Date: 20080616
Docket: T-542-07
Citation: 2008
FC 740
Ottawa, Ontario,
June 16, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Campbell
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
FREDERICK
JAMES TOBIN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The
present Application concerns the reputation of the Corrections Service of
Canada [CSC]; specifically, the reputation that the CSC might lose for continuing
to employ a person who has been found guilty of criminal harassment. Mr. Tobin
is such a person, who was terminated by the CSC for cause to protect its
reputation.
[2]
Mr. Tobin,
a psychologist with the CSC, took his termination to adjudication. Under the
authority of Public Service Staff Relations Act R.S.C., 1985, c. P-35, the
Adjudicator who heard Mr. Tobin’s grievance made two key determinations leading
to Mr. Tobin’s reinstatement: since the harassment occurred in Mr. Tobin’s “private
life”, the misconduct is beyond the control of the CSC; and evidentiary proof of
potential loss of reputation is required to substantiate termination for cause.
In essence, the CSC, as represented by the Applicant in the present
Application, brings the present judicial review to set aside the Adjudicator’s
decision for error on both determinations. For the reasons which follow, I find
that the CSC is successful.
I. Preliminary Objections
[3]
As is
detailed below in Section III of these reasons, Mr. Tobin was terminated
because his off-duty conduct might detrimentally affect the CSC’s reputation on
the application of standards set by the Commissioner of Corrections
[Commissioner]. At the grievance hearing before the Adjudicator, it was agreed
by both Counsel for Mr. Tobin and Counsel for the CSC that Mr. Tobin’s
termination should be reviewed, not according to the Commissioner’s standards,
but according to common law criteria for discipline for off-duty conduct outlined
in the case of Fibres Ltd. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l
Union, Local 9-670 (Mattis Grievance) [1967] O.L.A.A. No. 4 [Millhaven].
[4]
Thus,
while apparently acknowledging the CSC’s ground for dismissal, nevertheless, by
applying the Millhaven criteria, the Adjudicator made a number of
findings not related to the ground for termination. The obvious question that
arises is “why was Mr. Tobin’s conduct not considered according to the
Commissioner’s standards?” The answer to the question lies in the fact that Counsel
for both parties, and the Adjudicator, failed to turn their minds to the force
and effect of the Commissioner’s standards. Thus, a primary question addressed in
the present Application is: “are the Commissioner’s standards legally binding,
and if they are, can the decision under review withstand an argument that it
was made in error of law”? At the opening of the hearing of the present
Application, I put this question to Counsel for the CSC and Mr. Tobin. As a
result, it was agreed that supplemental arguments would be filed to address the
question, and the hearing was adjourned for this purpose.
[5]
On resumption,
Counsel for the CSC argued that, even though the Millhaven criteria were
chosen by agreement, since a legislated standard exists in law, the application
of the Millhaven criteria constitutes a reviewable error. As a result, Counsel
for the CSC argues that the Adjudicator’s decision should be set aside for
error of law and the matter should be referred back for redetermination. Counsel
for Mr. Tobin argues that it is unfair to allow the CSC to make this “new
argument” because of the agreement made before the Adjudicator. I disagree.
[6]
In my
opinion, the just result is to allow the CSC’s “new argument” to be considered
on the present judicial review, with any prejudice to Mr. Tobin being fairly resolved
by an award of costs in his favour on the present review. The issue of the correct
standard against which Mr. Tobin’s conduct is to be judged is so fundamentally
important to the outcome of the adjudication process that to neglect to address
it in the present judicial review constitutes a miscarriage of justice. While
the Adjudicator acted within jurisdiction in delivering the decision presently
under review, the application of what I find to be an incorrect standard
essentially makes the decision worthless as a fair and just result. This fact can
be rectified by setting the Adjudication decision aside and sending the matter
back for redetermination by a different adjudicator.
[7]
As
described in Section V below, in any event of the erroneous application of the Millhaven
criteria, the Adjudicator’s decision is made in fundamental error because the
Adjudicator misapprehended the correct approach to take in applying the
evidence to the question of whether Mr. Tobin’s termination was warranted.
Thus, a costs award on the present Application is, in fact, a benefit to Mr.
Tobin.
II. The
Legal Regime Governing the Management of the Public Service of Canada
[8]
The
following analysis describes governance factors in operation at the time of Mr.
Tobin’s termination. For the purposes of these reasons, the present tense is
used to describe their application with respect to Mr. Tobin’s termination.
[9]
Counsel
for the CSC advances an interpretation of the legal regime governing the
management of the Public Service of Canada, resulting in the argument that the
legislative and policy making regime applied in Mr. Tobin’s termination was
according to a legal standard of conduct enforceable by law. In response,
Counsel for Mr. Tobin makes a four-pronged response that includes the
suggestion that to accept the CSC’s legal standard argument will upset the collective
bargaining regime in the Federal Public Service. However, I accept the CSC’s
interpretation which is immediately detailed below, and reject Mr. Tobin’s
response in the analysis which follows.
A. The function of the Financial
Administration Act R.S., 1985, c. F-11 [FAA]
[10]
By
s. 7(1)(e) and (f) of the FAA, the Treasury Board has authority
to act on key matters relating to the public service, and, of particular
importance with respect to the present Application, has authority over human
resources management:
7.
(1) The Treasury Board may act for the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on
all matters relating to
[…]
(b) the organization of the public service of Canada or
any portion thereof, and the determination and control of establishments
therein;
[…]
(e) human resources management in the federal public
administration, including the determination of the terms and conditions of
employment of persons employed in it;
[Emphasis added]
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7. (1) Le
Conseil du Trésor peut agir au nom du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le
Canada à l’égard des questions suivantes :
[…]
(b) l’organisation de l’administration
publique fédérale ou de tel de ses secteurs ainsi que la détermination et le
contrôle des établissements qui en font partie;
[…]
(e) la gestion du personnel de
l’administration publique fédérale, notamment la détermination de ses
conditions d’emploi;
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With respect to human resources management, by s. 11(2) of
the FAA, the Treasury Board has authority to create enforceable
standards of conduct for employees of the public service:
11. (2) Subject to the provisions of any enactment
respecting the powers and functions of a separate employer but
notwithstanding any other provision contained in any enactment, the Treasury
Board may, in the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to personnel
management including its responsibilities in relation to employer and
employee relations in the public service, and without limiting the generality
of sections 7 to 10,
[…]
(f) establish standards of discipline in the public
service and prescribe the financial and other penalties, including
termination of employment and suspension, that may be applied for breaches of
discipline or misconduct, and the circumstances and manner in which and
the authority by which or whom those penalties may be applied or may be
varied or rescinded in whole or in part;
(g) provide for the termination of employment, or the
demotion to a position at a lower maximum rate of pay, for reasons other than
breaches of discipline or misconduct, of persons employed in the public
service, and establishing the circumstances and manner in which and the
authority by which or by whom those measures may be taken or may be varied or
rescinded in whole or in part;
[…]
(i) provide for such other matters, including terms and
conditions of employment not otherwise specifically provided for in this
subsection, as the Treasury Board considers necessary for effective personnel
management in the public service.
