Docket:
IMM-3364-13
Citation: 2014 FC 113
Ottawa, Ontario, February 13, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
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IVAN SIMKOVIC
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The Applicant left his country of origin without
telling anyone that he was leaving. Recognizing that the Applicant, a
university educated professional, did not attempt to regularize his status in
Canada for more than sixteen years, nor did he attempt to return to his country
of origin; the Applicant did not ask for refugee status during that entire
sixteen year period in Canada. Allegedly unaware of his indictment and sentence
for tax fraud in his country of origin, the Applicant also alleges that neither
his mother nor his sister, who had come to Canada for a visit, had shared with
him their knowledge of the trial held in his regard as well as the judgment and
sentence that was rendered therein.
[2]
Although the counsel of the Applicant points to
a Kafkaesque situation of the judicial system in Slovakia, having quoted from
the Refugee Protection Division (RPD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board Certified
Tribunal Record [CTR], affirmations to the effect that the Prime Minister of
Slovakia, Iveta Radicova, who had said at the relevant time-frame to this
matter: “I do not believe in judiciary”;
and, also: “we need a big judiciary reform”, in the Slovak Prime Minister’s
direct reference to corruption therein (CTR, vol 3 at p 458; CTR, vol 2 at pp
230-233 inclusive; CTR, vol 2 at pp 242-244 in that regard, which includes the
State Department Country Condition Report); however, in and of itself, that
does not discount uncontradicted evidence in regard to the participation of the
Applicant in the economic crime for which he was indicted and sentenced. A
decision of this Court cannot solely take into account a Country Condition
Report or other documentation in that regard without taking into account direct
uncontradicted evidence in respect of an applicant. Therefore, even if problems
exist with the “judicial system” in the generic, the uncontradicted evidence in
regard to the Applicant has led the Court to determine that the decision of the
RPD, on its face and in its substance, with regard to its reasoning on the
basis of all of the evidence therein, was reasonable as interpreted within the
framework of a trilogy of decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada: Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, Alberta (Information and
Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011]
3 SCR 654 and Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and
Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708.
[3]
The fact that the Applicant’s country of origin,
Czechoslovakia, was being divided into two, between the Czech and Slovak
Republics, when the Applicant fled, is not sufficient as a reason to flee his
former country, although changes were to take place, as the Applicant did not
have any political profile, nor any political antecedents, whatsoever.
[4]
Although the RPD decision has one line, at
paragraph 53, wherein an inadvertence had taken place: “Although the company is
noted as Slovakia’s ‘largest tax dodger’, there is no commentary about the
company being involved in any illegal activities, other than the tax arrears”
[emphasis added], that does not change the reasonableness of the entire
decision, which is composed of eighty seven paragraphs.
[5]
This judgment is in response to an application
for judicial review of the decision of the RPD that found that the Applicant is
not a “Convention Refugee” or “a person in need of protection” as defined in
sections 96 and 97, respectively, of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, SC 2001 c 27 [IRPA], as he is excluded under 1F(b) of
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees [Convention].
[6]
Article 1F(b) specifies, in part:
F. The provisions of this Convention
shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons
for considering that:
…
(b) He
has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
…
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F. Les dispositions de cette Convention
ne seront pas applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de
penser:
[…]
b) Qu’elles ont commis un crime grave d droit commun en dehors du
pays d’accueil avant d’y être admises comme réfugiés;
[…]
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(Schedule to the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act – Sections E and F of Article 1 of the United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.)
[7]
The RPD, after a hearing held on three separate
days and, subsequently, written submissions, determined that the Applicant is
excluded from refugee protection pursuant to Article 1F(b) for reasons
that include the following:
a)
On the basis of detailed documents from Slovakia
that the Applicant had committed crimes before he arrived in Canada, it was
determined that the claimant was convicted of “tax diminishment” contrary to
section 148, subsections (1) and (5) of the Slovak Penal Code of the government
Slovakia;
b)
In the hearing before the RPD, it was determined
that the above was equivalent to an act of “fraud” under subsection 380(1) of
the Criminal Code of Canada;
c)
Although the Applicant rejected the alleged
crimes attributed to his person, he did not dispute that such was the outcome
of his current legal situation in Slovakia;
d)
The Applicant alleged that he was, as a partner
in a business enterprise, a victim, of unscrupulous individuals who had misled
him and that criminal acts had taken place unbeknownst to him through the doing
of others;
e)
The RPD had had presented to it, excerpts from
the Canadian Criminal Code which indicate that the acts of the Applicant
are criminal in nature in Canada. Also, the crime is considered “a serious
non-political crime outside of the country of refuge prior to his admission to
that country as a refugee”;
f)
Section 98 of the IRPA specifies:
98. A person referred to in section E or
F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a
person in need of protection.
