Date: 20080815
Docket: IMM-2682-08
Citation: 2008 FC 949
Ottawa, Ontario, August 15, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Martineau
BETWEEN:
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Applicant
and
DONG ZHE LI and
DONG HU LI
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the applicant) contests the legality
of two decisions of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (the Board), specifically the decisions of Member Tessler, dated June 11,
2008, and Member Shaw Dyck, dated June 19, 2008, (together, the Release Orders)
ordering the release from detention of Mr. Dong Hu Li and Mr. Dong Zhe Li (the
respondents) on certain terms and conditions which include electronic
monitoring.
I. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
[2]
On June 13, 2008, the applicant filed two applications for
leave and for judicial review of Member Tessler's Release Orders in Federal
Court under Court File Nos. IMM-2682-08 and IMM-2683-08. The respondents were
unable to perfect or meet the terms and conditions of Member Tessler's
Release Orders prior to their next scheduled detention review hearing on June
19, 2008.
[3]
On June 23, 2008, the applicant filed two other applications
for leave and judicial review of Member Shaw Dyck's Release Orders in
Federal Court under Court File Nos. IMM-2819-08 and IMM-2820-08. The
applicant filed a motion seeking a stay of the execution of the former Release
Orders pending the earlier of a final determination of the underlying judicial
review applications or the next statutorily mandated detention review.
[4]
On June 30, 2008, Justice Tremblay-Lamer allowed the applicant's
motion and stayed Member Shaw Dyck's Release Orders until the respondents’ next
statutory required detention review hearing. In doing so, Justice
Tremblay-Lamer held:
Given the low threshold set by
the Supreme Court for establishing a serious issue for the purpose of a stay
application, I am satisfied that the member's failure to provide clear and
compelling reasons for departing from previous rulings on detention review
meets that threshold and constitutes a serious issue.
I am also satisfied that being
fugitives from justice who have consistently been found to be high flight
risks, the Li brothers' release at this time constitutes irreparable harm.
Finally, I am satisfied that the balance of
convenience favours staying their release until their next statutorily mandated
detention review.
[5]
On July 9, 2008, Justice Tremblay-Lamer granted leave and ordered
that the proceedings in Court File Nos. IMM-2682-08, IMM-2683-08, IMM-2819-08
and IMM-2820-08 be continued as a consolidated proceeding under IMM-2682-08. Moreover,
directions were made that the matter could be heard expeditiously.
[6]
On July 29, 2008, I heard this
consolidated application.
[7]
The parties agree that it would not be worthwhile for another
detention review to take place pending disposition of this application. Counsel
for the parties also agree that this case does not raise a question of general
importance. However, counsel have asked the Court to provide guidance in these
reasons for order, for the benefit of the Board members who may be called in
the future to review the detention, if the Release Orders are set aside and
quashed by the Court.
[8]
For the following reasons, I have decided to allow the
present application.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
[9]
Section 58
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27 (the Act)
provides:
58.
(1) The Immigration Division shall order the release of a permanent resident
or a foreign national unless it is satisfied, taking into account prescribed
factors, that
(a)
they are a danger to the public;
(b)
they are unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing,
removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that
could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection
44(2);
(c)
the Minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion
that they are inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or
international rights; or
(d)
the Minister is of the opinion that the identity of the foreign national has
not been, but may be, established and they have not reasonably cooperated
with the Minister by providing relevant information for the purpose of
establishing their identity or the Minister is making reasonable efforts to
establish their identity.
(2)
The Immigration Division may order the detention of a permanent resident or a
foreign national if it is satisfied that the permanent resident or the
foreign national is the subject of an examination or an admissibility hearing
or is subject to a removal order and that the permanent resident or the
foreign national is a danger to the public or is unlikely to appear for
examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada.
(3)
If the Immigration Division orders the release of a permanent resident or a
foreign national, it may impose any conditions that it considers necessary,
including the payment of a deposit or the posting of a guarantee for
compliance with the conditions.
|
58.
(1) La section prononce la mise en liberté du résident permanent ou de
l’étranger, sauf sur preuve, compte tenu des critères réglementaires, de tel
des faits suivants :
a)
le résident permanent ou l’étranger constitue un danger pour la sécurité
publique;
b)
le résident permanent ou l’étranger se soustraira vraisemblablement au
contrôle, à l’enquête ou au renvoi, ou à la procédure pouvant mener à la
prise par le ministre d’une mesure de renvoi en vertu du paragraphe 44(2);
c)
le ministre prend les mesures voulues pour enquêter sur les motifs
raisonnables de soupçonner que le résident permanent ou l’étranger est
interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits
humains ou internationaux;
d)
dans le cas où le ministre estime que l’identité de l’étranger n’a pas été
prouvée mais peut l’être, soit l’étranger n’a pas raisonnablement coopéré en
fournissant au ministre des renseignements utiles à cette fin, soit ce
dernier fait des efforts valables pour établir l’identité de l’étranger.
(2)
La section peut ordonner la mise en détention du résident permanent ou de
l’étranger sur preuve qu’il fait l’objet d’un contrôle, d’une enquête ou
d’une mesure de renvoi et soit qu’il constitue un danger pour la sécurité
publique, soit qu’il se soustraira vraisemblablement au contrôle, à l’enquête
ou au renvoi.
