Docket: T-2057-13
Citation:
2014 FC 1051
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, November 6, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Bédard
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BETWEEN:
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MÉLANIE ALIX
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The applicant is an inmate at the Joliette
Institution for Women (the Institution). She is seeking judicial review of a decision
dated November 13, 2013, of an independent chairperson (IC), in which she was
found guilty of an institutional offence under paragraph 40(r) of the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 (the Act). For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial
review is dismissed.
I.
Background
[2]
The personal effects of inmates are subject to
strict rules. Inmates must never have in their possession more than 35 items,
the total value of which must not exceed $1,500.
[3]
When inmates are temporarily transferred to the Institut
Philippe-Pinel de Montréal (IPPM), their personal effects are subject to additional
rules of management. At the time of the transfer, they leave the Institution
with a limited number of personal effects in what is referred to as a [translation] “bundle”. If their stay
extends beyond 30 days, the remainder of their personal effects is sent to the
IPPM by the Institution. A count of the personal effects of each inmate
temporarily transferred to the IPPM is conducted upon leaving the Institution and
upon their return.
[4]
During their stay at the IPPM, inmates are not
permitted to procure personal effects through outside persons or from outside
suppliers. They may, however, procure personal effects from internal suppliers,
namely, at the IPPM’s thrift shop or linen supply store, and upon their return
to the Institution they must provide receipts to account for their purchases
and attest to their provenance.
[5]
On May 13, 2013, the applicant was temporarily
transferred to the IPPM. Prior to leaving the Institution, she signed a form
entitled [translation] “Management
of Personal Effects – Agreement with respect to inmates during their stay at
the Institut Philippe-Pinel de Montréal (IPPM)” (agreement), which provides, in
part, the following:
[translation]
•
Upon my return to the Joliette Institution, I
consent to paying for any costs associated with shipping the personal effects
that I am permitted to keep and use at the IPPM, but which are not authorized
to be kept at the Institution, in accordance with Commissioner Directive (CD)
566-12 entitled “Personal Property of Inmates”;
•
I understand that my stay at the IPPM does not
grant me the right to acquire personal effects from outside sources and I
undertake to adhere to this agreement. Therefore, neither my visitors, or any
other person, may send me any personal effects;
•
I acknowledge that any failure to comply with
the present agreement may result in the seizure of unauthorized items upon my
return to the Joliette Institution;
•
I understand that I must keep receipts issued by
suppliers in accordance with the procedure established by CD 566-12, as proof
of purchase for any purchases made during my stay at the IPPM.
[6]
The applicant returned to the Institution on
July 19, 2013. On August 1, 2013, she received a disciplinary report produced
on July 31, 2013, by her correctional officer, Annick Guillemette. The report
reads as follows:
[translation]
You are being reported for having received
effects from outside sources while you were at Pinel, which you were not
authorized to do. You are notified of this report.
[7]
A serious disciplinary offence charge was issued
against the applicant. Section 40 of the Act sets out a series of behaviours
that constitute disciplinary offences. In this case, the applicant was charged
under paragraph 40(r), which provides as follows:
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Disciplinary offences
40. An inmate commits a disciplinary offence who
(r) willfully disobeys a written rule governing the conduct
of inmates;
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Infractions disciplinaires
40. Est coupable d’une infraction disciplinaire le détenu qui :
r)
contrevient délibérément à une règle écrite concernant la conduite des
détenus;
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Thus, the applicant was charged with having
deliberately disobeyed a written rule governing conduct, namely, the agreement.
[8]
When a charge is laid for a serious disciplinary
offence, a hearing is held before an IC (subsection 27(2) of the Corrections
and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620) who is appointed by the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
[9]
The burden of proof applicable to disciplinary
offences in correctional facilities is the same as that applied to criminal
matters. The evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the inmate
committed the offence with which they are charged. Subsection 43(3) of the Act
provides as follows in that regard:
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Decision
(3) The person conducting the hearing shall not find the inmate
guilty unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, that the inmate committed the disciplinary offence
in question.
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Déclaration de culpabilité
(3) La personne chargée de l’audition ne peut prononcer la
culpabilité que si elle est convaincue hors de tout doute reasonable, sur la
foi de la preuve présentée, que le détenu a bien commis l’infraction
reprochée.
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II.
Hearing and decision of IC
[10]
The hearing of the charge occurred over the
course of three different dates, namely, October 4 and 30, and November 13,
2013. The Institution’s evidence consisted of the testimony of the correctional
officer, Ms. Guillemette, and that of the security intelligence officer of the
Institution, Stéphane Desroches.
