Dockets: IMM-13236-12
IMM-13237-12
Citation:
2014 FC 742
Ottawa, Ontario, July 24, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
Docket: IMM-13236-12
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BETWEEN:
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NAFI DIABY
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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Docket: IMM-13237-12
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AND
BETWEEN:
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NAFI DIABY
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application under s. 72(1) of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [Act] for judicial
review of two decisions of a Senior Immigration Officer [Officer], both dated
November 30, 2012, which refused the Applicant’s Pre-Removal Risk Assessment
[PRRA] application and her application for permanent residence from within
Canada on humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] grounds.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The Applicant claims to be from Sierra Leone, but her nationality was the main issue in the two decisions under review. She
says she fled that country under severe circumstances and without proper
documentation, but the Officer was not satisfied that she had done enough in
the circumstances to prove her identity. The Applicant has two Canadian-born
children, who were 11 years-old and 10 years-old at the time of the hearing.
She says she is very fearful of what will happen to her and the children if she
is forced to return to Sierra Leone.
[3]
The Applicant says she was born in the rural village of Blama in Sierra Leone on or around November 19, 1971. At the age of 11, she was
subjected to female genital mutilation by village elders.
[4]
The Applicant’s family moved to Freetown in 1996, when her father got a job as a driver for the newly elected President,
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. However, the civil war in Sierra Leone was ongoing. The
Applicant says that in May 1997 armed rebels came to the family’s home and
killed her father, her mother, and her brother. The Applicant was gang raped
and then taken by the rebels to a camp, where she was tied to a bed, beaten and
raped repeatedly by other rebels. Remarking that her circumcision had been only
partially completed, the rebels decided to “finish the
job” with a knife.
[5]
The Applicant says she managed to escape when
the rebels took her to the market to buy food so that she could cook for them.
She asked to go to the washroom and escaped out the window in the commotion
caused by the rebels’ presence. She got on a truck filled with people fleeing
to safety and was taken to Conakry, Guinea, where many other refugees were
already gathered at the Sierra Leonean embassy. She was interviewed by consular
officials and given an affidavit in lieu of a birth certificate. She had no
other identity documents.
[6]
While at the embassy, the Applicant says she met
a man she now believes was a people smuggler. He said he would help her if she
agreed to come live with him as his “girlfriend.” She agreed out of
desperation, fearful that the rebels would come to the embassy. The man said he
would help her to go to Canada, and after a few weeks he took her to some men
at the port whom he said were his friends. They put her on a ship, where she
was placed in a room and repeatedly raped until the ship reached New York. She was then put on a train to Montreal. She says she slept most of the way and
does not recall going through a border check.
[7]
In Montreal, the Applicant sought out someone
who spoke her language and eventually found a couple who agreed to help her.
She lived with them for about a year, and has maintained a relationship with
the man, who is the father of her two children. She says he only sees the
children occasionally when he visits Toronto where she now lives, or takes them
to his home for a weekend, and provides only intermittent support.
[8]
The Applicant filed a refugee claim shortly
after her arrival. Her claim was denied in June 1998, as she was found not to
be a credible witness. Her application for leave to challenge that decision in
this Court through judicial review was denied.
[9]
The Applicant says she was terrified to return to
Sierra Leone, and met a man at a community meeting who advised her to change
her story and her identity and attempt another refugee claim. He provided her
with a fake Guinean birth certificate. Before her new claim was heard,
immigration officials discovered the lie and arrested her. She spent over four
months in detention in Laval, Quebec, and was eventually released on a bond
paid by a friend.
[10]
The Applicant moved to Toronto soon after this,
and gave birth to her two children in 2002 and 2004. She says she has supported
them mainly by doing hair braiding in her home.
[11]
The Applicant filed her PRRA and H&C
applications in September 2006, and both applications were denied by the same
Officer on November 30, 2012, after repeated discussions with the Applicant’s
counsel on the issue of identity and nationality.
[12]
The Applicant attests that she is terrified of
returning to Sierra Leone due to the trauma she allegedly experienced there,
and even more afraid of what will happen to her children. She says that while her
children are Canadian citizens and have the right to remain in Canada, she is their sole caregiver, and in practical terms they will have to go with her
if she is deported.
DECISIONS UNDER REVIEW
[13]
The Officer provided separate reasons for each
of the two decisions under review, but the analysis on the issue of the
Applicant’s identity is essentially the same.
