Date:
20120718
Docket:
IMM-9276-11
Citation:
2012 FC 901
Toronto, Ontario, July 18, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Gleason
BETWEEN:
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MAEDAH ALAVI MOFRAD
ZOHA ALAVI MOFRAD
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The
applicants, Maedah Alavi Mofrad and Zoha Alavi Mofrad, are sisters and citizens
of Iran, who fled that country and made refugee claims in Canada. They claim they would be at risk if returned to Iran by reason of their actual or
perceived political opinions.
[2]
The
applicants’ father was a civil servant in Iran and was detained by government
authorities for approximately six months from 2008 to early 2009. Neither
sister has a clear notion of the exact reasons for Mr. Mofrad’s detention,
other than it was apparently due to a belief that he was opposed to the
Ahmadinejad regime. In March 2009, Mr. Mofrad sent Maedah to England to study on a student visa, because he feared for her safety in Iran. That visa was set to
expire in October 2009. Mr. Mofrad did not originally send Zoha out of Iran because she was then engaged to be married, and the family believed that she was
accordingly less vulnerable than Maedah.
[3]
In
2009, Zoha became active in the anti-regime “Green Movement”, and claims to
have attended its meetings, distributed flyers, de-faced pro-Ahmadinejad
billboards and participated in anti-regime demonstrations. She alleges that in
August 2009 she was interrogated by members of the governmental security
service at her work about her activities and politics and that following the
questioning was summarily fired. Zoha claims that shortly thereafter her fiancé
broke off their engagement, due to fear that he might be viewed as being complicit
in her anti-regime activities or to share her anti-regime beliefs.
[4]
In
August 2009, by reason of what had transpired with Zoha, Mr. Mofrad made
arrangements for Maedah to be brought to Canada, where she made a refugee claim
in August 2009. A few months later, Zoha left Iran and went first to England and then, briefly, to Germany before coming to Canada. She arrived in Canada in May 2010 and, like her sister before her, made a refugee claim. She states she
did not seek refugee status in England or Germany as she wanted to join her
sister in Canada.
[5]
Although
the sisters filed separate claims and were represented by different counsel
before the RPD, the Board joined their files for hearing and issued a single
decision in respect of them. In its decision dated November 22, 2011, the RPD
rejected the applicants’ claims, finding neither to be a Convention refugee or
a person in need of protection, within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA or the Act].
Most of the hearing before the Board and virtually all of its decision were
devoted to consideration of Zoha’s situation. The Board premised its decision
on a finding that Zoha was not credible and accordingly determined that both
applicants’ claims were not well-founded.
[6]
In
this application for judicial review, the applicants seek to set aside the
decision of the RPD, arguing that the Board’s credibility determinations were
unreasonable, that the RPD erred in not fully considering or discussing Maedah’s
claim and that its assessment of their sur place claim, or claim to be
at risk by reason of the demonstrations they participated in while in Canada,
was unreasonable. While the applicants make several arguments regarding the
unreasonable nature of the Board's credibility determinations, only one of them
need be considered by me, as, for the reasons discussed below, it is
determinative and results in the Board's decision being set aside.
The applicable
standard of review
[7]
It
is well-settled that the reasonableness standard of review is applicable to
credibility findings made by the RPD (Aguebor
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 160 NR 315, [1993] FCJ No
732 (FCA) at para 4; Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1994), 169 NR 107, [1994] FCJ No 486 (FCA) at para 3 [Singh]; Cetinkaya
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 8 at para 17,
[2012] FCJ No 13).
[8]
The
reasonableness standard is an exacting one and requires the reviewing court afford
deference to the tribunal’s decision; a court cannot intervene unless it is
satisfied that the reasons of the tribunal are not “justified, transparent or
intelligible” and that the result does not fall “within the range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190). In applying
this deferential standard, it matters not whether the reviewing court agrees
with the tribunal’s conclusion, would have reached a different result, or might
have reasoned differently. So long as the reasons are understandable and the
result is one that is rational and supportable in light of the facts and the
applicable law, a court should not overturn an inferior tribunal’s decision
under the reasonableness standard of review.
[9]
In
assessing the reasonableness of a tribunal’s factual findings, the reviewing
court cannot and should not re-weigh the evidence (Khosa v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 SCC 12 at para 64, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339; Nekoie
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 363 at para 40,
214 ACWS (3d) 572; Matsko v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 691 at para 11). Indeed, the yardstick for determining the
reasonableness of the RPD’s factual determinations, including credibility
findings, is set out in paragraph 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC,
1985, c F-7 [FCA], which provides that the impugned finding must meet
three criteria for relief to be granted: first, the finding must be palpably
erroneous; second, it must be made capriciously, perversely or without regard
to the evidence; and, finally, the tribunal’s decision must be based on the
erroneous finding (Rohm & Haas Canada Limited v Canada (Anti-Dumping
Tribunal) (1978), 22 NR 175, [1978] FCJ No 522 at para 5 [Rohm &
Haas]; Buttar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006
FC 1281 at para 12, [2006] FCJ No 1607). Where a finding, including a
credibility funding, contradicts the evidence before the tribunal, it falls
within the scope of paragraph 18.1(4)(d) of the FCA as such a finding is made
without regard to the evidence (see e.g. Rahal v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 319 at para 38, 213 ACWS (3d) 1003; Obeid
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 503 at para 13,
[2008] FCJ No 633).
