Docket: IMM-6362-11
Citation:
2015 FC 1184
Toronto, Ontario, October 20, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Diner
BETWEEN:
|
AHMAD DAUD
MAQSUDI
|
HAKIMA MAQSUDI
|
AHMAD SHAHIM
MAQSUDI
|
AHMAD BARI
MAQSUDI
|
AHMAD ALHAM
MAQSUDI
|
Applicants
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision of the Immigration Division [the Division] of the Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada. While the application for judicial review was filed on
September 15, 2011 and the Applicants submitted their memorandum of fact and
law on October 18, 2011, it was not until February 24, 2015 that this Court
heard the review. Over this almost four-year period, the legislative and
jurisprudential landscape changed considerably, as did the pleadings. As a
result, by the time of the hearing and the post-hearing submissions that
followed, the Applicants had narrowed the scope of their submissions to a
single argument regarding the meaning and application of “subversion” under paragraph 34(1)(b) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act].
I.
Overview
[2]
Mr. Maqsudi [the Principal Applicant], a citizen
of Afghanistan, was found to be inadmissible to Canada on the basis of
subversion of the former Communist Afghan government under paragraph 34(1)(b)
and paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act and on the basis of war crimes under
paragraph 35(1)(a) of the Act. He was therefore found ineligible to claim
refugee protection.
[3]
Regarding the second of these inadmissibility
findings, paragraph 35(1)(a) denies admissibility to foreign nationals who are
found to have committed offences described in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24. To be denied refugee
protection for participation in such atrocities, the claimant must be complicit
in their commission. In Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola] at para 36, the Supreme Court held that, to be
excluded from refugee protection, complicity in any of the above offences
requires the refugee claimant to have made “a
voluntary, knowing, and significant contribution to the crime or criminal
purpose of a group”. This replaced the complicity test that the Division
had previously applied to the Principal Applicant, which required only the
claimant’s “personal and knowing” participation.
[4]
In light of Ezokola, the Respondent has
conceded that the paragraph 35(1)(a) finding can no longer stand. Consequently,
only the Division’s paragraph 34(1)(b) and paragraph 34(1)(f) findings remain a
live issue before me. These two provisions operate to preclude admissibility if
the foreign national is a member of an organization which has engaged in or
instigated the subversion by force of any government:
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible
on security grounds for
[…]
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any
government;
[…]
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable
grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in
paragraph …(b)….
|
34. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour raison de sécurité
les faits suivants :
[…]
b) être l’instigateur ou l’auteur d’actes visant au renversement d’un
gouvernement par la force;
[…]
f) être membre d’une organisation dont il y a des motifs raisonnables
de croire qu’elle est, a été ou sera l’auteur d’un acte visé aux alinéas
…b)...
|
[5]
The Principal Applicant concedes that, for the
purposes of paragraph 34(1)(f), he was a member of the organization at issue in
the Division’s decision. Therefore, the only question before me is whether that
organization, pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(b), engaged in or instigated the
subversion by force of the Afghan government of the day, and the reasonableness
of the subversion finding is the issue on which this matter hinges.
[6]
A review of the facts and the procedural history
of this matter are critical to situating the issues raised in this judicial
review.
II.
Facts
[7]
The events that brought Mr. Maqsudi and his
family to Canada began nearly three decades prior when the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan in 1979. Mr. Maqsudi was a university student in Kabul at the time.
When he graduated in 1981, he decided to participate in the resistance movement
led by Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud rather than face the alternative options –
conscription into the Afghan military or emigration from the country. Massoud
controlled an area known as the Panjshir Valley and commanded a fighting force
of his own. He was also part of a resistance force known as the Shora-E-Nezar,
as well as a broad, decentralized group of fighters comprising various ethnic
groups and ideological viewpoints known generally as the mujahideen (Certified
Tribunal Record [CTR], pp 9-12).