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98. La personne visée aux sections E ou F
de l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la
qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger.
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g) Section
380 of the Criminal Code of Canada, RCS, 1985, c C-46, reads :
Fraud
380. (1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other
fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of
this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of
any property, money or valuable security or any service,
(a) is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding
fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary
instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five
thousand dollars; or
(b) is guilty
(i) of an indictable offence
and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or
(ii) of an offence punishable
on summary conviction,
where the value of the
subject-matter of the offence does not exceed five thousand dollars.
Minimum punishment
(1.1) When a
person is prosecuted on indictment and convicted of one or more offences
referred to in subsection (1), the court that imposes the sentence shall
impose a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of two years if the
total value of the subject-matter of the offences exceeds one million
dollars.
Affecting public market
(2) Every one who, by deceit,
falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence
within the meaning of this Act, with intent to defraud, affects the public
market price of stocks, shares, merchandise or anything that is offered for
sale to the public is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
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Fraude
380. (1) Quiconque, par supercherie,
mensonge ou autre moyen dolosif, constituant ou non un faux semblant au sens
de la présente loi, frustre le public ou toute personne, déterminée ou non,
de quelque bien, service, argent ou valeur :
a) est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement
maximal de quatorze ans, si l’objet de l’infraction est un titre
testamentaire ou si la valeur de l’objet de l’infraction dépasse cinq mille
dollars;
b) est coupable :
(i) soit d’un
acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de deux ans,
(ii) soit
d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure
sommaire,
si la valeur
de l’objet de l’infraction ne dépasse pas cinq mille dollars.
Peine minimale
(1.1) Le
tribunal qui détermine la peine à infliger à une personne qui, après avoir
été poursuivie par acte d’accusation, est déclarée coupable d’une ou de
plusieurs infractions prévues au paragraphe (1) est tenu de lui infliger une
peine minimale d’emprisonnement de deux ans si la valeur totale de l’objet
des infractions en cause dépasse un million de dollars.
Influence sur le marché public
(2) Est
coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de
quatorze ans quiconque, par supercherie, mensonge ou autre moyen dolosif,
constituant ou non un faux semblant au sens de la présente loi, avec
l’intention de frauder, influe sur la cote publique des stocks, actions,
marchandises ou toute chose offerte en vente au public.
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h) Section
380.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada specifies:
Sentencing — aggravating circumstances
380.1 (1) Without limiting the generality of section
718.2, where a court imposes a sentence for an offence referred to in section
380, 382, 382.1 or 400, it shall consider the following as aggravating
circumstances:
(a) the magnitude,
complexity, duration or degree of planning of the fraud committed was
significant;
(b) the offence
adversely affected, or had the potential to adversely affect, the stability
of the Canadian economy or financial system or any financial market in Canada or investor confidence in such a financial market;
(c) the offence
involved a large number of victims;
(c.1) the offence had a
significant impact on the victims given their personal circumstances
including their age, health and financial situation;
(d) in committing the
offence, the offender took advantage of the high regard in which the offender
was held in the community;
(e) the offender did
not comply with a licensing requirement, or professional standard, that is
normally applicable to the activity or conduct that forms the subject-matter
of the offence; and
(f) the offender
concealed or destroyed records related to the fraud or to the disbursement of
the proceeds of the fraud.
Aggravating circumstance — value of the fraud
(1.1) Without limiting the
generality of section 718.2, when a court imposes a sentence for an offence
referred to in section 382, 382.1 or 400, it shall also consider as an
aggravating circumstance the fact that the value of the fraud committed
exceeded one million dollars.