(3)
Lorsqu’elle ordonne la mise en liberté d’un résident permanent ou d’un
étranger, la section peut imposer les conditions qu’elle estime nécessaires,
notamment la remise d’une garantie d’exécution.
|
[10]
Pursuant
to section 61, the regulations may include provisions respecting (a) grounds
for and conditions and criteria with respect to the release of persons from
detention; (b) factors to be considered by an officer or the Immigration
Division; and (c) special considerations that may apply in relation to the
detention of minor children.
[11]
Sections
244, 245 and 248 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations) state:
244.
For the purposes of Division 6 of Part 1 of the Act, the factors set out in
this Part shall be taken into consideration when assessing whether a person
(a)
is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from
Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order
by the Minister under subsection 44(2) of the Act;
(b)
is a danger to the public; or
(c)
is a foreign national whose identity has not been established.
245.
For the purposes of paragraph 244(a), the factors are the following:
(a)
being a fugitive from justice in a foreign jurisdiction in relation to an
offence that, if committed in Canada,
would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament;
(b)
voluntary compliance with any previous departure order;
(c)
voluntary compliance with any previously required appearance at an
immigration or criminal proceeding;
(d)
previous compliance with any conditions imposed in respect of entry, release
or a stay of removal;
(e)
any previous avoidance of examination or escape from custody, or any previous
attempt to do so;
(f)
involvement with a people smuggling or trafficking in persons operation that
would likely lead the person to not appear for a measure referred to in
paragraph 244(a) or to be vulnerable to being influenced or coerced by an
organization involved in such an operation to not appear for such a measure;
and
(g)
the existence of strong ties to a community in Canada.
[…]
248.
If it is determined that there are grounds for detention, the following
factors shall be considered before a decision is made on detention or
release:
(a)
the reason for detention;
(b)
the length of time in detention;
(c)
whether there are any elements that can assist in determining the length of
time that detention is likely to continue and, if so, that length of time;
(d)
any unexplained delays or unexplained lack of diligence caused by the
Department or the person concerned; and
(e)
the existence of alternatives to detention.
|
244.
Pour l’application de la section 6 de la partie 1 de la Loi, les critères
prévus à la présente partie doivent être pris en compte lors de
l’appréciation :
a)
du risque que l’intéressé se soustraie vraisemblablement au contrôle, à
l’enquête, au renvoi ou à une procédure pouvant mener à la prise, par le
ministre, d’une mesure de renvoi en vertu du paragraphe 44(2) de la Loi;
b)
du danger que constitue l’intéressé pour la sécurité publique;
c)
de la question de savoir si l’intéressé est un étranger dont l’identité n’a
pas été prouvée.
245.
Pour l’application de l’alinéa 244a), les critères sont les suivants :
a)
la qualité de fugitif à l’égard de la justice d’un pays étranger quant à une
infraction qui, si elle était commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction
à une loi fédérale;
b)
le fait de s’être conformé librement à une mesure d’interdiction de séjour;
c)
le fait de s’être conformé librement à l’obligation de comparaître lors d’une
instance en immigration ou d’une instance criminelle;
d)
le fait de s’être conformé aux conditions imposées à l’égard de son entrée,
de sa mise en liberté ou du sursis à son renvoi;
e)
le fait de s’être dérobé au contrôle ou de s’être évadé d’un lieu de
détention, ou toute tentative à cet égard;
f)
l’implication dans des opérations de passage de clandestins ou de trafic de
personnes qui mènerait vraisemblablement l’intéressé à se soustraire aux
mesures visées à l’alinéa 244a) ou le rendrait susceptible d’être incité ou
forcé de s’y soustraire par une organisation se livrant à de telles
opérations;
g)
l’appartenance réelle à une collectivité au Canada.
[…]
248.
S’il est constaté qu’il existe des motifs de détention, les critères ci-après
doivent être pris en compte avant qu’une décision ne soit prise quant à la
détention ou la mise en liberté :
a)
le motif de la détention;
b)
la durée de la détention;
c)
l’existence d’éléments permettant l’évaluation de la durée probable de la
détention et, dans l’affirmative, cette période de temps;
d)
les retards inexpliqués ou le manque inexpliqué de diligence de la part du
ministère ou de l’intéressé;
e) l’existence de solutions de rechange
à la détention.
|
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[12]
In this
proceeding, the applicant contends that Members Tessler and Shaw Dyck erred by
failing to give clear and compelling reasons to depart from prior Board
decisions which had ordered the continued detention of the respondents.
[13]
The
functional and pragmatic approach to a judicial review in the context of
detention on the grounds of constituting a danger to the public or a flight
risk was very carefully analyzed by Justice Gauthier in Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Thanabalasingham, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 523, 2003
FC 1225 (Thanabalasingham) at paras. 38-52. On appeal, Justice Gauthier
was found to have applied the proper standards of review to the findings
of the Board: [2004] 3 F.C.R. 572 (Thanabalasingham FCA) at para. 24.
To summarize Justice Gauthier’s conclusion in this regard, findings of
fact were to be reviewed on patently unreasonable standard and mixed issues of
fact and law on a reasonableness standard. Holdings in law are entitled to no
deference: the correctness standard applies.
[14]
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Lai,
2007 FC 1252, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1603 (QL) (Lai) at para. 17, Justice
Harrington determined that the issue as to whether a member erred by
failing to provide clear and compelling reasons for departing from all previous
decisions was a question of mixed fact and law. Accordingly, the member was found
to be entitled to deference on a reasonableness standard of review.