[…]
(4) Disciplinary action against, and termination of
employment or demotion of, any person pursuant to paragraph (2)(f) or (g)
shall be for cause.
[Emphasis added]
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11.
(2) Sous réserve des seules dispositions de tout texte législatif concernant
les pouvoirs et fonctions d’un employeur distinct, le Conseil du Trésor peut,
dans l’exercice de ses attributions en matière de gestion du personnel,
notamment de relations entre employeur et employés dans la fonction publique
:
[…]
(f)
établir des normes de discipline dans la fonction publique et prescrire les
sanctions pécuniaires et autres y compris le licenciement et la suspension,
susceptibles d’être appliquées pour manquement à la discipline ou pour
inconduite et indiquer dans quelles circonstances, de quelle manière, par qui
et en vertu de quels pouvoirs ces sanctions peuvent être appliquées,
modifiées ou annulées, en tout ou en partie;
(g)
prévoir, pour des raisons autres qu’un manquement à la discipline ou une
inconduite, le licenciement ou la rétrogradation à un poste situé dans une
échelle de traitement comportant un plafond inférieur des personnes employées
dans la fonction publique et indiquer dans quelles circonstances, de quelle
manière, par qui et en vertu de quels pouvoirs ces mesures peuvent être
appliquées, modifiées ou annulées, en tout ou en partie;
[…]
(i)
réglementer les autres questions, notamment les conditions de travail non
prévues de façon expresse par le présent paragraphe, dans la mesure où il
l’estime nécessaire à la bonne gestion du personnel de la fonction publique.
[…]
(4) Les mesures disciplinaires, le licenciement ou la
rétrogradation effectués en application des alinéas (2)f) ou g) doivent être
motivés.
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[11]
By s. 12(1)
of the FAA, the Treasury Board has authority to delegate its powers and
functions:
12. (1) The Treasury Board may authorize the deputy
head of a department or the chief executive officer of any portion of the
public service to exercise and perform, in such manner and subject to such
terms and conditions as the Treasury Board directs, any of the powers and
functions of the Treasury Board in relation to personnel management in the
public service and may, from time to time as it sees fit, revise or
rescind and reinstate the authority so granted.
[…]
(3) Any person authorized pursuant to subsection (1) or
(2) to exercise and perform any of the powers and functions of the Governor
in Council or the Treasury Board may, subject to and in accordance with the
authorization, authorize one or more persons under their jurisdiction or any
other person to exercise or perform any such power or function.
[Emphasis added]
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12.
(1) Le Conseil du Trésor peut, aux conditions et selon les modalités qu’il
fixe, déléguer tel de ses pouvoirs en matière de gestion du personnel de la
fonction publique à l’administrateur général d’un ministère ou au premier
dirigeant d’un secteur de la fonction publique; cette délégation peut être
annulée, modifiée ou rétablie à discrétion.
[…]
(3)
Les délégataires visés aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) peuvent, compte tenu des
conditions et modalités de la délégation, subdéléguer les pouvoirs qu’ils ont
reçus à leurs subordonnés ou à toute autre personne.
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B. The function of the Treasury
Board’s “Terms
and Conditions of Employment Policy” [Employment Policy]
[12]
By operation of its Employment Policy,
the Treasury Board acts on its legal authority under s. 11(2)(f) of the FAA
to delegate, which authorizes deputy
heads of departments to establish standards of conduct, and to enforce these
standards of conduct by imposition of penalties. Section 50 of Appendix A of
the Employment Policy states:
50. Subject to any enactment of the Treasury Board, a
deputy head may:
(a) establish standards of discipline
(i) for employees;
(ii) for persons occupying
teacher and principal
positions in the department
of Indian and Northern
Affairs, and
(b) prescribe, impose and vary or rescind, in whole or in
part, the financial and other penalties, including suspension and termination
of employment, that may be applied for breaches of discipline or misconduct.
[Emphasis added]
(Supplementary Memorandum of
Fact and Law of the Applicant, Tab 2)
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50.
Sous réserve de tout édit du Conseil du Trésor, l'administrateur général peut
:
(a)
établir des normes de conduite
(i) à l'égard des employés;
(ii) à l'égard des personnes
occupant un poste de
professeur ou de directeur
d'école au ministère des
Affaires indiennes et du
Nord, et
(b)
prescrire, imposer, modifier ou annuler, en tout ou en partie, les pénalités,
d'ordre financier ou autre, y compris la suspension et le licenciement
susceptibles d'être appliquées pour infraction à la discipline ou inconduite
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C. The function of the
rule making authority in the Corrections and Conditional Release
Act 1992, c. 20C-44.6 [Corrections Act]
[13]
It is not
disputed that the Commissioner is a deputy head of a department. In order for
the Commissioner to carry out the delegated authority given by the Employment
Policy, the standards of discipline and penalties for breach must be
formally established.
[14]
A vehicle
available to the Commissioner to establish standards of discipline is found in
the rule making authority of the Corrections Act:
6. (1) The Governor in Council may appoint a person
to be known as the Commissioner of Corrections who, under the direction of
the Minister, has the control and management of the Service and all matters
connected with the Service.
[…]
97. Subject to this Part and the regulations, the
Commissioner may make rules
(a) for the management of the Service;
(b) for the matters described in section 4; and
(c) generally for carrying out the purposes and provisions
of this Part and the regulations.
