Docket: T-2223-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1161
Ottawa, Ontario, October 14, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Manson
BETWEEN:
|
APOTEX INC,
APOTEX PHARMACHEM INDIA PVT LTD AND APOTEX RESEARCH PRIVATE LIMITED
|
Applicants
|
and
|
MINISTER OF HEALTH
AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
|
Respondents
|
Table of Contents
I. Introduction. 2
II. Background. 3
A. Regulatory Regime. 3
B. The Parties. 4
C. Interlocutory Proceedings. 5
III. Facts. 6
A. Chronological Outline. 6
B. Supporting Affidavit
Evidence. 13
(1) Applicants’ Supporting
Affidavits. 13
(2) Respondents’ Supporting
Affidavits. 15
IV. Relevant Legislation. 18
V. Issues. 18
VI. Decision Summary. 18
VII. Standard of Review.. 20
A. What is the Appropriate
Standard of Review of Health Canada’s Decision?. 20
(1) Applicants’ Submissions. 20
(2) Respondents’ Submissions. 21
VIII. Analysis. 25
A. Did the Minister Afford
Adequate Procedural Fairness when she Implemented the Import Ban and Amended
the EL Letters?. 25
(1) What Degree of Procedural
Fairness is Apotex Entitled to?. 25
(2) Improper Purpose and
Reasonable Apprehension of Bias. 28
(a) Apprehension of Bias. 28
(b) Improper Purpose. 31
(3) Failure to Act in
Accordance with Natural Justice. 35
B. Did the Minister Act Beyond
or Without Legislative Authority?. 39
(1) EL Action. 39
(a) Legislative / Regulatory
Scheme. 39
(b) Analysis. 40
(c) Are the Regulations
Unconstitutional Under Paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights?. .... 47
(2) CBSA Action. 48
C. Was the Minister’s Decision
Reasonable?. 50
D. Can this Court Grant the
Relief Sought?. 50
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review by
Apotex Inc. [Apotex], Apotex Pharmachem India Pvt Ltd. [APIPL] and Apotex
Research Private Limited [ARPL] [collectively “the Applicants”] of the decision
of the Respondent Minister of Health [the Minister] to impose an Import Ban
preventing the importation of drug products into Canada from two of Apotex’s
manufacturing facilities in India (APIPL and ARPL) on September 30, 2014, and
the related issuance by the Minister, on October 2, 2014, of four “EL Letters”
which purported to amend Apotex’s establishment licences [ELs], prohibiting
import of all products, apart from those deemed medically necessary.
[2]
Apotex commenced this application for judicial review
on October 29, 2014, on the basis that the Minister’s decision to implement the
Import Ban and amend Apotex’s ELs was unreasonable and unlawful. They allege
that the Minister failed to act in accordance with the principles of natural
justice by acting for an improper motive, failing to provide Apotex with notice
or an opportunity to be heard, and acting in such a manner so as to give rise
to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Applicants also allege that the
Minister acted outside of her regulatory powers conferred under the Food and
Drugs Act, RSC 1985, c F-27 [FD Act or Act], the Food and
Drugs Regulations, CRC, c 870 [FD Regulations or Regulations]
and/or the Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp).
[3]
The Applicants request that the Minister’s
decision to implement and her implementation of the Import Ban be deemed unlawful
and should be quashed, with costs to Apotex. Among other things, they request
an order quashing the four letters issued by the Minister on October 2, 2014, which
amend Apotex’s ELs, and an order compelling the Minister to retract her public
statement and requiring her to direct Health Canada to retract their statement
released on September 30, 2014.
[4]
The FD Act and Regulations govern
the manufacture, import and sale of all drug products in Canada. Various guidelines
and policies of Health Canada also help to interpret the Act and Regulations.
[5]
Drugs sold in Canada must have a drug
identification number [DIN] pursuant to the FD Regulations that has not
been cancelled. To sell new drugs in Canada, a manufacturer must also possess a
notice of compliance [NOC] issued by the Minister when satisfied that the
manufacturing process meets the required standards and that the new drug is
safe, effective and adequately labelled under the Regulations.
[6]
To fabricate, distribute or import into Canada
for sale any drug, the manufacturer must also hold an establishment licence
[EL], which is granted when the holder of the EL demonstrates its facilities
comply with Good Manufacturing Practices [GMP] and meet the requirements of
Part C, Division 2 of the FD Regulations.
[7]
The Regions and Programs Bureau [RAPB] of Health
Canada inspects domestic and foreign facilities to evaluate GMP compliance. To
assess GMP compliance of foreign manufacturing sites, Health Canada may perform
a “desktop” review of documentary evidence gathered by international regulatory
partners, external experts or consultants, or it may conduct on-site
inspections, at times with other regulatory partners. GMP observations are
classified by level of risk and depending on the severity and number of
observations, may result in the addition of terms and conditions to the ELs, or
a non-compliant rating.
[8]
Apotex is the largest pharmaceutical
manufacturer in Canada and is affiliated with the Indian companies APIPL and
ARPL. Apotex purchases and imports into Canada active pharmaceutical
ingredients [APIs] produced by APIPL and finished dosage form [FDF]
pharmaceutical products produced by ARPL.
[9]
The Respondent Minister of Health is
responsible, through her delegates at Health Canada, for administering the FD
Act and Regulations.
[10]
Health Canada is the federal government
department that oversees the regulation of drug products in Canada. It consists
of various branches, bureaus and offices, most notable to this application: the
Minister and Minister’s Office; the Health Products and Food Branch [HPFB],
which includes the Inspectorate, the branch responsible for compliance and
enforcement activities and oversight of establishment licensing for health
products; and the RAPB, responsible for inspection.
[11]
Both parties filed motions on September 10, 2015;
the Respondents requested dismissal of the application for judicial review as
moot, and the Applicants requested that material from the Respondents’ record
that was not served and filed properly or in a timely way be struck from the
record. The motions were heard at the outset of the judicial review and orders
have been issued separately.
[12]
In late January 2014, the United States Food and
Drug Administration [FDA] inspected APIPL’s manufacturing facility and issued a
Form 483, detailing their observations that APIPL was non-compliant with US GMP
requirements due to data reliability problems. On April 2, 2014, the FDA issued
an Import Alert on all products coming from APIPL, save one medically necessary
product. No issues of product quality were cited, nor were any drugs
originating from APIPL recalled.
[13]
Health Canada’s receipt of APIPL’s Form 483
prompted a desktop review by the RAPB in April 2014. The FDA’s observations
were classified according to Canadian risk classification ratings and a
non-compliant rating was recommended.
[14]
On April 29, 2014, Health Canada informed Apotex
of the non-compliant rating and requested that it cease sale of drugs
containing API made by APIPL until new evidence demonstrating GMP compliance
was provided. The following day Apotex, through counsel, responded to Health
Canada’s request, stating that there was no basis for ceasing sale and inviting
Health Canada to inspect APIPL itself.
[15]
At a meeting on June 10, 2014, Apotex provided
Health Canada with their corrective action plan for addressing deficiencies
outlined in APIPL’s Form 483. Further discussions throughout June led to the
adoption of a protocol [the Protocol], whereby Apotex would re-test all APIs
produced at APIPL in Canada for quality assurance. The Protocol was intended as
an interim measure until Health Canada’s on-site inspection of APIPL in August,
but was later extended until October 31, 2014.
[16]
On June 16, 2014, the FDA issued a “warning
letter” to Apotex detailing that APIPL’s corrective and preventative actions
continued to be insufficient to prevent recurrence of GMP deviations. A copy
was provided shortly thereafter to Health Canada.
[17]
With this information, in early August of 2014,
Health Canada conducted an on-site inspection of APIPL jointly with Australia’s
Therapeutic Goods Administration [TGA], with the purpose of verifying that
APIPL was indeed implementing corrective actions spurred by the FDA Import
Alert [Health Canada-TGA APIPL August Inspection]. In a teleconference with the
FDA, Canadian and Australian inspectors were informed of the FDA’s main
concerns from FDA inspections of APIPL and ARPL, to which they specifically
followed up on as part of their August inspection. An email to the HPFB
summarizing the RAPB’s observations indicated that “the
deficiencies noted are not critical (no risk 1 observations) that will require
immediate action to be taken” (Sharma First Affidavit, Exh 19; AR, Tab
8(19), p 1628).
[18]
During this same period, there were other
developments relating to Apotex’s FDF facility, ARPL. In May of 2014, ARPL was
issued GMP Certificates of Compliance from both the United Kingdom Medicines
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency [MHRA] and Health Canada, who had
conducted a joint inspection of ARPL in mid-February 2014.