[14]
The Officer noted that at the time of her
refugee claim, the Applicant provided no documents concerning her time in Sierra Leone or the United States or her entry into Canada. She provided only an affidavit, of which
she was the author, allegedly made at the Sierra Leonean Embassy in Guinea in May 1997. The Officer noted that the document was an undated photocopy, had no
particular Embassy letterhead, and the space for the name of the person to whom
it was sworn was blank. While it did bear a stamp and signature (both
illegible) from the Head of Chancery, the Officer found this only confirmed
that it was signed at the Embassy. The affidavit was made by the Applicant and
the information was provided by her. The Officer noted that the Embassy of
Sierra Leone in the United States, in correspondence to the Applicant, stated
that further verification of this document was needed before it would issue her
a passport. The Officer therefore assigned the affidavit no weight in terms of
establishing the Applicant’s identity and nationality.
[15]
The Officer acknowledged the difficulty involved
in obtaining identity documents “for a country that has
been through a difficult time” and to which the Applicant claimed to
have no remaining ties. However, the Officer found that the Applicant had other
options to establish her nationality.
[16]
For example, while the President of Sierra Leone
for whom the Applicant’s father allegedly worked was pushed out in a coup
around the time of the alleged attack on her family’s home, he was reinstated
in 1998 and remained President until 2007. The Officer found that the Applicant
could have tried to contact the entourage of this former President or a member
of her family in order to obtain identity documents.
[17]
Furthermore, the Officer found that while the
Applicant stated she did not go to school in Sierra Leone, she lived in a small
village, worked as a hairdresser in Freetown, and attended religious
institutions there. The Officer found that while it may be difficult to
re-establish contacts after several years, the Applicant claimed to have lived
in Sierra Leone for over 20 years and failed to demonstrate any particular
effort to establish her identity and citizenship.
[18]
The Applicant contacted the Sierra Leonean
Embassy in the United States, which refused to issue a passport without further
verification of her identity, and stated that she could deal directly with the
authorities in Sierra Leone. However, the Officer found that the Applicant did
not submit any evidence that she had taken steps to do so, or any explanation
to that effect.
[19]
The Officer noted the Applicant’s second refugee
claim in which she stated she was Guinean. In view of this and the absence of
identity documents, the Officer had “several contacts
spread out over several months – years even – with the applicant’s counsel in
which the importance of establishing the identity and nationality of the
Applicant was emphasized.” The Officer observed:
Indeed, in light of this second refugee claim
and the presence of a birth certificate submitted at that time, and considering
the languages spoken by the applicant and the absence of any document from
Sierra Leone, the applicant’s counsel was told that if she could demonstrate
her Guinean nationality, this could be a significant positive element for
consideration (given that it would establish a nationality) in the review of
the present application. Nevertheless, the applicant reaffirmed to us that she
was a citizen of Sierra Leone…
[20]
The Officer assigned only “the slightest weight”
to an affidavit from a Canadian citizen originally from Sierra Leone, Ahmed Kabba, attesting that he recalled the Applicant’s family in Blama, as he was
from a nearby village and had family in Blama. The Officer observed that Mr.
Kabba did not reside in Blama, did not meet the Applicant there, and provided
very few details other than vaguely recalling having a discussion with the
Applicant’s brother, who would have only been four or five years-old when Mr.
Kabba left the country. He also did not indicate whether his family still lived
there or whether he or the Applicant had attempted to contact them.
[21]
The Officer also assigned only “slight weight”
to a supportive letter from the Concerned Citizens and Friends of Sierra Leone.
While this letter stated that the Applicant was of Sierra Leonean origin, it
did not state how the author came to that conclusion.
[22]
In the PRRA decision, the Officer concluded on
the issue of nationality as follows:
I must observe that the applicant has not
submitted any probative documentation establishing her identity or nationality
for me. Thus, in light of the foregoing, I find that the applicant has failed
to establish on the balance of probabilities that she is a national of Sierra Leone. Accordingly, I cannot pronounce on the risks alleged with respect to her
potential return to Sierra Leone as I do not have any probative evidence
demonstrating that she is a national of that country.
[23]
In the H&C decision, the Officer went on to
consider the Applicant’s establishment in Canada, the best interests of her
children, and the evidence regarding the Applicant’s psychological condition.
[24]
Regarding establishment, the Officer found that
the more than 15 years the Applicant has spent in Canada is not due to
circumstances beyond her control, but rather is mainly due to her failure to
comply with Canadian law and to cooperate with immigration authorities toward
establishing her identity. The Officer also found that the information
regarding the Applicant’s employment was more than 2 years old, and that the
documents available did not allow a conclusion that she had recently been
financially independent or had demonstrated a recent history of employment
stability. While the Applicant had developed some relationships and ties to her
community, they were not such as to cause unusual and undeserved or
disproportionate hardship if she were required to leave so as to justify an
exemption from the normal rules.
