Date: 20071213
Docket: T-100-07
/ T-101-07
Citation: 2007 FC 1316
Ottawa, Ontario, this 13th day of December, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
T-101-07
SHIRE
BIOCHEM INC.
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
and
CANADA’S
RESEARCH-BASED PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
Intervener
AND BETWEEN:
T-100-07
JANSSEN-ORTHO
INC.
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
THE APPLICATIONS
[1]
The
Applicants, Shire Biochem Inc. (Shire) and Janssen-Ortho Inc. (Janssen-Ortho) are
seeking judicial review pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 of decisions (Decisions) made by the Patented Medicine
Prices Review Board (Board) and issued December 18, 2006, in which the Board
held it had jurisdiction to review the pricing of Shire’s drug product Adderall
XR and Janssen-Ortho’s drug product Concerta for that period of time between
the laying open and the granting of the relevant patents.
[2]
These
two matters are separate applications. However, the Board’s reasons and
conclusions are substantially the same for both Decisions so that, with the
consent of all parties, the Court ordered that both applications should be
heard consecutively on the same day.
[3]
Canada’s Research-based
Pharmaceutical Companies (Rx&D) is an intervener in file T-100-07 and was
also an intervener in the hearing before the Board below. Rx&D’s arguments support
and largely duplicate the arguments of the Applicants.
BACKGROUND
(i) The
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board
[4]
The
Board is established under the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 as
amended in 1987 by An Act to amend the Patent Act and to provide for certain
matters in relation thereto, S.C. 1987, c. 41, s. 15. Parliament created
the Board to prevent patentees from abusing the increased patent protection or
exclusivity for new inventions of medicines (which were also granted protection
in the 1987 amendments) by charging excessive prices. The powers of the Board
were strengthened in 1993 in conjunction with further increased patent
protection or exclusivity for new inventions of medicines.
(ii) Patent
Applications
[5]
Under
section 10 of the Patent Act, patent applications are laid open for
public inspection prior to the patent being granted. An applicant cannot
prevent anyone from infringing on the application during this time. However,
once a patent is granted, anyone who does infringe on the patent during the
laid-open period is liable to the patentee under subsection 55(2) for
reasonable compensation for any damages suffered. Also, once the patent is
granted, it confers on a patentee a wider range of privileges, rights,
entitlements, protection and remedies, including the ability to enjoin others
from continuing to use, manufacture or sell the subject-matter of the patent.
(iii) Shire’s
Adderall XR
[6]
Adderall
XR is a drug used for the treatment of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD)
[7]
Shire’s
U.S. affiliate
was granted Canadian Patent No. 3,348,090 on April 13, 2004. Shire is a licensee
of the patent and for purposes of the proceedings before the Board and this
Court is considered to be the Canadian patentee. All the parties agree that
this patent is for an invention pertaining to a medicine.
[8]
Shire
began selling Adderall XR on September 12, 2002, about 19 months before the
patent was granted. The patent application was laid open on April 27, 2000.
(iv) Janssen-Ortho’s
Concerta
[9]
Like
Adderall XR, Concerta is a medicine used for the treatment of ADHD. Janssen-Ortho
began selling Concerta in Canada on August 7, 2003.
[10]
Janssen-Ortho
has three relevant Canadian patents which pertain to Concerta: (i) Canadian
Patent No. 1,222,950 which was granted on June 16, 1987 and expired on June 16,
2004; (ii) Canadian Patent No. 2,265,668 which was granted on August 23,
2005 and will expire on November 12, 2017; and (iii) Canadian Patent No.
2,264,852 which was granted November 1, 2005 and will expire on September 16,
2017. The period in issue for Concerta is between the expiry of the first patent
and the time when the second patent was granted (June 16, 2004 to August 23,
2005). During this time, the latter two patents were laid open. All the parties
agree that these patents are for inventions pertaining to a medicine.
(v) History
of Proceedings
[11]
By
Notice of Hearing dated January 18, 2006, the Board commenced a hearing into
allegations that Shire was selling Adderall XR at excessive prices. Part of the
period covered by the Notice of Hearing involved the laid-open period for the
patent pertaining to Adderall XR.
[12]
On
February 26, 2006, Shire brought a motion before the Board contesting the Board’s
jurisdiction to make an order pertaining to the laid-open period. Janssen-Ortho
and Rx&D were granted intervener status by the Board.
