Docket: IMM-6316-11
Citation: 2012 FC 547
Ottawa, Ontario, May 4, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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ANDREA EUGENIA SABOGAL RIVEROS
ANGEL ANDRES VARGAS BUSTOS
EDILMA BUSTOS DE VARGAS
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This
is an application under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27 (Act) for judicial review of the decision
of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board,
dated 19 August 2011 (Decision), which refused the Applicants’ application to
be deemed Convention refugees or persons in need of protection under sections
96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Principal Applicant is 32 years old and currently lives with her husband in Hamilton. The
Secondary Applicants are her husband (Vargas) and mother-in-law (Bustos). All
are citizens of Colombia who claimed protection because they are afraid
of FARC guerrillas in that country.
[3]
When
the Principal Applicant lived in Colombia she worked as a
commercial investments advisor for the Bank of Colombia (Bank). As such, she
was responsible for serving the Bank’s clients who had personal monthly incomes
of more than 6 million pesos – approximately $3,000 – and corporations with
investments worth more than 150 million pesos – approximately $80,000. The Bank
restricted access to information about these clients to protect their
confidentiality, but the Principal Applicant had access because of her duties.
[4]
In
March 2008, the Principal Applicant opened a business chequing account for
Pabon Castro Barristers and Associates (Pabon). She was responsible for managing
this account up to the time of her resignation from the bank in February 2009.
In November 2008, the Principal Applicant learned that Pabon’s legal
representative, Margarita Pabon Castro (Castro), was connected to a money
laundering operation involving a company called DMG.
[5]
When
the Bank learned that Pabon was connected to the money laundering operation,
its legal department ordered that Pabon’s account be cancelled. The Bank closed
Pabon’s account and issued a cheque to Castro for the outstanding balance –
approximately 34 million pesos (approximately $18,000) – on 12 December 2008.
Castro was in detention at that time, so the Bank could not deliver the cheque
to her. She was also Pabon’s sole legal representative, so only she could
access funds from the account.
[6]
A
man calling himself Jorge Tovar called the Principal Applicant at work and told
her that his company, Tovar Legal Consulting (TLC), had been referred to
conduct investments at the Bank. As she would later learn, “Jorge Tovar” was an
alias of Commander Ruben of FARC’s Urban Bloque (Ruben). The Principal
Applicant arranged to meet Ruben at his office to determine if it was
appropriate for the Bank to take on TLC as a client. On 29 December 2008, the
Principal Applicant left her office to meet Ruben at the appointed time. While
she was in the basement of her office building, Jorge Tovar approached her and
asked what the outstanding balance was in Pabon’s account. Although this man
told the Principal Applicant he was going to be in charge of their relationship
from that point on, she refused to give him confidential information about
Pabon’s account. The man left and the Principal Applicant notified the Bank’s
security about what had happened.
[7]
After
this event, the Applicant went on holiday to the United States of America
(USA). She began her holiday on 30 December 2008 and intended to return to work
on 2 February 2009. Bustos took a phone call from Ruben at the home the
Applicants shared. Ruben told Bustos to look out the window, and when she did
she saw a man standing at the street corner near the house holding a cellular
phone. Ruben said that the best thing for the Principal Applicant to do was to
cooperate and stop hiding or the she and Vargas would pay the consequences. He
then hung up. The Applicants discussed this call and concluded that they were
dealing with an upset client.
[8]
Vargas
took a second call at the Applicants’ home on 30 January 2009. The caller asked
for the Principal Applicant and identified himself as Jorge Tovar. Vargas told him
the Principal Applicant was not at home, asked him to stop calling, and told
him to contact the Bank if he needed anything. The caller shouted at Vargas,
saying that the Principal Applicant should not hide anymore or he would be a
widower. When she learned of this phone call, the Principal Applicant decided
to inform her superiors at the Bank when she returned from her holiday on 2
February 2009.
[9]
Ruben
called the Principal Applicant at home on 1 February 2009. He identified
himself as Commander Ruben and said she knew him as Jorge Tovar. He demanded
that she tell him the balance in Pabon’s account and send him the money. He
reminded her that he was in charge and said that he would contact her again to
tell her where to send the money. He also told her not to tell anyone or he
would make it hard for her family. After this call, the Applicants disconnected
their phone and concluded they were dealing with FARC rather than an upset
client as they had earlier surmised.