[25]
Regarding the best interests of the Applicant’s
children, the Officer observed that this was only one of many important factors
to be considered. The Applicant’s psychological report dated January 13, 2012
indicates that the children are at a crucial moment in their development, but
does not indicate that the author ever met with the children or had any
particular familiarity with Sierra Leone. The Officer assigned “a certain
amount of weight” to this report with respect to the best interests of the
children, but noted it was being considered “in the
context of the applicant’s situation as a whole.”
[26]
The Officer observed that, while the Applicant
did not indicate that the children’s father plays a significant role in their
lives, it had “not been demonstrated that the father
could not take his children and be responsible for their financial, emotional,
psychological and social well-being.” The Officer found that “given that the applicant’s identity and nationality have not
been established I cannot make any presumption as to the potential impact on
the children if their mother were removed from Canada and they had to go with
her.” While acknowledging that separation from their mother is not in
the children’s best interests, and that their interests were an important
factor, the Officer found that it was “not the only one
and cannot outweigh the other factors… assessed in this case, including the
fact that the applicant has failed to establish her identity and has not made
reasonable efforts to do so.”
[27]
Regarding the two psychological reports
submitted by the Applicant, dated November 14, 2007 and January 13, 2012, the
Officer found that while the reports described symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder, they were based on information reported by the Applicant, and did
not support a conclusion that these symptoms were the result of the allegations
made by the Applicant about her past. The Officer noted that the Applicant’s
arrival in Canada, the length of her residency and the possibility that she
might be separated from her children could have certain effects on her
psychological status. There was no indication of psychological treatment
between 2007 and 2012. While the 2012 report states that the Applicant attends
a support group and was undergoing “therapy for rape
victims and therapy for PTSD as well as therapeutic support following the death
of her family members in 1997, personal therapy, and therapy for depression,”
the Officer noted that the Applicant had “not submitted
any document that might indicate treatment or therapy since that time.”
The Officer concluded on this point:
In light of the forgoing, and considering that
the applicant has not established that she is a Sierra Leonean national, I
assign only slight weight to these documents concerning mental health problems
related to her past in Sierra Leone.
[28]
Based on all of the above, the Officer was not
satisfied that having to file an application for permanent residence from
outside of Canada would cause unusual and undeserved or disproportionate
hardships for the Applicant.
[29]
The Officer also discussed the psychological
reports in the PRRA decision, and found that, in light of the fact that the
Applicant had not established that she is a Sierra Leonean national, the
reports warranted only “slight weight” concerning mental health problems
related to her past in Sierra Leone.
[30]
With respect to the risks the Applicant might
face on return to Sierra Leone, the Officer observed:
I cannot pronounce on the alleged risks of a
potential return to Sierra Leone, since I have no probative evidence
demonstrating that the applicant actually holds citizenship in that country.
[31]
Regarding risks to the children, the Officer
stated:
I note that the applicant’s children are
Canadian citizens and do not have to leave Canada. Furthermore, I find that the
applicant has not established her nationality and her identity.
[32]
With respect to the PRRA application as a whole,
the Officer concluded:
To the extent that the applicant has not
established that she is Sierra Leonean, and considering that there are no
probative documents in her name for Sierra Leone, I find that the applicant has
not demonstrated that there would be more than a mere possibility that she
would be persecuted in that country or that there are serious reasons to
believe that she would personally face a risk of torture, a threat to her life
or the risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
ISSUES
[33]
The Applicant raises the following issues in
this matter. First, with respect to the H&C decision:
(a) Did the Officer err in law by refusing to make a finding of
nationality on a balance of probabilities?
(b) Did the Officer err in law by refusing to assess hardship in the
country of removal?
(c) Did the Officer err in law and make unreasonable findings in her
analysis of the best interests of the children?
(d) Did the Officer err in law by failing to convoke an interview?
(e) Did the Officer render an unreasonable and perverse decision?
[34]
Second, with respect to the PRRA decision:
(a) Did the Officer err in law by refusing to make a finding of
nationality on a balance of probabilities?
(b) Did the Officer err in law by failing to assess risk in the country
of prospective removal?
(c) Did the Officer err in law by failing to convoke an interview?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[35]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] held that a standard of review analysis
need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review
applicable to a particular question before the court is settled in a
satisfactory manner by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that
standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless, or where the
relevant precedents appear to be inconsistent with new developments in the
common law principles of judicial review, must the reviewing court undertake a
consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis: Agraira
v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para
48.