[8]
The Principal Applicant states that he did not
want a combat role, so Massoud assigned him the role of a radio operator
(Application Record [AR], p 46). He travelled with Massoud and helped him
transmit and receive messages via long-wave radio, which was Massoud’s only
means of communication with his commanders aside from personal courier. A
double code system was used to ensure secrecy – messages were converted into
mathematical codes which were given to Mr. Maqsudi to convert again and transmit
over the radio. Messages were decoded using the same process at the receiving
end. Mr. Maqsudi alleges that because of these procedures, he did not know the
contents of the messages that were sent or received by Massoud, though his
associates would occasionally relay their contents (AR, p 47).
[9]
The radio operators lived in caves in the
mountains of Afghanistan, moving at night to avoid Soviet artillery. The
Principal Applicant testifies that while Massoud would leave to go to the
fronts where the war was being waged, he would never accompany Massoud on such
occasions, as the long-wave radios were too valuable a resource to put in
harm’s way. Mr. Maqsudi was highly trusted by Massoud and went on trips to the
United Kingdom and France to further his technical telecommunications expertise
(AR, pp 47-47(a)).
[10]
In 1989, the Soviets withdrew, but the fight
against the Soviet occupation was replaced by a civil war against the Communist
government. In 1992, that regime collapsed and Massoud became the Minister of
Defence for the new transitional government. Mr. Maqsudi moved to Kabul and
became the Director of the Communications division of the National Security
Office (CTR, p 396).
[11]
The post-Communist peace, however, was
short-lived. In 1992, civil war once again consumed Kabul. One of the factions
in this civil war was the Taliban, which eventually seized the capital in 1996.
The Principal Applicant followed Massoud’s retreat to the Panjshir Valley; from
there, Massoud continued to fight the Taliban. During this time, the Principal Applicant
assisted by working to rebuild a communications network for Massoud’s forces
(CTR, p 10).
[12]
In March 1997, the Principal Applicant went to
Pakistan, where his family had been living, but fled on the advice of his
brother, who informed him that the Taliban had been looking for him there. The
Applicants made their way from Pakistan to Iran in June 1997. In March 1998,
Massoud was invited by the Iranian Government to discuss the protection of the
Iranian-Afghani border. While there, Massoud asked if the Principal Applicant
was interested in serving as a diplomat in China on behalf of the pre-Taliban
government, as China (like the vast majority of nations at the time) did not
recognize the Taliban government. He accepted the position (CTR, pp 397-399).
[13]
The Principal Applicant lived in China until
September 1999, when he arrived in the Netherlands and claimed refugee status.
After coalition forces defeated the Taliban in 2002, the Principal Applicant
returned to Afghanistan and was subsequently appointed to serve at the Afghan
Embassy in Berlin. In 2007, upon the expiration of his diplomatic term and
fearing the deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan and the threat of a
resurgent Taliban, the Principal Applicant, his wife, and three sons made their
way to Canada where his father, brother, and two sisters were living (CTR, pp
399-402).
[14]
Mr. Maqsudi arrived in Canada on April 7, 2007
with his wife and two minor sons and made a refugee claim (CTR, p 4). The Principal
Applicants’ claim never reached the hearing stage, however, because on August
25, 2011, the Division found Mr. Maqsudi inadmissible to Canada pursuant to
paragraphs 34(1)(b), 34(1)(f), and 35(1)(a) of the Act.
III.
Procedural History
[15]
Given that this judicial review began in 2011
and was not heard until February 25, 2015, much of the legal landscape has
changed. This matter was first adjourned to await the outcome of Agraira v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 [Agraira], a case
in which the Principal Applicant had intervened. That decision came out on June
20, 2013. A month later, on July 19, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in another
relevant case, Ezokola.
[16]
The evolving jurisprudence was accompanied by
legislative change. On June 19, 2013, the day before the publication of Agraira,
the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, SC 2013, c 16 [Faster
Removal Act] came into effect. Of relevance to this dispute, the Faster
Removal Act resulted in the replacing of subsection 34(2) of the Act, which
gave inadmissible applicants access to ministerial relief, by the current
section 42.1, which places a greater emphasis on national interest and security
when granting such relief.