[10]
Ruben
called the Principal Applicant on her cellular phone on 8 February 2009. He
again demanded the money from the Pabon account. The Principal Applicant told
him that the account was closed and only Pabon’s legal representative or an
authorized person could receive the balance. He told her he would show he was
authorized, and he also demanded further information on the Bank’s other
clients. Ruben said the Principal Applicant would suffer the consequences if
she did not give him the information he required.
[11]
The
Principal Applicant believed she could not tell her superiors at the Bank what
was happening. Two men attacked her on her way home from work on the evening of
13 February 2009. These men did not identify themselves; they blocked her way
with motorcycles and one of them grabbed her arm and pushed her into a nearby
fence. This man asked if she understood how they authorized things and demanded
the balance from Pabon’s account. She begged him not to kill her and told him
the balance was 34 million pesos.
[12]
When
he heard that the balance was 34 million pesos, the man told the Principal
Applicant that she was lying. He said the account should have more than 300
million pesos in it and the money belonged to FARC. He also said that she had
until 22 February 2009 to give up the money or she would be killed.
[13]
The
Principal Applicant told Vargas about this incident. The Applicants also
contacted their friend, Abdelmur – a lieutenant in the Colombian Army – for
help. Abdelmur told them that the authorities could not help everyone
threatened by FARC because they focussed on protecting high-profile people. He
also told the Applicants that he doubted if FARC would stop harassing them even
if the Principal Applicant resigned from the Bank. Abdelmur said it would be
better for them to move and find a new place to live.
[14]
The
Principal Applicant resigned from the Bank on 11 February 2009 and the
Applicants moved to a friend’s house on 21 February 2009. They stayed there
until they fled Colombia on 28 February 2009. The Applicants first went
to the USA, from where
they contacted the Prinicpal Applicant’s sister in Canada. The sister
advised them to claim protection in Canada, so they came here and
claimed protection on 13 March 2009.
[15]
The
RPD joined the Applicants’ claims under subsection 49(1) of the Refugee
Protection Division Rules SOR/2002-227 and heard their claims on 31 March
2011. The RPD made its Decision on 19 August 2011 and notified the Applicants
on 24 August 2011.
DECISION
UNDER REVIEW
[16]
The
RPD reviewed the events which led the Applicants to claim protection in Canada. It found
that they had established their identities through certified copies of their
Colombian passports. It then went on to examine the merits of their claims.
Not Convention Refugees
[17]
The
RPD found that the Principal Applicant had refused to break the law and commit
a purely criminal act. Although she had asserted at the hearing that her
refusal to do what FARC demanded could be seen as an imputed political opinion,
the RPD rejected this assertion. It said that she had expressed no political
opinion and that she said several times she was only allowed to release funds
to Pabon’s authorized representative. The RPD concluded that the Applicants had
not established a nexus to a Convention ground, so their claim for protection
as Convention refugees under section 96 of the Act failed.
Internal
Flight Alternative
[18]
Having
found that they were not Convention refugees, the RPD turned to the question of
whether they were persons in need of protection under section 97 of the Act.
The RPD concluded they were not persons in need of protection because an
internal flight alternative (IFA) was available to them in Medellin,
Colombia.
Under subparagraph 97(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the existence of an IFA was
determinative of their claim.
[19]
The
RPD instructed itself on the test for an IFA; it noted that Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1991] FCJ 1256 (FCA) (QL) establishes
a two pronged test. First, the RPD must be satisfied, on a balance of
probabilities, that a claimant is not at risk in the area of the country where
an IFA is situated. Second, the RPD must be satisfied that it would not be
unreasonable for the claimant to seek refuge in the IFA.
Risk in all
Columbia
[20]
In
relation to the first prong of the test, the RPD found that FARC targeted the
Principal Applicant only because she worked at the Bank. She could only access
the money FARC wanted while she worked there. After she resigned from the Bank
on 16 February 2009, FARC would no longer be interested in her. The RPD
inferred from Ruben’s knowledge of the Bank’s operations that he had an inside
contact who would be able to tell him who became responsible for Pabon’s
account after the Principal Applicant left. Through this contact Ruben would be
able to access information which would show the Principal Applicant had not
taken the money. The RPD concluded that any information the Principal Applicant
had about the money would be stale. As she has not worked at the bank for 2 ½
years, she would not face a risk on this basis.
