Date: 20091015
Docket: IMM-2161-09
IMM-2162-09
Citation: 2009 FC 1045
Ottawa, Ontario, October 15,
2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
NKESE OLAWUNMI OLUWAFEMI,
OMOBOLA OLUDAMI OLUWAFEMI,
OMOYEMI MOSHEBO OLUWAFEMI,
OMOTARA WURAOLA OLUWFEMI,
OMOTAYO OLABIMP OLUWAFEMI
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION,
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPARDNESS
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
These two applications are for judicial review of two
decisions rendered by an Immigration Officer who denied the
applicants’ pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) application in a decision dated
March 19, 2009 and the applicants’ humanitarian and compassionate (H&C)
application for permanent residence under s. 25 of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) in a decision dated March
18, 2009.
FACTS
Background
[2]
The
applicants are citizens of Nigeria. Nkese Oluwafemi is the
forty-six (46) year old mother. She has four minor daughters who are also
applicants in this matter, Ms. Ombola Oludami Oluwafemi (19), Ms. Omoyemi Ms.
Moshebo Oluwafemi (16), Omotara Waraola Oluwafemi (14), and Omotayo Olabimp
Oluwafemi (10).
[3]
The
applicant family entered Canada as visitors on June 7, 2007 through Montreal with false
British Passports. The applicants applied for refugee protection in Ottawa on June 18,
2007.
[4]
On July 21, 2008 a panel of the Convention Refugee
Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (the Board) heard the applicants’ claim for refugee protection.
[5]
The basis of the applicants’ claim for refugee protection
was fear of persecution at the hands of the applicant mother’s former common
law spouse, Bernard Alo.
[6]
The applicants claimed that Mr. Alo was initially a kind spouse
and step father but after 2002 he began to change. Mr. Alo allegedly forbade
the applicant mother from working outside the home. Arguments with Mr. Alo
became angrier and he absented himself from the house for long trips. During
one argument he allegedly poured hot oil over the applicant mother’s thigh and
forbid her from seeking medical assistance. Mr. Alo later informed the
applicant mother that he was a member of MEND (movement for the Emancipation
for Nigerian Delta), as well as a member of a cult.
[7]
In May 2007, while Mr. Alo was away, the applicant mother
found firearms and photographic evidence of Mr. Alo’s association with militant
groups. One of Mr. Alo’s “boys” informed the applicant mother that Mr. Alo was
also a trafficker of drugs and women and that on occasions, Ms. Ombola
Oludami Oluwafemi, the eldest child applicant, was conscripted to make drug
deliveries on behalf of Mr. Alo. The applicant children affirmed their mother’s
allegations and further claimed that Mr. Alo inappropriately touched them and
threatened them. The applicant mother contacted the police who responded by
confiscating Mr. Alo’s firearms and militant photographs but were otherwise
unwilling or unable to arrest or stop Mr. Alo from beating the applicant mother
allegedly in front of them in retaliation. The applicant made a complaint to
the police in response to her beating but Mr. Alo was not arrested, instead
boasting he was untouchable because of his connections. Mr. Alo then threatened
to kill the applicant mother over the latest complaint.
[8]
The
applicants fled to several of their family members’ houses and eventually hired
a smuggler who supplied them with false British passports which they used to
enter Canada. The
applicants claimed that after leaving Nigeria the applicant mother’s
sister was beaten to death by Mr. Alo’s “boys”.
[9]
The
Board held that there was no nexus between the fear of the applicants and the
Refugee Convention grounds under s. 96 of IRPA because it was fear of criminal
violence or personal vendetta.
[10]
In
assessing the applicants’ claim for protection under s. 97 of IRPA the Board
found that the evidence produced by the applicants was untrustworthy and not
credible. The Board found that the affidavits purportedly sworn by the
applicant family’s grandmother and the applicant mother’s sister, which
supported the applicants’ claims, contained logical inconsistencies with regard
to why the affidavits were produced, the manner of production, and receipt by
the applicants of those affidavits. The Board assigned little weight or
credence to the two affidavits for those reasons, and for the failure of the
applicants to supply the Board with the originals.
[11]
The
Board determined that the documentary evidence of the applicants’ complaints to
the police appeared to be made in one of Nigeria’s document
factories.
[12]
The
Board similarly assigned little weight to undated photographs that purported to
show the applicant mother’s thigh injuries. The Board drew an adverse inference
from the applicants’ failure to obtain a physician’s report that would verify
that such injuries could be caused from a hot oil burn. In keeping with the
previous credibility findings, the Board held that photographs failed to
sufficiently provide trustworthy and credible evidence to prove that the
applicant mother was in fact injured by Mr. Alo.