[13]
By
Notice of Hearing dated July 24, 2006, the Board commenced a hearing into
allegations that Janssen-Ortho had excessively priced Concerta. As with the
Shire hearing, part of the period covered by the Notice of Hearing involved the
laid-open period for the patents pertaining to Concerta.
[14]
Given
that the same jurisdictional issue in the Shire hearing arose in the
Janssen-Ortho hearing, the Applicants proposed that the Board’s decision on the
jurisdictional motion for the Shire hearing would be incorporated by reference
into the Janssen-Ortho hearing. The Board accepted this proposal on September
14, 2006.
[15]
By
order dated December 18, 2006, the Board dismissed the motion brought by Shire.
The Board also issued a separate order in relation to Janssen-Ortho’s Concerta
hearing which stated that the reasons given in the Shire order also applied to
the Concerta hearing.
[16]
While
the Board’s order was issued on December 18, 2006, the decision itself was
dated December 15, 2006. In that decision, the Board provided detailed reasons
which included findings that can be summarized as follows:
1.
The
intention of Parliament was to control excessive pricing during periods of market
power related to the patent system and the provisions of the Patent Act
that create the Board’s remedial powers should be interpreted purposively to
give effect to this intent;
2.
The
effect of sections 10 and 55 of the Patent Act is that a party who is
granted a patent acquires market power from the date the patent application is
laid open to the public;
3.
Under
section 83 of the Patent Act the Board may make remedial orders with
respect to prices at which medicines are sold by a patentee “while a patentee.”
Section 79 defines “patentee” for inventions pertaining to medicine as “the
person for the time entitled to the benefit of the patent for that invention.”
4.
Once
a patent has been granted, the patentee has the “benefit of the patent” from
the time after the patent application is laid open. Specifically, a patentee
has the benefits of subsection 55(2) once the patent application is laid open.
APPLICABLE LEGISLATION
[17]
Relevant
provisions from the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 are set out below:
10. (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (6) and section 20, all
patents, applications for patents and documents filed in connection with
patents or applications for patents shall be open to public inspection at the
Patent Office, under such conditions as may be prescribed.
[ … ]
R.S., 1985, c. P-4, s. 10; R.S., 1985, c. 33 (3rd Supp.), s. 2; 1993, c.
15, s. 28.
GRANT OF PATENTS
42.
Every patent granted under this Act shall contain the title or name of
the invention, with a reference to the specification, and shall, subject to
this Act, grant to the patentee and the patentee’s legal representatives for
the term of the patent, from the granting of the patent, the exclusive right,
privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and
selling it to others to be used, subject to adjudication in respect thereof
before any court of competent jurisdiction.
R.S., 1985, c. P-4, s. 42; R.S., 1985, c. 33 (3rd Supp.),
s. 16.
INFRINGEMENT
[ … ]
55.
(1) A person who infringes a patent is
liable to the patentee and to all persons claiming under the patentee for all
damage sustained by the patentee or by any such person, after the grant of
the patent, by reason of the infringement.
(2) A person is liable to pay reasonable
compensation to a patentee and to all persons claiming under the patentee for
any damage sustained by the patentee or by any of those persons by reason of
any act on the part of that person, after the application for the patent
became open to public inspection under section 10 and before the grant of the
patent, that would have constituted an infringement of the patent if the
patent had been granted on the day the application became open to public
inspection under that section.
(3) Unless otherwise expressly provided,
the patentee shall be or be made a party to any proceeding under subsection
(1) or (2).
(4) For the purposes of this section and
sections 54 and 55.01 to 59, any proceeding under subsection (2) is deemed to
be an action for the infringement of a patent and the act on which that
proceeding is based is deemed to be an act of infringement of the patent.
R.S., 1985, c. P-4, s. 55; R.S., 1985, c. 33 (3rd Supp.),
s. 21; 1993, c. 15, s. 48.
PATENTED MEDICINES
Interpretation
79.
(1) In this section and in sections 80
to 103,
"Board"
«Conseil »
"Board"
means the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board continued by section 91;
[ [… ]
"patentee"
«breveté » ou
«titulaire d’un
brevet »
"patentee"
, in respect of an invention pertaining to a medicine, means the person for
the time being entitled to the benefit of the patent for that invention and
includes, where any other person is entitled to exercise any rights in
relation to that patent other than under a licence continued by subsection
11(1) of the Patent Act Amendment Act, 1992, that other person in
respect of those rights;
[ [… ]
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) and
sections 80 to 101, an invention pertains to a medicine if the invention is
intended or capable of being used for medicine or for the preparation or
production of medicine.