[17]
Second, the Faster Removal Act split
paragraph 34(1)(a) into two distinct paragraphs, (a) and (b.1), so that it now
reads:
34. (1) A permanent resident or a
foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
(a) engaging in an act of espionage
that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests;
(b) engaging in or instigating the
subversion by force of any government;
(b.1) engaging in an act of
subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they
are understood in Canada…
|
34. (1) Emportent interdiction de
territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits suivants :
a) être l’auteur de tout acte
d’espionnage dirigé contre le Canada ou contraire aux intérêts du Canada;
b) être l’instigateur ou l’auteur
d’actes visant au renversement d’un gouvernement par la force;
b.1) se livrer à la subversion contre
toute institution démocratique, au sens où cette expression s’entend au
Canada…
|
[18]
Given time to process these developments and to
make further submissions, the parties indicated to the court that they were
ready to proceed, and a hearing was scheduled for September 10, 2014. On
September 5, 2014, however, the parties sought and received an additional
adjournment to await a ruling in Najafi v Canada (Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness), 2014 FCA 462 [Najafi]. That appeal was
dismissed by the Federal Court of Appeal on November 7, 2014, and on December
18, 2014, the parties indicated to this Court that they were ready to proceed
with this judicial review.
IV.
Decision under Review
[19]
In its decision of August 25, 2011, the Division
found that the Principal Applicant was inadmissible on two grounds: under
paragraph 34(1)(f), for having been a member of Massoud’s organization that,
per paragraph 34(1)(b), had engaged in subversion by force of the Communist
government from 1978-1992; and under section 35(1)(a), for complicity in war
crimes committed by Afghan government forces commanded by Massoud from
1992-1996. The parties consented to a disposition on paragraph 35(1)(a) finding,
and therefore that issue is no longer in dispute.
[20]
On the remaining issue to be decided by the
Court in this matter, the finding of inadmissibility under paragraph 34(1)(b),
the Division first canvassed the jurisprudence on the term “subversion”, opting for a definition offered in Qu
v Canada, 2001 FCA 399 at para 12 [Qu]: “accomplishing
change by illicit means or for improper purposes related to an organization”.
The Division then concluded that the Principal Applicant was a member of
Massoud’s organization from 1978-1992 and that they had engaged in subversion
by force:
…the totality of evidence establishes there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the mujahedeen forces, including those
directly under Massoud, were involved in subversion by force against [the]
communist government of Afghanistan. The mujahedeen conducted open warfare but
also relied heavily on guerrilla activities in furtherance of the aim of
overthrowing the Communist regime and expelling the Soviet army. Such
activities are by their nature… clandestine activities. The use of
assassinations, raids, cutting off supply lines and communications all involve
the clandestine planning, movement of personnel and weapons and the execution
of offensive actions. However warranted or justifiable in the circumstance
these activities may have been, they fall within the meaning of illicit and
clandestine actions aimed at overthrowing a repressive Communist regime that
was supported by the Soviet army. (CTR, p 19)
V.
Submissions
A.
Applicants’ Submissions
[21]
With the passage of time and the changes brought
by the Faster Removal Act, Agraira, Ezokola, and Najafi,
the Applicants have adjusted their submissions significantly, acknowledging
that the Primary Applicant was a member of Massoud’s organization and that
Massoud was attempting to overthrow the Communist government of Afghanistan.
Originally, they asserted that the Division had erred in its interpretation of
the terms “subversion” and “any government” in paragraph 34(1)(b). This argument
played out along several lines: that the words “any
government” cannot apply to a “designated
regime”; that subversion cannot apply to struggles for
self-determination against repressive regimes; that since subversion includes
an illicit or illegitimate element, the use of force to overthrow a government
can only be illicit or illegitimate if the government in question is legitimate;
and that subversion cannot involve situations of armed conflict.
[22]
In their original submissions the Applicants
also argued that paragraph 34(1)(b) could not survive scrutiny under section 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Charter], and
that since the scope of Ministerial Relief under subsection 34(2) had been
narrowed by the Federal Court of Appeal’s ruling in Agraira v Canada (Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FCA 10, a broad interpretation of
subversion under paragraph 34(1)(b) was no longer sustainable.