[36]
With respect to the H&C decision, the
Officer’s assessment of the evidence and conclusion about whether an H&C
exemption should be granted is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness:
Alcin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1242 at para 36; Daniel
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 797 at para 12; Jung v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 678 at para 19. The question
of whether the Officer applied the proper legal test and legal threshold to the
H&C determination is reviewable on a standard of correctness: see Guxholli
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1267 at paras 17-18; Awolope
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 540 at para 30.
[37]
Absent an error in procedural fairness, the
standard when reviewing a PRRA decision is reasonableness: Jainul Shaikh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1318 at para 16; Cunningham v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 636 at para 15.
[38]
The Applicant alleges, with respect to both
decisions, that the Officer erred in law by failing to convoke an interview
before rejecting the Applicant’s affidavit evidence regarding her identity and
nationality. As I read it, this raises a question of procedural fairness that
is reviewable on a standard of correctness: see Canadian Union of Public
Employees (C.U.P.E.) v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at para
100; Canada (Attorney General) v Sketchley, 2005 FCA 404 at para
53. Although my decision does not turn on this, I realize that the
jurisprudence on this point has changed since I heard the matter. In view of
the Federal Court of Appeal’s decisions in Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at para 30 and Lemus v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 114 at para 18, the standard of
review that applies when determining whether the tribunal applied the proper
test to the H&C decision is now reasonableness, though as set out in my
recent decisions in Ainab v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014
FC 630 at paras 17-18 and Blas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2014 FC 629 at paras 17-23, the range of reasonable outcomes available to the
officer is constrained by the established principles set out in the
jurisprudence regarding s. 25(1) of the Act.
[39]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of
reasonableness, the analysis will be concerned with “the
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process [and also with] whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at para 47, and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59. Put
another way, the Court should intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable
in the sense that it falls outside the “range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law.”
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[40]
The following provisions of the Act are
applicable in these proceedings:
Application before entering Canada
11. (1) A foreign national must, before
entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other document
required by the regulations. The visa or document may be issued if, following
an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not
inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
[…]
|
Visa et documents
11. (1) L’étranger doit, préalablement à
son entrée au Canada, demander à l’agent les visa et autres documents requis
par règlement. L’agent peut les délivrer sur preuve, à la suite d’un
contrôle, que l’étranger n’est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme à la
présente loi.
[…]
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Humanitarian and compassionate
considerations — request of foreign national
25. (1) Subject to subsection (1.2), the
Minister must, on request of a foreign national in Canada who applies for
permanent resident status and who is inadmissible or does not meet the
requirements of this Act, and may, on request of a foreign national outside
Canada who applies for a permanent resident visa, examine the circumstances
concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign national permanent
resident status or an exemption from any applicable criteria or obligations
of this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by
humanitarian and compassionate considerations relating to the foreign national,
taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected.
[…]
|
Séjour pour motif d’ordre humanitaire à
la demande de l’étranger
25. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (1.2),
le ministre doit, sur demande d’un étranger se trouvant au Canada qui demande
le statut de résident permanent et qui soit est interdit de territoire, soit
ne se conforme pas à la présente loi, et peut, sur demande d’un étranger se
trouvant hors du Canada qui demande un visa de résident permanent, étudier le
cas de cet étranger; il peut lui octroyer le statut de résident permanent ou
lever tout ou partie des critères et obligations applicables, s’il estime que
des considérations d’ordre humanitaire relatives à l’étranger le justifient,
compte tenu de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant directement touché.
[…]
|
Conferral of refugee protection
95. (1) Refugee protection is conferred on
a person when
[…]
(c) except in the case of a person
described in subsection 112(3), the Minister allows an application for
protection.
[…]
|
Asile
95. (1) L’asile est la protection conférée
à toute personne dès lors que, selon le cas :
[…]
c) le ministre accorde la demande de
protection, sauf si la personne est visée au paragraphe 112(3).
[…]
|
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who,
by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of
nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is
outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
|
Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la
Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être
persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son
appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont
elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se
réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et
se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne
peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
|
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a
person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality
or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former
habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial
grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of
that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person
in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals
in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or
incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the
inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
[…]
|
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la
personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi
vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité,
dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs
sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article
premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque
de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut
se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce
pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent
ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas
de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes
internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas
de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
[…]
|
Application for protection
112. (1) A person in Canada, other than a
person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the
regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a
removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in
subsection 77(1).
[…]
|
Demande de protection
112. (1) La personne se trouvant au Canada
et qui n’est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1) peut, conformément aux
règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle est visée par une
mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe
77(1).
