Date:
20120106
Docket:
IMM-2235-11
Citation:
2012 FC 5
[UNREVISED CERTIFIED ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, the 6th day of January
2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Pinard
BETWEEN:
Victor
GONZALEZ MARTINEZ
Angelina RAMIREZ
RAMIREZ
Miguel Angel GONZALEZ
RAMIREZ
Applicants
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of
the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the panel)
filed pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act). The panel found that the applicants were neither
“refugees” nor “persons in need of protection” and thus rejected their claim
for refugee protection.
[2]
Victor
Gonzalez Martinez (the principal applicant), his wife Angelina Ramirez Ramirez and
their adult son Miguel Angel Gonzalez Ramirez (the applicants) are citizens of
Mexico. They claimed to fear for their lives due to events involving the
principal applicant in December 2006.
[3]
At
that time, when they were at a party organized by the wife of a man called Mr. Flores,
the principal applicant allegedly intervened in a dispute between Mr. and Mrs.
Flores. The party organizer allegedly then left her abusive husband and
reported his spousal abuse to the Mexican authorities. Mr. Flores apparently blamed
the principal applicant for this because of his intervention at the party, as
he believed that the principal applicant had encouraged his wife to report him
and leave him. Since then, the principal applicant and his family were
allegedly threatened.
[4]
The
panel found in its decision that the applicants were neither “refugees” nor “persons
in need of protection” within the meaning of the Act, since there was
insufficient evidence to support the refugee protection claim.
[5]
First,
under section 96 of the Act, the panel found that the applicants’ fear was not due
to their membership in a particular social group, contrary to the claims in
their Personal Information Forms. The panel found that the applicants were
threatened in Mexico for criminal reasons (Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2
SCR 689).
Consequently, the claim under section 96 of the Act was rejected.
[6]
The
refugee protection claim under paragraph 97(1)(a) of the Act was also
rejected, as the panel determined that there was no evidence that the
applicants risked facing torture if they were to return to Mexico.
[7]
Last,
the panel considered the refugee protection claim under paragraph 97(1)(b)
of the Act, specifically whether the danger they might face if
they returned to Mexico would be present “in
every part of that country”. The panel identified
Hermosillo and La Paz as internal flight
alternatives.
[8]
The
issue of internal flight alternative raised
in this case is determinative. The standard of review applicable here is
reasonableness, as this was a question of fact (Zavala v Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, 2009 FC 370, at paragraph 5 [Zavala]; Navarro
v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2008 FC 358, at paragraph 12 [Navarro];
Gomez v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2010 FC 1041, at
paragraph 11; Palacios v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2008
FC 816, [Palacios]).
[9]
The
applicants contend that the panel erred in finding that they had an internal
flight alternative because it did not take into account the evidence on the
record and ignored the applicants’ explanations and the contradictory evidence.
[10] Meanwhile,
the respondent argues that the panel considered all of the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, and its finding regarding the internal flight
alternative is reasonable.
[11] After
reviewing the relevant evidence, it seems to me that, contrary to the
applicants’ claims, the panel clearly considered the
contradictory evidence, specifically mentioning the principal applicant’s
testimony that associates of Mr. Flores would be able to find him anywhere
in Mexico. The panel also acknowledged that these associates were
criminals and that there is corruption in Mexico. However, the panel
relied on the documentary evidence to find that, despite this corruption, access
to confidential information is not automatic and the applicants did not prove
that their agents of persecution had the
contacts and resources needed to access that information. Consequently, the
applicants did not discharge their burden of proof. It was up to them, and not
the panel, contrary to their assertions, to show that Hermosillo and La Paz were
not reasonable internal flight alternatives
(Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (CA),
[2001] 2 FC 164 at para 11 [Ranganathan]; Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration) (CA), [1994] 1 FC 589 at paras 6 and 9 [Thirunavukkarasu];
Del Real v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2008 FC 140 at para
18 [Del Real]). The panel identified two specific locations in Mexico
where the applicants could live in safety. The identification of internal flight alternatives does not involve
determining whether the applicants would choose to move there, nor whether that
part of Mexico is attractive to them, but rather whether the IFA are realistic,
attainable options for them (Ranganathan at para 13). The panel
therefore had to determine if it was objectively reasonable for the applicants
to live in Hermosillo or La Paz without fear of persecution, taking into
account their personal circumstances (Ranganathan at para 13; Thirunavukkarasu
at paras 12, 13 and 17).
[12] The panel
was of the opinion that the applicants had not proven that these internal flight alternatives are objectively
unreasonable: “[i]t requires nothing less than [actual and concrete evidence] the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and
safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area.” (Ranganathan
at para 15; see also Del Real at para 30 and Palacios at
para 10).
[13] This finding
of the panel is reasonable, being justified and transparent:
the panel’s reasons fall within the range possible, acceptable outcomes which
are defensible in respect of the facts and the law, supported by the evidence
in the record (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para 47). It
was up to the panel to assess this evidence. Thus, it warrants deference from
this Court (Zavala at para 6). Further, the panel is presumed to have
considered all of the evidence, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary, and is not required to comment on every piece of evidence on
the record (Del Real, at paras 24, 32 and 33; Florea v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 598, at para 1 (CA);
Ramirez v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2008 FC 1214, at para
17).
[14] Here, the
Board did not perform a selective reading of the evidence, but took into
account the applicants' specific circumstances by considering internal flight
alternatives within Mexico. Like the panel, the case law states that it is not enough for claimants to file documentary evidence setting
out the presence
of corruption in Mexico (Del Real at para 25; Navarro at para
18). The applicants could not just claim, without supporting evidence, that
they could be found anywhere in Mexico using databases, because of the
corruption in their country and the crimes of their agents of persecution (Zavala
at para 15; Navarro at para 21).
[15]
As
stated in Palacios, at paragraphs 15 to 17:
In reading the decision, it is clear that [the panel] had consulted
the documents describing the situation in Mexico … [and] referred to the
objective documentary evidence in several places in its decision. [Thus, the panel] reasonably interpreted and analyzed all of the evidence and the
applicant[s]’ testimony.
Consequently, the Court’s intervention is not warranted.
[16] In conclusion,
since the existence of an internal flight alternative
in Mexico
leads to a refusal of the applicants’ refugee claim (Del Real at para
19 and Palacios at para 11), the application
for judicial review is dismissed.
[17] I agree with
counsel for the parties that no question for certification arises.
JUDGMENT
The
application for judicial review of the decision by the Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board dated March 9, 2011, is
dismissed.
“Yvon
Pinard”
Certified
true translation
Monica
F. Chamberlain
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