officer requested that
the Applicant bring certain documents to the interview.
[4]
While the Applicant provided certain of the
requested information, she failed to bring two specific documents requested by
the Officer, namely transcripts from her nanny training and salary slips from
her employer. The Officer questioned the Applicant about her education, work
experience, and training. When asked why she did not produce pay stubs, the
Applicant responded that her employer paid her in cash, and that she did not deposit
any money into the bank.
[5]
After the interview, the Officer attempted to
contact the employer using the number provided by the Applicant, but these
attempts proved futile. On June 19, 2015, the Applicant was sent a procedural
fairness letter [PFL] alleging that she failed to provide truthful information,
contrary to subsection 16(1) of the Act. The Officer noted the Applicant’s
failure to provide the requested documents at her interview, and questioned the
validity of both her education and employment. The Officer stated that the
employment documents appeared fraudulent and noted that she was unable to
contact the employer. The Officer gave the Applicant an additional 30 days to
respond.
[6]
The Applicant responded with an affidavit,
providing background regarding her employment: while she could not explain why
the Officer was unable to contact the school via telephone, she provided
telephone bills purporting to show the telephone number associated with the
school was in use. Furthermore, the Applicant reiterated that no pay stubs
were available since she was paid in cash. Instead, she provided other
employment documentation, such as the school’s register of employees,
photographs of her teaching, and a document purporting to prove the principal’s
status. Finally, the Applicant invited the Officer to visit the school and
provided contact information for the parents of two of its students.
[7]
In response to the Applicant’s affidavit, two
visa office representatives (including the Officer) conducted a site visit to
the purported employer early in the morning of October 16, 2016. The address
provided for the employer (school) was a house located in a residential
neighbourhood. There was no school signage on the house – only that of a
dental clinic.
[8]
The visa office representatives rang the
doorbell and Mr. Singh, who identified himself as the principal, answered and
told them that school started at 10:00 a.m. Mr. Singh showed the visa office
representatives a room and indicated that this was where the students took
classes. The Officer, however, noted that the room was completely devoid of any
children books, crayons, toys or classroom furniture. Mr. Singh stated that
the students bring their own materials to school.
[9]
The visa office representatives also spoke to
neighbours of the house. The first neighbour indicated that she knew people
inside the house ran a school but did not know where this school was located,
and was unaware that it was being run in the house opposite to hers. A second
neighbour, located adjacent to the house, indicated the house was a dental
clinic and not a school, as he never saw children attend school at the house.
[10]
The relevant part of the October 28, 2015
refusal letter states:
Following a site visit we determined
you do not work at Baby Model School at House 1144, Sec44B Chandigarh… You are
a member of an inadmissible class of persons described in the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). As a result, you are inadmissible to
Canada pursuant to the following Section(s)… A40(1)(a): For directly or
indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant
matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act
The Officer’s computer [GCMS] notes further
elaborate on the reasons.
[11]
The Applicant’s Record for this judicial review
includes two affidavits from parents of children who attended the school and
one affidavit from another teacher. These three affidavits are exhibits to an
affidavit in support of the Notice of Motion, which was sworn by a paralegal at
the law firm representing the Applicant. It does not appear that these
affidavits were before the Officer. In any event, they do not change the
analysis below.
II.
Issues and Analysis
[12]
The Applicant raises three issues. First, she
claims a breach of fairness due to the Officer’s failure to conduct a thorough
site visit, and subsequently to provide an adequate explanation of concerns
arising from the visit. Second, she argues that the misrepresentation findings
are unreasonable. Third, she contends the reasons to be inadequate.
[13]
The standard of review for the first issue is
correctness, and reasonableness for the other two: procedural fairness attracts
a correctness review (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009
SCC 12 at para 43), while reasonableness applies to challenges to material
misrepresentation findings (Seraj v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2016 FC 38 at para 11), and adequacy of reasons (Ahmed v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2013 FC 1083).
A.
Procedural Unfairness
[14]
The Applicant takes issue with the fairness of
the site visit due to its lack of thoroughness, including the failure to: visit
the actual classroom, instead of just the purported principal’s office;
understand that commercial signs were prohibited per the local residential
laws; review the school register; and wait until the school’s start time. The
Applicant further argues that there was a duty to provide an opportunity to
respond to concerns raised from the site visit to the purported employer,
relying primarily on the decision in Sidhu v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 FC 419.
[15]
I do not find that Sidhu obligates the
Officer to have provided yet another opportunity to meet the Act’s
requirements. Here, the Applicant failed to satisfy the Officer despite having
two opportunities to do so – namely in her initial application, and then in the
response to the PFL. These opportunities provided the necessary procedural
safeguards to the Applicant. The Officer then elected to visit the school,
which he did not have to do after being unsatisfied after the PFL response.
The Officer evidently decided to do so in fairness to the Applicant’s position.
That site visit turned out to be unsatisfactory.