[13]
On
August 14, 2008 the Board rendered a negative decision, concluding that the
applicants did not satisfy their burden of establishing a serious possibility
under a Convention ground or that it is more likely than not that they would
personally face a risk to their lives, or risk of cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment.
[14] The
applicants subsequently filed a PRRA application and an H&C
application for permanent residence on August 25, 2008.
[15]
The
PRRA application was based upon the applicants’ same risk in Nigeria from Mr.
Alo. The applicants argued that Nigeria provided inadequate
state protection to women and children who were the victims of gender based
violence. The applicants provided news articles and country condition
documentation as well some medical documentation and photographs to support the
applicants’ narrative. The applicants submitted two pieces of new evidence.
First, the eldest child applicant disclosed that she had been raped by Mr. Alo.
Second, the applicants disclosed that since the negative Board decision the
applicant mother’s sister was beaten to death by Mr. Alo.
[16]
The
H&C decision was based on the same risks that were cited in the PRRA
application. In addition to risk, the applicants argued that it was not in the
best interests of the applicant children to be sent back to Nigeria because
they would be at risk of abuse at the hands of Mr. Alo who may prevent the
family from applying for permanent residence visas from Nigeria. The
applicants argued that Mr. Alo may prevent the eldest child from going to
university and try to use her for prostitution and drugs. The applicant
submitted that departure from Canada would sever many social and communal ties
they had to Canada cause the
applicant mother to lose her current employment.
[17]
The
immigration officer rendered the H&C decision on March 18, 2009 and PRRA
decision on March 19, 2009.
Decisions under review
PRRA decision
[18]
The
immigration officer states at page 4 of the decision that the risks cited by
the applicants are the based on the same allegations that were made to the
Board. The immigration officer held that the applicants failed to provide
objective documentary evidence which supports the allegation that the eldest child
applicant was raped or subjected to trafficking by Mr. Alo.
[19]
The
immigration officer examined the news article that purported to report on the
murder of the applicant mother’s sister. The immigration officer had reservations
about the authenticity of the news article since the original newspaper was not
provided, no other supporting documentation was provided to prove the sister’s
murder, and the article mentioned the adult applicant, but none of the victim’s
other sisters or mother in Nigeria.
[20]
The
immigration officer stated that even if the incident in the news article took
place, the suggestion that Mr. Alo may harm the applicant family in the future
was speculative. The officer was satisfied that the article, if true,
demonstrated that Nigerian police acted appropriately in arresting Mr. Alo and
investigating the allegations.
[21]
The
immigration officer reviewed the medical evidence and photographs that
purported to show the extent of injuries suffered by the applicant mother and
accepted the existence of those injuries. However, the immigration officer held
that the medical evidence could not establish that the aforementioned injuries
were sustained at the hands of Mr. Alo.
[22]
The
immigration officer canvassed the country condition documentation and news
articles but held that they did not indicate that the applicants faced a
personalized risk. The immigration officer noted that Nigeria’s police and
justice systems were not perfect but were nevertheless adequate for a
developing democracy and the applicants had not provided clear and convincing
proof of lack of state protection.
[23]
The
immigration officer stated that the general country conditions had not changed
with respect to the applicants since the RPD hearing. The PRRA application was
therefore denied.
H&C Decision
[24]
The
H&C decision relied on the same objective evidence that was cited in
the PRRA decision.
The officer concluded that it would not constitute undue hardship for the
applicants to avail themselves of Nigeria’s
adequate state protection. The immigration officer determined that the evidence
on the record did not establish that Mr. Alo is currently seeking the
applicants.
[25]
The
immigration officer held that none of the personal ties the applicants have
forged in Canada would cause the applicants undue hardships if they were to
return to Nigeria. Employment,
friendships, and community ties were expected to be severed in removal
situations, and in the absence of sufficient evidence of a significant negative
impact that would constitute an unusual and undeserved or disproportionate
hardship, the severing of these ties could not be held to be a determinative valid
H&C factor.
[26]
The
immigration officer considered the best interests of the child and held that
the applicant children would not face unusual and undeserved or
disproportionate hardship in relocating to Nigeria because they
grew up in Nigeria and were
enrolled in the private school system.
[27]
The
immigration officer determined that the degree of establishment in Canada was
not beyond what was expected from refugee claimants who spent a year and half
in Canada. The
applicants were all engaged in some form of volunteer and employment
relationships in their community. There was no evidence that the applicants
were integrated in Canada to such an extent that unusual and undeserved
or disproportionate hardship not anticipated by IRPA would result from their
removal.