Non-mitigating factors
(2) When a court imposes a
sentence for an offence referred to in section 380, 382, 382.1 or 400, it
shall not consider as mitigating circumstances the offender’s employment,
employment skills or status or reputation in the community if those
circumstances were relevant to, contributed to, or were used in the
commission of the offence.
Record of proceedings
(3) The court shall cause to
be stated in the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it took
into account when determining the sentence.
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Détermination de la peine : circonstances
aggravantes
380.1 (1) Sans que soit limitée la
portée générale de l’article 718.2, lorsque le tribunal détermine la peine à
infliger à l’égard d’une infraction prévue aux articles 380, 382, 382.1 ou
400, les faits ci-après constituent des circonstances aggravantes :
a) l’ampleur, la complexité, la durée ou le niveau de planification
de la fraude commise est important;
b) l’infraction a nui — ou pouvait nuire — à la stabilité de
l’économie canadienne, du système financier canadien ou des marchés
financiers au Canada ou à la confiance des investisseurs dans un marché
financier au Canada;
c) l’infraction a causé des dommages à un nombre élevé de victimes;
c.1) l’infraction a entraîné des conséquences importantes pour les
victimes étant donné la situation personnelle de celles-ci, notamment leur
âge, leur état de santé et leur situation financière;
d) le délinquant a indûment tiré parti de la réputation d’intégrité
dont il jouissait dans la collectivité;
e) il n’a pas satisfait à une exigence d’un permis ou d’une
licence, ou à une norme de conduite professionnelle, qui est habituellement
applicable à l’activité ou à la conduite qui est à l’origine de la fraude;
f) il a dissimulé ou détruit des dossiers relatifs à la fraude ou
au décaissement du produit de la fraude.
Circonstance aggravante : valeur de la
fraude
(1.1) Sans
que soit limitée la portée générale de l’article 718.2, lorsque le tribunal
détermine la peine à infliger à l’égard d’une infraction prévue aux articles
382, 382.1 ou 400, le fait que la fraude commise ait une valeur supérieure à
un million de dollars constitue également une circonstance aggravante.
Circonstances atténuantes
(2) Lorsque
le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger à l’égard d’une infraction prévue
aux articles 380, 382, 382.1 ou 400, il ne prend pas en considération à titre
de circonstances atténuantes l’emploi qu’occupe le délinquant, ses
compétences professionnelles ni son statut ou sa réputation dans la
collectivité, si ces facteurs ont contribué à la perpétration de
l’infraction, ont été utilisés pour la commettre ou y étaient liés.
Inscription obligatoire
(3) Le
tribunal fait inscrire au dossier de l’instance les circonstances aggravantes
ou atténuantes qui ont été prises en compte pour déterminer la peine.
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i)
If the criminal act as perpetrated was committed in Canada, it would be considered an indictable offence with a maximum sentence of fourteen
years;
j)
The judgment from Slovakia is explicit in explaining the basis on which
the conclusions were reached:
•
The Applicant is said to have as a partner, in Coreco, the
company with which he was associated, entered into contracts with a liquor
producer/distributor for a large quantity of rum. The rum was to be exported
and not sold domestically in Slovakia. Such goods would be exempt from sales
tax, while domestic sales necessitate the payment of the sales tax;
•
Contrary to the laws of Slovakia, the rum was sold in Slovakia;
and, thus, the Applicant “caused by these actions and by not paying sales tax,
damages to the state, reported by the Revenue Office of Bratislava, in the
total amount of 4,406,160,106 Sk”, by which the “criminal offense of tax
evasion” was committed (at para 26). This is the equivalent of over 180,000.00
Canadian dollars. Not only was the Applicant to receive a sentence of
imprisonment for five years but prohibited from performing business activities
subsequently for five years. Thereby, the RPD determined that the Minister had
established that the Applicant has committed a serious non-political crime.
k) Jurisprudence
has clearly established that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard
requires something more than mere suspicion but less than the standard
applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities (Chiau
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 FC 297 at para
60 (CA));
l)
Furthermore, reasonable grounds exist when an objective basis exists on
compelling and credible information (Sabour v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 195 FTR 59, 9 Imm LR (3d) 61 (FCTD)).