[15]
In light
of the analysis in Lai, as well as the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (Dunsmuir), I find that the applicable
standard of review for the issues raised in this judicial review is
reasonableness.
[16]
This means
that I can only intervene if I am of the view that the impugned decisions are unreasonable,
in the sense that they fall outside the "range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law": Dunsmuir,
at para. 47. This is the case as explained in the analysis below.
IV. ANALYSIS
[17]
Judicial clarification of the legality of the impugned
decisions is warranted in this case despite the fact that a statutory review of
the reasons for continued detention must take place every thirty days.
[18]
The
Federal Court of Appeal in Thanabalasingham FCA, at para. 6 noted that
detention review hearings are not precisely de novo. To the contrary,
all existing factors relating to custody must be taken into consideration,
including the reasons for previous detention orders being made.
[19]
At paragraphs
10-13 of the Thanabalasingham FCA decision, mentioned above, the
Federal Court of Appeal sets out a number of principles that apply when a
member of the Board conducts a detention review hearing:
Detention review decisions are the kind
of essentially fact-based decision to which deference is usually shown. While,
as discussed above, prior decisions are not binding on a Member, I agree with
the Minister that if a Member chooses to depart from prior decisions to
detain, clear and compelling reasons for doing so must be set out. There
are good reasons for requiring such clear and compelling reasons.
Credibility of the individual concerned
and of witnesses is often an issue. Where a prior decision maker had the
opportunity to hear from witnesses, observe their demeanour and assess their
credibility, the subsequent decision maker must give a clear explanation of why
the prior decision maker's assessment of the evidence does not justify
continued detention.
For example, the admission of relevant new evidence would be a valid basis for
departing from a prior decision to detain. Alternatively, a reassessment of the
prior evidence based on new arguments may also be sufficient reason to depart
from a prior decision.
The best way for the Member to provide
clear and compelling reasons would be to expressly explain what has given rise
to the changed opinion, i.e. explaining what the former decision stated and why
the current Member disagrees.
However, even if the Member does not
explicitly state why he or she has come to a different conclusion than the
previous Member, his or her reasons for doing so may be implicit in the
subsequent decision. What would be unacceptable would be a cursory decision
which does not advert to the prior reasons for detention in any meaningful way.
[Emphasis added]
[20]
The
principles elucidated by the Court in Thanabalasingham FCA, were
summarized by Justice Dawson in Sittampalam v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FC 1352, [2005] F.C.J.
No. 1734 (QL) as follows:
First,
a detention review is not, strictly speaking, a de novo hearing. The record
before the Board continues to be built at each hearing and the Board is
expected to take into consideration the reasons for previous detention orders.
Second, the Board must decide afresh at each hearing whether continued
detention is warranted. Third, where a member chooses to depart from prior
decisions of the Board, clear and compelling reasons for doing so must be set
out. Fourth, the onus is always on the Minister to demonstrate that there are
reasons which warrant detention or continued detention. However, once the
Minister has made out a prima facie case for continued detention, the
individual must provide some evidence or risk his or her continued detention.
[21]
In this
instance, I am of the view that the impugned decisions are unreasonable. Succinctly,
Members Tessler and Shaw Dyck failed to provide clear and compelling reasons to
depart from the previous decisions of the Board with respect to the issues of
long term detention and alternatives to detention, including electronic
monitoring.
[22]
Given
the complex nature of the case before me, it is worthwhile to emphasize, in
some detail, the facts which led to the earlier decisions of the Board and
other immigration instances, as well as the key findings made on these
occasions.
[23]
The
respondents are brothers and Chinese citizens who came to Canada on December
31, 2004. They entered the country on Temporary Residents Visas. Instead of
leaving the country when their visas expired, the respondents remained in Canada illegally
and took concerted steps to avoid Canadian authorities.
[24]
Based
on information provided by the Chinese authorities, the respondents fled the
People's Republic of China (China) a few weeks
before they were both charged with conspiring to commit fraud involving over
$136 million CDN through the transfer of funds from bank accounts of victim
companies into the bank accounts of companies controlled by either of the
respondents. The Chinese authorities identified 24 suspects: seven suspects
fled and six have been convicted.
[25]
On
January 24, 2005, the Chinese authorities issued warrants for the respondents’ arrest.
The warrants were issued by the People's Protectorate of Harbin City,
Heilongjiang Province, China, under
article 194 of the Criminal Law of China. If committed in Canada, this offence
would be equivalent to paragraph 380(1)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, fraud over $5,000.00, an indictable offence punishable by
a maximum term of imprisonment of fourteen years.
[26]
Before
going further into the admissibility and detention decisions in this case it is
useful, at this point, to refer to subsection 55(1) of the Act, which enables
an immigration officer to issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a
permanent resident or a foreign national who the officer has reasonable grounds
to believe is inadmissible and is a danger to the public or is unlikely to
appear for examination, an admissibility hearing or removal from Canada.
[27]
Within 48
hours after a permanent resident or a foreign national is taken into detention,
or without delay afterward, the Immigration Division must review the reasons
for the continued detention and then again within seven (7) days after the
48-hour review and every 30-day period thereafter (subsections 57(1) and (2) of
the Act).
[28]
On
November 12, 2006, Immigration Enforcement Officer, Cheryl Shapka (Officer
Shapka) issued a report that, in her opinion, Dong Zhe Li is inadmissible
pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act for serious crimes committed
outside Canada. A few days later, she issued a report
that, in her opinion, Dong Hu Li is also inadmissible pursuant to the same paragraph
of the Act.