[11]
Ms. Guillemette’s testimony centred mainly on
the following three elements:
•
The applicant had signed the agreement prior to
leaving for the IPPM.
•
The agreement stipulated that inmates who are
transferred to the IPPM may not, during their stay, procure personal effects by
means of outside persons, such as parents, visitors or others.
•
At the IPPM, patients may, however, procure personal
effects from two internal suppliers, either at the thrift shop or at the linen
supply store. Prior to that, patients had been able to purchase personal
effects from an outside supplier, Sears, but this possibility no longer existed
at the time of the applicant’s stay at the IPPM.
•
During the applicant’s stay at the IPPM, the
thrift shop was closed.
•
If inmates choose to procure personal effects
from internal suppliers at the IPPM, they must keep the receipts to remit them
to correctional officers upon their return to the Institution. In addition,
they must comply with the maximum 35 items the total value of which must not
exceed $1,500.
•
The applicant left the Institution with a bundle
and her remaining personal effects were shipped to her when the length of her
stay exceeded 30 days.
•
During the first weeks of the applicant’s stay
at the IPPM, and before the remainder of her personal effects had been shipped
to the IPPM, Ms. Guillemette received a call from one of the staff at the IPPM.
He informed her that the applicant had been asking whether she could [translation] “have some clothes brought
in” because much of the clothing she had brought with her in her bundle
consisted of clothes she was not allowed to wear at the IPPM (for example, some
of the clothes were too low-cut). Ms. Guillemette stated that she told the
staff member that it was up to them to assess the applicant’s needs.
•
When the applicant returned to the Institution, her
personal effects were reshipped to the Institution. Ms. Guillemette had counted
her personal effects at the time of the transfer. Upon the applicant’s return,
she did a recount of the applicant’s personal effects and noticed that certain items
did not match the items that had been in the applicant’s possession when she
went to the IPPM. The items that did not appear on the list of the applicant’s personal
effects at the time she went to the IPPM were seized. The officer also
completed the offence report, cited at paragraph 6 of this judgment, on
August 1, 2013.
•
When the applicant was notified that she was the
subject of an offence report, she went to see Ms. Guillemette and told her that
she had purchased the items. Ms. Guillemette then invited her to submit
receipts that corresponded to the purchases in order to verify the provenance
of the items the applicant claimed to have purchased.
•
A few weeks later, she was informed by Mr.
Desroches that the applicant had received an envelope containing blank receipts
in the mail. The envelope contained receipts and a letter. This envelope had
been mailed on August 14, 2013, and was received by the Institution on August
15, 2013.
•
Ms. Guillemette, Mr. Desroches and Ginette
Turcotte, Manager, Assessment and Interventions, met with the applicant to
asker her about the provenance of these receipts.
•
During the meeting, Ms. Guillemette asked the
applicant to read the letter that accompanied the receipts. The letter reads as
follows:
[translation]
Hi
Grandma
Here is the receipt form
Pinel go to the “Librairie Moderne” and buy a pad of receipts like this one
please.
Write the date of June
12, 2013, on one of the receipts
Mélanie Alix, F-1
Write the following items down
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1 pair leather sandals
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2,00
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1 sneakers
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4,00
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1 pyjamas
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1,00
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3 pants
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3,00
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3 sweaters
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3,00
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1 dress
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1,00
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3 undershirts
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3,00
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2 Bras (leopard,
Lascana)
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2,00
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# 68920-1020
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TOTAL
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19,00
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P.S. Return the
bill with the new receipt and a blank receipt.
Thanks!
•
Ms. Guillemette and the two other
representatives of the Institution questioned the applicant about the receipts
and the letter and the applicant admitted having intended to falsify receipts.
•
After the meeting, the applicant returned to see
Ms. Guillemette and provided her with three transaction statements from a Sears
credit card in her grandmother’s name, on which she had underlined the items
she indicated she had procured. A first statement was dated March 2013, a second
April 2013, and a third was from July 2013. Ms. Guillemette noticed that these
statements showed purchases that were made prior to the applicant’s stay at the
IPPM (January 28, 2013, February 4, 2013, March 14, 2013, March 15, 2013),
except for one purchase that had been made on June 17, 2013.
•
She confronted the applicant with the fact that
the transactions had been made prior to her being transferred to the IPPM, to
which the applicant responded that she had already been planning to go to the IPPM.