1993, c. 2, s. 7; 1996, c. 8, s. 32.
Excessive
Prices
83.
(1) Where the Board finds that a
patentee of an invention pertaining to a medicine is selling the medicine in
any market in Canada at a price that, in the Board’s opinion, is excessive,
the Board may, by order, direct the patentee to cause the maximum price at
which the patentee sells the medicine in that market to be reduced to such
level as the Board considers not to be excessive and as is specified in the
order.
(2) Subject to subsection (4), where the
Board finds that a patentee of an invention pertaining to a medicine has,
while a patentee, sold the medicine in any market in Canada at a price that,
in the Board’s opinion, was excessive, the Board may, by order, direct the
patentee to do any one or more of the following things as will, in the
Board’s opinion, offset the amount of the excess revenues estimated by it to
have been derived by the patentee from the sale of the medicine at an
excessive price:
(a) reduce the price at which the patentee sells the
medicine in any market in Canada, to such extent and for such period as is specified
in the order;
(b) reduce the price at which the patentee sells one
other medicine to which a patented invention of the patentee pertains in any
market in Canada, to such extent and for such period as is specified in the
order; or
(c) pay to Her Majesty in right of Canada an amount
specified in the order.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), where the Board finds that a former
patentee of an invention pertaining to a medicine had, while a patentee, sold
the medicine in any market in Canada at a price that, in the Board’s opinion,
was excessive, the Board may, by order, direct the former patentee to do any
one or more of the following things as will, in the Board’s opinion, offset
the amount of the excess revenues estimated by it to have been derived by the
former patentee from the sale of the medicine at an excessive price:
(a) reduce the price at which the former patentee sells a
medicine to which a patented invention of the former patentee pertains in any
market in Canada, to such extent and for such period as is specified in the
order; or
(b) pay to Her Majesty in right of Canada an amount specified in the order.
(4) Where the Board, having regard to the
extent and duration of the sales of the medicine at an excessive price, is of
the opinion that the patentee or former patentee has engaged in a policy of
selling the medicine at an excessive price, the Board may, by order, in lieu
of any order it may make under subsection (2) or (3), as the case may be,
direct the patentee or former patentee to do any one or more of the things
referred to in that subsection as will, in the Board’s opinion, offset not
more than twice the amount of the excess revenues estimated by it to have
been derived by the patentee or former patentee from the sale of the medicine
at an excessive price.
[ … ]
1993, c. 2, s. 7; 1994, c. 26, s. 54(F).
|
10. (1) Sous
réserve des paragraphes (2) à (6) et de l’article 20, les brevets, demandes
de brevet et documents relatifs à ceux-ci, déposés au Bureau des brevets,
peuvent y être consultés aux conditions réglementaires.
[ … ]
L.R. (1985),
ch. P-4, art. 10; L.R. (1985), ch. 33 (3e suppl.), art. 2; 1993,
ch. 15, art. 28.
OCTROI DES BREVETS
42. Tout brevet accordé en vertu de la
présente loi contient le titre ou le nom de l’invention avec renvoi au
mémoire descriptif et accorde, sous réserve des autres dispositions de la
présente loi, au breveté et à ses représentants légaux, pour la durée du
brevet à compter de la date où il a été accordé, le droit, la faculté et le
privilège exclusif de fabriquer, construire, exploiter et vendre à d’autres,
pour qu’ils l’exploitent, l’objet de l’invention, sauf jugement en l’espèce
par un tribunal compétent.
L.R. (1985), ch. P-4, art. 42; L.R. (1985), ch. 33 (3e
suppl.), art. 16.
CONTREFAÇON
[ … ]
55. (1) Quiconque contrefait un brevet
est responsable envers le breveté et toute personne se réclamant de celui-ci
du dommage que cette contrefaçon leur a fait subir après l’octroi du brevet.