[29]
On
November 16, 2006, Officer Shapka issued an inadmissibility report under
subsection 44(1) of the Act. On that same day, she issued warrants for the respondents’
arrest in Canada.
[30]
Officer
Shapka subsequently issued additional reports indicating that, in her opinion,
the respondents are also inadmissible to Canada pursuant to
subsections 41(a) and 29(2) of the Act for remaining in Canada after the
period authorized to remain in Canada on a
temporary basis.
[31]
The
respondents went underground and succeeded in eluding the Canadian authorities
for some time. During the time the respondents were fugitives, one of their associates,
Gao Shan and his wife, Li Xue, were arrested in Canada.
[32]
In
February 2007, Officers of the Vancouver Police Department discovered the respondents
were staying at the Sheraton Wall Centre Hotel in downtown Vancouver. The
Officers knocked on their hotel room door on February 23, 2007; however, the respondents
refused to open the door to the police. Resorting to the use of a Special Entry
Warrant, the Officers entered the respondents’ hotel suite. When the respondents
were arrested, the Officers found several pieces of torn up paper inside the
tank of their toilet. The ripped up documents included a passport, driver’s license
and a driver’s record card all in the name of Zhou Hua. In early 2005, the respondents
had used false Chinese identity documents in the names of Zhou Hua and Guo Feng.
[33]
The
respondents were taken into custody immediately. They were
detained at the North Vancouver RCMP detachment where they were read their
rights. In addition, Officer Shapka interviewed each respondent separately and
informed them that they had been arrested for inadmissibility to Canada as a
result of the serious fraud charges against them in China, in accordance with
paragraph 36(1)(c) of the Act. She also informed them that they were
arrested and detained pursuant to section 55 of the Act because of their
refusal to leave Canada or apply for
an extension when their Temporary Residents Visas expired.
[34]
The
respondents were afforded an opportunity to contact a lawyer, Mr. Stanley Foo.
Mr. Foo retained Mr. Kompa, a criminal lawyer with experience in
immigration law, to appear as his agent and represent the respondents at their admissibility
and detention review hearings which were both scheduled to occur one after
another on February 26, 2007.
[35]
At the admissibility
hearing, the respondents were interviewed by the applicant's delegate who was
satisfied that the allegations contained in the reports, relating to the overstay of their temporary residence
authorization, were valid. The next day the applicant's
delegate issued Exclusion Orders against the respondents.
[36]
As
a consequence of the Exclusion Orders, the respondents were not eligible to
make a claim for refugee protection pursuant to subsection 99(3) of the Act.
[37]
The
respondents filed applications for leave and judicial review in the Federal
Court with regard to the Exclusion Orders. These applications delayed the processing
of the respondents’ Pre-removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) application, as
explained below.
[38]
The
respondents’ detention hearing was dealt with by the Immigration Division on
the same day as the admissibility hearing. At the request of counsel for the
respondents, Member Shaw Dyck adjourned the hearing to continue on March 2,
2007.
[39]
In
the meantime, on February 27, 2007, the respondents were given notice of their
eligibility to apply for a PRRA.
[40]
On
March 13,
2007, the respondents submitted their PRRA application. However, they requested
a deferral of the PRRA determination until their judicial review applications
with respect to their challenge of the Exclusion Orders and
refugee claim eligibility were determined by the Federal Court. In a decision
dated September 21, 2007, my colleague Justice Noël dismissed
the applications for judicial review: Li v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 941, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1215
(QL).
[41]
The
resumption of the detention review hearing before Member Shaw Dyck took place
on March 2, 2007. The applicant sought the continued detention of the respondents pursuant to subsection 245(a) of the
Regulations on the ground that they were “unlikely to appear for removal from Canada.”
Counsel for the respondents confirmed that the respondents were not seeking
their release; rather, they consented to remain in detention.
[42]
Member Shaw Dyck determined that the respondents were “fugitives
from justice” and concluded they were “unlikely to appear for removal from Canada.”
These conclusions were never challenged by the respondents in subsequent
detention review hearings. Member Shaw Dyck ordered their continued detention.
[43]
The
next detention review hearing took place seven days later on March 9, 2007. As
the position of the parties remained the same, Member Shaw Dyck ordered
continued detention until the next statutorily mandated detention review
hearing.
[44]
On
April 5, 2007, in light of the fact that the parties’ positions remained the
same, Member Shaw Dyck again ordered the respondents’ continued detention. Moreover,
at subsequent detention review hearings held on April 23, 2007 and May 16,
2007, the Member ordered their continued detention on the ground that the respondents
were “unlikely to appear for removal from Canada.”
[45]
Detention
hearings were held before Member King on June 28, 2007, July 3, 2007, and on
July 4, 2007. The respondents requested on that occasion that they be
released from detention with a proposed bond in the amount of $200,000 CDN to
be posted by a friend working for the Royal Winnipeg Ballet. The applicant
filed documents from the Chinese authorities relating to the fraud allegations
and witness statements. The respondents both testified orally in the
proceedings.
[46]
In
a decision rendered on July 6, 2007, Member King rejected the respondents’
proposal for release and ordered their continued detention. The
respondents were found not to be credible. Again, I wish to point out that
credibility findings made on this occasion have not been seriously questioned
by the respondents at the subsequent review hearings.