[21]
The
RPD agreed with the Applicants’ assertion that FARC is still able to carry out
violence in Colombia. However,
the RPD found that the Principal Applicant was not a whistle-blower or human
rights defender – two groups that face a heightened risk in Colombia. When she
handled the Pabon account, the Principal Applicant was simply doing her job and
she would have been replaced after she left. She did not report the threats to
anyone and, since FARC likely had someone inside the Bank, that person would
know the Principal Applicant had not reported the threats and had left the
country when pressed.
[22]
Based
on the documentary evidence before it, the RPD concluded that FARC’s ability to
pursue the Principal Applicant was limited and that FARC would not pursue her
to Medellin if she fled
there.
Reasonable
Relocation
[23]
The
RPD found that it was reasonable in all the circumstances for the Principal
Applicant and her family to relocate to Medellin. She and
Vargas both had excellent work and education histories so they would be employable
in Medellin. It would
not be unduly harsh for them to relocate there.
[24]
The
RPD concluded that the Applicants’ claim under section 97 failed because they
had an IFA available to them.
ISSUES
[25]
The
Applicants raise the following issues in this case:
a.
Whether
the RPD’s conclusion that they did not have a nexus to a Convention ground was
reasonable;
b.
Whether
the RPD’s conclusion they had an IFA was reasonable.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
[26]
The
Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held that
a standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead,
where the standard of review applicable to a particular question before the
court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that
standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing
court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of
review analysis.
[27]
The
standard of review applicable to the first issue in this case is
reasonableness. In D.F.R. v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 772, Justice Donald
Rennie held at paragraph 8 that the existence of a nexus to a Convention ground
is a question of fact. As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Dunsmuir,
above, at paragraph 51, questions of fact generally attract the reasonableness
standard of review.
[28]
The
standard of review applicable to the second issue in this case is also
reasonableness. In Martinez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2012
FC 5, Justice Yvon Pinard held at paragraph 8 that the standard of review
applicable to the RPD’s analysis of an IFA is reasonableness. Justice Richard
Mosley made a similar finding in Ponce v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2011 FC 1360, at paragraph 13, as did Justice Luc Martineau in
Zavala v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2009 FC 370 at
paragraph 5.
[29]
When
reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be
concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at
paragraph 47, and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v
Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at paragraph 59. Put another way, the Court should
intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls
outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.”
STATUTORY
PROVSIONS
[30]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in this proceeding:
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Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who,
by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of
nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
[…]
Person in Need of Protection
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a
person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they
do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual
residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds
to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention
Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part
of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that
country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful
sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards,
and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide
adequate health or medical care.
[…]
|
Définition de «
réfugié »
96. A qualité de
réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité,
de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se
trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de
cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
[…]
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au
risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture
au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une
menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans
le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou,
de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est
exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de
ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou
le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au
mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés
par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de
l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
[…]
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ARGUMENT
The
Applicants
Nexus
to a Convention Ground
[31]
The
Applicants argue that the RPD’s finding that they did not have a nexus to a
Convention ground was unreasonable because it was not based on the evidence.
They point to Ward v Canada (Attorney General), [1993]
2 SCR 689 for the proposition that political opinion can arise from an imputed
political opinion, regardless of a claimant’s actual beliefs. The evidence
before the RPD showed that FARC is a political organization and that when
people refuse to help FARC they are treated as enemies. The Applicants say that
nothing in the record shows that FARC would not see the Principal Applicant’s
refusal to help them as a political act. Although the RPD mentioned their
submissions on this point, the RPD did not say why it rejected their evidence.
It also did not find the Applicant was not credible, so the RPD must have taken
their evidence as true.
Internal
Flight Alternative
[32]
The
RPD’s conclusion on the IFA available to the Applicants was based on a plausibility
finding and Valtchev v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 2001 FCT 776 establishes that the RPD
should only make such findings in the clearest of cases. This was not such a
case. The Decision must be returned for reconsideration.
[33]
The
Applicants also say that the RPD’s conclusion that an IFA is available to them
is contradicted by the evidence. The Principal Applicant testified at the
hearing and in her Personal Information Form (PIF) that Abdelmur told her that
resigning from the Bank would not end her problems with FARC. Abdelmur had
first-hand knowledge about FARC’s operations because he fought against them
with the Colombian Army. The RPD ignored this relevant and reliable evidence.