[28]
On
the other hand, the applicants had familial ties to Nigeria and recently
lived, studied, and worked there. The applicants had knowledge of Nigerian
culture and society.
[29]
The
officer acknowledged that Canada may a more desirable place to live then Nigeria, but the
difference in desirability is not determinative of an H&C assessment.
[30]
The
H&C application was therefore denied.
LEGISLATION
[31]
Section
25 of IRPA permits the Minister to exempt an applicant from one or more
requirements of IRPA if the Minister is satisfied that humanitarian and
compassionate reasons justify the granting of the exemption:
25. (1) The Minister shall, upon request of a foreign
national in Canada who is inadmissible or who does not meet the requirements of this
Act, and may, on the Minister’s own initiative or on
request of a foreign national outside Canada, examine the circumstances concerning the
foreign national and may grant the foreign national permanent
resident status or an exemption
from any applicable criteria or obligation of this Act if
the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian and
compassionate considerations relating to them, taking into account the best
interests of a child directly affected, or by public policy considerations.
|
25. (1) Le
ministre doit, sur demande d’un étranger se trouvant au Canada qui est
interdit de territoire ou qui ne se conforme pas à la présente
loi, et peut, de sa
propre initiative ou sur demande d’un étranger se trouvant hors du
Canada, étudier le cas
de cet étranger et peut lui octroyer le statut de résident permanent ou lever
tout ou partie des critères et obligations applicables,
s’il estime que des circonstances
d’ordre humanitaire relatives à l’étranger — compte tenu de l’intérêt
supérieur de l’enfant
directement touché — ou l’intérêt public le justifient.
|
[32]
Section
112(1) of IRPA allows persons subject to a removal order to apply to the
Minister for protection:
112. (1) A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1),
may, in
accordance with the regulations, apply to the
Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal
order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection
77(1).
…
|
112. (1) La
personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n’est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1)
peut, conformément
aux règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle est visée par une
mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe
77(1).
…
|
[33]
Section
113(a) of IRPA allows a PRRA applicant to present only evidence that arose
after the rejection of the refugee claim:
113. Consideration of an application for protection
shall be as follows:
(a) an applicant whose claim to refugee protection
has been rejected may present only
new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not
reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been
expected
in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of
the rejection;
…
|
113. Il est
disposé de la demande comme il
suit :
a) le
demandeur d’asile débouté ne peut présenter
que des éléments de
preuve survenus depuis le rejet ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement
accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’il n’était pas raisonnable, dans les
circonstances, de s’attendre à ce qu’il les ait présentés au moment du rejet;
…
|
[34]
Subsection
161(2) of the IRPR requires the applicant to identify new evidence:
…
(2) A person who makes written submissions must identify
the evidence presented
that meets the requirements of paragraph 113(a) of
the Act and indicate how that evidence relates to them.
|
…
(2) Il désigne, dans
ses observations écrites, les éléments de preuve qui satisfont aux exigences
prévues à l’alinéa 113a) de la Loi et indique dans quelle mesure ils
s’appliquent dans son cas.
|
ISSUES
[35]
The
sole issue on this application is reasonableness of the immigration officer’s
PRRA and H&C decisions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[36] In Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 372 N.R. 1, the Supreme Court of Canada held
at paragraph 62 that the first step in conducting a standard of review analysis
is to “ascertain whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a
satisfactory manner the degree of (deference) to be accorded with regard to a
particular category of question (see also Khosa v. Canada (MCI), 2009
SCC 12, per Justice Binnie at para. 53).”
[37]
The
Federal Court of Appeal recently held in Kisana v. Canada (MCI), 2009
FCA 189, per Justice Nadon at para. 18 that the standard of review of an
immigration officer’s H&C decision is reasonableness.
[38]
This
case concerns the relative weight assigned to evidence, the interpretation and
assessment of such evidence, and whether the officer had
proper regard to all of the evidence when reaching a decision. It is clear
as a result of Dunsmuir and Khosa that such questions are to be
reviewed on a standard of reasonableness (see also my decisions in Pathmanathan
v. Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 885; Lionel v. Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 236; Christopher
v. Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 964, Ramanathan v. Canada (MCI), 2008 FC
843; and Erdogu v. Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 407, [2008] F.C.J. No. 546 (QL),
per Justice Mandamin).