[…]
98. (1) The Commissioner may designate as
Commissioner’s Directives any or all rules made under section 97.
(2) The Commissioner’s Directives shall be accessible to
offenders, staff members and the public.
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6.
(1) Le
gouverneur en conseil nomme le commissaire; celui-ci a, sous la direction du
ministre, toute autorité sur le Service et tout ce qui s’y rattache.
[…]
97. Sous réserve de la présente
partie et de ses règlements, le commissaire peut établir des règles
concernant :
a)
la gestion du Service;
b)
les questions énumérées à l’article 4;
c)
toute autre mesure d’application de cette partie et des règlements.
[…]
98.
(1) Les
règles établies en application de l’article 97 peuvent faire l’objet de
directives du commissaire.
(2)
Les directives doivent être accessibles et peuvent être consultées par les
délinquants, les agents et le public.
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D. The function of Directive “060
Code of Discipline, 1994-03-30” [Code of Discipline]
[15]
Acting
pursuant to s. 97 of the Corrections Act, the Commissioner issued a
Directive that established a Code of Discipline which sets standards to
which employees of the CSC are expected to adhere. Section 6 of the Code of
Discipline specifies the standards related to conduct are as follows:
Conduct and Appearance
Behaviour, both on and off duty, shall reflect positively
on the Correctional Service of Canada and on the Public Service generally. All
staff are expected to present themselves in a manner that promotes a
professional image, both in their words and in their actions. Employees dress
and appearance while on duty must similarly convey professionalism, and must be
consistent with employee health and safety.
Infractions
An employee has committed an infraction, if he or she:
a.
displays appearance and/or
deportment which is unbecoming to an employee of the Service while on duty or
while in uniform;
b.
is abusive or discourteous by
word or action, to the public, while on duty;
c.
acts, while on or off duty,
in a manner likely to discredit the Service;
d.
commits an indictable
offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction under any statute of
Canada or of any province or territory, which may bring discredit to the
Service or affect his or her continued performance with the Service;
e.
fails to advise his or her
supervisor, before resuming his or her duties, of being charged with a criminal
or other statutory offence;
f.
fails to account for,
improperly withholds, misappropriates or misapplies any public money or
property or any money/property of any other person(s) coming into his or her
possession in the course of duty or by reason of his or her being a member of
the Service;
g.
consumes alcohol or other
intoxicants while on duty;
h.
reports for duty impaired or
being unfit for duty due to influence of alcohol or drugs;
i.
sleeps on duty.
[Emphasis added]
(CSC Code
of Discipline, CSC/SCC 1-11 (R-94-02), Supplementary Memorandum of Fact and
Law of the Applicant, Tab 2)
[16]
To
guarantee that CSC employees know of the standards of conduct established by
the Code of Discipline and have formal notice of their exact terms, two
explanatory booklets have been issued by the Commissioner entitled “Standards
of Conduct” and “Code of Discipline”. For the purposes of the present
Application, it is not disputed that: the terms of the explanatory booklets
accurately express the terms of the Code of Discipline; Mr. Tobin
acknowledges that he was served with both booklets and, therefore, had notice
of the standards of conduct expected of him; and the CSC could terminate Mr.
Tobin’s employment for cause by committing infractions “c” and “d” as expressed
in the Code of Discipline.
[17]
As
detailed in Section III below, Mr. Tobin’s termination was stated to be for
breach of Standard 2 of each of the explanatory booklets which repeat the terms
of infractions “c” and “d” of the Code of Discipline. To bring clarity
to any confusion that exists about the legality of Mr. Tobin’s termination, I
find that it is pursuant to the Code of Discipline and that the use of the
phrase “Standard 2” is an expression of this fact. Therefore, for
convenience, in these reasons the statement that Mr. Tobin has breached “Standard
2” should be read as meaning Mr. Tobin has committed infractions “c” and
“d” of the Code of Discipline”. Indeed, for the purposes of the present
Application, neither Counsel for the CSC nor Mr. Tobin expressed any concern
about the duplication of the terms of the three expressions. However, the CSC
maintains that Standard 2 has the authority of law, which is an argument
with which Mr. Tobin disagrees.
E. Analysis of Mr. Tobin’s Objections
to the CSC’s Interpretation
(1) Martineau v.
Matsqui Institution [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118, [1977] S.C.J. No. 44 [Martineau]
[18]
Mr. Tobin
relies on Justice Pigeon’s decision in Martineau to argue that the directives of the
Commissioner are only administrative in nature and, therefore, are not binding
as a matter of law. In
Martineau, the
issue for determination was whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to
review a disciplinary order made by the Commissioner pursuant to a
Commissioner’s Directive. Section 28.1 of the then Federal Court Act 1970-71-72 (Can.), c. 1, limited the Court of Appeal’s review power to
non-administrative decisions and orders:
28. (1) Notwithstanding s. 18 or the
provisions of any other Act, the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and
determine an application to review and set aside a decision or order, other
than a decision or order of an administrative nature not required by law to be
made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis, made by or in the course of proceedings
before a federal board, commission or other tribunal ...
[Emphasis added]
[19]
To
determine the issue, Justice Pigeon considered the regulatory framework leading
to the Commissioner’s authority to issue and enforce directives, which was
found in s.
29 of the Penitentiary Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6:
(1) The Governor in Council may
make regulations
for the organization, training,
discipline, efficiency, administration and good government of the Service;
for the custody, treatment,
training, employment and discipline of inmates; and
generally, for carrying into
effect the purposes and provisions of this Act.
(2) The Governor in Council may,
in any regulations made under subsection (1) other than paragraph (b) thereof, provide
for a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months, or both, to be imposed upon summary conviction for the
violation of any such regulation.
(3) Subject to this Act and any
regulations made under subsection (1) the Commissioner may make rules, to be
known as Commissioner's directives, for the organization, training, discipline,
efficiency, administration and good government of the Service, and for the
custody, treatment, training, employment and discipline of inmates and the good
government of penitentiaries.