Ms. Guillemette viewed this as, among other things, proof that the applicant
had intended to smuggle personal effects from outside during her stay at the IPPM.
•
As for the purchase made on June 17, 2013, she
contacted staff at the IPPM to verify whether they had authorized the applicant
to purchase items at Sears. The IPPM staff confirmed to her that no
authorization had been given for the purchases at Sears and further indicated
that even if the applicant had received such authorization, the item purchased
in June (a close-fitting dress) would never have been allowed at the IPPM.
•
On September 5, 2013, Ms. Guillemette was
informed by Mr. Desroches that the applicant had received in the mail a receipt
from the Centre de Partage Communautaire Johannais dated September 3, 2013. The
envelope containing the receipt had been mailed on September 4, 2013. This
receipt was stapled to another receipt. She met with the applicant to ask her
about this receipt and the applicant asked her [translation]
“what was wrong with it”. Ms. Guillemette told her that the receipt was dated
September 3, 2013, at which time she was no longer at the IPPM. The
applicant told her that this receipt referred to another receipt from July
2013.
[12]
Mr. Desroches also testified. He declared that
he had learned of the envelope received by the applicant on August 15, 2013.
The envelope contained the letter written by the applicant to her grandmother,
a receipt bearing the same information that was in the letter as well as more
blank receipts. He attended the meeting at which the applicant was questioned
about the letter and receipts and he stated that the applicant admitted having
asked her grandmother to write the receipts because she wanted to have her
clothes returned to her.
[13]
The applicant also testified. Her testimony
centred mainly on the following elements:
•
When she arrived at the IPPM, she was told that
she could not wear many of the clothes she had brought with her from the
Institution in her bundle because they were deemed to be inappropriate.
•
This situation created difficulties for her
because she did not have enough clothes that she could wear and there were only
two days per week when she could wash her clothes. She had, on some occasions,
been forced to wear the same dirty clothes.
•
Two weeks after her arrival, she asked a staff
member at the IPPM to contact Ms. Guillemette to ask her if the Institution
could send her additional clothing before the end of the usual 30-day period.
The staff member informed her that Ms. Guillemette had refused and indicated
that she would have to wait the usual time period for the rest of her personal
effects.
•
She informed her sociologist of the situation
and he authorized her to procure some clothes.
•
She received the remainder of her personal
effects from the Institution five weeks after her arrival at the IPPM.
•
The thrift shop at the IPPM was closed during
her stay.
•
At the time she left the IPPM, she had not
received prior notice, and as a result, did not have time to obtain supporting
documentation for the items she had procured during her stay.
•
When she received the disciplinary report and
the notice of seizure of her personal effects, she went to see Ms. Guillemette and
asked her if she could have her things returned to her if she submitted
receipts. Ms. Guillemette told her that she could indeed have her personal
effects returned to her if she could account for her purchases with receipts.
•
She was not aware of the fact that inmates were
no longer authorized to purchase clothing at Sears and with the exception of
one item, the clothes that had been purchased by her grandmother were purchased
prior to her stay. She knew in March 2013 that she was going to Pinel, but her
transfer ended up being delayed until May.
•
As for the receipt from the Centre de Partage Communautaire
Johannais, her grandmother had bought her clothes at the Centre, but Ms.
Guillemette had refused the cashier’s receipt because it was not detailed. She
subsequently asked her grandmother to return to the Centre to request a
detailed receipt of the previous purchases. This is the receipt dated September
3 that had been sent to her at the Institution.
[14]
The IC then asked the applicant the following
question with regard to the blank receipts: [translation]
“How do you explain the matter of the blank receipts?”. Counsel for the
applicant objected and refused to allow the applicant to answer the question. He
cited the risk of the applicant incriminating herself in the event criminal
charges were laid against her. The applicant therefore provided no explanation
with regard to the letter written to her grandmother or to the receipts that
the latter had sent her.
[15]
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IC
declared the applicant guilty of having committed the offence set out at
paragraph 40(r) of the Act. The IC concluded her decision with
these words:
[translation]
I am therefore convinced, beyond all doubt,
that Ms. Alix committed the offence with which she is charged and deliberately
contravened section 41R [sic] of the Act.
III.
Issues
[16]
This application raises two issues:
(1) Did the IC err by failing to make a
determination as to the defence raised by the applicant?
(2) Did the IC err in her assessment of the
applicant’s guilt?
IV.
Standard of review
[17]
The first issue raises a question that touches
on procedural fairness. In Ayotte v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCA
429 at paras 19-20, [2003] FCJ No 1699 [Ayotte], Justice Létourneau
indicated that disregarding a means of defence compromised procedural fairness.