[39]
In reviewing the
Board's decision using a standard of reasonableness, the Court will consider
"the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within
the decision-making process" and "whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law." (Dunsmuir at paragraph 47; Khosa, supra,
at para. 59).
ANALYSIS
The adequacy of the
applicants’ evidence and its consideration
[40]
The
applicants submit that the immigration officer made several errors in requiring
more objective evidence than the applicants could reasonably be expected to
produce.
[41]
First,
the applicants submit that the officer erred in requiring objective documentary
evidence to support that the eldest child applicant, Omobola, was raped or
subjected to trafficking by Mr. Alo. In regard to Omobola’s disclosure of rape,
the applicants submit that the officer failed to consider the Board’s Gender
Guidelines.
[42]
Second,
the applicants submit that the officer erred by drawing an adverse inference
from the applicants’ failure to produce the original newspaper that reported on
the applicant mother’s sister’s murder. Third, by requiring the applicants to
produce a death certificate or police report of the applicant sister’s death. Fourth,
by requiring the applicants to provide supporting objective documentary
evidence indicating that the applicants continue to be sought by Mr. Alo. Fifth,
by holding that the medical letter written by a registered nurse Laura
Kollenberg did not further the applicant mother’s claim for hardship.
[43]
This
Court has held that a PRRA application is not an opportunity to reargue a
failed refugee claim but rather an opportunity to present evidence that demonstrates a development that is new,
different or additional to the evidence that was before the Board (see my
decisions in: Kaybaki v. Canda
(Solicitor General of Canada), 2004 FC 32, 128 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 784; Singh v. Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 774, at para. 18). An
immigration officer deciding a PRRA must respect the negative refugee
determinations of the Board “unless there is new evidence of facts that might have affected the
outcome of the RPD hearing if the evidence had been presented to the RPD” (Raza v. Canada (MCI), 2007 FCA 385, 370 N.R. 344, per Justice Sharlow at para. 13).
[44]
The applicants in this
case raised the same risks that were raised in front of the Board. The Board
rejected the applicants’ claims because their evidence was deemed to be
untrustworthy and without credibility.
[45]
Considering the negative
credibility findings of the Board, it was not unreasonable for the officer to
require objective documentary evidence to support the risks which the
applicants submitted they would face upon removal to Nigeria.
[46]
The evidence produced by
the applicants was equivocal when it came to demonstrating hardship for the
purposes of the H&C application. This Court may believe the applicants when
they state that they sincerely believe that hardship will befall them upon
return to Nigeria. However, it was incumbent upon the applicants to adduce
proof of any claim upon which the H&C application lies (Owusu v.
Canada (MCI), 2004 FCA 38, per Justice Evans at para. 5).
[47]
The applicants’ evidence,
if accepted as credible which was not, may have established past hardship, but
it could not establish future or ongoing hardship to the applicants or their
family. It was therefore open to the officer to hold that the evidence provided
by the applicants did not establish the probability of hardship as a result of
harassment by Mr. Alo.
[48]
With regard to the
eldest daughter’s allegations of rape by Mr. Alo, this Court is of the view
that it was reasonably open for the officer to require objective documentary
evidence. There was nothing stopping the applicants from submitting a
psychological report that would have allowed the officer to conduct a “careful
and compassionate” assessment (Fernandez v. Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 232,
per Justice Hughes at para. 5). The allegation of rape by the mother in her
PRRA application was not even mentioned by the daughter in her own PRRA
application. This omission undermines the credibility of the “last-minute” rape
allegation, which, in any event, ought to have been presented before the
Refugee Protection Division. It is not new evidence, and the daughter would
have mentioned it to her mother earlier if it was true.
[49]
This Court is of the view the
evidence presented to the immigration officer for both the H&C and PRRA was
reasonably found to not show a risk or hardship on a forward looking basis. The
officer was therefore reasonable in concluding that applicants have failed to
discharge their evidentiary onus.
Best interests
of the children
[50]
The applicants submit that the officer
was not alert, alive and sensitive to the best interests of the children. The
officer erred by limiting the discussion of the best interests to the
availability of private schooling in Nigeria. On the
question of schooling, the officer is alleged to have assumed that the
applicant mother could pay the children’s tuition, even though in her Personal
Information Form the applicant mother states that the Mr. Alo was the one who
paid the children’s tuition.
[51]
The
H&C officer engages in a detailed review of the children’s individual
circumstances, noting their level of schooling and success in Canada. The officer
states that the applicants have not been forthcoming with claims of specific
hardships other than the risk presented by Mr. Alo. This determination was
reasonably open to the officer. The record reveals no other hardship claims
except for the risk posed by Mr. Alo, which was fully addressed above, and the
educational concerns of the children, which the officer evaluated.