[23]
With the passage of time and the release of
relevant decisions by the Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Appeal,
however, the focus of this 2015 judicial review hearing narrowed to whether
subversion could apply to situations of armed conflict. The Applicants maintain
that subversion is poorly defined in domestic law, has not been elucidated by
case law, and needs definition which, in the absence of domestic sources, may
be assisted by international law. Along these lines, the Applicants contend
that the Division erred in considering “clandestine
tactics” in a state of open armed conflict sufficient to render said
conflict subversive.
[24]
To assert this claim, the Applicants first
review the jurisprudence on paragraph 34(1)(b), noting while several cases
looked at various elements of the provision, only one, Al-Yamani v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] FCJ No 317 [Al-Yamani],
examined the concept of subversion in-depth. There, at para 62, Justice Gibson
found subversion to contain, at minimum, a “clandestine
or deceptive element” and “an element of
undermining from within”.
[25]
The Applicants claim that subsequent decisions,
including Najafi, have not addressed the concerns in Al-Yamani
sufficiently, and have never properly defined “subversion”,
relying instead on overbroad definitions found in Re Shandi, (1992), 51
FTR 252 at 259 (FCTD) [Shandi] (“any act that is
intended to contribute to the process of overthrowing a government is a
subversive act”) and Qu at para 12 (“subversion
connotes accomplishing change by illicit means or for improper purposes”).
In the Applicants’ view, other cases that have applied paragraph 34(1)(b)
subversion have erroneously relied on the overbroad Qu and Shandi definitions.
The Applicants cite cases including Oremade v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1077; Suleyman v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 780; Eyakwe v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 409; Maleki v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1331; and Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v USA, 2014 FC 416).
[26]
As for Najafi, the Applicants argue that
the Federal Court of Appeal did not pronounce on the definition of subversion
itself, rather focusing on the words “any government”,
relying on Shandi and Qu and ignoring the concerns raised in Al-Yamani.
Similarly, the Applicants argue that subversion requires more definition and
precision to avoid internal inconsistencies and absurd outcomes. To conclusively
resolve these inconsistencies and to arrive at a proper definition of
subversion, the Courts should seek guidance from international law. The
Applicants submit that in international law there is little use or elucidation
of the word “subversion”, but there is
substantial explanation of the term “armed conflict”,
which assists in shedding light on the definition of subversion. In short, “subversion” should end where “armed
conflict” begins.
[27]
The Applicants offer the definition of “non-international armed conflict” from the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 art 1 [Protocol II]:
[Any conflicts] which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol…
This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature…
[28]
The Applicants argue that since international
law has drawn a clear distinction between situations of armed conflict and
situations of lesser intensity, Canadian law should as well: subversion should
exist only until there is a legally recognized armed conflict, at which point
paragraph 34(1)(b) should no longer apply.
[29]
The Applicants contend that this is a
common-sense interpretation of the term “subversion”,
since it connotes a clandestine quality that is absent in the context of open,
internationally recognized armed conflict. To bolster this interpretation, they
argue that, unlike the decision at hand, none of the previous cases on
paragraph 34(1)(b) concerned an armed conflict as defined in international law.
[30]
In brief, the Applicants submit that confining
subversion to situations outside of armed conflict is consistent with (i)
international law, (ii) the ordinary meaning of the word “subversion”, and (iii) the case law, which has never
applied section 34(1)(b) to an armed conflict. There is nothing in the objectives
of the Act nor is there any security reason why subversion should not be
interpreted thusly.
B.
Respondent’s Submissions
[31]
The Respondent asserts that the Division
reasonably concluded that Massoud’s organization engaged in subversion by
force. First, “subversion” is sufficiently
defined in the case law. While the Shandi and Qu definitions were
both acceptable, they have been superseded by the decision in Najafi,
which, at para 65, defines subversion as “the act or
process of overthrowing the government”. And while Najafi may not
offer a complete definition of subversion, it is more than adequate to dispose
of this application.