(2) Est responsable envers le breveté et
toute personne se réclamant de celui-ci, à concurrence d’une indemnité
raisonnable, quiconque accomplit un acte leur faisant subir un dommage entre
la date à laquelle la demande de brevet est devenue accessible au public sous
le régime de l’article 10 et l’octroi du brevet, dans le cas où cet acte
aurait constitué une contrefaçon si le brevet avait été octroyé à la date où
cette demande est ainsi devenue accessible.
(3) Sauf disposition expresse contraire,
le breveté est, ou est constitué, partie à tout recours fondé sur les
paragraphes (1) ou (2).
(4) Pour l’application des autres
dispositions du présent article et des articles 54 et 55.01 à 59, le recours
visé au paragraphe (2) est réputé être une action en contrefaçon et l’acte
sur lequel il se fonde est réputé être un acte de contrefaçon.
L.R. (1985), ch. P-4, art. 55; L.R. (1985), ch. 33 (3e
suppl.), art. 21; 1993, ch. 15, art. 48.
MÉDICAMENTS
BREVETÉS
Définitions
79. (1) Les définitions qui suivent
s’appliquent au présent article et aux articles 80 à 103.
«breveté » ou «titulaire d’un brevet »
"patentee"
«breveté » ou «titulaire d’un brevet » La personne ayant pour le
moment droit à l’avantage d’un brevet pour une invention liée à un
médicament, ainsi que quiconque était titulaire d’un brevet pour une telle
invention ou exerce ou a exercé les droits d’un titulaire dans un cadre autre
qu’une licence prorogée en vertu du paragraphe 11(1) de la Loi de 1992
modifiant la Loi sur les brevets.
«Conseil
»
"Board"
«Conseil » Le Conseil d’examen du prix des médicaments brevetés
prorogé au titre de l’article 91.
[ … ]
(2) Pour l’application du paragraphe (1)
et des articles 80 à 101, une invention est liée à un médicament si elle est
destinée à des médicaments ou à la préparation ou la production de
médicaments, ou susceptible d’être utilisée à de telles fins.
1993, ch. 2, art. 7; 1996, ch. 8, art. 32.
Prix excessifs
83. (1) Lorsqu’il estime que le
breveté vend sur un marché canadien le médicament à un prix qu’il juge être
excessif, le Conseil peut, par ordonnance, lui enjoindre de baisser le prix
de vente maximal du médicament dans ce marché au niveau précisé dans
l’ordonnance et de façon qu’il ne puisse pas être excessif.
(2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (4),
lorsqu’il estime que le breveté a vendu, alors qu’il était titulaire du
brevet, le médicament sur un marché canadien à un prix qu’il juge avoir été
excessif, le Conseil peut, par ordonnance, lui enjoindre de prendre l’une ou
plusieurs des mesures suivantes pour compenser, selon lui, l’excédent
qu’aurait procuré au breveté la vente du médicament au prix excessif :
a) baisser,
dans un marché canadien, le prix de vente du médicament dans la mesure et
pour la période prévue par l’ordonnance;
b) baisser,
dans un marché canadien, le prix de vente de tout autre médicament lié à une
invention brevetée du titulaire dans la mesure et pour la période prévue par
l’ordonnance;
c) payer à Sa
Majesté du chef du Canada le montant précisé dans l’ordonnance.
(3) Sous réserve du paragraphe (4),
lorsqu’il estime que l’ancien breveté a vendu, alors qu’il était titulaire du
brevet, le médicament à un prix qu’il juge avoir été excessif, le Conseil
peut, par ordonnance, lui enjoindre de prendre l’une ou plusieurs des mesures
suivantes pour compenser, selon lui, l’excédent qu’aurait procuré à l’ancien
breveté la vente du médicament au prix excessif :
a) baisser,
dans un marché canadien, le prix de vente de tout autre médicament lié à une
invention dont il est titulaire du brevet dans la mesure et pour la période
prévue par l’ordonnance;
b) payer à Sa
Majesté du chef du Canada le montant précisé dans l’ordonnance.
(4) S’il estime que le breveté ou l’ancien
breveté s’est livré à une politique de vente du médicament à un prix
excessif, compte tenu de l’envergure et de la durée des ventes à un tel prix,
le Conseil peut, par ordonnance, au lieu de celles qu’il peut prendre en
application, selon le cas, des paragraphes (2) ou (3), lui enjoindre de
prendre l’une ou plusieurs des mesures visées par ce paragraphe de façon à
réduire suffisamment les recettes pour compenser, selon lui, au plus le
double de l’excédent procuré par la vente au prix excessif.