[Emphasis added]
[20]
Justice
Pigeon drew a distinction between the regulation-making power of the Governor
and the rule-making power of the Commissioner as follows:
I
have no doubt that the regulations are law. The statute provides for
sanction by fine or imprisonment. What was said by the Privy Council with
respect to orders in council under the War Measures Act in the Japanese Canadians
case [ [1947] A.C. 87.], at p. 107, would be applicable:
The legislative activity of Parliament is
still present at the time when the orders are made, and these orders are
"law".
I
do not think the same can be said of the directives. It is significant that
there is no provision for penalty and, while they are authorized by
statute, they are clearly of an administrative, not a legislative, nature.
[Emphasis added]
[21]
As
outlined above, under the legal regime relevant to the present
Application, the
Treasury Board has, by s. 50 of the Standards Policy, delegated to the
Commissioner the authority granted to it under s. 11(2)(f) of the FAA to
“prescribe, impose and vary or rescind, in whole or in part, the
financial and other penalties, including suspension and termination of
employment, that may be applied for breaches of discipline or misconduct”. Therefore,
the rule making power of the Commissioner in the present legal regime is
supplemented by power to enforce rules made by the imposition of penalties that
may be applied. As a result, since the rules made under the legal regime in Martineau
were determined to be administrative
because no power to enforce was provided, and since there is power to enforce
rules made under the legal regime under consideration in the present
Application, I find that the decision in Martineau is correctly interpreted to conclude that
rules made by the Commissioner in the present case are law.
(2) Non-binding policy
[22]
Counsel
for Mr. Tobin argues that, as the delegation at issue is made pursuant to a
policy, being the Employment Policy, the exercise of this authority is
not law and, therefore, any action taken with respect to it is not law.
[23]
One
approach to the argument is based in the notion that some legislative step must
be taken, either by statute or regulation, to accomplish the delegation. I
disagree. In my opinion, no statutory instrument is required to act on a
statutory power to delegate a legal authority. Once the statutory power exists
to delegate, all that is required to effect the delegation is a clear formal
statement of the authority being delegated, and to whom it is being delegated.
This is accomplished by the Employment Policy; persons who hold the
position in government of “deputy head” are authorized to act in the stead of
the Treasury Board to carry out the actions specified in s. 50 of Appendix A of
the Employment Policy.
[24]
Another
example of the form of delegation accomplished by the Employment Policy is
that used for the operation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA]. By s. 6(1)
and (2) of IRPA, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has authority to delegate his
or her powers and duties, and the delegation need only be in writing:
6. (1) The Minister may
designate any persons or class of persons as officers to carry out any
purpose of any provision of this Act, and shall specify the powers and duties
of the officers so designated.
(2) Anything that may be done by the Minister under this
Act may be done by a person that the Minister authorizes in writing, without
proof of the authenticity of the authorization.
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6.
(1) Le ministre désigne, individuellement ou par catégorie, les personnes
qu’il charge, à titre d’agent, de l’application de tout ou partie des
dispositions de la présente loi et précise les attributions attachées à leurs
fonctions.
(2)
Le ministre peut déléguer, par écrit, les attributions qui lui sont conférées
par la présente loi et il n’est pas nécessaire de prouver l’authenticité de
la délégation.
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The
document which presently accomplishes the Minister’s delegation is entitled Instrument
of Designation and Delegation (see: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/il/il3_e.pdf).
[25]
A second approach to the argument centres on the
decisions in Endicott v. Canada (Treasury Board) 2005 FC 253, [2005]
F.C.J. No. 308 and Glowinski v. Canada (Treasury Board) 2006 FC 78, [2006]
F.C.J. No. 99, to advance the position that s. 11 of FAA only gives
power to the Treasury Board to set non-binding policies.
[26]
In Endicott, the issue was whether legal
effect should be given to a definition in a Treasury Board policy which was
directly contrary to a definition contained in the Public Service Employment
Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. P-33. In the present Application, no issue is taken
with Justice Strayer’s finding at paragraph 11 that:
Whether
such internal directives create legal rights which a court can define or
enforce, appears from the jurisprudence to depend on what the intent was and
the context in which the directive was issued.
[27]
However, Counsel for Mr. Tobin relies on Endicott
for Justice Strayer’s application of Martineau at paragraph 13 as follows:
The
respondent, on the other hand, relies on several cases where it has been held
that internal policies and manuals are not legally binding. The leading general
authority on this is Martineau v. Matsqui Institution [1978] 1 S.C.R.
118 where it was held that the Commissioner's directives of the Correctional
Service of Canada do not have the force of law but are simply for the efficient
management of the institutions.
Given the analysis
of Martineau
provided above, I find that the generalized interpretation
of Martineau in Endicott does not apply to the circumstances of the
present case. In my opinion, the
intent of the legal regime described above, and in particular the function of
the Employment Policy, considered in the context of a need to establish
enforceable rules of conduct for CSC employees, provides authority to the
Commissioner to achieve this result.
[28]
In Glowinski the issue was whether a
certain policy could be found to be legally binding as opposed to others which
were in conflict and argued not to be legally binding. Justice Kelen applies Justice
Strayer’s statement in Endicott to pass comment at paragraph 42 that:
The
Court is of the view that it should not interpret or reconcile inconsistent and
conflicting Treasury Board policies and should not give legal effect to a
multitude of such policies. I agree with Justice Rouleau in Girard,
supra, [Gerard v. Canada, [1994] F.C.J. No. 420] that if the Treasury
Board intended these policies to have a legal effect the Treasury Board
would have exercised its right to enact these policies by way of regulation
under the applicable section of the Financial Administration Act.
[Emphasis
added]
I do not accept
this statement as authority for the proposition that policy statements cannot
have the authority of law, because they can as stated by Justice Strayer in Endicott.
I consider the comment in Glowinsky as only an expression of an
expectation of what would be required to resolve the argument respecting the conflicting
policies in issue in that case. As a result, I find that Glowinsky is
not relevant.
(3) Interference with the present collective bargaining process
[29]
Counsel for Mr. Tobin presents what I consider to be a weak
argument that the imposition of binding legal standards of conduct interferes
with the ongoing present collective bargaining process with respect to Canada’s
public service. While there is no debate that the “terms and conditions” of employment
are negotiated through the collective bargaining process, there is no evidence that
standards of conduct have been negotiated, nor is there any evidence that the
collective agreement process that affects the CSC and its employees
contemplates such a negotiation. Indeed, the evidence goes to the contrary.
