Docket: T-1252-11
T-1058-11
T-1825-11
Citation:
2014 FC 502
Ottawa, Ontario, May 27, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
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BETWEEN:
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RATIOPHARM INC.
(NOW TEVA CANADA LIMITED)
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
Ratiopharm Inc sells generic drugs in Canada, including an anti-asthmatic medicine called ratio-salbutamol HFA (“ratio HFA”).
Ratio HFA is the generic equivalent of Ventolin HFA, a product manufactured by
GlaxoSmithKline Inc (GSK). Ratiopharm sold ratio HFA to pharmacies after having
purchased it under contract from GSK. The two products competed against one
another and other similar products in the Canadian market. Under the contract
with Ratiopharm, GSK retained all patent rights to its product.
[2]
In 2011, the Patented Medicines Prices Review
Board found that Ratiopharm, by virtue of its contract with GSK, was a
“patentee” under s 79(1) of the Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4 (see Annex),
which put its prices within the jurisdiction of the Board. It went on to find
that Ratiopharm was obliged to provide the Board with information and
documentation about its prices; that Ratiopharm was selling ratio HFA at an
excessive price; and that Ratiopharm must pay damages of $65,898,842.76.
Ratiopharm challenges all three decisions (Files T-1252-11, T-1058-11, and
T-1825-11, respectively). As this decision relates to the three files, the
original of these reasons will be filed in T-1252-11 and copies will be placed in
the other two files.
[3]
Ratiopharm argues that it is not a “patentee”
and, therefore, the Board has no jurisdiction over it. Further, it maintains
that its prices were not excessive. In addition, Ratiopharm submits that if it
falls under the jurisdiction of the Board pursuant to the Patent Act,
then the relevant provisions of that Act are unconstitutional as they encroach
on provincial jurisdiction over Property and Civil Rights under s 92(13) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, and are beyond federal jurisdiction over
patents.
[4]
In my view, taking into account the
federal1provincial division of powers, and interpreting the scope of the Act
accordingly, Ratiopharm is not a “patentee”. Therefore, the Board had no
jurisdiction over its sales of ratio HFA and I must allow all three of
Ratiopharm’s applications for judicial review. There are three issues:
1. What is
the standard of review applicable to the Board?
2. Is
Ratiopharm a “patentee”?
3. Is the
legislation unconstitutional?
II.
The Board’s Decisions
[5]
The Board found (in T-1058-11) that the
agreement between Ratiopharm and GSK gave Ratiopharm the right to sell and set
the prices for ratio HFA. Without that agreement, Ratiopharm would have
violated GSK’s patent for Ventolin HFA. In that sense, Ratiopharm was entitled to
“exercise … rights in relation to that patent”,
which brought it within the definition of “patentee” in s 79(1). The Board
rejected Ratiopharm’s argument that the Board has no jurisdiction over a
generic company that sells a product under an agreement with a patent holder in
which, as here, the latter retains ownership in its intellectual property. If
that were the case, according to the Board, the generic company could sell its
product to pharmacies and others at an unregulated price.
[6]
The Board went on to consider whether
Ratiopharm’s price for ratio HFA was excessive. It compared that price with the
price of similar medicines, prices in other countries, and changes in the
consumer price index.
[7]
Given its conclusion that Ratiopharm is a
“patentee”, the Board found (in T-1252-11) that Ratiopharm had a duty to
provide the Board with information and documents relating to sales, prices,
expenditures, and revenues relating to patented medicines.
[8]
Finally, the Board calculated the excessive
revenues that Ratiopharm had realized at $65,898,842.76 (in T-1825-11).
III.
Issue One – What is the standard of review
applicable to the Board?
[9]
Ratiopharm argues that the Board’s
interpretation of the term “patentee” should be reviewed on a standard of
correctness because it relates to the Board’s jurisdiction. On the other
issues, the proper standard of review is reasonableness.
[10]
In my view, all of the Board’s conclusions
should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard. The Board’s main conclusion
relates to the meaning of “patentee” as defined in the Patent Act, which
is the principal enactment the Board must interpret. The Board merits deference
due to its particular familiarity with that statute (Celgene Corp v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1, at para 34; Alberta (Information and Privacy
Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers Association, 2011 SCC 61, at para 34).
Therefore, on the question of whether Ratiopharm is a “patentee”, I will apply a reasonableness standard.
[11]
The same degree of deference does not apply to
constitutional questions. There, as the parties agree, the standard of review
is correctness.
IV.
Issue Two – Was the Board’s conclusion that
Ratiopharm is a “patentee” unreasonable?
[12]
The Minister argues that the Board’s decision
was reasonable because Ratiopharm is authorized under its agreement with GSK to
sell and market a patented medicine, ratio HFA. But for that agreement, GSK
would have held the exclusive right to make, use and sell that product.