[16]
Procedural fairness does not afford applicants
endless opportunities to make their case and/or nullify doubts. Here, the
Officer’s site visit confirmed previously communicated concerns. Requiring
further fairness input from applicants arising from each credibility concern,
after having already provided various opportunities to disabuse concerns of
fraud, would result in a never-ending cycle of queries and responses.
[17]
There must be some finality to the immigration
application process: Khan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1998] FCJ No 626 at para 4, 1998 CanLII 7835 (FCTD); the Applicant has the
burden to satisfy the requirements of the legislative scheme. The burden
cannot be reversed, such that the officer has a never-ending duty to apprise
the Applicant a new chance to respond to every lingering question or unanswered
concern. As stated by Justice Russell in Singh v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 526 at para 52, the “onus is upon applicants to put together applications that
are convincing and that anticipate possible adverse inferences contained in the
evidence and local conditions and address them.”
[18]
In this case, the Officer provided the Applicant
with opportunities to assuage concerns, but remained unsatisfied with the
results. The fairness opportunities sufficed, as they did in Talpur v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 25 at para 26, and Zhang v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 463.
B.
Materiality of Misrepresentations
[19]
The Applicant takes issue with the Officer’s
material representation finding. Subsection 40(1)(a) of the Act outlines when
an applicant is inadmissible for misrepresentation:
40(1) A permanent resident or a
foreign national is inadmissible for misrepresentation:
(a) for directly or indirectly
misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter
that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act.
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40(1) Emportent
interdiction de territoire pour fausses déclarations les faits suivants:
a) directement ou
indirectement, faire une présentation erronée sur un fait important quant à
un objet pertinent, ou une réticence sur ce fait, ce qui entraîne ou risque
d’entraîner une erreur dans l’application de la présente loi
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[20]
In this case, the concerns arose from a central
element to the application, namely her work background. Work experience is
certainly a factor considered under paragraph 112(c)(ii) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227:
12. A work permit shall not be
issued to a foreign national who seeks to enter Canada as a live-in caregiver
unless they
[…]
c) have the following training or
experience, in a field or occupation related to the employment for which the
work permit is sought, namely,
[…]
(ii) completion of one year of
full-time paid employment, including at least six months of continuous
employment with one employer, in such a field or occupation within the three
years immediately before the day on which they submit an application for a
work permit;
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12.
Le permis de travail ne peut être délivré à l’étranger qui cherche à entrer
au Canada au titre de la catégorie des aides familiaux que si l’étranger se
conforme aux exigences suivantes:
[…]
c) il a la formation ou l’expérience
ci-après dans un domaine ou une catégorie d’emploi lié au travail pour lequel
le permis de travail est demandé:
[…]
(ii) une année d’emploi rémunéré à temps plein
— dont au moins six mois d’emploi continu auprès d’un même employeur — dans
ce domaine ou cette catégorie d’emploi au cours des trois années précédant la
date de présentation de la demande de permis de travail;
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[21]
As was stated recently
in Goburdhun v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC
971 at para 28, “misrepresentation need not be decisive
or determinative. It is material if it is important enough to affect the
process” (Goburdhun at para 28). The Officer’s findings on materiality
and misrepresentation were reasonable.
C.
The Adequacy of the Officer’s Reasons
[22]
Finally, the Officer’s reasons were adequate.
In Solopova v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 690, Justice
Gascon discussed the reasonableness standard as it applied to visa officer
decisions:
[32] Reasonableness, not
perfection, is the standard. Even where the reasons for the decision are brief,
or poorly written, this Court should defer to the decision-maker’s weighing of
the evidence and credibility determinations, as long as the Court is able to
understand why the decision was made. I add that a visa officer’s duty to
provide reasons when rejecting a temporary resident is minimal and falls at the
low end of the spectrum.
[23]
In addition to these observations, a visa officer
is under no obligation to refer to every piece of evidence contrary to the
ultimate finding (Ahmed v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 1083 at para 34).
[24]
In sum, I find the Officer’s reasons to be
sufficiently justifiable, transparent, and intelligible in explaining why the
Officer concluded that the Applicant misrepresented her employment experience.
While the Applicant correctly observes that the Officer failed to specifically
mention her affidavit in the refusal letter, the GCMS notes make it clear that
the Officer had done so. The GCMS notes further explain, in significant
detail, why the Officer was not satisfied with the site visit, including the
complete lack of evidence found at the house and confirmation of said suspicion
from the neighbours. After all, GCMS notes constitute part of the reasons (Ahmed
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1083 at para 22).
[25]
The Officer’s reasons, in the context of the
record (i.e. the Officer’s initial concerns, the Applicant’s responding
affidavit, and the follow-up site visit) are reasonable and the outcome of a
misrepresentation finding was within the range of acceptable possibilities open
to the Officer.
III.
Conclusion
[26]
In light of all of the above, this application
for judicial review is dismissed.