[32]
In response to the arguments about the
overbreadth of paragraph 34(1)(b), the Respondent contends that a plain reading
of the statute, along with a review of the parliamentary debates that preceded
its adoption, demonstrates that the legislators intended the provision to be
large. To define subversion any differently would be engaging in judicial
policy-making.
[33]
The Respondent further argues that turning to
international law to define subversion is inappropriate and unnecessary.
Specifically, Protocol II does not assist as an interpretive tool to
define subversion under Canadian immigration law and does not support the Applicants’
position that the definition of subversion should exclude any conflict that
would qualify as an armed conflict under international law. Rather, Protocol
II exists to define the point at which domestic combatants are held to
humanitarian legal norms, a field far removed from Canada’s immigration and
security concerns. Protocol II establishes a legal framework under
international humanitarian law that simply has no bearing on whether a conflict
involves subversion under Canadian immigration law, where the prerogative is to
define who can enter and remain in the country.
[34]
Indeed, the Respondent contends that subversion
and armed conflict are not mutually exclusive: subversion is a ‘goal’, while armed conflict is a ‘means’ of achieving that goal. The Respondent notes that
Najafi did indeed involve an armed conflict – albeit one under the terms
of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [Protocol I], which covers
either international armed conflicts or armed conflicts involving a struggle
for self-determination, rather than Protocol II. However, the Respondent
asserts that this distinction is meaningless.
[35]
Finally, the Respondent asserts that the
Division cannot be faulted for failing to consider the ‘armed
conflict’ arguments being made now since they only became a focus of
legal arguments in the years since the hearing.
VI.
Standard of Review
[36]
Standard of review did not factor significantly
into either the written or oral pleadings in this matter. This being a judicial
review, however, I feel it necessary to situate this decision on the judicial
review spectrum.
[37]
The issue in question – the definition and
application of paragraphs 34(1)(b) and 34(1)(f) – concerns the interpretation
and application of the legal concept of subversion to the facts as well as the
interpretation of the Division’s home statute and mixed questions of fact and
law. These are matters falling under the rubric of the reasonableness standard
of review, as found by Najafi at para 56 (see also Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association,
2011 SCC 61 at para 34; Agraira at para 50; and Khosa v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 SCC 12 at para 89).
[38]
Under a reasonableness standard, the Court will
only intervene where there is an absence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process and the decision falls
outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at
para 47).
VII.
Analysis
[39]
Although I am highly sympathetic to the
Principal Applicant’s position and recognize the potential absurdity in denying
refugee status to an individual on the basis of his efforts to combat
organizations that Canada opposed as well, I am nonetheless bound to apply the
jurisprudence of our Court of Appeal. Najafi clearly constrains my
ability to provide the result that the Applicants desire.
[40]
A brief review of the underlying facts of Najafi
is useful, as not only is it the most recent appellate jurisprudence on
paragraph 34(1)(b), but there are also factual similarities between this matter
and Najafi as well.
[41]
Mr. Najafi was an Iranian citizen of Kurdish
ethnicity and a member of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran [KDPI], an
organization which had engaged in an unsuccessful armed uprising against the
Government of Iran over the course of several decades (Najafi at paras 14-16).
Mr. Najafi argued that because the use of force was legitimate, in that it
advanced his people’s right to self-determination in the face of a repressive
regime, the KDPI’s actions could not fall within the ambit of “subversion by force of any government” described in
paragraph 34(1)(b) (Najafi at para 51).
[42]
In Najafi, the Federal Court of Appeal
was asked to decide whether, in interpreting the ambit of paragraph 34(1)(b),
Canada’s ratification of Protocol I required the Division to exclude
individuals who had attempted to subvert a government in furtherance of an
oppressed people’s claimed right to self-determination.
[43]
Justice Gauthier, writing for a unanimous Court
in dismissing this argument, concluded that the clear and unambiguous language
of “any government” was not limited to only
democratic governments, but also applied to colonial governments, foreign
occupations, and oppressive regimes (Najafi at paras 69-70).