[19]
In the final week of June 2014, the FDA
inspected ARPL, following which they issued a Form 483, finding data integrity
problems and deviations from GMP. Health Canada received a copy shortly
thereafter and an RAPB inspector who compared the FDA and Health Canada-MHRA
inspections recommended a non-compliant rating be assigned to ARPL. This is
despite the fact that the Health Canada-MHRA inspection “did not find data integrity / laboratory practices issues,”
and had assigned a compliant rating just over a month before. The inspector was
of the opinion that the scope of the inspections differed, with that of the FDA
centering on data integrity issues. He also suggested that follow-up with
Apotex would be necessary to “further clarify the
issues and determine what corrective actions the company is planning,”
as per Health Canada’s usual practice (Sharma First Affidavit, Exh 22; AR, Tab
8(22), p 1660).
[20]
Beginning on September 11, 2014, the Toronto
Star began to publish a series of articles and editorials highly critical of
Health Canada and the Minister, portraying them as inept in comparison to the
FDA, particularly in their regulatory approach towards Apotex, and attacking
them for failing to protect the health of Canadians against suspect drugs. The
articles spurred vigorous questioning of the Minister in the House of Commons.
[21]
The articles also caused an immediate reaction
at Health Canada and in the Minister’s Office, as evinced by internal
communications between personnel at HPFB, the Inspectorate, the Minister’s
Office, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Communications and Public Affairs Branch
of Health Canada. In an email to Deputy Minister George DaPont, the Minister
expressed concern that Health Canada did not “have a
strong enough policy response” and wanted to revoke the license of
Apotex “if these drugs that are considered harmful by
the FDA are still on the Canadian market,” to which she was assured by
staff that (i) the FDA had not recalled any products, (ii) program experts were
confident no risky products were on the market, (iii) all products coming from
Apotex were being re-tested in Canada, and that consequently it would be “hard to pull the license at this point” (Rule 318
Record, AR, Vol XVII, Tab 19(c)(27)).
[22]
On September 22, 2014, the FDA issued an Import
Alert for ARPL, except for products deemed medically necessary. No drug
products were recalled from the shelves. The following day Health Canada
requested that Apotex confirm it would voluntarily quarantine all products made
at ARPL by close of business on September 24. This deadline was accelerated to
10:00 am on the 24th after a series of calls and emails between the
Minister’s Office and Health Canada personnel. Apotex acceded to this request,
for one week, requesting that Health Canada undertake a review of the recent
ARPL inspections and “provide compelling reasons, with
specific factual bases for each affected product,” if they wanted to
continue the quarantine. Health Canada did not request an extension of the
quarantine from Apotex.
[23]
In an email, Ministerial staff expressed
frustration that Apotex had been provided an opportunity to quarantine products
voluntarily and indicated that “stronger action” was to be taken in response to
ARPL than what had happened with APIPL. The record also reveals that Health
Canada was prepared to move to an Import Ban had Apotex disagreed with the
quarantine, such that either way, products from APIPL and ARPL would be off the
market.
[24]
Accordingly, up to September 29, 2014, there had
been no indication from Health Canada to Apotex that any concerns about GMP
compliance at either APIPL or ARPL could result in an Import Ban.
[25]
In the interim during which ARPL had become the
central focus, an internal working group at Health Canada had confirmed the
assigned risk ratings from the Health Canada-TGA APIPL August Inspection. On
September 25, 2014, Apotex was provided with a draft Inspection Exit Notice,
proposing a Compliant with Terms and Conditions rating for APIPL, under which
new terms and conditions would require Apotex to re-test APIPL products in
Canada.
[26]
Given the concerns at Health Canada surrounding
the Apotex APIPL and ARPL facilities, the RAPB communicated to the Deputy
Minister’s Office that they would be providing a finalized Exit Notice to APIPL
- not ARPL, the subject of the voluntary quarantine - to which they received
express instructions to “[p]lease stand down re
pressing send on inspection rating” (Rule 318 Record, AR, Vol XVIII, Tab
20(56) & (62)). No explanation was or has been given to Apotex regarding
why the Exit Notice was not provided.
[27]
On September 29, 2014, Health Canada and the FDA
held a conference call, from which Health Canada allegedly learned “new
information” they claim formed the basis for their regulatory action and
resulting Import Ban of products from APIPL and ARPL.
[28]
On September 30, 2014, without notice, Health
Canada communicated to Apotex that the Minister had instructed the Canadian
Border Services Agency [CBSA] to immediately restrict importation of drug products
from APIPL and ARPL [CBSA Action]. An email from the Minister’s Office to the
Prime Minister’s Office conveyed that this move represented that Health Canada
was both catching up with the US and going even further, and that the ban as
compared to a voluntary quarantine was “largely
cosmetic and very useful for pushback” (Rule 318 Record, AR, Vol XVIII,
Tab 20(76)). Apotex was informed by way of a telephone call from Health Canada,
press releases issued by both Health Canada and by the Minister, and a list of
the banned products on Health Canada’s website - all on September 30, 2014.
[29]
In the September 30 phone call, Health Canada
maintained it could not rely on data coming from APIPL and ARPL, and that due
to the “new information” received from the FDA, it was re-reviewing the
compliant status communicated to Apotex by way of the draft Inspection Exit Notice
five days earlier, and terms and conditions would be applied to Apotex’s ELs
[EL Action]. The CBSA Action and EL Action collectively constitute what is
hereinafter referred to as the Import Ban.
[30]
The Minister’s public statement conveyed that “Health Canada has taken decisive action today to stop the
import into Canada of all drug products from [APIPL and ARPL],” but
reassured that “Health Canada has received no evidence
that the problems pose an immediate risk,” and that like the FDA, no
recall would be required. Further, the Minister stated “when
trust between a regulator and a company is broken, strong actions are required”
(Rule 318 Record, AR, Vol XVIII, Tab 20(90)). Health Canada’s statement is to a
similar effect.
[31]
Despite repeated requests for disclosure, Apotex
remained unaware of what “new information” prompted Health Canada to
immediately impose the Import Ban until after initiation of this judicial review.
Health Canada attributes this to their confidentiality agreement with the FDA,
which prevented them from sharing the acquired information. The new information
that is set out in Dr. Supriya Sharma’s First Affidavit at paragraphs 89 to 94,
includes:
a) selective reporting of positive test results;
b) the FDA’s investigation was more detailed and lengthy than
previously appreciated;
c) it would be an in-depth process for the company to rectify serious
problems; and
d) the FDA had intercepted at the US Border API subject to the Import
Alert “mistakenly” listed with incorrect information (this ended up being a
misunderstanding, and was not an issue in the proceeding).
[32]
During this period, there was no correspondence
between Health Canada and Apotex regarding GMP compliance at APIPL or ARPL, nor
regarding any clarification of information learned from the FDA.
[33]
On October 2, 2014, Apotex received copies of
four form letters [the EL Letters], which purported to amend Apotex’s ELs by
applying new terms and conditions that effectively banned import of all drug
products from APIPL and ARPL, save for medically necessary products if
re-tested by a third party once in Canada.
[34]
Neither the TGA nor MHRA, with which Health
Canada shares mutual recognition agreements, have implemented import bans for
these Indian facilities, despite being aware of the FDA and Health Canada’s
import bans for APIPL and ARPL products. They claim to have relied on their own
inspections and detailed analysis of information to make independent risk-based
decisions.
[35]
The Affidavits filed by the parties describe in
detail communications between Apotex and Health Canada leading up to and
following imposition of the Import Ban and amendment of the ELs. The Minister’s
(and her delegates’) actions prior to September 30, 2014, are most pertinent to
this proceeding: evidence post-dating the regulatory action taken by Health
Canada is of little relevance to the decision under review, save for some
contextual significance as to what actions preceded the September 30, 2014
Import Ban.
[36]
Affidavits were filed by Dr. Jeremy Desai, Mr. Ed
Carey and Mr. Kiran Krishnan.
[37]
Dr. Desai, President and Chief Executive Officer
of Apotex Inc., swore two affidavits. He describes Apotex’s compliance with the
FD Regulations for obtaining DINs, NOCs and ELs and affirms that Apotex
has continually held valid, unsuspended DINs, NOCs and ELs for the banned
products and facilities where the banned products were made, APIPL and ARPL.
[38]
Dr. Desai’s description of events leading up to
the Import Ban demonstrates a transparent relationship between Apotex and
Health Canada, whereby FDA observations, the corresponding US Import Alert, and
Apotex’s corrective actions were openly communicated to Health Canada. Dr.