Ratiopharm obtained its own Drug Identification Number (DIN) for the product,
and obtained regulatory approval to sell it. Therefore, by virtue of its
agreement with GSK, Ratiopharm was able to exercise rights under the patent and
accordingly, in the Minister’s submission, is a “patentee”.
[13] In addition, the Minister contends that the Board’s approach is
consistent with the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Act, which is to
protect consumers from excessive prices that patent holders, by virtue of their
monopolies, are able to charge for drugs (ICN Pharmaceuticals v Canada (Patented
Medicines Prices Review Board), (1996) 108 FTR 190 (FCTD), at para 24; Celgene,
at para 29). In pursuit of that purpose, Parliament defined “patentee” broadly
to include all entities enjoying any advantage, right or benefit from a patent.
Here, Ratiopharm enjoys the right to sell patented medicines which is
sufficient to bring it within the Board’s jurisdiction. It is not necessary,
according to the Minister, to show that Ratiopharm actually held a monopoly.
[14] For the following reasons, I cannot accept the Minister’s position.
[15] First, it is clear that the relevant provisions of the Act were
enacted out of concern that patent holders could take undue advantage of their
monopolies to the detriment of Canadian consumers. They “address
the ‘mischief’ that the patentee’s monopoly over pharmaceuticals during the
exclusivity period might cause prices to rise to unacceptable levels” (Celgene,
at para 28). The Board’s paramount responsibility is to ensure “that the monopoly that
accompanies the granting of a patent is not abused to the financial detriment
of Canadian patients” (Celgene, at para 29). In short, the
legislation aims to ensure that patent holders cannot take undue advantage of
their monopolies and it should be interpreted in keeping with that purpose (Shire
Biochem Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 1316 at para 23).
Accordingly, the Board’s should confine its role to reviewing prices charged by
patent holders, who benefit from a time-limited monopoly, to determine whether
those prices are excessive. As Justice Johanne Gauthier stated, Parliament
intended the Board “to control the market power of the
monopoly created by the exclusivity of the patent” (Sanofi Pasteur
Limited v Attorney General of Canada, 2011 FC 859, at para 6).
[16] Second, while the federal government can regulate patents of
invention, it has no overall jurisdiction to regulate the price of generic
versions of patented medicines. That responsibility falls squarely on the
provinces (Katz Group Canada Inc. v Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care),
2013 SCC 64, at para 3).The provisions of the Act creating the Board have been
upheld as constitutional on the basis that they fall within the federal
jurisdiction over patents of invention. In 1991, Justice Dureault of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench found that the 1987
amendments to the Act extending the duration of patent protection and creating
the Board (SC 1987, c 41) served a dual purpose – to increase patent protection
for new medicines, and to address the potential abuse of monopolies through
excessive pricing by patent holders (Manitoba Society of Seniors Inc v
Canada (Attorney General), (1991), 77 DLR (4th) 485, at para 21,
aff’d (1992), 96 DLR (4th) 606 (Man CA)). Accordingly, the
legislation did not constitute a scheme for controlling the price of drugs; it
addressed issues relating to patent protection and, therefore, fell within the
federal domain over patents of invention.
[17] At that time, the Board’s powers were limited to curtailing a patent
holder’s monopoly. Now, as a result of amendments passed in 1993, the Board has
the power to order a patent holder to reduce the price at which it sells a
patented medicine and to pay to the Crown a specified amount. Ratiopharm argues
that these amendments introduce a price control system, in place of a patent
regulation regime, which renders them unconstitutional. For present purposes,
without addressing the constitutional argument directly (see below), if it is
capable of more than one interpretation, the legislation should be construed in
a manner consistent with the federal jurisdiction over patents. That approach
suggests that the definition of “patentee” should take into account the
limitations on federal jurisdiction over the pricing of medicines and,
therefore, should recognize that a patentee is the holder of the exclusive
rights that inure to a patent holder. To expand the definition to include
generic companies who neither hold patents nor enjoy monopolies would expose
the legislation to an attack on constitutional grounds. In other words, if the
legislation were interpreted as applying to, and giving the Board jurisdiction
over, products sold by generic pharmaceutical companies, its constitutionality
would be in doubt. That approach should be avoided.
[18] Further, federal jurisdiction in this area is generally understood
to be confined to regulating the “factory-gate” prices of patented medicines (Pfizer
v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 719, at para 61-63). Factory-gate
prices are those charged by patent holders to their first purchasers; they do
not include the prices charged by distributors or wholesalers, or others down
the chain of sales. In this case, then, factory-gate prices would be those
Ratiopharm paid for medicines, not the prices at which it sold them.
[19] With those considerations in mind, I also note the following
factors.
[20] In my view, the mere fact that a company sells a generic version of
a patented medicine under contract is insufficient to bring it within the
definition of a patentee. Usually, a generic company is not entitled to the
principal benefit of a patent – an exclusive monopoly to make, use, or sell the
patented product. Nor can a generic company typically exercise rights in
relation to a patent held by another company. Before the patent expires, a
generic company can enter the market with a license from the patent holder, or
with the patent holder’s permission, or by successfully challenging the patent.