[…]
|
Consideration of application
113. Consideration of an application for
protection shall be as follows:
(a) an applicant whose claim to refugee
protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose after
the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could
not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at
the time of the rejection;
[…]
(c) in the case of an applicant not
described in subsection 112(3), consideration shall be on the basis of
sections 96 to 98;
[…]
|
Examen de la demande
113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il
suit :
a) le demandeur d’asile débouté ne peut
présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis le rejet ou qui
n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’il
n’était pas raisonnable, dans les circonstances, de s’attendre à ce qu’il les
ait présentés au moment du rejet;
[…]
c) s’agissant du demandeur non visé au
paragraphe 112(3), sur la base des articles 96 à 98;
[…]
|
ARGUMENT
Applicant
[41]
The Applicant argues that the Officer’s finding
regarding her identity and nationality is unreasonable. The Officer purported
to go through a process of assigning weight to the evidence, the Applicant
says, giving “no weight” to the affidavit from the Embassy in Conakry, Guinea, the “slightest weight” to the affidavit of Ahmed Kabba, and “slight weight” to the letter
from a Sierra Leonean community organization. However, the Officer made no
finding about the weight to be assigned to the sworn evidence of the Applicant
herself. The Applicant says there were only two possible nationalities – Sierra
Leonean and Guinean – and that the only evidence assigned any weight indicated
that the Applicant is from Sierra Leone. There was therefore no other
reasonable conclusion.
[42]
The Applicant also argues that the Officer erred
by failing to assess the hardship or risk she would face in the prospective
country of removal. The Officer appears to have accepted that the Applicant
would be removed to Sierra Leone following the negative decisions, but having
refused to find that the Applicant was a national of that country, declined to
consider the risk she would face there. Even if the Applicant has not
established her nationality on a balance of probabilities (which the Applicant
denies), it was incumbent on the Officer, under s. 7 of the Charter and
Canada’s human rights obligations as well as the Protected Persons, Chapter 3
(PP3)-Pre-removal risk assessment Manual (PP3 PRRA Manual) and the Inland
Processing, Chapter 5 (IP5) – Immigrant Applications in Canada made on
Humanitarian or Compassionate Grounds Manual, to assess the risk and hardship
the Applicant faces in that country.
[43]
The Applicant quotes the PP3 PRRA Manual as
follows:
IRPA does not explicitly require a risk
assessment with respect to any other country to which the individual may be
removed. However, both our domestic and international legal obligations require
the consideration of risk in any country to which an individual is to be
removed, whether it is the individual’s country of citizenship or former habitual
residence or not.
[44]
The Applicant also quotes from this Court’s
decision in Chen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 379 at
para 55:
I believe the Officer was correct to conclude
that, notwithstanding the continuing identity problems, she was still obliged
to assess risk against the country of removal. The failure to establish
identity means that there is no need to proceed further with an analysis of
persecution. See: Najam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2004] F.C.J. No. 516 at paragraph 16; Su v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) 2007 FC 680 at paragraph 14; Elmi v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 773, at paragraph 4; Jin at
paragraph 26; Liu at paragraph 18. I do not read this line of cases as
suggesting that a PRRA officer need go no further in assessing risk if identity
is a continuing problem, and the Officer in this case did proceed beyond the
identity issue.
[45]
The Applicant says that the Officer also erred
by failing to be alert, alive and sensitive to the best interests of the
children, citing Justice Zinn’s analysis in Sebbe v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 813 at paras 15-17 [Sebbe]. Rather than even
approaching a balanced and sensitive analysis, the Applicant argues, the
Officer simply refused to consider the grave hardships and risks facing the
children in Sierra Leone, including female genital mutilation. Instead, the
Officer relied upon pure, unsupported speculation that the children’s father
should be able to care for them, despite the absence of any evidence to support
this finding and in the face of sworn evidence indicating that the father is
not involved in raising the children and has previously refused to care for
them.
[46]
The Applicant also argues that it is well
established in law that, where credibility lies at the heart of a PRRA or
H&C decision, natural justice and s. 113 of the Act require that a hearing
be convoked. At the very least, she argues, the Officer was obligated to
respond to the request for an interview with a reasonable decision on that
request, which the Officer did not do: Shafi v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 714 at paras 19-24; Singh v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [Singh]; Liban
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1252 at para 14; Arfaoui
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 549 at para 20 [Arfaoui];
Zokai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1103
at paras 11-12 [Zokai]; Latifi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 1388 at paras 51, 63.
Respondent
[47]
The Respondent argues that the Officer
reasonably assessed the evidence and concluded that the Applicant was not
entitled to an exemption on H&C grounds under s. 25 of the Act.
[48]
The Respondent emphasizes that s. 25 is not
designed to provide an alternative route to permanent residence: Vidal v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] FCJ No 63, 41 FTR 118; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Legault, 2002 FCA 125 [Legault].