Desai asserts that Health Canada did not express concern regarding the safety
of products coming from APIPL or ARPL, and in fact conducted their own
inspections of the facilities, which resulted in GMP compliant ratings.
[39]
Dr. Desai sets out the Toronto Star articles
scrutinizing Health Canada. On September 30, 2014, Dr. Desai learned, without
warning, that an Import Ban had been placed on drug products coming from APIPL
and ARPL. Health Canada told Dr. Desai that “new information” from the FDA
constituted the basis for the Ban. In his experience, this was not Health
Canada’s usual regulatory response, which typically involves communication and
cooperation with the companies - as had been happening up until this point.
[40]
Press releases by Health Canada and the Minister
on September 30, 2014, also alleged that trust with Apotex had been broken.
This is the only information provided to Apotex until after initiation of the judicial
review.
[41]
Ed Carey, Vice President of Global Quality &
Compliance at Apotex Pharmachem Inc., is responsible for compliance and
oversight of foreign API manufacturers and works closely with Dr. Desai. In his
Affidavit, he claims that Health Canada was fully aware of concerns, claimed to
be “new information” since at least January of 2014, as evinced by the
following; correspondence with the FDA, Apotex’s corrective action plans,
investigations by Health Canada with international regulatory partners, and
implementation of the Protocol for testing in Canada.
[42]
The Krishnan affidavit explained a
misunderstanding by Health Canada of some information provided by the FDA that
has since been clarified. It is no longer relevant to the proceeding, other
than to demonstrate that some information upon which Health Canada relied in
forming an opinion of mistrust towards Apotex was potentially inaccurate.
[43]
Each of the Respondents’ affiants, Ms. Robin
Chiponski and Dr. Supriya Sharma, provided two affidavits.
[44]
Ms. Chiponski is Director General of the HPFB
and is involved in oversight of Health Canada’s establishment licensing. Her
evidence sets out the events of September 2014, from Health Canada’s
perspective. It explains that Health Canada reviewed and assessed potential
compliance and enforcement approaches for Apotex, including the option of
restricting import.
[45]
Ms. Chiponski claims that information from the
FDA led her to believe that the data integrity problems at Apotex were more
widespread and deeper-rooted than previously thought. She asserts that Health
Canada’s restriction of import and imposition of terms and conditions on APIPL and
ARPL’s ELs stemmed from a concern that products from APIPL and ARPL posed a
potential risk to Canadians’ health and safety. She does not point to evidence
that the banned products constituted a risk to health and safety, apart from
GMP non-compliance at the facilities.
[46]
Ms. Chiponski also explains that Health Canada
does not notify a regulated party of import restrictions before they take
effect in order to prevent the importer from flooding the market with product
prior to the ban.
[47]
Dr. Sharma is the Senior Medical Advisor at HPFB
and at the relevant time held the position of Acting Associate Deputy Minister
and Senior Medical Advisor. Her affidavit describes the regulatory framework
and outlines the guidelines and policies that set out Health Canada’s interpretation
of the FD Act and FD Regulations. Potential compliance and
enforcement approaches used in the event of GMP non-compliance are outlined in
Health Canada’s Compliance and Enforcement policy (POL-0001). A brief summary
of the relevant points follows:
a) Non-compliance is brought to the company’s attention and the
Inspectorate will clarify what is necessary to achieve compliance. Enforcement
actions are undertaken when necessary, mainly when the regulated party is
unable or unwilling to comply with the Regulations.
b) To identify the appropriate enforcement action, Health Canada will
consider; the risk to health and safety, compliance history of the regulated
party, whether the regulated party acted with indifference or premeditation,
the degree of cooperation, whether the problem is systemic, the effectiveness
of the response, and the need to maintain public confidence in the programs
administered by the HPFB and the Inspectorate.
c) The Inspectorate has broad powers to enforce the Act and Regulations.
If a regulated party does not respond voluntarily, the Inspectorate can
consider a variety of measures, including; customs activities, public warning
or advisory, seizure and detention, and refusal, suspension or amendment of
establishment licences.
d) Fairness is a guiding principle of the policy, requiring that the
Inspectorate follow a predictable, uniform, non-discriminatory and unbiased
approach to enforcement in Canada for all regulated products.
e) The primary objective of the response strategy is to manage the risk
to Canadians and use the most appropriate level of intervention to ensure that
the regulated party brings the product or activity into compliance.
[48]
Dr. Sharma emphasizes the importance of adhering
to GMP to ensure the quality, efficacy and safety of drugs. She also highlights
the policy considerations weighed by Health Canada in the implementation of
regulatory measures. In this case, she claims that Health Canada’s regulatory
action was spurred by the lengthy history of communication and engagement between
Health Canada and Apotex over the course of 2014.
[49]
After the call with the FDA on September 29,
2014, Dr. Sharma doubted that Health Canada could trust Apotex due to the FDA’s
data integrity concerns, “all other information Health
Canada had about Apotex,” and Apotex’s insufficient remedial actions to
date.
[50]
That same day, Dr. Sharma discussed the
agreed-upon regulatory action, the Import Ban, with Deputy Minister DaPont and
Associate Deputy Minister Glover, following which she then spoke with the Minister’s
office.
[51]
The Respondents’ affiants claim to have received
no direction from the Minister or her staff about what regulatory actions to
take against Apotex. The record demonstrates that both were included in much of
the email correspondence between the Minister’s Office and Health Canada following
the Toronto Star Articles regarding what to do about Apotex.
[52]
As a result of the Respondents’ motion heard
prior to this judicial review, in a separate order I have granted leave to file
the affidavit of Laura Van Soelen containing exhibits of correspondence between
Health Canada and Apotex, dated August 31, 2015, pertaining to the issuance of
new ELs for both APIPL and ARPL (on September 1, 2015). It is of limited relevance,
but provides a contextual framework of the ongoing regulatory relationship
between the parties up to September 30, 2014.
[53]
The relevant legislation is attached in Annexes
A and B.
[54]
The issues are:
A. What is the appropriate standard of review of Health Canada’s decision?
B. Did the Minister act in accordance with the duty of procedural
fairness when she implemented the Import Ban and amended the EL Letters?
C. Did the Minister act beyond or not in accordance with her regulatory
powers under the FD Act, the FD Regulations and/or the Customs
Act?
i.
Are the Regulations unconstitutional
under paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights?
ii.
If the Minister employed the proper regulatory
powers, was her decision reasonable?
D. Can this Court grant the relief sought?
[55]
The standard of review is correctness for
allegations of procedural fairness. A correctness standard should also be
applied to the issue of whether the Minister employed the correct statutory
mechanisms to carry out the Import Ban (EL Action and CBSA Action). The
Minister's actual decision of whether to implement the Import Ban should be
reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, as this is a question of mixed fact
and law.
[56]
The Minister acted for an improper purpose and
did not act in accordance with the duty of procedural fairness when she
implemented the Import Ban and amended the EL Letters. Consequently, the Import
Ban should be quashed.
[57]
For the EL Action, the Minister employed the
proper statutory provision to add terms and conditions to Apotex's ELs (subsection
C.01A.008(4)). However, in the circumstances, that provision should encompass
the procedural fairness afforded to EL holders throughout the rest of the regulatory
scheme, requiring at least notice and reasons for the addition of terms and conditions.
[58]
There is no need to consider the CBSA Action, as
the Customs Target has expired and has not been renewed.
[59]
Paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights,
SC 1960, c 44 [Bill of Rights] does not apply in the circumstances.
[60]
The Applicants submit that the appropriate
standard of review for determining issues of procedural fairness is correctness
(Rt Hon Jean Chretien v Hon John H Gomery et al, 2008 FC 802 at paras
65-66, aff’d 2010 FCA 283; Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at
para 79 [Khela]).
[61]
They claim that correctness also governs the
issue of whether the Minister had authority to act and, if so, pursuant to
which particular legislative provision, as this is a question of jurisdiction (New
Brunswick (Board of Management) v Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 at para 59 [Dunsmuir];
Burnell v Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), 2009 NSSC 341 at
paras 5-10, aff’d 2010 NSCA 22).
[62]
Further, recent FCA jurisprudence has determined
that the EL Action is to be reviewed on a correctness standard (Takeda
Canada Inc v Minister of Health, 2013 FCA 13 at paras 26, 111, leave to
appeal denied 2013 CarswellNat 1867 (SCC) [Takeda]; Canada (Minister
of Health) v Celgene Inc, 2013 FCA 43 at paras 34-35 [Celgene].