[34]
The
RPD also ignored the expert report of Dr. Mark Chernick – an associate
professor of Government and Latin American Studies at Georgetown University –
called Country Conditions in Colombia Relating to Asylum Claims in Canada.
This report says that victims of FARC cannot know if threats against them will
be carried out. Once targeted, FARC’s victims can only comply with FARC’s
demands or leave Colombia. Dr. Chernick is a highly qualified expert; he
is at least as qualified as Dr. Judith Hellman. In Villicana v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 2009 FC 1205, I held that it was an error
for the RPD to discount expert evidence on Mexico from Dr.
Hellman. Because Dr. Chernick is as qualified as Dr. Hellman and Dr. Chernick’s
report was prepared under similar circumstances to Dr. Hellman’s, it was an
error for the RPD not to consider this report. Further, a report from the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees on Colombian asylum seekers
corroborates Dr. Chernick’s report. This means the RPD’s conclusion was
unreasonable.
[35]
The
Applicants also say that the RPD’s finding on IFA was speculative. When it
found that FARC would likely leave the Principal Applicant alone because she
has resigned from the Bank, the RPD unreasonably assumed FARC would follow the
RPD’s own logic.
The
Respondent
[36]
The
Respondent argues that, based on the evidence before it, the RPD’s finding on
nexus was reasonable. This finding was consistent with the Principal
Applicant’s testimony that, because she had resigned nearly two years ago, her
knowledge about the Bank’s clients would be dated. The Respondent notes that
the question of nexus is within the RPD’s jurisdiction and says that the Court
should defer to the RPD’s finding of fact on this issue.
[37]
The
Applicants bore the onus of establishing a nexus and, where there no evidence
on the record to establish a particular Convention ground, the RPD is under no
obligation to consider or specifically address that ground (see Casteneda v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 1012 at paragraph
19). There was no evidence before the RPD that FARC imputed any political views
to the Principal Applicant. She did not express any political opinion; all she
told FARC was that she could only release funds to an authorized representative
of Pabon. The RPD’s conclusion that the Applicants had no nexus to any of the
Convention grounds was reasonable.
[38]
Although
the Applicants object to the RPD’s IFA finding, this is not a reason for the
Court to find that it was unreasonable. As with the finding on nexus, this is a
factual finding to which the Court should defer. The Respondent points to Rasaratnam,
above, for the proposition that once IFA becomes an issue, the onus is on the
claimant to show that it is not available. In this case, the Applicants did not
discharge the onus on them. On the contrary, several facts on the record
support the RPD’s conclusion:
a.
The
Principal Applicant can no longer assist FARC and Ruben would know this through
his contact at the Bank,;
b.
The
Principal Applicant is not a member of the groups FARC typically targets for
reprisal;
c.
Because
of Ruben’s contact at the Bank, FARC would know that the Principal Applicant
had not informed on them;
d.
Recent
documentary evidence indicated that FARC’s ability to carry out acts of
violence has been compromised by the Colombian Government’s actions;
e.
There
is no evidence to show why FARC would still be interested in the Principal
Applicant. They would likely be interested only in her successor at the Bank;
f.
Given
their work histories and education, the Applicants can reasonably relocate to Medellin;
g.
The
Principal Applicant testified that she could relocate to Medellin.
[39]
The
Respondent notes that the Court has upheld similar analyses of IFA by the RPD
in recent cases. See Velasquez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2011 FC 804, Ramirez v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 227, and Ramos v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 15.
The
Applicants’ Reply
[40]
The
Applicants say that, to ground a nexus finding, a political opinion only has to
be perceived by the persecutors and does not have to be expressed. In Ward,
above, the Supreme Court of Canada found that a political opinion imputed from
activities or behaviour may be based on an opinion incorrectly imputed to an
individual.
[41]
The
Applicants also say that it was an error for the RPD to require proof that
persecution would occur, rather than proof of a risk of persecution.
ANALYSIS
[42]
The
nexus issue does not need to be addressed because the RPD’s principal finding
on IFA is unreasonable and the Decision must be returned on this ground alone.
[43]
Following
Rasaratnam, above, the RPD found that the first prong of the test for an
IFA was satisfied in this case because:
a.