The issue is therefore reviewable on a correctness standard (Mission
Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at para 79, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502).
[18]
The second issue raises questions of mixed fact
and law and it is well-settled that an IC’s assessment of whether an inmate is
guilty of a disciplinary offence is reviewable on a reasonableness standard (Forrest
v Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 539 at para 17-18, [2002] FCJ No 713,
aff’d by Forrest v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FCA 156 at para 8, [2004]
FCJ No 709; Brennan v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 40 at para 29,
[2009] FCJ No 81; Lemoy v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 448 at para
14, [2009] FCJ No 589; Cyr v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 213 at
para 13, [2011] FCJ No 245; Tremblay v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC
404 at para 5, [2011] FCJ No 503; Gendron v Canada (Attorney General),
2012 FC 189 at para 12, [2012] FCJ No 202 [Gendron]; Piché v Canada (Attorney
General), 2013 FC 652 at para 10, [2013] FCJ No 683).
V.
Parties’ positions
A.
Applicant’s position
[19]
The applicant submits that the IC refused to
exercise her jurisdiction in declining to address the means of defence she
raised, namely, lawful excuse.
[20]
The applicant maintains that she had a lawful
excuse for procuring clothing from outside sources during her stay at the IPPM.
He defence is founded on the fact that she could not use many of the clothes
she had brought in her bundle, that Ms. Guillemette had refused to send her the
remainder of her personal effects before the end of the normal 30-day period,
and that the thrift shop was closed. She was therefore in a state of need and
had not had an opportunity to regularize her list of personal effects when she
left the IPPM because she had not received prior notice of her return to the
Institution. The applicant argues that the IC could not disregard her means of defence
or the evidence in support of that means of defence.
[21]
The applicant adds that since the IC did not
address her means of defence in her decision, it is impossible to know whether
she disregarded the means of defence or rejected it. She therefore submits that
the IC failed to provide adequate reasons for her decision.
[22]
The applicant further submits that the IC failed
to address the burden of proof or the requisite intent for a finding of
guilt. She further contends that the means of defence she presented raised a
reasonable doubt as to her guilt.
B.
Respondent’s position
[23]
The respondent submits that the IC’s decision
contains no error that would warrant the Court’s intervention. First, the
respondent argues that the IC clearly indicated that she was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the applicant had committed the offence with which she
was charged. It is therefore clear that she set out and applied the correct
standard of proof, namely, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
[24]
As for the finding of guilt, the respondent
maintains that it was entirely reasonable, in light of the evidence of the
implementation of a premeditated plan to produce false receipts, for the IC to
have determined that the applicant had deliberately breached the agreement.
[25]
The respondent alleges that the applicant’s line
of argument ignores the entire issue regarding the creation of false receipts. The
respondent insists on the fact that the IC provided her with an opportunity to
explain her actions with respect to this determinative aspect of the evidence,
but that she refused to do so. The applicant therefore never raised a defence
regarding the determinative component of the case, namely, that she had
fraudulently produced false receipts.
[26]
The respondent adds that the situation in this
case differs from the context found in Ayotte, above, and that here, the
IC had weighed and analyzed the evidence as a whole in a fair manner.
[27]
The respondent further submits that the
obligation to provide reasons for a decision must be analyzed having regard to
the principles set out in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 [Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union] and that the Court must assess the reasons for
the decision together with the outcome in order to determine whether the
decision falls within a range of possible outcomes.
VI.
Analysis
[28]
I find that the arguments raised by the
applicant cannot succeed.
(1)
Did the IC err by failing to make a
determination as to the means of defence raised by the applicant?
[29]
The applicant submits that she offered a reasonable
excuse to explain why she had procured clothing from outside sources, namely,
that she was in a state of need, and that the IC erred by failing to address
this means of defence.
[30]
First, I am of the view that the IC was under no
obligation to address every conceivable means of defence; she was supposed to
consider means of defence that were likely to raise a reasonable doubt and to
influence the assessment of her possible guilt. In Ayotte, above, an
inmate was sanctioned for having refused to provide a urine sample. At the
hearing before the IC, the inmate claimed that he had been unable to provide
the required sample depite having made several attempts to do so. The defence
that was raised was directly linked to the inmate’s intention to commit the
alleged offence. Justice Létourneau staed as follows:
[19]
The
chairperson of the court could not disregard the only true defence raised by
the appellant without compromising procedural fairness and failing in his
duty to hold a full hearing. To repeat the remarks of Denault J. in Hendrickson,
supra, or of Addy J. in Blanchard, supra, he should have
examined "both sides of the question". He could dismiss the defence
advanced by the appellant, but he could not disregard it in light of the
evidence submitted.