[47]
That
being said, Member King acknowledged that the respondents faced long detention:
“it will probably take a long time for their legal matters to be resolved in Canada. Nevertheless, that factor
alone does not overcome the other relevant considerations in their case.” Member
King held that the respondents’ conduct demonstrated they were a high flight
risk and reaffirmed that they are unlikely to appear for removal from Canada if released.
[48]
Member
King ordered their continued detention and found as follows:
1.
The respondents
are highly motivated to avoid returning to China and thus, pose a significant flight risk;
2.
The respondents
and their wives began divesting themselves of all assets and property in their
names shortly after arriving here to avoid detection in Canada. In this regard, Dong
Zhe Li was not credible in his testimony;
3.
The respondents
were trying to avoid arrest by Canadian authorities and are willing to make a
significant effort to do so. On this issue their testimony was self
contradictory and implausible; and,
4. The bond proposed by the
respondents would not provide them with the necessary incentive to appear for
removal from Canada.
[49]
At
the next detention review hearing, approximately one month later, Member
Nupponen agreed with all aspects of Member King’s decision and dismissed the
propositions made by the respondents who were seeking the installation of a
bonds person. He determined that the respondents are unlikely to report for
removal and ordered the continuation of their detention. Member Nupponen further
emphasized that the respondents face potentially long detention. Nevertheless,
the Member stated: “I do not consider that to be an indeterminate period. It is
simply a long period that will be required for the procedures to be worked
through. In view of the high unlikelihood of appearing that potential length of
continued detention, in my view, is not excessive.”
[50]
Additional
detention review hearings were held on September 6, 2007, October 4, 2007,
October 30, 2007, and on November 27, 2007. Finding that there was no reason to
depart from previous decisions, the respondents were ordered to remain in
detention on the grounds that they are unlikely to appear for their removal from
Canada.
[51]
In
particular, on November 27, 2007, Member Nupponen stated:
Myself and other Members have
concluded that the brothers Li would have sufficient funds available to themselves
to make themselves -- be in a position where they would not need to report to
Immigration officials if they were called upon to do so.
Alternatives to detention have been posed in the past
and those alternatives have been disposed of. Myself included, have concluded
that the alternatives would not be appropriate in addressing the substantial
risk of not appearing.
[52]
The
next detention review hearings were held on December 19 and 20, 2007. At the
hearing, the respondents asserted that the “PRRA process will be lengthy, will
likely involve a judicial review application regardless of the outcome and,
therefore, it will likely be many years until their immigration
applications are concluded.”
[53]
The
respondents proposed their release subject to electronic monitoring, an alternative
to detention that had not been previously considered. In support of their
proposal, the respondents submitted Board decisions in the case of USA v.
Welch and Romero (September 26, 2006), Vancouver B.C., 23960
(B.C. Supreme Court) (Welch and Romero). Both of these
individuals were found by the Board to be a high flight risk and that
substantial bonds would not reduce the risk. However, after they had been in
detention for several months, the Board determined that their release, subject
to electronic monitoring, would be appropriate. The release order was never
given effect, however, because within a short period of time extradition
proceedings were commenced.
[54]
In
this instance, the applicant vehemently opposed electronic monitoring as an
appropriate alternative to detention and provided rationale and arguments of
fact in this case which distinguished the Welch and Romero decisions and
other cases upon which the respondents had been relying on to request their
release on conditions. The applicant’s reasoning was entirely
endorsed by Member King who refused to order the release of the
respondents on the conditions then proposed which were all found to be
unacceptable.
[55]
In
a decision rendered on January 10, 2008, Member King reasserted
that the respondents pose a significant flight risk if they are released from
detention.
[56]
With
respect to the length of time the respondents had been detained, Member King
concluded:
[T]he length of time the Li’s have been in detention does
not operate in their favour when weighed against the other factors of their
case. They have been in immigration detention for 10 months. Although it is
true that their PRAA process may be lengthy, it is also equally possible that
it may be concluded relatively quickly if leave to judicially review the PRAA
decision is dismissed.
[57]
With respect to the respondents’ proposal that electronic
monitoring can sufficiently reduce the risk in the circumstances of the case,
Member King provided ample reasons to dismiss this particular alternative.
Notably, Member King distinguished the Welch and Romero case:
Welch and Romero were not accused in their home
country of financial crimes. They never at any time prior to their arrest in Canada
had access to wealth on a scale comparable to the Li’s. Welch and Romero never
had or used false identity documents, they had never used aliases in Canada,
and they had not made elaborate plans to hide their presence in Canada. They
were discovered by a RCMP officer within days of being in this country and they
cooperated completely with that officer on first contact. Most significantly,
Welch and Romero had never been found by a Member of this tribunal to lack
credibility.
[58]
Member
King also reviewed relevant case law and Board decisions regarding electronic
monitoring and found that electronic monitoring does not ensure the attendance
of a person. To the contrary, all it does is alert the company (in this case
Trace Canada) and the relevant
authorities to the possibility that the subject has fled or otherwise
disappeared. It does not assist in locating the subject, nor does it reveal her
or his plans.
[59]
Acknowledging
that terms and conditions of release under the Act are not required to provide
the applicant with a perfect substitute for detention, Member King was
nevertheless of the view that continued detention was required since electronic
monitoring does not physically restrict the movement of the person wearing it
and it does not assist in locating a person who has managed to remove or
disable the device.