[44]
Justice Gauthier also addressed the definition
of “subversion” in her decision. Discussing the
Division’s conclusion that “the jurisprudence indicates
that using force with the goal of overthrowing any government amounts to
subversion by force”, she wrote at paras 65-66:
As noted by the [Division], the word
“subversion” is not defined in the Act, and there is no universally adopted
definition of the term. The Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition to which
the [Division] refers at paragraph 27 (particularly, the words “the act or
process of overthrowing … the government”) is very much in line with the
ordinary meaning of the French text («actes visant au renversement d’un
gouvernement »). Although in certain contexts, the word “subversion” may well
be understood to refer to illicit acts or acts done for an improper purpose,
the words used in the French text do not convey any such connotation. I am
satisfied that the shared meaning of the two texts does not ordinarily include
any reference to the legality or legitimacy of such acts.
I note that the word “subversion”
is used only in the English version of paragraph 34(1)(b), while it is used in
both the English and French versions of paragraph 34(1)(a). This may or may not
signal a different meaning, but it is not my purpose to properly construe
paragraph 34(1)(a) in this appeal. I will only note that in Qu v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 4 F.C. 71, rev’d in 2001
FCA 399, the application judge was dealing with a predecessor of paragraph
34(1)(a), and this Court never had to deal with the meaning of “subversion”
on appeal.
[45]
The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Najafi
is clear that while the term subversion remains undefined in the legislation
and may require further precision in other contexts, for the purposes of
paragraph 34(1)(b), it has a broad meaning in line with the French text: “actes
visant au renversement d’un gouvernement”.
[46]
This broad definition supplants the narrower
definitions provided in Qu and Al-Yamani. Applying Najafi to
Mr. Maqsudi’s situation, the Division’s findings (along with the undisputed
fact that Massoud’s organization was engaged in a struggle to overthrow the
government) lead to the reasonable conclusion that the Principal Applicant is
inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(b).
[47]
I disagree with the assertion that international
law, and specifically Protocol II, limits the definition of subversion.
There is no compelling reason why an international legal document that does not
– except perhaps by implication – address the question of subversion should be
applied to define subversion domestically, particularly in the context of
Canadian immigration law. Protocol II involves the protection of victims
of armed conflicts and is not related to immigrant admissibility in any way.
[48]
Even if it were possible to make a meaningful
distinction between subversion and armed conflict for the purposes of paragraph
34(1)(b), the Applicants must still face the fact that the Division, in Najafi,
made a clear finding that Mr. Najafi’s organization, the KDPI, had been
engaged in an armed conflict. As summarized by Justice Gauthier at para 15:
The Division then reviewed the KDPI’s
methods. After acknowledging that there was considerable evidence that the
KDPI’s use of force had largely been in self-defence, it found that the KDPI
nonetheless deliberately used armed force to try to overthrow the Iranian
government and that this was part of its strategic repertoire. This was
certainly true in the 1967-1968 period, during which it was engaged in an
unsuccessful armed uprising against the Shah of Iran. In 1973, the KDPI
“committed itself formally to armed struggle”. The Division then noted that the
KDPI’s armed conflict with the Iranian government was at its height in 1982 and
1983, during which it was driven out of population centres and forced into
guerrilla warfare in the mountains, although it temporarily recaptured the town
of Bukan in September 1983…
[49]
Justice Gauthier also found that Parliament was
alive to the possibility that the broad reach of the provision would, in some
circumstances, catch those fighting oppressive regimes (Najafi at para
79). In order to avoid an injustice, she notes Parliament ensured that there
was a Ministerial exemption available to those caught by the provision:
[80] Obviously, when I state that Parliament
intended for the provision to be applied broadly, I am referring to the
inadmissibility stage, for, as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh,
albeit in a different context, the legislator always intended that the Minister
have the ability to exempt any foreign national caught by this broad language,
after considering the objectives set out in subsection 34(2). This is done by
way of an application. (As discussed above, subsection 34(2) is now subsection
42.1(1). Per subsection 42.1(2), it can now also be granted on the Minister’s
own initiative).