[20]
Similarly,
he could weigh and assess the evidence submitted by the appellant in support of
his defence but he could not ignore it: Canada (Attorney General) v.
Primard, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1400; Maki v. The Canada Employment Insurance
Commission et al., [1998] F.C.J. No. 1129; Boucher v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1378; Lépine v. Canada (Employment and
Immigration Commission, [1990] F.C.J. No. 131; Rancourt v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1429.
[Emphasis added.]
[31]
Still in Ayotte, at para 9, the Federal Court
of Appeal reiterated the applicable principles regarding the role and
responsibilities of ICs with respect to charges of disciplinary offences as
follows:
In Hendrickson v.
Kent Institution Disciplinary Court (Independent Chairperson) (1990), 32 F.T.R. 296 (F.C.T.D.), the Honourable Mr. Justice
Denault identified the following six principles based on the Martineau case, supra, in particular, that apply
to the prosecution of disciplinary offences in the prison environment:
1. A hearing conducted by an
independent chairperson of the disciplinary court of an institution is an
administrative proceeding and is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in
character.
2. Except to the extent there are
statutory provisions or regulations having the force of law to the contrary,
there is no requirement to conform to any particular procedure or to abide by
the rules of evidence generally applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunals or adversary proceedings.
3. There is an overall duty to act
fairly by ensuring that the inquiry is carried out in a fair manner and with
due regard to natural justice. The duty to act fairly in a disciplinary court
hearing requires that the person be aware of what the allegations are, the
evidence and the nature of the evidence against him and be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to respond to the evidence and to give his version of
the matter.
4. The hearing is not to be conducted
as an adversary proceeding but as an inquisitorial one and there is no duty
on the person responsible for conducting the hearing to explore every
conceivable defence, although there is a duty to conduct a full and fair
inquiry or, in other words, examine both sides of the question.
5. It is not up to this Court to review
the evidence as a court might do in a case of a judicial tribunal or a review
of a decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal, but merely to consider whether
there has in fact been a breach of the general duty to act fairly.
6. The judicial discretion in relation
with disciplinary matters must be exercised sparingly and a remedy ought to be
granted "only in cases of serious injustice" (Martineau No 2, p.
360).
[10] For
the chairperson of the tribunal, who is obliged to conduct a full and impartial
hearing, the non-adversarial nature of the prison disciplinary process can give
rise to the obligation to question witnesses, including the prisoner charged
with the offence: Re Blanchard and Disciplinary Board
of Millhaven Institution and Hardtman, [1983] 1 F.C. 309 (F.C.T.D.).
[11]
Simply put,
the prison disciplinary process calls for flexibility and efficiency, but
flexibility and efficiency that must be sought and achieved through procedural
fairness and compliance with the mandatory provisions of the law. Now let us
turn to see what happened in the case under appeal
[My emphasis]
These principles were recently reiterated in
Gendron, above, at para 15.
[32]
It therefore follows, in my view, that the IC
was under no obligation to explore every conceivable means of defence, but that
she was instead supoosed to analyze all of the evidence and consider any means
of defence that, if accepted, would influence the assessment of the inmate’s
guilt or raise a reasonable doubt.
[33]
With respect, I do not find the means of defence
in this case to be determinative and the IC was under no obligation to
specifically address it in her decision. The fact that the applicant needed to
procure clothing before receiving the remainder of her personal effects from the
Institution was incidental. The problem does not reside in the fact that the
applicant needed to procure additionnal clothes before her personal effects
were sent by the Institution, but in the fact that she indicated having purchased
these clothes and was unable to support her statement with receipts that were
deemed to be acceptable.
[34]
Indeed, the situation evolved considerably after
the offence report was issued in which the applicant was charged with procuring
items from outside sources. The evidence showed that when the applicant
received the offence reoprt, she denied the charge made against her and claimed
that she had purchased these items and had asked Ms. Guillemette if she could
retreive them by providing receipts. Ms. Guillemette accepted the request. Later,
the evidence showed that the applicant admitted to having sought to falsify the
receipts. In addition, citing a fear of self-incrimination, the applicant
refused to answer questions about the receipts sent to her by her grandmother.