[60]
At
the next three detention reviews, held on February 6, 2008, March 5, 2008, and
on April 2, 2008, given the fact that there was no new evidence that would
allow the Members to depart from the previous decisions taken, the Board ordered
continued detention.
[61]
On May 1, 2008, Member Tessler adjourned the detention review hearing
until May 7, 2008, enabling the respondents to attend the hearing. On May 7,
2008 and May 22, 2008 at a detention review hearing before Member Tessler, counsel
for the respondents advised that, in their opinion, there was “a significant
change in circumstances of the case”.
[62]
In essence, the respondents alleged that a new development in the
processing of the PRRA application suggested that detention would be
substantially longer. Counsel argued that a PRRA Officer had rendered an
opinion that the respondents would be subject to risk upon return to China, and
that the PRRA application would now have to undergo a lengthy review and
determination process in Ottawa (commonly referred to as the “balancing
exercise”) before a final PRRA decision could be rendered.
[63]
In support of this position, the respondents adduced two affidavits
of Lorne Waldman, a barrister and solicitor practicing exclusively in the area
of immigration law and counsel for the respondents’ co-accused Gao Shan. According
to Mr. Waldman’s testimony:
In cases where a positive risk
assessment has been referred to the Minister by the PRRA officer pursuant to
112(3) [of the Act] for a balancing, my experience indicates that the process
is extremely time-consuming and runs into the years. […]
Based on all of my experience in all of these cases,
it is my firm belief that, despite any assurances that a case will be given a
high priority, it is unlikely that there will be a decision for a year and it
is very likely that the decision will take longer.
[64]
On the contrary, the applicant submitted that there was no
significant change of circumstances to warrant Member Tessler to depart from
previous decisions of the Board in this case. Moreover, the letter sent by the
PRRA Officer to the respondents, in which it was stated that she or he had
completed the work on the file, had been sent in error as attested in
subsequent correspondence addressed to respondents’ counsel. Indeed, the applicant
tendered a letter from the PRRA coordinator informing the respondents that “the
completed pre-removal risk assessment has not yet been concluded.”
[65]
In contrast to the timeline suggested by Mr. Waldman, counsel for
the applicant stated that the applicant had obtained a time estimate from a
credible and trustworthy source, the Director-General of the Case Management
Branch at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, suggesting that the balancing
under section 113 of the Act would normally take “between three to five months
to render a decision.”
[66]
Further, the applicant challenged the affidavits of Mr. Waldman
as lacking impartiality since he is counsel to Gao Shan who is alleged by
Chinese authorities to have conspired with the respondents.
[67]
By reasons and decision dated June 11, 2008, Member Tessler
ordered the release of the respondents on terms and conditions including
electronic monitoring.
[68]
Under the section marked “Change in circumstances,” Member
Tessler noted:
I am satisfied from the evidence that the Li brothers
have been determined by a PRRA officer to be at risk if returned to China. In fact
the Minister conceded this at the third sitting of this detention review. The
PRRA has now entered a potentially lengthy phase in its processing. This represents
a significant change in circumstances.
[69]
In a section of the decision entitled “Legal principles on long
term detention”, Member Tessler reviewed the factors for consideration in
assessing long term detention and whether it amounts to a breach of the right
to liberty enshrined in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms as stated in Sahin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1995] 1 F.C. 214, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1534 (QL) and codified
in section 248 of the Regulations.
[70]
Member Tessler first found that the respondents had been detained
as unlikely to appear for their removals.
[71]
Member Tessler then noted that they have been in detention for
15 months.
[72]
With respect to the third factor, that is whether there are any
elements that can assist in determining the length of time that detention is
likely to continue, and if so, that length of time, Member Tessler stated that
it was apparent the respondents had been determined by a PRRA Officer to be at
risk if returned to China. Accordingly, before the results of the risk
assessment are communicated to the respondents, the applicant will need to
balance the risk to the individuals against the risk to society.
[73]
The Member rejected the applicant’s argument that Mr. Waldman was not
impartial, finding instead that he was merely providing empirical information
on processing times where no other information had been tendered. Member
Tessler was satisfied that Mr. Waldman had “no personal or professional
interest in the outcome of this hearing.”
[74]
The Member then estimated that if the respondents were “to
remain in detention and all processes were to be expedited then the applicant
would be unable to remove them for an additional 3 or 4 years.” As there were a
number of possible steps that may be taken by either side and the times to take
each step are mostly unknown, the Member concluded that the detention is
approaching indefinite and may offend the rights to liberty: “In this case
where there is a likelihood of indefinite detention and no risk to the health,
safety and security of Canadians, the liberty interest of the Li brothers
outweighs the public interest.”
[75]
With respect to whether or not there were unexplained delays, the
Member concluded that the pursuit of legal remedies does not amount to
unexplained delay by the respondents. Nor was there any delay or lack of
diligence attributable to the applicant.
[76]
Finally, turning to alternatives to detention, Member Tessler
agreed with the findings of previous Members that the respondents are a high
flight risk. However, as the “news of a positive risk assessment of the
Minister seeking a restriction assessment are important new facts in respect of
the potential length of detention”, the Member was of the view that the
circumstances have substantially changed and the length of time detention is
likely to continue which “tips the balance in favour of release.”
[77]
Member Tessler remained of the view that a bond would have little
influence on the respondents’ future behaviour: “If they are desperate enough a
bond is not going to prevent their flight.” As such, Member Tessler then
considered whether electronic monitoring would limit their flight impulses.