[ …
]
1993, ch. 2, art. 7; 1994, ch. 26, art. 54(F).
|
ISSUES
[18]
The
primary issue before me is whether the Board erred in determining it had
jurisdiction to review the pricing of Adderall XR and Concerta during the
period when the relevant patents were laid open.
REASONS
(i)
Standard of Review
[19]
All
parties agree that the standard of review is correctness. As noted by Justice Heneghan
in Hoechst Marion Roussel Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005
FC 1552 at paras. 99- 110 [HMRC], questions of jurisdiction are
questions of law for which the Board does not possess more expertise than does
this Court. While the Patent Act’s purpose is to resolve competing
policy objectives, pointing to greater deference, there is no privative clause.
For these reasons, I accept that the standard of review is correctness.
(ii)
Application of HMRC
[20]
The
Applicants argue that the Board erred by failing to follow HMRC. In that
decision, Justice Heneghan held that the Board did not have jurisdiction to
review prices when a patent is laid open. However, in HMRC, the relevant
patents had not issued; they were merely patent applications. As Justice Heneghan
noted at para. 136 of her reasons, “a patent application gives rise only to the
potential for a grant of a patent.” As no patent had been granted, there was no
patentee on the facts before her. The Board’s jurisdiction is with respect to
patentees, and for that reason it had no jurisdiction to review the prices in
that case.
[21]
In
the case at bar, the patents have been granted and there is no dispute that,
because the Applicants are patentees, the Board has jurisdiction to review the
prices at least from the date the patents issued. Consequently, because of the
important difference in the fact situations regarding the relevant patents, the
decision in HMRC is not, in my view, determinative of whether the Board
can, subsequent to the granting of a patent, review prices during the laid-open
period. Hence, in my view, the Board did not err in distinguishing the case at
bar from Justice Heneghan’s decision in HMRC. My own review of HMRC
convinces me that there is nothing in Justice Heneghan’s reasons to suggest that
she intended to address a situation such as exists on the facts before me where
the relevant patents have been granted and the Applicants are patentees within
the meaning of the Patent Act. Having achieved that status, the
Applicants are now beyond the conceptual difficulties that confronted Justice
Heneghan in HMRC. The question now is whether, given the fact that the
Applicants are patentees, the Board’s power can be extended back to the time
when the patents were laid open.
(iii) Statutory
Interpretation
[22]
In
my view, the question of jurisdiction raised in these Applications depends upon
the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Patent Act. This
requires a purposive analysis, giving such fair, large and liberal construction
and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of the Patent Act’s
objective in accordance with the relevant jurisprudence (Rizzo & Rizzo
Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Interpretation Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. I-12, s. 12).
[23]
The
Federal Court has held that the purpose of the Board is “to address the
‘mischief’ that the patentee’s monopoly over pharmaceuticals during the
exclusivity period might cause prices to rise to unacceptable levels” (ICN
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Canada (Patented Medicine Prices Review Board) (1996),
108 F.T.R. 190 at para. 24, aff’d [1997] 1 F.C. 32 (F.C.A.)). It follows, then,
that the provisions must, in so far as the language of the text permits, be
interpreted in a manner consistent with that purpose (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan
and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 2002) at 195).
[24]
The
Federal Court of Appeal has previously held that the Board’s jurisdiction is
not based upon an actual or prospective effect on market power (ICN
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Canada (Patented Medicine Prices Review Board,
[1997] 1 F.C. 32 at para. 76 (F.C.A.)). Parliament gave the Board broad scope
to review prices of medicines, even when the nexus to a patent was a slender
thread, to ensure that pharmaceutical companies could not avoid the
jurisdiction of the Board, and to avoid limiting the Board’s ability to protect
Canadian consumers from excessive pricing (para. 60).
(iv) Meaning
of Patentee
[25]
A
patentee, as defined in section 79 of the Patent Act, “means the person
for the time being entitled to the benefit of the patent for that invention.”
[26]
The
benefit of a patent includes the patentee’s rights to exercise a number of
enforcement options against infringers of the patent as described in sections
54 to 59 of the Patent Act. Included among these enforcement options is
the ability to sue for reasonable compensation under subsection 55(2) for any
infringement that resulted after the patent application was laid open under
section 10 of the Patent Act. Under subsection 55(4), that action for reasonable
compensation is deemed to be an action for infringement of the patent.