[63]
The Respondents submit that although the
appropriate standard of review for procedural matters is generally correctness,
a decision-maker’s choice of procedure that involves a Ministerial decision related
to public health considerations under her own statute is entitled to deference
(Forest Ethics Advocacy Assn v National Energy Board, 2014 FCA 245 at
para 70 [Forest Ethics]; Maritime Broadcasting System Ltd v Canadian
Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59 at para 55 [Maritime Broadcasting]).
[64]
The Respondents also argue that the Minister’s
decision to implement the Import Ban, and the mechanisms she used to carry it
out, are reviewable on a reasonableness standard. The need for discretion stems
from the Minister’s expertise in assessing drug safety and efficacy, and the
fact that she is interpreting her home statute – a circumstance for which the
Supreme Court has set out a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (Information
& Privacy Commissioner v Alberta Teachers Association, 2011 SCC 61 at
para 34 [ATA]; British Columbia (Securities Commission) v McLean,
2013 SCC 67 at para 21 [McLean]).
[65]
Furthermore, the Respondents argue that issues
of fact or mixed fact and law are subject to reasonableness review (Tervita
v Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3 at para 39; Agraira v
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36
at para 50).
[66]
In my opinion, the standard of review for
procedural fairness in the present circumstances is correctness. The Supreme
Court has determined that deference is not owed when determining whether the
decision-maker’s process is fair (Khela, above, at para 79).
[67]
The recent FCA cases suggesting otherwise cited
by the Respondents do not aptly apply to the present facts. Forest Ethics
and Maritime Broadcasting, above, contemplate situations where tribunals
were given discretion to determine their own procedures. In such a situation,
the FCA has found that deference is owed to procedural rulings made by a
tribunal with the authority to control its own process. In the present case, the
Minister was given no such discretion to control her own process, but instead
must comply with the procedures set out in the extensive regulatory regime
governed by the FD Act and FD Regulations.
[68]
The parties disagree as to the appropriate
standard to apply with respect to the review of the Minister’s decision. The
Applicants argue that the issue is jurisdictional. I disagree. The Supreme
Court has expressed serious reservations about the presence of jurisdictional
issues: they are narrow and will be exceptional (ATA, above, at para
33). Further, the case law cited by the Applicants in support is not applicable
on the present facts.
[69]
The Respondents submit that cases involving
public health and safety are reviewed on a reasonableness standard. Although prior
jurisprudence has established that the appropriate standard of review of
decisions on questions of fact and the exercise of discretion by Health Canada under
the FD Regulations is reasonableness (North American Nutriceutical
Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 1044 at para 78 citing Wellesley
Therapeutics Inc v Canada (Minister of Health), 2010 FC 573 at para 31),
the Minister’s interpretation of her power under the FD Regulations to
implement the EL Action, and under the Customs Act to carry out the CBSA
Action, are not questions of fact or discretion.
[70]
The issue is best characterized as one of
statutory interpretation: the EL Action comes down to the Minister’s
interpretation of her powers under the FD Regulations, specifically
whether subsection C.01A.008(4) authorizes her to add terms and conditions to
Apotex’s ELs; and the CBSA Action involves the Minister’s interpretation of her
powers under the Act, Regulations and the Customs Act. Statutory
interpretation is a question of law (Canadian National Railway v Canada
(Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40 at para 33).
[71]
Only once it is determined that Minister chose
the correct statutory mechanisms would her decision to implement the Import Ban
– a policy-based question involving public health considerations – be properly
characterized as one of mixed fact and law, with the applicable standard of
review at this stage being reasonableness.
[72]
According to Dunsmuir, the Court must
first ascertain whether judicial precedents have satisfactorily established the
standard of review applicable to the Minister's interpretation of the FD Act
and Regulations. Where prior jurisprudence has not indicated the proper
standard, the Court must analyze the Dunsmuir factors.
[73]
In Takeda, above, Justice David Stratas
in dissent on a separate issue, and Justice Eleanor Dawson of the FCA, conclude
that the Minister’s interpretation of the data protection provisions of the FD
Regulations is correctness. Justice Stratas arrives at correctness by
rebutting the Supreme Court’s presumption of reasonableness set by ATA,
through an analysis of the Dunsmuir factors. Justice Dawson found that
the issue had been determined in recent prior jurisprudence.
[74]
Although there is no prior jurisprudence setting
out the appropriate standard of review on the specific provisions at issue,
Justice Stratas’ analysis of the Dunsmuir factors is helpful: the
present facts involve the same Minister and the same regulations. He writes at
paras 29 and 30:
29 In my view, the presumption [of
reasonableness set out in ATA] is overcome. All of the factors relevant
to determining the standard of review lean in favour of correctness review. In
this case, the nature of the question is purely legal. There is no privative
clause. The Minister has no expertise in legal interpretation. There is nothing
in the structure of the Act, this regulatory regime or this particular
legislative provision that suggests that deference should be accorded to the
Minister's decision. This analysis of the factors mirrors that in Georgia
Strait Alliance v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), 2012 FCA 40
(F.C.A.) at paragraphs 101-105 (sometimes also referred to as "Georgia
Strait"); Sheldon Inwentash & Lynn Factor Charitable Foundation v.
R., 2012 FCA 136 (F.C.A.) at paragraphs 18-23.
30 I am comforted in this conclusion
by the application of the correctness standard to Ministerial interpretations
of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133:
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 26,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 533 (S.C.C.) at paragraph 36; Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v.
Canada (Minister of Health), 2006 SCC 49, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 (S.C.C.); Purdue
Pharma v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 132 (F.C.A.) at paragraph 13.
Although different regulations are involved in this case, both concern
Minister-administered regimes governing the period before drugs are authorized
for sale. It would be anomalous if the standards of review differed.
[75]
Justice Stratas’ analysis applies to the present
facts: statutory interpretation is a legal question, the FD Regulations
contain no privative clause and the Court is as well placed as the Minister to
determine the proper statutory interpretation of the Regulations. Part
C, Division 1A does not confer a large degree of deference to the Minister.
Although the particular provision, subsection C.01A.008(4), which the
Respondents contend provides statutory authority for the Minister’s actions,
does provide the Minister with some degree of deference to set out terms and
conditions, the contextual and legal scheme for establishment licensing
provides little deference to the Minister. Even in situations where the
Minister is given some discretion, she is required to consider certain factors
and follow specific procedures.
[76]
While I find that the appropriate standard is
correctness, given my decision below, whether one applies the standard of
correctness or reasonableness on interpretation, the result would be the same.
[77]
The Applicants submit that the Minister was
under a common law duty to act fairly: her decision affected Apotex’s rights
and interests - mainly, Apotex’s pre-existing authorization to import products
from APIPL and ARPL. Consequently, it requires that they be provided the
opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, and that decisions are made
using a fair, impartial and open process (Baker v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras 20, 22, 28 [Baker]).
[78]
The Respondents argue that procedural fairness
is not owed under the Regulations at the time terms and conditions are
imposed. A party disputing the imposition may apply for an amendment under
section C.01A.006, and will then be granted procedural protection pursuant to subsection
C.01A.010(3) of the FD Regulations.
[79]
The Respondents cite Baker as authority
for the importance of context to assessing the content of procedural fairness,
and analyse the Baker factors. They argue that if the Court finds a duty
of procedural fairness is owed prior to the imposition of terms and conditions,
the factors indicate the duty is low for the following reasons:
a) Ministerial decisions must ensure legislative policy is implemented
(Imperial Oil Ltd v Quebec, 2003 SCC 58 at paras 34, 37-38).
b) In the context of public safety procedural guarantees will be
adjusted “in accordance with the degree of risk and
urgency” (Miel Labonte Inc v Canada, 2006 FC 195 at para 70).
c) The decision was a non-final regulatory decision reached by a
non-adjudicative process.
d) The purpose of the FD Act and Regulations is the
protection and promotion of Canadians’ health and safety. The Minister is
provided discretion to apply her expertise and is statutorily mandated to
protect public health.
e) Apotex’s interest is purely economic, which cannot outweigh the
public interest of having safe products on the market (Hilbert Honey Co v
Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2009 FC 818 at paras 63 and
120-122).
f) Tribunals with expertise, such as Health Canada in this context, are
to be afforded deference in establishing decision-making processes (Maritime
Broadcasting, at para 56).
[80]
The Respondents claim that a finding that low
procedural fairness is owed to Apotex is consistent with other case law arising
under the Regulations (Canadian Pharmaceutical Technologies International
(CPT) Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 244 at paras 54-55; Duchesnay
Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 976 at para 64).