[8]
It is significant that the Applicant stated that he did sign the initial
contract for the purchase of rum in the company’s name to which he was a
partner; he, also acknowledged that the contract was for products for export;
and, he was cognizant that the exports, in question, were sold for a lesser
price; and, thus not taxable at the point of purchase from the producer. The
Applicant did not submit any proof that the rum had been, in fact, for export;
and the Applicant, also, acknowledged that his company had been paid for the
transactions in which he was engaged.
[9]
The Federal Court of Appeal in Xie v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2004 FCA 250, [2004] 1 FCR 304, has held that the RPD can
rely upon an indictment on an arrest warrant to conclude that reasonable
grounds exist whereby a refugee claimant has committed a crime. The Slovakian
Court extracts, in this case, do have details of the allegations themselves,
and, evidence in that respect, finding that the Applicant had evaded taxes,
after having heard witnesses who had testified thereon, and, subsequent, also,
to documentary evidence in that regard.
[10]
Although the Applicant argues as to weaknesses in the evidence in
respect of the Slovakian indictment and judgment, the evidence on file does
establish a prima facie case or “serious reasons to consider” that the
Applicant had committed a serious non-political crime in Slovakia.
[11]
It is not for the RPD to conduct a criminal trial beyond a reasonable
doubt or on a balance of probabilities. The indictment and the judgment from Slovakia do support the RPD’s determination of serious reasons for considering that the Applicant
had committed a crime (Sing v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2005 FCA 125).
[12]
The RPD’s decision, further to analysis by this Court, does demonstrate
that the RPD, in this case, deserves deference (Febles v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 324).
[13]
An offence punishable by a term of ten years, if committed in Canada, is a serious crime. A serious crime can include an economic crime (Jayasekara v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 404, [2009] 4 FCR 164).
[14]
The Applicant was convicted of defrauding the Slovakian government the
equivalent of more than $180,000 in taxes. That was not contradicted with any
substantial evidence from the Applicant.
[15]
It is important to clearly specify that the RPD had conducted a thorough
and clear analysis in its assessment of the seriousness of the crime:
a) The
elements of the crime;
b) The
mode of prosecution;
c) The
penalty prescribed;
d) The facts
of the conviction;
e) Any
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in respect of the conviction.
(Jayasekara, above, at para
44).
[16]
The elements of the crime had been established. Although the trial was
conducted in absentia, that was due to the Applicant having left Slovakia in 1992 to come to Canada. The Applicant’s personal circumstances had been considered as
had the fact that he had participated with others in the crime, including the
potential for rehabilitation and the fact that he had had no previous criminal
record. In reaching its sentence of five years, the serious social nature of
the crime was taken into consideration. All of the above factors, including the
fact that the Applicant left Slovakia avoiding prosecution, had been under
consideration.
[17]
In addition, the Applicant could not provide anything to support his
allegation that the RPD erred in finding he could be excluded as Slovakia could not enforce the judgment due to prescription as to the time sequence which
had elapsed. That had not been established by the Applicant. That argument does
not, in essence, assist the Applicant as that would mean he could return to
Slovakia, with the criminal matter in question in Slovakia, no longer to his
detriment due to the prescription which was raised by the Applicant in respect
of discounting the sentence, even if it is existed. That prescription issue
works both ways in this case, both to his detriment if he states that he cannot
go back, the matter is not prescribed; if it is prescribed, then he could go
back. The Applicant cannot have it both ways.
[18]
The RPD conducted “a full and proper hearing”. The RPD has an
inquisitorial role, given to its members to ensure that clarity is obtained on
issues within the RPD’s jurisdiction in conduct that is conducive to such a
hearing (Arica v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995),
182 NR 392 (FCA)).
[19]
As to an allegation of bias of the RPD’s member, as expressed by the
Applicant, the transcript clearly demonstrates that extensive and energetic
questioning took place without any reasonable apprehension of bias on the part
of the RPD member. The RPD member, as per the transcript, simply did all
that was possible to understand the evidence for the purposes of analysis and
determination.
[20]
The RPD did not err in its determination. Serious reasons for
consideration do exist that the Applicant had committed a serious non-political
crime prior to his admission to Canada. Also, the Applicant failed to show that
the RPD was either biased or had engaged in irrelevant considerations in his
regard as per his allegation (Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45,
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 259; Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (National
Energy Board), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369).
[21]
For all of the above reasons, the Applicant’s application for judicial
review is dismissed.