[27]
In
essence, this means that once a patent is granted a patentee has the benefit of
the patent from the date the patent was laid open in the form of an action for
reasonable compensation.
[28]
The
Applicants argue that the term “benefit” in section 79 refers to all
attributes of a patentee’s rights under a patent. They note that, once a patent
is granted, a patentee has enforcement options in addition to seeking reasonable
compensation, including, for example, the right to seek injunctions under
section 57 of the Patent Act. As the patentee can only seek reasonable
compensation during the laid-open period (and only after the patent is granted),
the Applicants say that the patent holder does not have the full benefit of the
patent during this period and so should not be regarded as a patentee during
that period.
[29]
In
my view, there is nothing in the statute that suggests that “benefit” must be
taken to mean every enforcement option available to a patentee under the
statute. The purpose of subsection 55(2) is to extend the patent benefits to
patentees during the patent application period. Once a patent application is
laid open it is possible for a third party to read the published material and use
the invention. Subsection 55(2) provides that anyone who does so (or otherwise
infringes on the invention) is liable to pay reasonable compensation should the
patent be subsequently granted. Subsection 55(4) specifically provides that any
such action for reasonable compensation “is deemed to be an action for the
infringement of a patent and the act on which that proceeding is based is
deemed to be an act of infringement of the patent.” So the Patent Act
specifically makes the reasonable compensation right granted under subsection
55(2) part of the bundle of enforcement rights enjoyed by a patentee under the
relevant patent once that patent has issued.
[30]
In
my view, it follows that since the patentee, once the patent issues, enjoys
patent rights from the time the patent is laid open (even if not the full complement)
then the patentee is deemed by the Patent Act to enjoy those rights as a
patentee and must be taken to have sold medicines in accordance with section
83(2) “while a patentee” and as the person entitled to the benefit of the
patent during that period of time.
[31]
This
being the case, I am convinced that the purposive analysis carried out by the
Board and referred to in its Decisions is correct and that it was Parliament’s
intent that the Board’s jurisdiction over prices for medicines should extend to
the period in question between laying the patent open and the grant of the
patent. This is provided, of course, that a patent is granted, as the patents
were granted in this case.
(v) Whether
Retroactive Application
[32]
Just
as a patentee cannot sue for infringement during the laid-open period until the
patent has been granted, the Board cannot review prices during the laid-open
period until the patent has been granted. Until the patent is granted, the
patent application gives rise only to the potential for the grant of a patent (HMRC
at para. 135) which is insufficient both for enforcement and for review of
prices.
[33]
The
Applicants argue that this interpretation leads to a retroactive application of
the Patent Act and that there is nothing in the statute that rebuts the
strong presumption that legislation is not intended to have a retroactive effect
(Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271 at 279).
They argue that while subsection 55(2) provides a retroactive or retrospective
right of action once the patent is granted, there is no similar provision that
provides a retroactive or retrospective right of review of prices by the Board.
[34]
In
my view, the provisions do not operate retroactively or retrospectively. They
do not purport to operate as of a time prior to the 1987 amendments that
brought them into being. Nor do they attach new consequences to an event that
took place before the statute was enacted. (Benner v. Canada, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 358 at paras. 39-40); see also Sullivan, at 547 ff).
[35]
Rather,
the provisions have a prospective operation. Patent applicants know when they
file their applications that if the patent is subsequently granted, they will
have the benefit of subsection 55(2) from the date the application is laid
open. Although the benefit becomes effective on a date before its existence is
crystallized (the date the patent is granted), it is nevertheless prospective
as it takes effect after the applicant files the application and after
the enactment of the provisions.
[36]
For
the same reasons, the Board’s ability to review prices is crystallized on the
date the patent is granted but becomes effective the date the patentee obtains
the benefit of the patent – the date it was laid open.
[37]
Even
if the provisions could be characterized as retroactive or retrospective in
their operation, they nevertheless, in my view, meet the test set out in Gustavson
Drilling. As noted above, subsection 55(2) expressly provides that the patentee
has a benefit once the patent is granted during the laid-open period. By
necessary implication, this means that once a patent is granted the patentee is
a patentee during the laid-open period. In fact, subsection 55(4) deems any
action under subsection 55(2) to be a patent infringement action. To construe
the statute otherwise would, in my view, twist the meaning of benefit beyond
what the language permits and beyond what Parliament intended.