Rather, such relief is available only in exceptional circumstances, and only if
the Applicant can demonstrate unusual and undeserved or disproportionate
hardship: Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para 17 [Baker]; Legault, above, at para 23; Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Hawthorne, 2002 FCA 475 at
paras 9, 30; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 11 at
para 19; Irimie v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2000] FCJ No 1906 at para 26, 10 Imm LR (3d) 206 (TD).
[49]
Furthermore, the Respondent argues, in the
absence of reviewable error, it is not for the Court to substitute its view of
the merits of a s. 25 decision, or to re-weigh the factors or the evidence: Owusu
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 3 FC 172, 2003
FCT 94 (TD); Alvarado v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2002 FCT 255 (TD); Legault, above, at para 11. In the present case, the
Respondent says, the Officer considered the Applicant’s case and all of the
relevant factors and reasonably determined that no exemption from the
legislative requirements was warranted. The Applicant merely disagrees with the
negative result.
[50]
The Respondent says that the Officer reasonably
determined that there was insufficient evidence of the Applicant’s identity.
The embassy staff of her alleged country of nationality confirmed as much,
consistently refusing to issue a travel document to the Applicant due to a lack
of proof.
[51]
Moreover, the Respondent argues, the Officer did
not find that the Applicant was Guinean, but simply found there was not enough
evidence to make any determination about her nationality. The Applicant bore
the burden of proving her nationality and failed to do so.
[52]
The Respondent says that it is especially
inappropriate that this particular Applicant should demand that her
declarations of citizenship be accepted, since there was a valid determination
by the Immigration and Refugee Board [IRB] that she lacked credibility, and
thereafter she fraudulently commenced a second refugee claim under a false
identity.
[53]
There being no satisfactory evidence that the
Applicant is from Sierra Leone, the Respondent argues, there was no basis for
the Officer to consider evidence of potential hardship to the Applicant in that
country. There is no basis for concluding that Sierra Leone is a country of
removal, since to date the Applicant has been unsuccessful in obtaining a
travel document from the responsible authorities.
[54]
With respect to the best interests of the
Applicant’s children, the Respondent says that the Applicant declined to
provide any substantial information regarding the possible assumption of the
children’s care by their father. She dismissively states that only she can care
for them, but this is not sufficient: Bernard v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] FCJ No 1474 at paras 37-38, 2001 FCT
1068 (TD) [Bernard]; Patel v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1997] FCJ No 54, 36 Imm LR (2d) 175 (TD) [Patel]. The
psychological evidence that the Applicant did provide regarding the children’s
best interests was assessed appropriately and accurately, the Respondent says.
The report, while entitled to some weight, did not require the Officer to
approve the Applicant’s application.
[55]
The Respondent also submits that there was no
basis for approving the Applicant’s application based on establishment, as her
establishment evidence was extremely weak and demonstrated that the Applicant
is not economically established in Canada.
[56]
As regards the PRRA decision, the Respondent
does not oppose the application and agrees that the PRRA Officer erred by
failing to assess the risks facing the Applicant in the country of prospective
removal (ie. Sierra Leone). The parties have now submitted a consent order on
IMM-13237-12 for the Court’s approval and signature.
Applicant’s Reply Submissions
[57]
The Applicant argues in reply that the evidence
before the Officer regarding the Applicant’s nationality was not the same as
the evidence before the IRB, and it is therefore wrong for the Respondent to
suggest that the Refugee Protection Division’s conclusion on this issue should
be determinative here. Furthermore, the Applicant argues, the s. 25 process
exists specifically to provide flexibility where the strict application of the
law would lead to unanticipated results or unusual and undeserved hardship. The
Officer neither convoked an interview to satisfy herself about the credibility
of the Applicant’s sworn affidavit evidence, nor seriously considered the
impact the decision would have on the Applicant and her children.
[58]
The Respondent’s assertion that there is no
basis for concluding that Sierra Leone is the reference country of removal is
directly contradicted by the record. Upon being served with the refusal of her
application the Applicant was immediately asked to sign an application for a
Sierra Leonean travel document: Affidavit of Kezia Speirs, Applicant’s Record
at p. 26. It is therefore clear that Sierra Leone is the primary country of
prospective removal.
[59]
With respect to the best interests of the
children, the Applicant says that the evidence before the Officer, including
her own sworn evidence, consistently referred to her as a single mother and
stated that the children’s father had no real role in their lives. There was
absolutely no evidence contradicting this, and no reason to doubt its veracity.