[78]
The Member noted first that the respondents would be responsible
for paying for the service which is “very flexible and allows for varying
degrees of restrictions on the movements of the monitored persons.
Notifications of the location of the Li brothers and of any breaches would be
communicated by the U.S. [monitoring system] to the [Canadian Border Services
Agency] by telephone, fax or email.”
[79]
The Member then acknowledged the applicant’s strenuous objections
to electronic monitoring as articulated in written submissions presented
to Member King in December 2007. Member Tessler was of the view that one of the
main objections to electronic monitoring is that CBSA does not have the
resources to receive the monitoring reports or to respond to breaches.
Nevertheless, he stated: “It occurs to me that the cost of detention is
considerably higher than the costs involved in receiving monitoring reports and
responding to breaches when appropriate. Where there is a will, there is a
way.”
[80]
Although electronic monitoring is merely a different form of
periodic reporting that does not guarantee appearance for removal, since the
balance had tipped in favour of release, the Member anticipated that “CBSA will
embrace the electronic monitoring system […]”. In conclusion, given the degree
of the flight risk and the potential for indefinite detention, Member Tessler
issued the Release Orders with restrictive conditions including electronic
monitoring.
[81]
On June 19, 2008, a detention review hearing was held before
Member Shaw Dyck since the respondents had not yet been able to perfect or meet
the terms and conditions of Member Tessler’s Release Orders. At this
hearing, the respondents requested changes to the terms and conditions imposed
by Member Tessler. Applicant's counsel argued for continued detention based on
important errors made by Member Tessler in his Release Orders.
[82]
On this occasion, the applicant filed a letter dated June 19,
2008 from the Director-General of the Case Management Branch at Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, providing the following time estimate for a decision on the
respondents’ PRRA application:
CIC
will complete working on a “Restriction Assessment” (case summary) based on the
danger profile within approximately four weeks after the reception of the risk
assessment and danger package. Both assessments (risk and danger assessment)
will then be returned to Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) for disclosure to
the client. For instance, if we were to receive both packages by June 25, 2008
and working on the assumption that all the necessary material has been provided
to us by CBSA, we should be able to disclose both the assessment (risk and
danger) to the clients by July 30, 2008. If we give the clients the required 15
days for a submission, presuming that the client do not require an extension, we
should receive the submissions back by August 29, 2008 which includes the time
for transfer of the assessments from CIC to CBSA and the transfer of the
submission from CBSA to CIC. We anticipate that the Minister’s Delegate will
render a decision by the middle of October, 2008 with the caveat that we have
received the assurances from China regarding the death penalty.
[83]
Moreover, the applicant continued to assert that the respondents
remain a high flight risk which could not be managed by electronic monitoring.
The applicant called as a witness an RCMP Officer who testified that he was
leader of a surveillance team investigating the respondents. During the
investigation, the RCMP determined that Mr. Dong Hu Li had traveled to Toronto
in January 2007 to obtain fraudulent Canadian identity documents; including a
Canadian passport and birth certificate, an Ontario driver’s license, and Ontario
health insurance documents.
[84]
By oral decision rendered at the hearing, Member Shaw Dyck
stated: “I do not have any compelling reason or any good reason whatsoever to
depart from the decision rendered by Member Tessler on the 11th of
June 2008. So I adopt his decision in its entirety […].” Finding that
“[e]lectronic monitoring is better than nothing”, the Member ordered the
release of the respondents on terms and conditions amended from those previously
imposed by Member Tessler.
[85]
Having
carefully read the certified Tribunal Record in its entirety and considered the
arguments made by the parties, I conclude that clear and compelling reasons for
departing from previous decisions have not been articulated in the impugned
decisions which are otherwise unreasonable.
[86]
Indeed, previous
decisions of the Board had expressly considered the potential length of
detention and ultimately rejected this factor in favour of the respondents’
release due to the nature of their flight risk.
[87]
Neither
can I find any clear rationale in the impugned decisions reasonably supporting
the conclusion at this point in time, that the detention of the respondents can
be qualified today as being “indefinite” or “indeterminate”. If there has been
indeed a “change of circumstances”, at best, the evidence is contradictory. In
determining the length of time that detention is likely to continue and Members
Tessler and Shaw Dyck should have given cogent reasons to discard direct and
relevant evidence submitted by the applicant in this regard.
[88]
Moreover,
alternatives to detention, including electronic monitoring, were all rejected by
the Board in the past for very articulated and convincing reasons, which appear
to still be valid today. Same appears to have been ignored or arbitrarily
discarded by Members Tessler and Shaw Dyck in the impugned decisions in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.
[89]
Approximately
one year before the Release Orders were rendered, the respondents first raised
the length of detention issue arguing that their legal proceedings may take
several years to resolve. As such, they proposed a release on the posting of a
bond as an alternative to detention. As discussed above, this line of
argumentation was expressly rejected by Member King in a decision dated July 6,
2007.
[90]
The issue
of length of detention resurfaced at the next detention review hearing, this
time before Member Nupponen. Again, as described above, the Member did not
consider that the prospect of a long detention pending the PRRA would amount to
an indeterminate period of detention, nor was the detention to be seen as excessive
in the circumstances.