(vi) Constitutional
Authority
[38]
Janssen-Ortho
argues that it would be ultra vires the power of Parliament to give the Board
the power to regulate prices during the laid-open period because the regulation
of prices falls normally under provincial heads of power. The argument is that Parliament
may only regulate the prices of products pursuant to its exclusive legislative
competence over patents and, since the relevant patents were not granted during
the time in question, the Board is attempting to regulate prices in a manner
beyond the patent power of Parliament. Janssen-Ortho argues that it could not
have been the intent of Parliament to grant the board jurisdiction during the
laid-open period because Parliament would not legislate in a way that could
extend its jurisdiction.
[39]
There
is no dispute, however, that Parliament has legislative authority over “Patents
of Invention and Discovery.” Because the definition of patentee encompasses the
rights enjoyed during the laid-open period once the patent is granted, the
legislation is, in my view, clearly intra vires and so there can be no
inhibition on Parliamentary intent along the lines argued.
[40]
In
my view, the same power that makes subsection 55(2) of the Patent Act intra vires also makes the power of
the Board to review prices during the laid-open period intra vires.
(vii) Whether
Evidence Required for Jurisdiction
[41]
Shire
argues that the Board erred because there was no evidence of “mischief”
requiring it to intervene. In its Decisions, the Board stated that patent
applicants could engage in “purposeful avoidance behaviour” by delaying the
grant of their patents in order to extend the laid-open period and the benefits
of subsection 55(2) unless the Board had subsequent jurisdiction under
subsection 83(2). In the absence of any evidence that this would happen, Shire
argues the Board erred in law by relying on this rationale.
[42]
In
my view, this argument misstates the position of the Board. The term “mischief”
comes from case law (see e.g., ICN Pharmaceuticals) and refers to the
possibility that pharmaceutical companies might seek to evade the Board’s
jurisdiction. There is no allegation that either of the Applicants engaged in
any such mischief, and I have seen no evidence that would support such an
allegation if it was made.
[43]
Parliament
created the Board to address the possibility of mischief. Evidence of mischief
is not necessary to provide a basis for that jurisdiction. For instance, the Board
does not need evidence of market power arising from a patent, or even that a
patent is, in fact, used in order for it to exercise its regulatory powers. Parliament
granted the Board broad jurisdiction to ensure that it could carry out its
purpose of ensuring that prices are not excessive.
[44]
In
my view, it is irrelevant whether patentees might delay obtaining the grant of
the patent in order to minimize the Board’s jurisdiction. In the absence of
that jurisdiction, patentees may be able to price their products excessively,
using the benefit of subsection 55(2) to protect their monopoly pricing power
during the laid-open period. The purpose of the Board is to address the
possibility of mischief that could arise from an abuse of a patentee’s monopoly
power. The same possibility of mischief exists both after the date the patent
is granted and during the laid-open period.
[45]
Similarly,
Shire argues that the Board never found that market power existed during the
laid open period. However, as noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in ICN
Pharmaceuticals, it is irrelevant whether market power exists in order for
the Board to have jurisdiction. Whether the Applicants had market power during
the relevant periods may be a factor for the Board to consider in determining
whether the prices for the medicines were excessive. That question, though, is
not before me today. In my view, the Board has the jurisdiction to consider
whether the prices are excessive and, if so, to order appropriate remedies as
provided for under the Patent Act.
(viii) Conclusion
[46]
In
summary, I conclude that for purposes of section 79 of the Patent Act,
“benefit of the patent” includes the benefit of subsection 55(2) which is
realized once the patent is granted. Accordingly, once the patent is granted,
a patentee is a patentee from the date the application was laid open under
section 10. For that reason, the Board has jurisdiction with respect to the
patentee’s prices during the laid-open period under subsection 83(2). In my
view, the Board made no error in law in coming to this same conclusion and thus
its Decisions should stand.
JUDGMENT
UPON reviewing the
material filed and hearing the submissions of counsel for both parties in Ottawa on Wednesday,
November 7, 2007;
THIS COURT HEREBY
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
1.
For
the reasons given above the judicial review in both applications is hereby
dismissed with costs to the Respondent.
“James Russell”
Judge