[81]
With regard to some of the above points, on the
facts before me, there is no evidence to support the contention that the
Minister was concerned about immediate health risks posed by the products
subject to the ban, nor that the situation was highly urgent, and that
consequently, the level of procedural fairness should be less. Moreover, in
terms of the statutory scheme, the Minister is not given “wide discretionary
power” under the Regulations, in all but few provisions (such as
paragraph C.01A.008(4)(b)). Further, the statutory scheme provides procedural
protections (notice, reasons and/or the opportunity to be heard) for the
licensees in all sections, apart from those relating to issuance. This
indicates that some procedural fairness was intended for the EL scheme.
[82]
The regulatory regime and the present
circumstances suggest procedural fairness should have been afforded prior to
implementation of the Import Ban. The Minister made an administrative decision that
affected Apotex’s rights, privileges and interests. Even at the mid-to-low end
of the spectrum, Apotex was entitled to basic participatory rights and the required
procedural fairness as set out in the Regulations.
[83]
The Minister was procedurally unfair. She failed
to provide any notice and thus denied Apotex an opportunity to be heard before
unilaterally imposing the Import Ban on September 30, 2014.
[84]
Apotex submits that that the Minister and her
delegates conducted themselves so as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias, both for lack of impartiality and for lack of independence.
[85]
The legal test for reasonable apprehension of
bias is confirmed in Baker, above, at para 46 to be:
What would an informed person, viewing the
matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through –
conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the
decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?
[86]
The Applicants allege that this test is met and
that a lack of impartiality arose from the Minister’s improper motives and the
fact that she and her delegates had made a decisive decision to take strong
action against Apotex.
[87]
They cite a September 16, 2014 email from the
Minister to her Chief of Staff and the Deputy Minister in which the Minister
expresses her concern that they didn’t “have a strong
enough policy response,” and that she wanted to say she would “revoke the license [sic] of [Apotex] if they do not remove
these products asap” (Rule 318 Record, Tab 26, AR, Vol XVII, Tab
19(c)(26)).
[88]
An email from the Minister’s Director of Issues
Management, Mr. Olsen, to the Prime Minister’s Office on September 23, 2014, also
indicates that the Minister’s Office directed the department (presumably the
RAPB) to take “stronger action” (Rule 318
Record, Tab 34, AR, Vol. XVII, Tab 19(C)(34)).
[89]
Apotex also submits that the Minister (and
delegates) lacked independence in the particular circumstances, as there was no
one involved in the process of deciding whether or not to implement an import ban
who could render an independent decision, free from external pressure. Apotex
claims that by September 29, 2014, everyone who was involved in the issue of
what to do about Apotex were tainted by the media coverage and Ministerial
pressure.
[90]
The obligation of impartiality on the Minister
is not equivalent to the impartiality that is required of a judge or an
administrative decision-maker whose primary function is adjudication. The
Minister is dealing with polycentric considerations and has as her duty the
protection of the Canadian public’s health and safety (Imperial Oil Ltd v
Quebec, 2003 SCC 58 at paras 31, 34).
[91]
While the Minister expressed a desire to pull
Apotex’s ELs following intense questioning in the House of Commons on September
16, 2014, I do not think an “informed person,” looking to context and with information
(i) about the events between Health Canada and Apotex from April 2014 onwards,
(ii) of APIPL and ARPL’s GMP non-compliance, and (iii) considering the complex
regulatory interplay of the various Health Canada branches (as evinced by
communication between individuals in all departments) would think it is more
likely than not that the decision-maker (not solely involving the Minister)
would not at least be amenable to persuasion. Legally, the threshold has not
been met.
[92]
With respect to the alleged lack of
independence, there is evidence from the record that discussions and meetings
were taking place up and down the ladder at Health Canada. However, in
considering the regulatory regime and the division of powers at Health Canada, based
on the facts before me, the Applicants have not met their burden of
demonstrating that no one at Health Canada could render an independent decision
free from external pressure.
[93]
Internal emails indicate that Health Canada was
indeed concerned with the Toronto Star articles and what to do about Apotex. As
Ms. Chiponski stated in her First Affidavit, it is Health Canada’s
responsibility to be apprised of information, including from the media, falling
within its mandate. The articles were highly critical of Health Canada and of
the Minister and it is not unusual or in my opinion probative for demonstrating
a lack of independence that Health Canada personnel were discussing same.
[94]
The Applicants have not met the burden of
establishing that the Minister demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias,
either from a lack of independence or impartiality, given the high threshold
for establishing that bias (Balta v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2011 FC 1509 at para 18; Fletcher v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 909 at para 8).
[95]
The evidence does however demonstrate that the
Minister acted for an improper purpose.
[96]
Discretionary decisions are constrained by the
confines of the enabling legislation and must be exercised in accordance with
the rule of law. It is thus ultra vires for a Minister to make a
decision for a purpose other than for which that power was granted by the
legislature (Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 at 140, 143).
[97]
The Applicants allege that the Minister’s
actions were not motivated by a desire to protect the health and safety of
Canadians and ensure compliance with the FD Regulations, but were instead
for the purpose of easing political pressure stemming from heavy criticism by
the media and in the House of Commons.
[98]
The evidence they assert supports this
allegation includes:
a) An email from the Minister’s staff expressing frustration with the
Inspectorate’s decision to offer Apotex the option of voluntary quarantine,
thereby precluding any immediate “stronger measures”
(Rule 318 Record, Tab 36, AR, Vol XVII, Tab 19(c)(36)).
b) Frequent requests by the Minister’s staff for “stronger action,” following which they were indeed
taken: Health Canada accelerated Apotex’s deadline for responding to their
request for voluntary quarantine, and then withheld the Exit Notice for APIPL
that granted a Compliant with Terms and Conditions rating.
c) When asked why Health Canada’s action was more severe than that of
the FDA, Health Canada personnel pointed to Toronto Star coverage, not a
concern for health and safety.
d) Public assurances by the Minister, Dr. Sharma and Health Canada that
there were no health and safety concerns of the banned products, and the fact
that no APIPL or ARPL products were recalled.
e) Interactions between Health Canada and Apotex prior and subsequent
to the Toronto Star criticism. In April 2014, the FDA Import Alert for APIPL
products resulted in discussions between Health Canada and Apotex, further
inspection and a jointly agreed upon testing protocol. The FDA alert regarding
ARPL products in September – in the midst of media attacks – resulted in a
demand for voluntary quarantine and Import Ban.
f) Finally, a FDA Import Alert in 2013 for another foreign manufacturer
charged with serious data integrity issues, including fraudulent falsification,
did not result in an import ban by Health Canada, but instead ended in
cooperation with the company. That situation was not in the wake of highly
critical media attention, as was present here.
[99]
The Applicants emphasize that the motivation
behind the Minister’s actions was to ease political pressure – clearly
unrelated to the intent and purpose of the FD Act and Regulations.
[100] The purpose of the FD Act and Regulations is the
protection and promotion of Canadians’ health and safety. It is not contested
that Health Canada had concerns about GMP compliance at Apotex’s Indian
facilities. Nor is it disputed that in order to protect Canadians’ health and
safety, Health Canada has the option to ban products from facilities found to
be non-compliant with GMP, as is set out by their Compliance and Enforcement
Policy (POL-0001).
[101] However, the issue for the Court is whether, on the facts contained
in the record before me, the Import Ban was implemented based on a legitimate
concern for protecting Canadians’ health and safety, and not to silence
criticism in the media or in Parliament, or for any other improper purpose.
[102] In my opinion, a consideration of the following facts illustrates
that it is more likely than not that an improper purpose was at play. In
September of 2014, in the absence of media criticism on the Minister or Health
Canada, evidence of the on-going regulatory relationship between Apotex and
Health Canada demonstrates that it is unlikely and against past and customary
practice that Health Canada would have:
a) suddenly and without explanation withdrawn its own inspectors’
Compliant with Terms and Conditions rating for APIPL, which stemmed from an
inspection expressly aimed at investigating FDA concerns of the APIPL and ARPL
facilities;
b) immediately and without notice ceased the usual pattern of ongoing
dialogue for working with regulated parties and taking corrective actions in
situations of GMP non-compliance, as outlined by their own policies;
c) banned products from both facilities targeted in the Toronto Star
articles, despite the fact that APIPL had just been granted a Compliant with
Terms and Conditions rating by Health Canada inspectors and only ARPL had been
the subject of the most recent FDA Import Alert; and
d) implemented an Import Ban without first attempting to consult with
Apotex regarding the newly learned FDA concerns, or requesting an extension of
Apotex’s voluntary quarantine.