The Applicant says that the Officer’s finding that the children’s father could
care for them is pure conjecture, and does not meet the threshold of being
“alert, alive and sensitive” to the children’s best interests: Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Satiacum, [1989] FCJ No 505, 99
NR 171 (FCA); Baker, above; Sebbe, above. The Bernard and Patel
decisions cited by the Respondent are in no way relevant to the issue, the
Applicant argues, and in no way diminish the strength of the Applicant’s
arguments.
ANALYSIS
[60]
As regards IMM-13237-12, the Respondent has
advised the Court that it does not oppose the application and consents to the
order requested by the Applicant on the grounds that the PRRA Officer erred by
failing to assess the risks facing the Applicant in the country of prospective
removal. The Respondent, however, feels that redetermination should not occur
immediately because the Applicant’s nationality remains a live issue and a new
PRRA can only be decided once that issue is resolved. The parties have provided
the Court with a consent order to deal with IMM-13237-12 which the Court
accepts and which will be issued on that file.
[61]
It is my view that the H&C decision also
contains several reviewable errors. In particular, the Officer failed to
consider the hardship faced by the Applicant if she is returned to Sierra Leone
and failed to conduct a best interests of the child [BIOC] analysis that takes
into account that there is no evidence to support a finding that the father
would take the children in Canada, and that the children will face grave
hardships and risks – including female genital mutilation – if they accompany
the Applicant back to Sierra Leone. The Officer also breached procedural
fairness by simply failing to respond to the Applicant’s request for an
interview, and then totally disregarding the Applicant’s sworn evidence about
her nationality.
[62]
It was unreasonable for the Officer not to
assess hardship in this case because it is clear on the evidence that the
Applicant either comes from Sierra Leone or Guinea, and the Guinea claim was clearly fraudulent. Hence, it is obvious that the Applicant will either be retuned
to Sierra Leone or she will remain as a stateless person in Canada. The Respondent has accepted, for purposes of the PRRA decision, that the same Officer should
have assessed risk against Sierra Leone even if nationality has not been
clearly established. The fact that the Applicant did not establish to the
Officer’s satisfaction that she is a citizen of Sierra Leone does not mean she
will not be exposed to risks and hardship when she is returned there. And, if
the Applicant remains in Canada, then the Officer should have assessed the
hardship she will face as a stateless person.
[63]
The Applicant provided a sworn affidavit
outlining her background and the horrendous treatment she experienced before
she managed to find her way to Canada. Over 15 years ago, the Convention
Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada found
her narrative not credible on the basis of the record available at that time.
But there is now a significant amount of evidence as to what women experienced
in Sierra Leone at the time when the Applicant says she was raped, mutilated,
witnessed the death of her family and was forced to flee. That evidence lends
considerable support to the Applicant’s claim that she is from Sierra Leone (and she provided supportive and consistent medical and psychological evidence from Canada). If the Officer did not believe the Applicant’s sworn evidence then she should have
convoked an interview as requested by the Applicant. There is no explanation in
the H&C decision as to why the Applicant’s affidavit was ignored and
discounted, or why the Officer did not even respond to the Applicant’s request
for an interview so that, in a situation where identity cannot be clearly
established with the usual documentation, the Applicant would have an
opportunity to deal with the Officer’s concerns. This was a breach of
procedural fairness. See Duka v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2010 FC 1071 at para 13; Zokai, above, at paras 11-12; Arfaoui,
above, at para 20; Chekroun v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013
FC 738 at para 72; Singh, above, at para 59.
[64]
As the Respondent concedes, if the Applicant is
telling the truth, then this is an extremely compelling case. Given the obvious
difficulties of providing documentation from Sierra Leone to establish identity
it was most unfair of the Officer not to respond to the Applicant’s request for
an interview.
[65]
The Officer finds unreasonably that “the applicant could have tried to contact the entourage of
this ex-president or a member of her family in order to obtain certain
documents that could have confirmed her identity.” This leaves out of
account the Applicant’s evidence that she comes from a rural village, has no
formal education, her family was murdered, her birth was never registered, her
home was destroyed and she has no contact with anyone in Sierra Leone who she could turn to for assistance.
[66]
In assessing the best interests of the children,
the Officer says:
The applicant does not indicate that the father
plays a significant role, but I do not know what particular relationship the
children have with their father or the support that he provides or could
provide. On the other hand, it has not been demonstrated that the father could
not take the children and be responsible for their financial, emotional,
psychological and social well-being.
[67]
The sworn evidence before the Officer was that:
Even worse is the thought of what will happen
to my children if we go back. I know that as Canadian citizens my children have
the legal right to remain in Canada, but practically speaking if I am deported
they will have to come with me. I am their mother and their only caregiver. There
is no one in Canada who could take care of them were I to be sent away, as Tanjura
has always said he would not do so and he is in my opinion not in a position to
do so in any event. What’s more, I could not bear to leave my children
without a mother. My own family was taken away from me when I was young; I know
what that feels like and refuse to do the same to my own children.