In none of these scenarios does the generic company receive the exclusive
benefits and rights that inure to patent holders. On the other hand, in those
cases where a generic company owns a patent and holds a monopoly for a drug,
that company could be a “patentee” and come within the Board’s jurisdiction.
[21] Generally speaking, generic companies either help create or join a
competitive marketplace, which helps keep the costs of patented medicines down.
Reviewing the prices charged by generic companies who hold no patents and no
monopolies, on its face, appears to be beyond the Board’s mandate.
[22] If the term “patentee” is interpreted too broadly so as to catch a
company in the position of Ratiopharm, there are likely very few generic
companies who would not be similarly placed. Most generics enter the market by
comparing their products against drugs that are the subject of patents held by
other companies. To that extent, they indirectly enjoy the benefits of patents
and, ultimately, may be regarded as having acquired rights in relation to them.
If Ratiopharm is a patentee, so are many other generic companies and possibly
other entities down the line of distribution.
[23] I note that Ratiopharm cannot bring an action for infringement or
seek an order of prohibition keeping another company off the market. Ratiopharm
simply does not enjoy the special patent rights that inure to the benefit of
the patent holder.
[24] Ratiopharm only enters the market under agreement with GSK. GSK
decides when it wishes to relinquish its monopoly. Ratiopharm
is never in a monopoly position.
[25] The Board did not consider the French version of s 79(1) of the Patent Act which states
that a “patentee” (“breveté” ou
“titulaire d’un brevet”) is “la personne ayant
pour le moment droit à l’avantage d’un brevet pour une invention liée à un
médicament, ainsi que quiconque était titulaire d’un brevet pour une telle
invention ou exerce ou a exercé les droits d’un titulaire”. In short, the French version ties the
definition of “patentee” more closely to the rights of the patent holder. It is
a narrower definition than in the English version, which includes any person
entitled to exercise any rights relating to a patent.
[26]
Taking account of all of these factors, I find
the Board’s conclusion that Ratiopharm is a “patentee” unreasonable. The
objectives the legislation sought to achieve did not include regulating the
prices charged by companies who do not hold a monopoly. The constitutionality
of the legislation depends on its close connection to patent protection and the
potential undue exploitation of the concomitant monopolies. Generic companies,
like Ratiopharm, do not generally hold monopolies and, in fact, do not normally
operate in a market where any monopoly exists.
[27]
In my view, had the Board taken these factors
and considerations into account, it could not reasonably have concluded that
Ratiopharm was a “patentee”.
V.
Issue Three – Is the legislation constitutional?
[28] Even though the relevant provisions of the Act have already been
found to be constitutional (Manitoba Society of Seniors Inc), Ratiopharm
argues that subsequent amendments to the Act relating to the Board’s powers now
place those provisions beyond federal jurisdiction over patents, encroaching on
provincial jurisdiction over Property and Civil Rights.
[29] Those amendments “strengthened the Board’s
remedial and punitive powers” to offset the effect of abolishing the
prior scheme of compulsory. Their purpose was to enable the Board “to influence the pricing of patented medicines to much the
same extent that the competition fostered by compulsory licensing used to
influence it” licensing (ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Canada (Patented Medicines
Prices Review Board), [1997] 1 FC 32 (CA) at para 12).
[30] As I see it, the amendments giving the Board the power to address
the pricing of patented medicines more directly through monetary remedies and
penalties did not alter the basic purpose of the legislation or expand the
Board’s mandate. Therefore, I see no basis for departing from the conclusion
reached in Manitoba Society of Seniors Inc that the provisions of the Patent
Act dealing with patented medicines, properly interpreted, fall within federal
jurisdiction over patents of invention; they are constitutional.
VI.
Conclusion and Disposition
[31] The Board’s conclusion that Ratiopharm is a “patentee” and that
Ratiopharm was obliged to comply with certain requirements under the Act and
Regulations was unreasonable. The Board failed to take adequate account of the
purpose of the legislation and its limited role in relation to patented
medicines. Properly interpreted as being closely connected to the federal
jurisdiction over patents of invention the relevant provisions of the Act are
constitutional.
[32] I must, therefore, allow this application for judicial review, with
costs.
[33] Ratiopharm argued that I should not remit the case to the Board for
redetermination on the basis that it would be pointless to do so. I agree.
[34] Based on the applicable law and the evidence in this case, there is
only one possible conclusion – that the Board does not have jurisdiction to
review the prices at which Ratiopharm, a company holding no patents and no
monopolies, sells medicines. In this situation, it would be futile to send the
matter back to the Board for reconsideration. The proper recourse, therefore,
is to send the matter back to the Board with a direction, pursuant to s 18.1(3)
of the Federal Courts Act, RSC, 1985, c F-7, that
it find that Ratiopharm is not a “patentee”.
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