[10]
The
starting point in reviewing a credibility finding is the recognition that the
role of a court is a very limited one because the tribunal had the advantage of
hearing the witnesses testify, observed their demeanor and is alive to all of
the factual nuances and contradictions in the evidence. Moreover, in many
cases, the tribunal has expertise in the subject matter at issue that the
reviewing court lacks. It is therefore much better placed to make credibility
findings, including those related to implausibility. Also, the efficient
administration of justice, which is at the heart of the notion of deference,
requires that review of these sorts of issues be the exception as opposed to
the general rule.
[11]
The
recognition of the primacy of a tribunal’s role in making credibility
determinations has important implications in judicial review applications such
as the present. On one hand, such recognition mandates a truly restrained
approach by the court in concluding that a credibility determination is
unreasonable and requires that the reviewing court assess both the reasons and
the record before deciding that a decision is unreasonable due to an
unreasonable credibility determination. On the other hand, where a tribunal’s
decision is determined to be based on an unreasonable credibility finding and
the decision is therefore held to be unreasonable, the matter must be remitted
to the tribunal for a re-hearing because it is for the tribunal, and not the
court, to re-assess credibility.
The impugned credibility finding
[12]
The
applicants assert that the key credibility finding made by the Board in the
decision was made without regard to the evidence before the RPD. This finding
centres on the RPD’s determination that Zoha did not offer any explanation for
why she did not elaborate on her reasons for seeking refugee protection in
Canada when she was interviewed by the port of entry official, prior to stating
during her testimony before the Board that she was too frightened to do so and
suffers from a heart condition that is worsened by stress. The Board found the
delay in offering this explanation to significantly impugn Zoha’s credibility.
[13]
In
terms of the delay in providing the explanation, the Board stated as follows:
“It was only subsequent to the panel noting such serious omissions [i.e. the
absence of details regarding the reason for her refugee claim in the statements
made to the port of entry official] did the claimant inform the panel, for
the first time, that she was too scared to explain why she was seeking
Canada's protection when she first made her claim” (decision at para 14)
[emphasis added]. In terms of the heart condition, the panel wrote: “With
respect to her subsequent explanation [i.e. given during her testimony] that
she was taking some sort of medication, not only was this the first time she
informed the panel of this, as a result of her counsel's line of questioning,
but she disclosed no documentation concerning such medication and/or that this
medication would [affect] her ability to explain her refugee claim, until after
the hearing” (decision at para 15) [emphasis added].
[14]
Counsel
for both parties concur that these findings are erroneous. Zoha mentioned her
heart condition and the fact that she was taking medication for it to the port
of entry official and explained in her Personal Identification Form [PIF],
which she completed shortly after her arrival in Canada, that she was too
frightened to say more than she had to the port of entry official regarding the
reasons for her seeking refugee status in Canada.
[15]
As
noted, the applicant asserts that these erroneous findings are sufficient, of
themselves, to set aside the Board’s decision as it was premised in large part
on these findings. The applicant points in this regard to the fact that these
issues were the ones first discussed by the Board in the decision, that they
were discussed in detail and that the Board concluded in respect of them that
Zoha’s “significant omissions in this regard seriously undermine her
credibility” (decision at para 16).
[16]
Counsel
for the respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the erroneous findings are
not so central to the Board’s decision that their erroneous nature should lead
to the Board’s decision being overturned. Rather, the respondent asserts that
the Board’s negative credibility determination can be upheld based on some of
the other factors the Board considered. However, counsel candidly admitted that
not all of these other factors are tenable and conceded that the Board’s
drawing a negative inference from the fact that Zoha did not attend a major
Green Movement rally was unreasonable as missing a single rally is not
inconsistent with the claim of being a Green Movement supporter and Zoha had
offered an explanation for not having attended.
[17]
In
my view, the applicant’s position must prevail and the decision must be set
aside because it does turn in large part on the erroneous findings made by the
RPD. The most significant basis for the Board’s negative credibility
determination was the finding that Zoha had not given the details behind her
refugee claim until the hearing. As noted, following its erroneous
determinations in this regard, the RPD stated that these erroneous
determinations “seriously undermined” Zoha’s credibility. The other points
relied on by the RPD to undercut her credibility are much less significant and,
as conceded by the respondent, at least one of them bears no weight.
[18]
Because
the Board’s determination that Zoha lacked credibility is largely based on
findings which contradict the evidence, the determination is unreasonable as it
was made without regard to the material before the Board. And, because the
Board rejected Zoha’s refugee claim by reason of its credibility determination,
it follows that the entire decision is unreasonable. This is not a situation
where the Board failed to discuss a point or issued inadequate reasons such
that the result might nonetheless be upheld as being reasonable. The core of
the Board’s conclusion centres on the unreasonable determination that Zoha
failed to provide details of her refugee claim until the hearing, which is
unsupportable in view of the uncontradicted evidence that was before the Board.
Accordingly, the portion of the Board’s decision that relates to Zoha’s claim
must be set aside.
[19]
The
parties concurred that if the decision in respect of Zoha’s claim was set
aside, the decision pertaining to Maedah’s claim must likewise be set aside as
the Board in effect treated it as being derivative of Zoha’s claim. Thus, this
portion of the decision will be set aside as well.
[20]
No
question for certification under section 74 of IRPA was presented and none
arises in this case.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1.
This
application for judicial review is granted;
2.
The
decision of the RPD dated November 22, 2011 in these matters is set aside;
3.
The
applicants’ refugee claims shall be remitted to the RPD for reconsideration by
a differently constituted panel;
4.
No
question of general importance is certified; and
5.
There
is no order as to costs.
"Mary J.L.
Gleason"
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