[30]
In support of the argument, Counsel for Mr. Tobin points to a
provision of the collective agreement between the Treasury Board and CSC
employees that states “where written departmental standards of discipline are
developed or amended, the Employer agrees to supply sufficient information on
the standards of discipline to each employee and to the Institute” (Agreement
between the Treasury Board and the Professional Institute of the Public Service
of Canada, Applicant’s Record, Tab E). However, I find that this provision only
represents an agreement to meet a due process concern and in no way constitutes
a substantive agreement that standards of conduct are part of the existing
collective bargaining process. Instead, the state of affairs seems to point to
the conclusion that CSC employees are content to have the Treasury Board develop
standards of conduct through the delegated authority process. It might very
well be the case in the future that the collective agreement process will be
used to set standards of conduct, but that is not the present situation. The
Treasury Board has occupied the field, effectively by consent. Therefore, I
give no weight to the interference argument.
[31]
Counsel
for Mr. Tobin also argues that, to accept binding standards for CSC employees,
means that is possible for different standards to be set for employees in each
department of government with the negative effect of a breach in the concept of
uniformity required in the collective bargaining process. It seems to me that
standards of conduct might very well vary depending on the context of the job
function concerned. For example, the reputation concerns of the CSC with
respect to off-duty conduct of its employees who administer to incarcerated
persons will, most likely, be of greater public concern than the off-duty
reputation concerns of a government department which administers poultry
marketing. This is so because CSC employees who work with inmates are in a
dominant power position, and their personal conduct, whether on-duty or
off-duty, must reflect adherence to the highest standards of responsibility. In
my opinion, Counsel for Mr. Tobin has not made a convincing argument on this
issue.
(4)
Interference with the Adjudicator’s discretion
[32]
Counsel
for Mr. Tobin argues that, given that grievance adjudication is an important element
of collective bargaining, the imposition of a legal standard of conduct on an adjudicator
is interference with the exercise of an adjudicator’s discretion.
[33]
I do not
accept that an adjudicator’s discretion is fettered by being required to adhere
to a legal standard of conduct resulting in a dismissal for cause. As stated by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell
Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Association 2003 SCC 36, [2003] 1
S.C.R. 884 at para. 35, it is incorrect to equate “fettering” with the need to
make a decision according to applicable law:
In
oral argument, counsel for Bell stated repeatedly that the guideline
power "fetters" the Tribunal in its application of the Act. This
assumes that the sole mandate of the Tribunal is to apply the Act, and not also
to apply any other forms of law that the legislature has deemed relevant --
such as guidelines. This assumption is mistaken. If the guidelines issued by
the Commission are a form of law, then the Tribunal is bound to apply them, and
it is no more accurate to say that they "fetter" the Tribunal than it
is to suggest that the common law "fetters" ordinary courts because
it prevents them from deciding the cases before them in any way they please.
F. Conclusion
[34]
I agree
with the CSC’s argument that the legal standard of conduct that Mr. Tobin was
required to meet during the course of his employment is that stated in the Code
of Discipline. As an employee of the CSC, and, by law, being bound by the
established standards of conduct by application of the legal regime outlined
above, Mr. Tobin was subject to termination of employment for cause for
his “off-duty” conduct.
III. Enforcement of Standard
2
A. Mr. Tobin’s conduct
[35]
Mr.
Tobin’s substantive position at the time his employment was terminated was that
of a Consultative Psychologist (PS-03) at the Regional Treatment Centre [RTC]
which is part of a maximum security penal institution in Kingston, Ontario. Mr. Tobin commenced employment with the
CSC in 1988, and since that time has primarily worked as the Program Director
at the Female Behavioural Unit. For the period ending in 2000, Mr. Tobin acted
in several positions, including Acting Deputy Executive Director of the RTC and
acting Deputy Warden of the Prison for Women.
[36]
In July
2002, Mr. Tobin was charged with a number of criminal offences relating to his involvement
with a young woman who is referred to in the Adjudicator’s decision by the
initials “HM”. In January 2001, HM began to work at the RTC as a volunteer. HM
and Mr. Tobin commenced a relationship in March of 2001, while Mr. Tobin was
working as the Acting Deputy Warden of the RTC. HM was later hired by the RTC. HM’s
employment at the CSC ended in January of 2002.
[37]
On or
about July 5, 2002, Mr. Tobin was charged with six criminal offences relating
to his conduct towards HM. The counts that Mr. Tobin faced were as follows:
1.
Uttered a
threat to cause death to HM contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal
Code of Canada (CCC);
2.
Did
without lawful authority confine HM contrary to section 279(2) of the CCC;
3.
Did
wrongfully and without lawful authority compel HM from driving to her intended
destination contrary to section 423(1)(e) of the CCC;
4.
Did
knowing that HM is harassed or being reckless as to whether HM is harassed did
without lawful authority beset or watch the dwelling house and/or other places
where HM happened to be, thereby causing HM to reasonably in all the
circumstances fear for her safety and did thereby commit and offence contrary
to section 264(2)(c) of the CC;
5.
That Mr.
Tobin did knowing that HM is harassed or being reckless as to whether HM is
harassed did without lawful authority engage in threatening conduct directed at
HM thereby causing HM to reasonably in all the circumstances fear for her
safety and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section 264(2)(d) of the
CCC;
6.
That Mr.
Tobin did commit a sexual assault on HM and did thereby commit an offence
contrary to section 271(1)(a) of the CCC.
(Ex. E-1, Certified Copy of Criminal
Charges dated July 29, 2003, Birch Affidavit, Applicant’s Record, Vol. 1, Tab 2-C
at p. 50-54)
[38]
Shortly
before his trial, Mr. Tobin plead guilty to count five, and, as a result, all
other charges were dropped. Mr. Tobin received an 18-month suspended sentence
which included regular meetings with a probation officer. At his sentencing hearing
an agreed statement of facts as to the events leading up to the charges was
read into the record; an abbreviated version of these facts is as follows:
·
HM
obtained a work placement with the CSC and, shortly after, she and Mr. Tobin
became involved in a personal relationship.