[91]
Further,
at a detention review held in late 2007/early 2008, the respondents again
argued that their PRRA process will be lengthy, will likely involve a judicial
review application regardless of the outcome and that it will likely be many
years before their immigration applications are concluded. Nevertheless, Member
King reaffirmed previous Board decisions. In particular, he found that although the respondents
have been in immigration detention for ten (10) months and that their PRRA
process may be lengthy, it is also equally possible that it may be concluded
relatively quickly if leave to judicially review the PRRA decision is dismissed.
[92]
Members Tessler
and Shaw Dyck rendered the Release Orders based, to a great extent, on the
finding that there was a change in circumstances with respect to the PRRA
process. Member Tessler was of the view that the respondents’ positive
risk assessment would lead to a potentially lengthy processing. Such a finding
was supported by the general opinion contained in the Waldman affidavit which,
I note, was in direct contrast to the information submitted by the applicant to
the effect that the PRRA process would normally take between three (3) to five
(5) months for a decision to be rendered with respect to an application for
protection under section 112(3) of the Act.
[93]
However,
in issuing the Release Orders, neither Member Tessler nor Member Shaw Dyck made
any reference to the fact that the potential long-term detention had already
been considered and rejected by previous Board Members. Indeed, neither
Member provided clear and compelling reasons to depart from previous Board
decisions which concluded that the length of detention did not weigh in favour
of release when all other relevant factors are considered. This is a revisable
error that justifies the intervention of the Court.
[94]
Despite my
finding that the impugned decisions were unreasonable in the sense that they
failed to provide clear and compelling reasons to depart from the previous
decisions of the Board with respect to the issue of long-term detention, I am
also of the view that the issue of indefinite or indeterminate detention may
have been brought prematurely before the Board. As this issue is not
determinative in this application for judicial review, I have not considered it
in detail. Suffice it to note, there is evidence on the record which clearly
indicates that the Minister’s Delegate should render a decision by mid-October
2008 (with the caveat that assurances from China regarding the death penalty have been
received). Unless the evidence in question is found to be unreliable or not
credible, it would be unreasonable for the Board, at this point in time, to
outright dismiss such direct and relevant evidence emanating from the applicant.
[95]
Additionally,
I am of the opinion that the impugned decisions were unreasonable as they
failed to provide clear and compelling reasons to depart from the previous
decisions of the Board with respect to electronic monitoring.
[96]
In the Decision
and Reasons dated January 10, 2008, Member King specifically considered release
on electronic monitoring (as proposed by the respondents) as an alternative to
detention. Based on the evidence on record, Member King determined that
electronic monitoring was inappropriate in the circumstances.
[97]
I
reiterate, at this point, that the respondents are accused of financial crimes.
They have been found to have access to an enormous amount of wealth, to have
used false identity documents, to have aliases in Canada, to have made plans to
hide their presence in Canada and to lack credibility. The respondents
were and continue to be a high flight risk. The Board clearly decided in past
decisions that the proposed alternatives to detention were not satisfactory and
provided clear and compelling reasons in support of their conclusion. In
particular, Member King clearly rejected electronic monitoring as an
appropriate alternative to detention. The evidence upon which these past findings
have been made has not been challenged by the respondents.
[98]
Despite
Member King’s clear finding that electronic monitoring was not a viable
alternative to detention, Member Tessler nevertheless ordered the respondents’ release
on precisely the same proposed alternative that was expressly rejected by Member
King. Although Member Tessler states in the Release Order: “I am not
choosing to differ from my colleague’s finding on the appropriateness of
proposed terms and conditions; I am simply reassessing the alternative in light
of a significant change of circumstance,” he fails to provide a clear and
compelling reason why electronic monitoring is now appropriate. He further
fails to describe how electronic monitoring would serve to mitigate the flight
risks which had been identified in every previous Board decision.
[99]
Member
Shaw Dyck erred in the same regard. In her reasons, the Member states that
electronic monitoring is better than nothing. However, yet again she fails to
provide a clear and compelling reason why electronic monitoring is now
appropriate and how electronic monitoring could reduce the flight risks previously
identified by all Members of the Board.
V. CONCLUSION
[100] In conclusion, Members Tessler
and Shaw Dyck erred by failing to provide clear and compelling reasons to
depart from the previous decisions of the Board with respect to the issue of
long term detention. This reviewable error was compounded by a failure to
provide clear and compelling reasons to depart from the previous decisions of
the Board with respect to the issue of electronic monitoring.
[101] For these reasons, this
consolidated application for judicial review shall be allowed. The Release
Orders will be set aside and quashed accordingly. At the next detention review,
the Board shall consider the reasons contained in the present decision of the
Court together with prior decisions of the Board in respect of same, and with the
evidence and the submissions on record, including all new evidence or additional
submissions of the parties, and accordingly determine whether clear and
compelling reasons to depart from the previous decisions exist, and whether
having considered and weighed all relevant factors, the respondents should be
released on conditions.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that this consolidated application
for judicial review is allowed. The Release Orders of Members Tessler and Shaw
Dyck, dated June 11, 2008 and June 19, 2008 respectively, are set aside and quashed
accordingly. At the next detention review, the Board shall consider the reasons
contained in the present decision of the Court together with prior decisions of
the Board in respect of same, and with the evidence and the submissions on
record, including all new evidence or additional submissions of the parties,
and accordingly determine whether clear and compelling reasons to depart from
the previous decisions exist, and whether having considered and weighed all
relevant factors, the respondents should be released on conditions.
"Luc Martineau "