At the same time, going back to Sierra Leone would place them at very grave risk. It is a violent place. My children would
be exposed to this violence, to rape, to disease, and to extreme poverty. They
would not have access to education or medical care anywhere near the level to
which they are entitled as Canadians. They would have no future. Even worse, I
know that FGM is still very, very common there, and many girls bleed to death
when it is performed on them. Yet as a single mother there with no family to
rely on for assistance or protection, I would be powerless to prevent Goundoba
from being subjected to this atrocity.
[Emphasis added]
[68]
The Applicant made it very clear that she is the
sole custodian of the two Canadian children and that their father provides only
intermittent support but has played no parenting role and has made it clear
that he never will. If the Officer did not believe this clear evidence that the
children cannot turn to their father, or anyone else in Canada, for support, the Officer should have responded to the Applicant’s request for an interview.
As a consequence, there was no meaningful assessment of the best interests of
the children.
[69]
Counsel agree that, if the application is granted,
there is no question for certification and the Court concurs.
[70]
The Court has decided that this matter must be
returned for reconsideration, but the Applicant has also asked the Court for
special instructions to guide reconsideration given the extraordinary features
of this case and the length of time it has taken. Counsel have asked for an
opportunity to confer and advise the Court on this issue before the final order
is issued.
[71]
Upon reviewing counsel’s further written
submissions, the Court is of the view that the humanitarian considerations that
arise on this application are so compelling that an effort is required to reach
a resolution as soon as reasonably possible.
[72]
The long delay in reaching an H&C decision
cannot be entirely attributed to the Minister. Just as Sierra Leone is
difficult from the Applicant’s perspective, it is also difficult for the
Minister who has to assess an application where the country of reference is so
chaotic that normal procedures for establishing identity are not available. In
addition, it was the Applicant (no doubt ill-advised and out of desperation)
who submitted a second refugee claim in which she stated that she was Guinean.
This certainly caused significant problems for the Minister and impeded the
process.
[73]
Given the complications, however, the Officer in
the case would not even respond to the request for an interview, which could
well have provided valuable information and progress towards a timely
resolution for a process that, in humanitarian terms, has really gone on far
too long. This suggests that we cannot just leave this matter to run its course
and that some direction, and perhaps supervision, might be helpful to both
sides.
[74]
With this in mind, the Court has concluded that
the matter should be returned for reconsideration with the following
directions:
i.
The Minister shall either accept Sierra Leone as
the country of reference, on the basis of the record before the Court, for the
purposes of assessing hardship in the country of prospective removal and the
best interests of the children; or the Minister shall assess hardship on the
basis of de facto statelessness in Canada if, following an oral
interview with the Applicant and counsel, the Officer finds that, on a balance
of probabilities, the Applicant is not a national of Sierra Leone and so will
not be removed to that country;
ii. The Applicant shall have 30 days to provide the Minister with
updated application forms and such further evidence and written material as the
Applicant deems appropriate;
iii. The Minister shall render and communicate to the Applicant and
counsel a fresh first stage decision on H&C grounds within 60 days of
receiving the Applicant’s updated materials;
iv. If the fresh decision is positive, the Minister shall waive the
requirement for further documentation or evidence with respect to identity
and/or nationality, including the requirement to provide a passport, and shall
render a final decision on the permanent residence application as soon as
possible, and in any event within 60 days of the first stage decision;
[75]
The Court recognizes that, given the
complexities of this case, the above deadlines may not be easy to meet.
However, given the unacceptable approach of the Officer who decided the decision
under review, and the compelling humanitarian factors at play, there is a real
need to conclude this matter in a timely way. Hence, failing agreement by the
parties, the above deadlines may only be extended by further order of this
Court. Upon the advice of counsel and for this purpose, I will remain seized of
the matter to ensure that any deviations from the schedule are reasonable and
required in the circumstances.
[76]
The Applicant has asked for costs in this
matter. I am of the view that this mater has not been dealt with in a timely
manner. However, the delays cannot be entirely laid at the feet of the
Minister. This is a complex case and the Applicant must assume some
responsibility for the complications which she introduced into the process with
the second refugee claim based upon Guinean nationality. Consequently, I don’t
think I can find the “special reasons” required for an award of costs at this
point. I think that the timetable set out above is a sufficiently clear message
to the Minister that this matter requires resolution in a timely manner.
However, I remain seized of this matter and future conduct may give rise to
cost considerations that will be dealt with as may arise.