·
Some
months after the relationship began HM tried several times to end it, due to
Mr. Tobin’s overly-possessive and manipulative behaviours.
·
Due to Mr.
Tobin’s conduct towards her at a business conference, which they attended
together, HM felt humiliated and ended the relationship permanently.
·
On July 2,
2002, HM was at home meeting with her real estate agent when she received
repeated, unwanted calls from Mr. Tobin enquiring as to the identity of her
visitor.
·
Mr. Tobin arrived
at HM’s residence and confronted HM and her real estate agent.
·
After the
confrontation, Mr. Tobin left HM’s residence and subsequently left several
degrading messages on her answering machine.
·
HM left
her residence to spend the night at her parents’ house, but, on her way to
there, Mr. Tobin drove passed her, going in the opposite direction.
·
Mr. Tobin quickly
turned his car around and began to follow her.
·
He caught
up to her and drove aggressively until HM felt that it was necessary, for her
safety, to pull off the road.
·
Mr. Tobin
approached her vehicle, and proceeded to berate, degrade and verbally abuse HM for
approximately two hours, during which time HM was crying, and fearful for her
safety.
·
After Mr.
Tobin made repeated demands that she accompany him in his car, HM finally
relented and got into his vehicle.
·
They
proceed to Lemoine Point, stopping first at a Tim Horton’s drive-through.
·
HM
testified that, during the drive, Mr. Tobin threatened to kill her, and that
she was fearful for her life.
·
After
approximately one hour at Lemoine Point, HM decided to pacify Mr. Tobin by
convincing him that she wanted to get together with him; he then returned her
to her car.
·
The next
day, HM’s father drove to his daughter’s residence, and had a small
confrontation with Mr. Tobin, whom he found there.
·
That day,
Mr. Tobin left a further eight or nine non-threatening messages on HM’s
answering machine.
(Excerpt from Ex. E-2, Plea and
Sentencing Transcript, dated April 19, 2004, Birch Affidavit, Applicant’s
Record, Vol. 1, Tab 2 at p. 3-7)
B. The CSC’s Application
of Standard 2 to Mr. Tobin’s conduct
[39]
After the CSC
learned of the charges against Mr. Tobin, he was suspended from his position pending
an administrative review. This review was completed on September 10, 2002, and
was considered by Ms. Nancy Stableforth, then the CSC Deputy Commissioner for
Ontario Region. At that time, Ms. Stableforth concluded that there was
insufficient information to continue Mr. Tobin’s suspension, and, therefore,
reinstated him to a position at the same level as his substantive position,
pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Ms. Stableforth testified at
the Adjudication that a factor she took into consideration in reaching this
decision was that Mr. Tobin had said he was innocent of the charges.
[40]
Shortly
after Mr. Tobins’s guilty plea, Ms. Stableforth terminated Mr. Tobin’s
employment by a letter dated May 7, 2004, which states:
I have completed a full review of the
Plea and Sentencing document along with the Administrative Review conducted in
2002. I have also taken your comments from our meeting of April 28, 2004 and
those of your union representative, provided to me in writing May 4, 2004, into
consideration.
As indicated by your union representative
on May 4, 2004, you have pled guilty to engaging in threatening conduct
directed at [HM], thereby causing [HM] to reasonably, in all circumstances,
fear for her safety, and you did thereby, commit an offence contrary to section
264 (2)(d) of the Criminal Code of Canada. You are on record as accepting
responsibility for your actions in relation to this conviction and have been
imposed a suspended sentence and eighteen months of probation by the Court.
You have contravened Standard 2 - Conduct
and Appearance of the Code of Discipline and the Standards of Professional
Conduct:
- Acts, while on or off duty, in a manner
likely to discredit the Service;
- Commits an indictable offence or an
offence punishable on summary conviction under any statute of Canada or any province or territory,
which may bring discredit to the Service or affect his or her continued
performance with the Service.
In making my decision, I have concluded
that the behaviour you have demonstrated is incompatible with the duties you were
required to perform as a Psychologist and with the behaviour expected of
employees of the Correctional Service of Canada.
You have brought the Correctional Service
of Canada into disrepute in the eyes of the public, the staff and offenders,
and the trust and confidence that you were once afforded have been irrevocably
damaged.
I have taken into consideration your
years of service and your disciplinary record; however, this does not mitigate
the seriousness of your actions. Therefore, based on the foregoing and in
accordance with the Financial Administration Act, Section 11 (2), you are
hereby advised that your employment with the Correctional Service of Canada is
terminated effective April 23, 2004.
(Letter of Nancy Stableforth dated May 7,
2004, Applicant’s Record, Tab C, p. 158)
[41]
At the
Adjudication, Ms. Stableforth gave the following reasons for imposing the
termination:
·
Standard Two (Conduct and Appearance) of the Standards of
Professional Conduct (Exhibit E-11) had been violated;
·
Mr. Tobin's behaviour had discredited the CSC;
·
Mr. Tobin had pled guilty to an indictable offence;
·
Mr. Tobin's judgment would be affected;
·
It is particularly important for CSC employees to abide by the
law, as they serve as role models for inmates;
·
Mr. Tobin would no longer be credible in providing counselling
and advice; and
·
The behaviour that led to the filing of the criminal charges
involved more than one incident.
(Adjudicator’s Decision, para.
22)
IV. The Adjudicator’s Decision
[42]
Following
the Adjudication, the Adjudicator ordered the CSC “to reinstate Mr. Tobin to
his substantive position without loss of either pay or benefits, and to remove
from his file any reference to the termination of his employment”. Key
features of the Adjudicator’s reasons for arriving at this result are as
follows:
IV.
Reasons
83
To meet its burden
in discipline cases, an employer must normally prove that the misconduct
complained of occurred and that the discipline imposed was reasonable in the
circumstances. However, the fact that the conduct complained of in this case
was off-duty conduct raises a third consideration, as not all off-duty
behaviour is subject to the employer's power to correct through the application
of progressive discipline.
84
The first part of
the burden is met by the plea of guilty. However, before I look at the
reasonableness of the discipline imposed, I must determine whether Mr. Tobin's
off-duty behaviour was within the employer's control.
85
An employer is not
generally considered to be the custodian of an employee's moral character.