[103] There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the events of
September were so different from the previous six months such that the Import
Ban was needed immediately, without notice or any opportunity to be heard, and
for both APIPL and ARPL – facilities expressly mentioned in the critical
articles.
[104] A review of the “new information” obtained by Health Canada on
September 29, 2014, also does not explain the urgency of the regulatory action
taken. The evidence reveals that Health Canada: had been apprised of the FDA’s
Form 483s, which detailed their observations and concerns; had been informed of
the FDA warning letter to APIPL in June 2014, regarding its failure to
sufficiently correct problems; had come to a mutually agreed upon Protocol for
re-testing products; and had conducted an inspection specifically for the
purpose of reviewing APIPL’s progress in light of the FDA findings. Although in
September ARPL came under the spotlight, observations from the FDA inspection
outlined in ARPL’s Form 483 were not so disparate or egregious to those found
for APIPL that such a different course of regulatory action was justified. The way
this Import Ban was carried out fell outside Health Canada’s customary
regulatory practice, but publicly represented that they were going further than
the US FDA.
[105] Further, if the Import Ban was motivated by the purpose of
protecting health and safety, it is curious that the Minister and Health Canada
would publicly assure that the banned drug products’ were safe and at no point issued
any recall for those products available in the Canadian market. Upon
cross-examination, the Respondents’ affiants stated that there was no evidence
that products from APIPL or ARPL produced a risk or threat to the health of
consumers.
[106] While the Minister is provided some discretion under the FD
Regulations and has been charged with protecting Canadians’ health and
safety through her implementation of the FD Act and Regulations,
her discretionary decisions must be prescribed by law and fall within the
confines of her mandate. They are also restricted by the requirements of
natural justice (Morton v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans),
2015 FC 575 at paras 29-31 citing Comeau's Sea Foods Ltd v Canada (Minister
of Fisheries & Oceans), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 12 at para 36).
[107] The above facts suggest that the Import Ban was motivated by the
Minister’s desire to ease pressure triggered from the media and in the House of
Commons – a purpose falling outside her delegated authority from the enabling
legislation, which must be exercised in accordance with the rule of law. The
Minister’s actions were therefore ultra vires and she erred in her
exercise of jurisdiction by implementing an Import Ban on September 30, 2014.
The public statements released on September 30, 2014, by the Minister and
Health Canada constituted a manifestation of this improper purpose; they were a
way for the Minister to publicly convey she was taking strong action and was
not weaker than her US regulatory counterpart.
[108]
The Respondents submit that Apotex cannot
credibly argue it was unaware of Health Canada’s concerns. Ongoing
correspondence and information exchange between a regulator and regulated party
can constitute notice. Thus, the Respondents argue Apotex was aware of Health
Canada’s concerns of data integrity since April 2014.
[109] They further maintain that the Applicants also cannot claim to have
been denied an opportunity to be heard: Apotex provided information to Health
Canada relating to data integrity issues and the corresponding corrective
actions taken, such as re-testing of products once in Canada pursuant to the
Protocol.
[110] The Respondents also claim that the statutory basis and reasons for
the decision were explained in the EL Letters and Health Canada’s call with
Apotex on September 30, 2014. To the extent the reasons given are inadequate,
the Court must look to supplement them, as suggested by Justice Abella in Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),
2011 SCC 62 at paras 12-16.
[111] In addition to reviewing inspection reports of APIPL and ARPL,
documents from the Respondents’ Rule 318 Response and sworn evidence from Ms.
Chiponski and Dr. Sharma demonstrate Health Canada’s consideration of all the
information provided to it. The Respondents thus claim that the history of
engagement and ongoing correspondence between Apotex and Health Canada
constituted adequate notice.
[112] I disagree.
[113] Participatory rights are afforded so that the interested parties
have an opportunity to bring evidence and arguments relevant to the decision to
be made to the attention of the decision-maker (Baker, above, at paras
22, 28). Although the content of procedural fairness varies with the
circumstances, notice is a fundamental element. Its main purpose is to afford
those affected with a reasonable opportunity to present their case and to
respond to what is presented in opposition. Notice must thus be given sufficiently
in advance to allow for preparation and must provide adequate information to
allow meaningful participation (Brown and Evans, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada
Limited, 2014) at 9:1100, 9:1200).
[114] Apotex is a large pharmaceutical manufacturer that works with
various international facilities and functions within a complex regulatory and
licensing scheme: they are seemingly in constant correspondence with their
regulator. It is obvious they knew of Health Canada’s concerns regarding data
integrity issues at APIPL and ARPL – they themselves supplied Health Canada
with information regarding same and of corrective actions taken in response,
and in cooperation with, the FDA. This correspondence does not constitute
notice or an opportunity to be heard.
[115] The last communication between Apotex and Health Canada prior to the
Import Ban was the draft Inspection Exit Notice, conveying that APIPL had
received a Compliant with Terms and Conditions rating from Health Canada on
September 25, 2014, four days prior to imposition of the Import Ban. If
anything, this correspondence conveyed to Apotex that Health Canada’s data integrity
concerns had lessened and were being addressed, in the ordinary course of the
parties’ normal, ongoing dialogue in dealing with regulatory concerns.
[116] Further, both the Respondents’ affiants attest to the fact that “new
information” obtained from the FDA on September 29, 2014, called into question
the reliability of data coming from APIPL and ARPL and caused concerns that
corrective actions to that point “might not be
sufficient” (Sharma Supplementary Affidavit, para 20; AR, Tab 10, p
2466). This conversation and the “new information” do not form part of the
ongoing correspondence between Apotex and Health Canada, yet it was a decisive
factor in Health Canada’s decision to amend Apotex’s ELs and detain their
products at the border.
[117] Apotex was informed of the Import Ban over the phone on September
30, 2014, and via press releases by Health Canada and the Minister that day.
This cannot amount to notice, which must be prospective in order to provide a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.
[118] The Respondents also claim that Health Canada took “escalating action” to address problems at APIPL and
ARPL and warned that additional steps may be taken in the future. The evidence
demonstrates that between April and September of 2014, rather than escalating,
the correspondence and actions taken exemplify the cooperative approach
outlined in Health Canada’s Compliance and Enforcement Policy (POL-0001)
whereby non-compliance is brought to the attention of the regulated party and
the Inspectorate clarifies what is necessary to achieve compliance (section
8.0, POL-0001) – this is what happened in the context of APIPL. Although
non-binding, the policy provides insight into Health Canada’s usual regulatory
practice. It states:
When a non-compliance issue is identified, it
is brought to the attention of the company or individual involved. Initially,
the Inspectorate will clarify what is necessary to achieve compliance. It is
then the organization or individual's responsibility to take timely and
appropriate action to comply with legislative and regulatory requirements.
Enforcement actions will be undertaken by the Inspectorate when necessary,
particularly when the regulated party is unable or unwilling to comply with
legislative and/or regulatory requirements.
[119] Health Canada’s warning that they may take “additional
steps” if necessary, does not constitute adequate notice, as it did not
provide sufficient information to allow Apotex to participate.
[120] Consequently, without proper notice Apotex was not provided with a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Although Health Canada had information
about Apotex’s corrective actions, this preceded the new information conveyed
by the FDA, and did not provide an opportunity to be heard on the factors
leading to the decision.
[121] The Minister did not act in accordance with natural justice and
denied Apotex the basic procedural rights required in the circumstances.
[122]
While I need not consider whether the Minister
acted without legislative authority, given my findings of the Minister’s
procedural unfairness and acting for an improper purpose, it is an issue that
warrants clarification by this Court. The record before me is extensive and a
consideration of this issue has consequences for ascertaining future licensees’
rights under the FD Regulations.
[123] The FD Regulations create a scheme whereby no person can
manufacture, import or sell a drug, except in accordance with an EL. Once the
requisite information is provided, section C.01A.008 regulates issuance.
Subsection C.01A.008(4) authorizes the Minister to set out terms and conditions
in an EL regarding required testing and “any other
matters necessary to prevent injury to the health of consumers, including
conditions under which drugs are fabricated, packaged/labelled or tested”.
[124] The Minister is authorized to amend these terms and conditions under
section C.01A.012, if necessary, to prevent injury to the health of the
consumer, provided 15 days’ notice and the reasons for the amendment are given
in writing.
[125] The Minister may suspend ELs in respect of any matters indicated in
subsection C.01A.008(2) if the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) the licensee contravened the Act or Regulations; or (b) the
licensee made a false or misleading statement in the application for the EL
(section C.01A.016). Under subsection C.01A.016(3), the Minister cannot suspend
an EL until the licensee is provided written notice that sets out the reason
for the proposed suspension and any required corrective action, and the
licensee has been given an opportunity to he heard.