She then attempted to justify these purchases through transaction statements of
purchases made at Sears by her grandmother and through a receipt from the
Centre de Partage Communautaire Johannais dated September 3, 2013. Virtually
all of these purchases had been made either well before or after her stay at
the IPPM. The evidence further demonstrated that she had not received
authorization from IPPM staff to purchase items from Sears or from another
outside source. Thus, the context that gave rise to the offence report had
changed and so the reasons for which the applicant claimed to have procured the
clothes became quite incidental.
[35]
Moreover, the agreement did not prohibit the
applicant from obtaining clothes; it was the manner in which she obtained these
clothes that posed a problem. The agreement provided for the possibility of the
applicant procuring clothes from internal suppliers at the IPPM and was not
concerned with her reasons for doing so, on condition that she provided
receipts. In addition, it appears from the evidence that Ms. Guillemette had indicated
to the staff at the IPPM that it was up to them to assess the needs of the
applicant. She therefore recognized that it was possible that the applicant had
aquired clothing during her stay at the IPPM with the authorization of IPPM
staff. Thus, the applicant had a number of means by which she could obtain
clothing, possibly even from outside sources, if she had acted with the
authorization of the IPPM. What the applicant is truly being faulted for, is
having denied that she had smuggled in clothing from outside sources by
claiming that she had purchased the items in question only to subsequently
produce receipts that were either falsified or that indicated that the items
had been purchased by outside persons.
[36]
Given such a context, the IC was not required,
in my opinion, to address a means of defence that was not at the heart of the
issue of whether the applicant was guilty of the offence with which she was
charged.
[37]
The remarks of Justice Abella in Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union, above, appear to me to be entirely applicable
to this case:
15 In assessing
whether the decision is reasonable in light of the outcome and the reasons,
courts must show “respect for the decision-making process of adjudicative
bodies with regard to both the facts and the law” (Dunsmuir, at para. 48). This means that courts should not substitute
their own reasons, but they may, if they find it necessary, look to the record
for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of the outcome.
16 Reasons may
not include all the arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other
details the reviewing judge would have preferred, but that does not impugn the
validity of either the reasons or the result under a reasonableness
analysis. A decision-maker is not required to make an explicit finding on
each constituent element, however subordinate, leading to its final conclusion
(Service Employees’ International Union, Local No.
333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn., [1975]
1 S.C.R. 382, at p. 391). In other words, if the reasons allow the
reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it
to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes,
the Dunsmuir criteria
are met.
(2)
Did the IC err in her assessment of the
applicant’s guilt?
[38]
First, it appears clear from the IC’s decision
that she set out and applied the correct standard of proof, namely, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears from the decision that the IC
indicated having been persuaded beyond a doubt that the applicant had committed
the offence with which she was charged.
[39]
Second, in finding the applicant guilty of
having deliberately contravened the agreement, the IC made a reasonable
decision with regard to the evidence submitted and in regard to the applicant’s
choice to decline to speak of the letter sent to her grandmother and the
receipts sent back to her by her grandmother.
[40]
The IC provided reasons for her decision by
citing the following elements:
•
Ms. Guillemette explained in great detail the
process that occurs when an inmate is transferred to the IPPM. She also
explained that, in the past, inmates had been allowed to purchase items at
Sears, but that this option was no longer available to them.
•
A review of the items that were seized convinced
her that the items the applicant had in her possession at the time of her
transfer to the IPPM were not the same as those that had been seized.
•
Ms. Guillemette had described the meeting in
which Mr. Desroches and Ms. Turcotte had participated and during which the
applicant admitted having asked her grandmother to send her blank receipts and
to fill out one with the list of items she had included in the letter.
•
The completed receipt and the blank receipts
bore sequential numbers. The writing on the completed receipt appears to be the
same as the writing on the envelopes, namely, that of the applicant’s
grandmother.
•
Mr. Desroches also stated that the applicant had
admitted to having asked her grandmother to send her receipts.
•
The applicant demonstrated that she knew the
regulations well, but that she undoubtedly was not aware that it was no longer
possible to purchase clothes from Sears.
•
The purchases at Sears were made in January and
in March 2013 and the applicant had testified that she had been planning to go
to the IPPM since January 2013.
•
She was not convinced by the applicant’s
explanations to the effect that she allegedly asked her grandmother to return
to the Centre de Partage Communautaire Johannais in September 2013 to obtain a
more detailed receipt.
[41]
I therefore find that the IC analyzed all of the
relevant evidence and made a determination that falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190). Thus, the intervention of Court is not warranted.
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