Counsel for the employer recognized this principle when he submitted that the
employer's reason for not directing Mr. Tobin to end his relationship with HM
was that "it's not their responsibility to guide Mr. Tobin's personal
life". Ironically, it is precisely this issue that I must decide in order
to determine whether the employer had the right to discipline Mr. Tobin for
off-duty behaviour - an event that occurred in Mr. Tobin's personal life. If
that event was beyond the employer's control, any discipline imposed for that
off-duty behaviour cannot stand.
86
Counsel agreed
that, in order to answer this question, the Millhaven Fibres test should
be applied. I agree with this submission, as this five-fold test has been
applied numerous times over the last 40 years.
A. Did Mr. Tobin's conduct harm the
CSC's reputation and has his criminal conviction rendered his conduct injurious
to the general reputation of the CSC and employees working at the CSC?
87
The first criterion
of the Millhaven Fibres test is closely related to Standard Two (Conduct
and Appearance) of the Code of Discipline and relates to harming the
CSC's reputation. It is also similar to the second part of its fourth
criterion, which relates to "... rendering his conduct injurious to the
general reputation ..." and employees working at the CSC. I will deal with
the first Millhaven Fibres criterion and the second part of its fourth
criterion.
88
I accept counsel
for Mr. Tobin's submission that proof is required, perhaps even clear and
cogent proof, given the criminality of the conduct complained of, but some
proof is required at the very least. It seems logical to me, as well, that not
only the severity of the conduct but the severity of the discipline imposed can
elevate, within the civil standard, the quality of evidence required.
89
There is no
evidence of harm suffered by the CSC as a result of Mr. Tobin's off-duty
behaviour. To arrive at such a conclusion, I would need evidence of the following:
a) the CSC's reputation before the
events of July 2002;
b) the CSC's reputation following the events
of July 2002; and
c) if there was any deterioration of the
CSC's reputation in the pre- and post-July 2002 period, whether that
deterioration was directly attributable to Mr. Tobin's off-duty conduct.
90
I have been provided
with no evidence to support a finding on any of these points. The only evidence
before me that relates to potential harm to the CSC's reputation falls short of
any acceptable standard of proof and especially that of clear, convincing and
cogent evidence.
[…]
109 As I stated
earlier, there must be some proof that the criteria in Millhaven Fibres
apply, as, generally speaking, employers have no authority over what employees
do outside of their working hours. Employers must prove some link between
events that occur during off-duty hours and the workplace. I do not believe, in
the facts before me, that the employer has proven that a link exists. As stated
earlier, absent that essential link, Mr. Tobin's off-duty behaviour is beyond
the CSC's control and any discipline imposed for that off-duty behaviour cannot
stand.
110
As tragic as the
events were for two families, these events, as stated by the employer in its
"Suggested Media Lines" (Exhibit G-9), "... are the result of a
personal matter outside of his work with the CSC... ."
[Emphasis
added]
(Adjudicator’s
Decision, paras. 109-110)
V. Is the Adjudicator’s
Decision Made in Reviewable Error?
A. The Adjudicator’s failure to correctly
apply Standard 2
[43]
As
described in Section II of these reasons, Counsel for the CSC and Mr. Tobin,
and the Adjudicator, made the wrong choice of the correct standard against
which Mr. Tobin’s conduct and his termination must be judged. As a result, as
already stated, as I agree with the supplementary argument advanced by Counsel
for the CSC that an enforceable standard of conduct exists in law, I find that
the failure of the Adjudicator to apply Standard 2 constitutes an error
in law. But there is also another fundamental error in the decision under
review.
B. The Adjudicator’s failure
to apply the evidence
[44]
In my opinion, the Adjudicator’s reasons
disclose a fundamental misapprehension on how to approach the evidence
resulting in a termination such as that imposed on Mr. Tobin.
[45]
In the
first place, in approaching the review, the Adjudicator was required to be
fully informed of Mr. Tobin’s workplace responsibilities, and to decide how his
conduct might affect the reputation of the CSC with respect to those particular
responsibilities. Mr. Tobin’s conduct was off-duty, but it was this conduct
that required examination. That is, it was fundamentally necessary to consider
this conduct because it was this conduct that resulted in Mr. Tobin’s
termination. The Adjudicator was looking for the link between Mr. Tobin’s
off-duty conduct and the workplace; in my opinion, the link was provided in the
reasons given by Ms. Stableforth, and it was those reasons that should have
focussed the Adjudicator’s attention.
[46]
Instead of
focussing on Ms. Stableforth’s reasons, in paragraph 89, the Adjudicator decided
that the basis for Mr. Tobin’s termination should be found in an opinion from
an external source. This is an error.
[47]
Ms.
Stableforth’s decision to terminate is based on evidence upon which she made
the finding that the CSC might lose reputation for continuing to employ Mr.
Tobin. In my opinion, the Adjudicator was required to go through the same process,
and provide clear reasons for coming to a conclusion, either in agreement with
Ms. Stableforth or otherwise. Indeed, with respect to
this requirement, regardless of failing to apply Standard 2 as he was
required to do, the Adjudicator failed to go through the proper reasoning
process on the standard he did apply.
[48]
The Adjudicator
applied the common law criteria for termination for off-duty conduct stated in Millhaven
which are as follows:
(1) the conduct of the
grievor harms the Company's reputation or product
(2) the grievor's behaviour
renders the employee unable to perform his duties satisfactorily
(3) the grievor's behaviour
leads to refusal, reluctance or inability of the other employees to work with
him
(4) the grievor has been
guilty of a serious breach of the Criminal Code and thus rendering his conduct
injurious to the general reputation of the Company and its employees
(5) places difficulty in
the way of the Company properly carrying out its function of efficiently
managing its Works and efficiently directing its working forces.
[Emphasis added]
(Millhaven, at para. 20)
As a result, the first consideration that the Adjudicator
should have directed his mind to is the evidence used to support Mr. Tobin’s
termination, and whether that conduct “harms” the CSC’s reputation since this
is exactly what Ms. Stableforth found. Instead of doing this, the Adjudicator
found that Mr. Tobin’s off-duty conduct was irrelevant. It appears that his
finding is based in his conclusion expressed in paragraph 88 that he required
evidence from some source that would somehow create the opinion he was required
to form and express. This is a misapprehension of duty. It is only the
Adjudicator who can form the opinion through use of his or her own knowledge
and analytical ability. No proof of loss of public respect is necessary to
reach a conclusion. That is, whether the public’s confidence in, and respect
for, the CSC will be diminished if Mr. Tobin is not terminated is not a matter
of proof; it is a matter of judgment, correctly, fairly, and reasonably
applied.