[81] This mechanism can be used to protect
innocent members of an organization but also members of organizations whose
admission to Canada would not be detrimental or contrary to national interest
because of the organization’s activities in Canada and the legitimacy of the
use of force to subvert a government abroad.
[50]
As described above in this matter, the Applicants
originally made submissions concerning the scope of a ministerial relief under
subsection 34(2) (the Principal Applicant even intervened before the Supreme
Court in Agraira on the issue), arguing that limiting the factors that
the Minister can consider in issuing relief from paragraph 34(1)(b) to national
security and public safety was unjustifiably restrictive. As subsection 42.1(3)
makes clear, however, “the Minister may only take into
account national security and public safety considerations, but, in his or her
analysis, is not limited to considering the danger that the foreign national
presents to the public or the security of Canada”. Even in light of this
legislative clarification, I do not believe that the Principal Applicant is
unduly restricted in his access to relief. In applying, Mr. Maqsudi would be
able to provide evidence to the Minister that he was assisting by serving on the
side of Canada’s national security and public safety interests, first against
the Communist government and later against the Taliban, both of which were
regimes Canada opposed.
[51]
In light of the jurisprudence, particularly Najafi,
I agree with the Respondent that a plain reading of paragraph 34(1)(b) makes it
clear that the provision was to be given broad scope. Legislators are presumed
to give meaning to their words, and this is supported by the parliamentary
debates cited and relied upon by both the Federal Court and the Federal Court
of Appeal in Najafi.
[52]
The preponderance of the jurisprudence and a
plain reading of the legislative provisions raised in this matter lead me to
the conclusion that the Division’s decision was reasonable.
[53]
I am sympathetic to Mr. Maqsudi’s situation
regarding the reach of subversion given that he was found inadmissible for
having resisted the Soviet-backed communist Afghan regime. This is a
government which Canada has designated under paragraph 35(1)(b) of the Act on
the basis that it has committed gross human rights violations or war crimes. Senior
officials of designated governments are inadmissible to Canada (see, for
instance, with respect to this former government of Afghanistan, Holway v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 309 at
para 29; see more generally regarding designated governments section 8.1 of CIC Operations Manual ENF 18, “War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”). There is therefore a Catch-22 quality to the outcome for Mr.
Maqsudi vis-à-vis subversion. However, the jurisprudence has clearly
established that the breadth of paragraph 34(1)(b) was considered, debated, and
approved by Parliament. A broad interpretation of this provision has been
upheld in an analogous situation of armed conflict in Najafi, an
appellate decision that is binding on this court.
[54]
Having concluded thus, I am nonetheless hopeful
that in evaluating his eventual relief application under section 42.1, the
Minister will take into consideration Mr. Maqsudi’s participation in a struggle
against a regime with a well-documented history of barbarity.
VIII.
Certified Question
[55]
The Applicants proposed the following question
for certification:
Does “subversion” in paragraph 34(1)(b)
of the Act apply when an organization seeks to overthrow a government during an
armed conflict (as defined by Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949)?
[56]
After a careful review of the Applicants’
rationale behind proposing this question, I am in agreement with the Respondent’s
submissions that it does not meet the two-part test established in Liyanagamage
v Canada (Secretary of State), [1994] FCJ No 1637 (CA). The proposed
question neither has broad application nor general importance, because the
general issues it raises have already been considered and answered by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Najafi. The Court of Appeal considered the definition
of subversion and settled on a broad interpretation, including considering the
application of international law. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada
considered but denied leave to appeal in Najafi on April 23, 2015 (Najafi
v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015
CanLII 20818 (SCC)).
IX.
Conclusions
[57]
Despite very able representation by Applicants’ counsel,
I am unable to find that the decision of the Division was unreasonable or that
the Member incorrectly interpreted the statute in applying the subversion
provision to the Principal Applicant, even if the outcome is one that may be
questioned given the circumstances of this case. However, the factors raised
in these proceedings will, I assume, be put before the Minister in a relief
application, and will provide the opportunity for Mr. Maqsudi to explain, as he
did to this Court, why the subversion found is not contrary to national
interest.