[52]
The
officer considered the applicant children’s past experience in Nigeria and
reasonably determined that there was no indication why they would not be able
to reintegrate into their old lives once they return:
Submissions indicate that the PA’s
children attended Pampers Private School and Jewels International School while living in Nigeria and the submission before me
indicate that the children would not be able to return to these private
learning centres.
[53]
The
officer provided reasons for the above determination, basing it on the
following facts:
Submissions show that the children’s
mother tongue is English and Efik and that they are fluent in both languages;
the children have been raised in Nigerian culture and it is noted that they
were of school age when they arrived in Canada, and have been educated in the
private school system in their home country; it is reasonable to expect that
they are familiar with Nigerian society and their adjustments in re-settling in
Nigeria would be minimal.
[54]
In my view the officer
provided a reasonable analysis for his conclusion that the best interests of
the children in this case did not point toward a hardship not expected by IRPA
if the applicants were to be removed to Nigeria. The
evidence indicated that the applicant mother is a qualified nurse who could
provide for her children in Nigeria. Not being able to return to a private school in Nigeria is not a
hardship warranting an H&C or PRRA application.
[55]
This ground of review
must therefore fail.
Availability of state
protection
[56]
The
applicants submit that the immigration officer erred in finding that adequate
state protection exists in Nigeria and that the applicants
failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that they made reasonable
efforts to avail themselves of that protection. The applicants concede that the
officer appreciated the difference between the hardship test in an H&C
application and a PRRA application. They argue that the officer did not
evidence in his reasons a consideration of whether Mr. Alo managing to find the
applicants would constitute hardship (Singh v. Canada (MCI), 2008 FC
1263, per Justice Pinard at para. 20).
[57]
The
applicants submit that the finding of adequate state protection which the
applicants could have accessed through the Nigerian Police Forces (NGF), Criminal
Investigation Unit (CID), and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), is
contradicted by the findings of the officer who held that the documentary
evidence indicated that the NPF operates with impunity and that the NHRC is not
empowered to act cases such as this.
[58]
In Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ward,
[1993] 2
S.C.R. 689, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that refugee protection is a form of "surrogate
protection" intended only in cases where protections from the home state
are unavailable.
[59]
Further, the Court
held that except in situations where there has been a complete breakdown of the
state apparatus, there exists a general presumption that a state is capable of
protecting its citizens. While the presumption of state
protection may be
rebutted, this can only occur where the refugee claimant provides "clear
and convincing" evidence confirming the state's inability to provide
protection. Such evidence can include testimony of similarly situated
individuals let down by the state protection arrangement, or the refugee claimant's
own testimony of past incidents in which state
protection was not
provided (see Ward, supra,
at 724-725).
[60]
In
Kadenko, supra,
the Federal Court of Appeal held that in order to rebut the
presumption of state protection, refugee claimants
must make "reasonable efforts" at seeking out state protection, and that the burden on the claimant
increases where the state in question is democratic.
[61]
Consequently,
the applicants had to adduce relevant and reliable evidence with sufficient
probative value that satisfies the trier of fact on a balance of probabilities
that state protection is inadequate.
[62]
In
the case at bar the officer found that the applicant mother contacted the local
police on two occasions, after the applicant mother discovered Mr. Alo’s
firearms, and when Mr. Alo beat her in front of the police. The local police
became involved a third time with the applicants’ family when the applicant
mother’s sister was allegedly murdered by Mr. Alo. For that incident the
officer found that the police acted appropriately.
[63]
It
is clear that state protection in Nigeria is not perfect. The
officer acknowledged this by canvassing the substantial volume of country
condition information. However, state protection need not be perfect; rather
adequacy of state protection is all that is required.
[64]
In
my view the officer reasonably held that the applicants failed to discharge
their evidentiary burden. The evidence of state protection in this case is
mixed. The police in this case investigated the applicants’ allegations and
allegedly arrested Mr. Alo at least once.
[65]
Having weighed the country condition
evidence against the evidence produced by the applicants, it was reasonably
open to the officer to hold that adequate state protection was available
for the applicants and that it would not constitute an unusual and undeserved
or disproportionate hardship for the applicants to avail themselves of that
protection.
CERTIFIED QUESTION
[66] Both parties
advised the Court that this case does not raise a serious question of general
importance which ought to be certified for an appeal. The Court agrees.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
The
application for judicial review is dismissed.
“Michael
A. Kelen”