[49]
Support
for the application of a “reasonable person” standard in the application of
judgment with respect to loss of reputation warranting discipline is found in Flewwelling
v. Canada (F.C.A.) [1985] F.C.J. No. 1129 (QL). Justice
MacGuigan makes this point at p. 8:
It appears to me that there are forms of
misconduct which, whether they are prohibited by regulations or by the Criminal
Code or by any other statute, are of such a character that they are readily
recognizable by any reasonable person as incompatible and inconsistent with the
holding by one involved in such conduct of a public office and in particular of
an office the duties of which are to enforce the law. As Chief Justice Dickson
recently had occasion to say for the Supreme Court in Fraser v. Public Service
Staff Relations Board, unreported, decided on December 10, 1985:
The federal public service in Canada is part of the executive
branch of government. As such, its fundamental task is to administer and
implement policy. In order to do this well, the public service must employ
people with certain important characteristics. Knowledge is one, fairness
another, integrity a third.
[50]
The drawing
of an inference that an employee’s conduct will result in a loss of reputation
is recognized as an appropriate approach. Counsel for Mr. Tobin relies on the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Fraser v. Canada (Public Service Staff
Relations Board)
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, [1985] S.C.J. No. 71 (QL) to argue that the Adjudicator
did not err in requiring external opinion, as the general rule is that direct
evidence will be necessary to find that an employee’s actions detrimentally
impact their employer. However, when it comes to whether the employee’s job
function is impaired by that conduct, Fraser supports the proposition
that the necessary conclusion can be drawn by inference. Chief Justice Dixon
makes this point in paragraphs 47 and 48:
I
do not think the Adjudicator erred on either count. As to impairment to perform
the specific job, I think the general rule should be that direct evidence of
impairment is required. However, this rule is not absolute. When, as here, the
nature of the public servant's occupation is both important and sensitive and
when, as here, the substance, form and context of the public servant's
criticism is extreme, then an inference of impairment can be drawn. In this
case the inference drawn by the Adjudicator, namely that Mr. Fraser's conduct
could or would give rise to public concern, unease and distrust of his ability
to perform his employment [page 473] duties, was not an unreasonable one for
him to take.
Turning
to impairment in the wider sense, I am of opinion that direct evidence is not
necessarily required. The traditions and contemporary standards of the
public service can be matters of direct evidence. But they can also be matters
of study, of written and oral argument, of general knowledge on the part of
experienced public sector adjudicators, and ultimately, of reasonable inference
by those adjudicators. It is open to an adjudicator to infer impairment on
the whole of the evidence if there is evidence of a pattern of behaviour which
an adjudicator could reasonably conclude would impair the usefulness of the
public servant. Was there such evidence of behaviour in this case? In order to
answer that question it becomes relevant to consider the substance, form and
context of Mr. Fraser's criticism of government policy.
[Emphasis
added]
[51]
In
reaching the determination that Mr. Tobin should be terminated to maintain the CSC’s
required public profile, it was necessary for Ms. Stableforth to clearly
describe how the evidence of Mr. Tobin’s conduct would adversely affect this
profile if he were not terminated. It was also necessary for the Adjudicator to
go through this process; his failure to do so constitutes an error of law.
VI. Result
[52]
In the
decision under review, two errors have been identified; an error of law in
applying the wrong standard of conduct, and an error of law respecting the
application of evidence. The answer to the question of whether these errors
constitute reviewable errors requires an application of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9 [Dunsmuir].
Counsel for Mr. Tobin argues that, since the Adjudicator is a member of an
expert tribunal, the errors should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard
rather then a correctness standard which would allow the decision to withstand
the present review. I do not accept this argument.
[53]
In my
opinion, the analysis required to address the issues resulting in the errors,
as has been conducted in these reasons, falls outside the Adjudicator’s area of
expertise. That is, the Adjudicator is an expert in labour relations, and not
in decision-making with respect to complex legal questions such as those that
arose in Mr. Tobin’s grievance. With respect to such questions, at paragraph 60
in Dunsmuir, Justices Bastarache and LeBel said this:
As mentioned earlier, courts must also
continue to substitute their own view of the correct answer where the question
at issue is one of general law "that is both of central importance to the
legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's specialized area of
expertise" (Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., at para. 62, per LeBel J.).
Because of their impact on the administration of justice as a whole, such
questions require uniform and consistent answers. Such was the case in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., which dealt with complex
common law rules and conflicting jurisprudence on the doctrines of res
judicata and abuse of process issues that are at the heart of the
administration of justice (see para. 15, per Arbour J.).
[54]
Therefore,
I find that the errors must be reviewed on the standard of correctness; and,
therefore, I find that the Adjudicator’s decision is made in reviewable error.
[55]
In my
opinion, even judging the Adjudicator’s decision on the less demanding standard
of reasonableness, the decision is unreasonable. The fact that the Adjudicator
failed to come to grips with the essence of the reasons for Mr. Tobin’s
termination for cause and, consequently, did not apply the evidence on the
record, constitutes the use of a flawed evidentiary and analytical process;
therefore, I find that the Decision does not fall “within
a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law” (Dunsmuir at para. 47).
[56]
Given the
change of position by Counsel for the CSC on the standards issue as described
above, I find it is fair to award costs of the present Application to Mr.
Tobin.
JUDGMENT
Accordingly, I set aside the Adjudicator’s decision, and
refer the matter back for redetermination before a different adjudicator on the
following directions:
1. The redetermination be conducted in accordance with the
reasons provided; and
2. As may be agreed to between Counsel for the CSC and Mr.
Tobin, evidence on the record before the Adjudicator be admitted on the
redetermiation, together with such further evidence as the adjudicator may
allow.
I award costs of the present Application to Mr. Tobin.
“Douglas R. Campbell”