[126] Section C.01A.017 grants the Minister power to suspend a licence
without providing an opportunity to be heard if necessary to prevent injury to
the health of the consumer. Reasons for the suspension must be provided in
writing and within 45 days the licensee must be provided an opportunity to be
heard if requested.
[127] Apotex contends that under the FD Regulations, the Import Ban
(partially carried out via the Minister’s amendment of APIPL and ARPL’s ELs)
could only legitimately be pursued under sections C.01A.016 or C.01A.017, both
of which implicate procedural rights that were not provided.
[128] On September 30, Health Canada informed Apotex that it was
restricting import and would be amending Apotex’s ELs. The added terms and
conditions effectively prohibit import into Canada of all products from APIPL
and ARPL, save those deemed medically necessary by the Minister, which are then
subject to additional third-party testing.
[129] The Applicants submit that “terms and conditions” were not intended
to be interpreted so as to nullify Apotex’s right to carry on a designated
activity. This amounts to suspension, for which the Minister’s power stems from
section C.01A.016, and under which she is required to provide Apotex notice,
reasons and an opportunity to be heard. Under urgent circumstances, she is
still required to provide an opportunity to be heard if requested (section
C.01A.017). By effectively suspending Apotex’s EL’s without complying with the
requirements, the Minister acted without legislative authority.
[130] Apotex submits that the Minister’s claimed reliance on subsection
C.01A.008(4) was in error for some of the following reasons:
a) all of section C.01A.008 addresses the Minister’s powers in the
context of a fresh application or amendment sought by the licensee – section
C.01A.012 grants the Minister authority to amend terms and conditions by her
own initiative;
b) the power to set terms and conditions under one subsection cannot be
read to include the power to revoke primary rights granted in another.
[131] They note that the Court’s interpretation of the FD Regulations
should be reviewed in light of paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights: all
Canadian laws are to be construed so not to hinder the right to a fair hearing
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Alternatively, if subsection
C.01A.008(4) is found to authorize the Minister’s EL action, it is a decision
that includes the common law right to a fair hearing before imposition of the
terms and conditions. See the subsequent section for a discussion of the
Applicants’ argument on paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights.
[132] The Applicants argue that the Minister also lacked factual basis to
implement the Import Ban: she did not believe on reasonable grounds that the
amendment was necessary to prevent injury to the health of consumers, as
required by the Regulations.
[133] Despite the Minister’s assertion that the new terms and conditions
were “necessary to prevent injury to the health of
consumers,” cross-examinations of Ms. Chiponski and Dr. Sharma reveal
that there was no evidence that products from APIPL or ARPL produced an
immediate risk or threat to the health of consumers. Also, the Chiponski and
Sharma Affidavits speak of a concern with a “potential risk” to the consumer, which
does not meet the conditions set out in subsection C.01A.008(4).
[134] The Minister is given broad discretion under subsection
C.01A.008(4), which states (for ease of reference):
(4) The Minister may, in addition to the
requirements of subsection (2), set out in an establishment licence terms and
conditions respecting
(a) the tests to be performed in respect of
a drug, and the equipment to be used, to ensure that the drug is not unsafe for
use; and
(b) any other matters necessary to prevent
injury to the health of consumers, including conditions under which drugs are
fabricated, packaged/labelled or tested.
[135] In my opinion, subsection C.01A.008(4) does authorize the Minister
to add new terms and conditions to previously issued ELs. However, procedural rights
that are provided to EL holders throughout Division 1A of the Regulations
in similar circumstances should also be afforded when terms and
conditions are added to existing ELs.
[136] This is a matter of statutory interpretation, for which the approach
set out in Rizzo v Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para 21 is to be
followed:
the words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with
the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
[137] Section C.01A.008 is the only provision falling under the heading
“Issuance”. It initially appears odd that Ministerial authority to add new
terms and conditions to existing ELs at any given time (not just upon issuance
or application by the licensee for amendment) would fall within the section
dealing with issuance. This is especially so considering Division 1A contains a
separate part devoted to “Terms and Conditions,” under which section C.01A.012
authorizes the Minister, by her own initiative, to amend (not impose) terms and
conditions to an EL if she has reasonable grounds to believe it is necessary.
[138] However, Ministerial power to impose new terms and conditions to
existing ELs – grammatically and on an ordinary meaning of the words – reasonably
falls under the heading “Issuance,” as the provision could be interpreted to
apply to both issuance of a new EL, as well as issuance of new terms and
conditions.
[139] The interpretation that subsection C.01A.008(4) does not provide the
Minister with authority to add new terms and conditions to existing ELs leads
to an absurd result, as the Minister is thus precluded from adding terms and
conditions if she did not do so at the outset.
[140] Terms and conditions can in fact be added to ELs following an
on-site inspection or desktop review. This is what occurred in the present case
when Apotex was provided a draft Inspection Exit Notice for APIPL, setting out
a Compliant with Terms and Conditions rating. Notably, the statutory basis for
adding terms and conditions cited in the Exit Notice was sections C.01A.008(4)
and C.01A.012. This Exit Notice was provided by a Health Canada employee,
without the knowledge or authorization of the Minister. Nevertheless, the
Inspection Exit Notice on which new terms and conditions were imposed pursuant
to these sections provides notice and an opportunity to be heard:
If you disagree with the content of the
Inspection Exit Notice, you have ten (10) calendar days to bring your concerns
to the attention of the Regional Manager… If you exercise this option, please
do so in written submission outlining the basis of the dispute citing the
specific sections of the Inspection Exit Notice that are contentious (Desai
First Affidavit, Exh I; AR, Tab 3(I), p 242).
[141] Thus, if Health Canada is concerned with a licensee’s compliance
with the FD Act or Regulations, terms and conditions may be added
to ELs following an inspection, and the licensee is provided an opportunity to
be heard.
[142] Analysis of the suspension provisions (sections C.01A.016,
C.01A.017) further supports the interpretation that subsection C.01A.008(4) was
intended to provide the Minister power to add terms and conditions to existing
ELs. The Applicants claim that suspension may be “in
whole or in part,” while the Respondents argue that the suspension
applies to a category of products – hence why the Minister could not suspend
Apotex’s licences, as she needed to allow importation of medically necessary
products.
[143] The Respondents’ interpretation is more tenable on a reading of the
words in their grammatical and ordinary sense: section C.01A.016 states that
the Minister may suspend an EL “in respect of any or
all matters indicated in subsection C.01A.008(2)…”. The terms “any or
all” do not provide that any or all drug products may be suspended, rather they
indicate that suspension may stem from contravention of one or more matters
listed under subsection C.01A.008(2). The matters listed under that subsection
include authorized activities, such as importation.
[144] An interpretation that subsection C.01A.008(4) was the proper
statutory basis authorizing the Minister to impose new terms and conditions to
APIPL and ARPL’s existing ELs is consistent with the intent of the legislative
scheme, as the Minister must be able to impose terms and conditions other than
at the time of issuance to protect Canadians’ health and safety. However, using
this provision to impose new terms and conditions on existing ELs should
encompass a right to notice and reasons for the new terms and conditions.
[145] If subsection C.01A.008(4) permits adding new terms and conditions
to existing ELs, but does not provide notice or reasons, a nonsensical outcome
ensues. Under section C.01A.012, when the Minister changes the parameters of an
EL by amending existing terms and conditions of an EL, the Minister is required
to provide at least 15 days’ notice in writing and reasons for the amendment,
but when the Minister changes the parameters of an EL by adding new terms and
conditions, no notice or reasons are required. There is no logical basis for
the requirement for notice and reasons in one of these situations, but not the
other.
[146] Further support that the some procedural fairness should apply to the
Minister’s use of subsection C.01A.008(4) to impose terms and conditions on ELs
is that the regulatory scheme provides such procedural rights, even to those
not holding an EL: the Minister is required to provide notice, reasons and an
opportunity to be heard to applicants for which she has refused to issue an EL
(subsection C.01A.010(3)). It would be procedurally unfair that at the very
least notice and reasons are not provided to EL holders.
[147] Once an EL is issued, the licensee is granted procedural protection
for Minister-initiated actions: upon annual licence review under section C.01A.009,
if the Minister refuses to issue the EL or amend terms and conditions (as
requested by the licensee under section C.01A.006) she is required to notify
the licensee and provide an opportunity to be heard (subsection C.01A.010(3));
under section C.01A.012 the Minister may amend terms and conditions on an
existing EL, but must provide at least 15 days’ notice in writing, as well as
reasons; under section C.01A.016, upon suspension the Minister must provide
written notice and reasons, if corrective action is required, and provide the
licensee an opportunity to be heard; and even when urgent, section C.01A.017
requires the Minister to provide an opportunity to be heard if requested.