The
Principal Applicant was targeted solely because of her job at the Bank;
b.
The
Principal Applicant had the ability to release funds only while she worked at
the Bank;
c.
The
Principal Applicant has now left the Bank and so no longer has the ability to
release funds or provide usable information;
d.
FARC
would now focus upon whoever it is that can provide them with what they wanted
when they approached and threatened the Principal Applicant;
e.
Because
FARC seems to have a source inside the Bank who gave them the information they
required, they are likely not interested in the Principal Applicant;
f.
With
the reduced circumstances that FARC now finds itself in, and the passage of
time, it is unlikely that they would be searching for the Principal Applicant
nationally or that they would send someone to harm her.
[44]
In
other words, the basis of the finding is that the Principal Applicant has now
left the Bank and is not likely to be of any further interest to FARC. Hence,
on a balance of probabilities, the Applicants can go to Medellin where they
will not face a danger of torture or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment. However, it seems to me if FARC has now lost interest in the
Principal Applicant for these reasons, there would be no need for the
Applicants to move to Medellin. If they are not at
risk, they have no need to flee. The RPD’s reliance upon IFA means that it must
believe the Applicants are at risk in Bogota and so need to move to
the IFA.
[45]
The
RPD agrees with the Applicants that
FARC still possesses the ability to carry
out violence against targets in Colombia
if they are motivated to do so.
[46]
If
the Applicants need to take advantage of an IFA, then they must be under threat
from FARC which, as the RPD found, possess the ability to carry out violence
against its targets.
[47]
The
only way to make sense of this finding is to assume that the Applicants are
still under threat in Bogota but, because FARC is now operating under
reduced circumstances, it is not likely that FARC will go to the trouble of
hunting for the Applicants nationally.
[48]
As
the Applicants point out, this is basically a plausibility finding based upon
very little except the RPD’s own speculation about what FARC is likely to do in
the circumstances. This finding is contradicted by highly material evidence
that was before the RPD, which it appears to disregard. This evidence includes:
a.
The
advice the Principal Applicant received from Abdelmur – a lieutenant in the
Colombian army who has fought guerrillas – that her resignation from the bank
will increase the risk she faces. He said she would be killed for disobeying
FARC;
b.
The
objective country evidence from Dr. Chernick and, in particular, that
When the victim receives a death threat,
he or she cannot know if it will be carried out. They can only live in fear.
This is the objective. This is how the terrorism works.
[…] the modus operandi of Columbia’s illegal armed actors is to
assert authority through violence and intimidation. All the illegal and rogue
actors have detailed computerized records of their enemies. In Colombia, memories are long. Thought [sic]
long and tragic history of this conflict, reprisals have regularly taken place
months and years after the events. This has not been changed. At this time,
there is no credible evidence, data analysis that would suggest that the risk
to threatened individuals has lessened, or these individuals would be able to
avoid continued threats and harm were they return or returned.
Could an asylum seeker who had been
threatened years earlier move return [sic] to Colombia but move to
another region of the country. [sic] The answer is no. The FARC
guerrillas and the paramilitaries still operate in all areas of the country.
[...] All illegal groups, especially the FARC, have sophisticated computer
technology and have repeatedly tracked down those viewed as enemies to other
regions. They have an estimated 8,000-11,000 rural combatants and thousands of
urban militias connected into a highly sophisticated national network. There is
virtually no city or town where a person who has been once targeted would not
be looking over his shoulder, wondering if the FARC or another group might find
him or her, wondering if their name had been entered into the type of national,
computerized database that the FARC has so carefully developed.
c.
The
fact that FARC had no problem locating the Applicants in Bogota;
d.
General
Information in the National Documentation Package that an IFA or relocation
alternative is generally not available in Colombia.
[49]
The
RPD’s speculative conclusions on this point are simply not supported by the
evidence. This renders the Decision unreasonable and it is my view that it must
be returned for reconsideration. See Hassan v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] FCJ No 250 at paragraphs 7 and 8 and Smith
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 2009 FC 1194 at paragraph 49.
[50]
Counsel
agree there is no question for certification and the Court concurs.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S
JUDGMENT is that
1.
The
application is allowed. The decision is quashed and the matter is returned for
reconsideration by a differently constituted RPD.
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James
Russell”
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