[148] Basically, anytime the Minister purports to do anything affecting an
already-issued EL, the Minister must also provide notice and/or reasons and/or
an opportunity to be heard as set out in the Regulations. Parliament
clearly intended that licensees be afforded at least these components of
procedural fairness.
[149] The Applicants argue that “terms and conditions” should not be
interpreted so as to nullify Apotex’s right to carry on a designated activity,
and that this amounts to suspension under section C.01A.016. The terms and
conditions imposed on Apotex’s ELs are stringent; however, if the Minister were
to suspend Apotex’s ELs to prevent against importation of non-compliant drugs,
then she may be putting at risk the health and safety of Canadians if a
shortage of essential drugs ensued as a result. The Regulations cannot
be read so as to frustrate the purpose for which they were enacted.
[150] In my opinion, the Minister used the correct statutory mechanism to
add terms and conditions to Apotex’s ELs. However, in the present circumstances
(when the Minister imposes terms and conditions on an existing EL under subsection
C.01A.008(4)), the most basic procedural protections, like notice and reasons
for imposing the new terms and conditions, should be afforded. This is
consistent with the regulatory scheme and Health Canada’s own policies.
[151] The Applicants submit that if the Regulations are construed
to have permitted the Minister to remove Apotex’s right to import without a
fair hearing it is unconstitutional and thus inoperative for contravening paragraph
2(e) of the Bill of Rights.
[152] The Respondents counter that paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights
does not create a right to a hearing where neither the legislation nor the
common law require it and since Apotex was not owed a hearing pursuant to subsection
C.01A.008(4) of the Regulations, the Bill of Rights does not
apply (Amaratunga v Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, 2013 SCC
66 at para 61 [Amaratunga]).
[153] The Supreme Court has made it clear that paragraph 2(e) of the Bill
of Rights does not create a free-standing right to a hearing – it “provides for a fair hearing if and when a hearing is held”
(Amaratunga, above, at para 61). I have determined that basic procedural
fairness should have been provided when Health Canada imposed new terms and
conditions on Apotex’s ELs, however this is not synonymous with imposing a
right to a fair hearing. As clarified by the Supreme Court, the protections afforded
by paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights are operative only in the
application of law to individual rights and obligations in a proceeding before
a court, tribunal or similar body (Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v
Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 39 at paras 59-61).
[154] To execute the Import Ban, the Minister stopped import into Canada
of all drug products from APIPL and ARPL by way of Lookouts sent to CBSA on
September 30, 2014, which cited data reliability problems at APIPL and ARPL as
justification.
[155] The purported statutory basis for implementing the ban stems from
contravention of sections C.02.003, C.02.003.1 and C.02.003.3 of the FD
Regulations, together with section 101
of the Customs Act. Apotex submits the Minister acted without
legislative authority and that reliance on these provisions is illegitimate for
the following reasons:
a) There is no legitimate basis to rely on the Customs Act and
ignore section C.01A.017, which gives the Minister power to prevent importation
in urgent circumstances.
b) Section 101 states “[g]oods that have been
imported or are about to be exported may be detained.” This confers
power to detain goods already in Canada, not to “prevent”, “prohibit” or “ban”
importation of anything.
c) Section 101 is an interim regulatory mechanism; it contemplates
detention until the goods have been “dealt with in
accordance with” the applicable legislation.
d) Sections 23 to 27 of the FD Act, which authorize inspectors
to seize products in relation to which the Regulations have been
contravened, requires the inspector to release the goods under section 26 once
satisfied of compliance. If not satisfied, he or she must either obtain consent
to their destruction or bring proceedings in a superior court – which affords
procedural protections (section 27).
[156] The Respondents claim that the Customs Target is not reviewable
under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act because it is not a final
determination of admissibility of products under the Customs Act and
does not affect the rights or interests of an applicant, as not one Apotex
product was seized as a result of the Customs Target. To challenge a final
determination of product admissibility from APIPL or ARPL, Apotex must have
brought a proceeding under section 106 of the Customs Act, which it did
not do.
[157] The Applicants have requested that the Minister’s decision to
implement, and her implementation of the Import Ban, be quashed, which includes
the CBSA Action. The Customs Target expired on March 31, 2015, and was not renewed.
The Applicants argue that the CBSA Action was a vital component of the Import
Ban. While this may be true, this facet of the Import Ban does not have
continuing effects or lasting repercussions on Apotex’s current right to import
products from APIPL or ARPL, as the EL Action may. Even should this Court
decide that the Minister’s decision was without legislative authority and or
unreasonable, there is no further remedy the Court may grant, since the Customs
Target has expired and is not in force.
[158] The Minister implemented an Import Ban that was motivated by an
improper purpose, and without affording Apotex the procedural protections
required by law. This is neither a reasonable decision nor a correct one – it
is an action taken without legal authority and thus must be quashed.
[159] Under subsection 18.1(3) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985,
c F-7 [FCA] the Court is provided broad powers under (a) to order a
federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has
unlawfully failed to do or under (b) to “declare
invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for
determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate,
prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board,
commission or other tribunal”.
[160] The Respondents argue that this Court cannot grant Apotex’s
requested order that the Court compel the Minister to retract her statement and
that she require Health Canada to retract their statement, both released on
September 30, 2014. The Respondents claim that these statements are not
amenable to judicial review, as they do not affect Apotex’s substantive rights
or carry any legal consequences (Girouard v Canadian Judicial Council,
2014 FC 1176 [Girouard]; Toronto Coalition to Stop the War v Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 957 [Toronto
Coalition]).
[161] In Girouard, Justice Luc Martineau found that a press release
issued by the Canadian Judicial Council [CJC] announcing members of an inquiry
committee was not a reviewable decision, as it had no legal effect. The sole
purpose of the press releases was to inform the public of the composition of
the Inquiry Committee and the name of the CJC's independent counsel.
[162] The Toronto Coalition case cited by the Respondents involved
an informational letter sent by a CBSA employee to the Applicant regarding
admissibility to Canada, who did not have statutory authority to make a final
decision regarding the Applicant’s admissibility. The letter constituted
notice, but did not affect rights or carry legal consequences because a final
decision on admissibility must be done at the border.
[163] The above cases are not applicable to the present facts. While the
Minister and Health Canada’s public statements do not constitute the decision
in and of itself, they form part of the Minister’s implementation of the
decision that was procedurally unfair and motivated by an improper purpose. The
facts suggest that publicly showing strong and decisive action towards Apotex
in light of intense media criticism was the motivation behind the import ban –
issuing two public statements would help to achieve these ends.
[164] Contrary to Toronto Coalition, this is not a situation where
the decision-maker was not the individual authorized with making such
decisions. Further, the public statements cannot be said to embody notice to
Apotex about a decision not yet made – it was made clear to Apotex on September
30 that the Import Ban was effective immediately.
[165] The Applicants argue that the Minister and Health Canada’s
statements of September 30, 2014, constitute an “act” under subsection 18.1(3),
and request that the Court compel the Minister to retract the statements. Use
of the term “matter” under subsection 18.1(1) encompasses a variety of
administrative actions, including any matter in respect of which a remedy may
be available under section 18 of the FCA (Krause v Canada, [1999]
2 FCR 476 (FCA) at para 21).
[166] The Applicants cite McCabe v Canada (Attorney General),
[2001] 3 FCR 430 [McCabe] to support their argument that information
released to the media is judicially reviewable. In that case, Justice Danièle
Tremblay-Lamer found that a recommendation by the National Parole Board was not
a valid expression of their statutory power in the circumstances and that as a
result, the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction in releasing its recommendation
to the media. The Court granted the judicial review and ordered that the Board
remove all copies of the recommendation from the Applicant’s files and declared
that the Board acted without jurisdiction in releasing the recommendation to
the media.
[167] The present facts are analogous: the Minister acted without
jurisdiction by implementing the Import Ban for an improper purpose. Thus, the
statements released by the Minister and Health Canada conveying the information
to the public, which also contained statements potentially harmful to Apotex,
were invalid.
[168] The Minister and Health Canada acted without jurisdiction in
releasing the statements to the media. Nothing in subsection 18.1(3) suggests
that if a declaration of invalidity can be ordered, as in McCabe, that a
declaration of invalidity and order for retraction of such a statement, made
for an improper purpose and without procedural fairness, could not also be part
of such a remedy.