Docket: IMM-554-11
Citation: 2012 FC 33
Ottawa, Ontario, January 13, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
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HUA HE
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application by Hua He (the “Applicant”) for judicial review under s. 72
(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA],
of a decision by the Immigration Program Manager at the Canadian Embassy in Beijing, Sidney
Frank (the “Decision Maker”). The Decision Maker refused the Applicant’s application
for a permanent resident visa as a member of a provincial nominee class, on the
basis that she was inadmissible to Canada for misrepresentation under s.
40(1)(a) of IRPA.
[2]
For
the reasons that follow, I have not been persuaded that the Officer has erred
or that the principles of natural justice have been breached. As a result, the
application is dismissed.
FACTS
[3]
The
Applicant is a citizen of China. On March 8, 2010, she submitted her
application for permanent residence in Canada under the
New Brunswick Provincial Nominee Program along with her spouse and their son.
[4]
During
the initial assessment of the application, an immigration officer noted that
the Applicant had reported total earnings of approximately RMB 2,278,579
between 1997 and 2007. The application stated that this income was from working
as a sales manager/sales person at the Yunnan Weitong Bulding Material Co. Ltd
in Kumming,
Yunnan province
(the “Company”). The immigration officer asked the Anti-Fraud Unit to verify
the Applicant’s employment.
[5]
Hong
Yan Ren (“RHO” as is referred
to in the Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System (“CAIPS”) notes), a
Verification Assistant with the Anti-Fraud Unit, phoned the Company to
determine if and when the Applicant was employed there and if her stated income
could be accurate. He was also to verify the identity of Huang Liang Kun who
had signed the Applicant’s employment letter.
[6]
RHO called the
Company and was referred to Huang Shaolin who worked in the Company’s web
department and was responsible for preparing employee attendance sheets and
keeping a list of employees. Mr. Huang stated that he did not know the
Applicant.
[7]
RHO was then
referred to Huang Deng Ta, the Company’s General Manager who first stated that
he did not know the Applicant although he had been working for the Company for
over 10 years. When RHO called back two hours later, Huang Deng Ta
confirmed that he knew the Applicant and that she had worked for the Company
for that time period at the Company’s shop in Hongshengda.
[8]
These
phone calls raised concerns about the authenticity of the Applicant’s stated
employment at the Company. A letter detailing the concerns was sent to the
Applicant on August 9, 2010 (the “fairness letter”), giving her the opportunity
to respond and submit supplementary evidence. The Applicant responded by faxing
two letters on September 1, 2010 from Mr. Huang Deng Ta and Mr. Huang Shaolin.
Huang Deng Ta’s letter explained that he had made an error in the first call as
he had not worked closely with the Applicant when she was at the Company. Huang
Shaolin stated that he had said he did not know the Applicant because he did
not want to get into trouble, and that he had not known her well when she
worked at the Company.
[9]
On
September 20, 2010 the Applicant was interviewed by Visa Officer Daniel Unrau
(the “Officer”). The Officer repeated the concerns of the fairness letter, but
was not satisfied with the Applicant’s explanation. The Officer recommended to
the Decision Maker that the Applicant’s application be denied on the grounds of
misrepresentation.
THE IMPUGNED DECISION
[10]
The
Decision Maker decided that the Applicant is inadmissible under s. 40(1)(a) of
the IRPA because she had misrepresented her employment at the Company.
As per s. 40(2)(a) of the IRPA, the Applicant remains inadmissible into Canada for a period
of two years.
[11]
The
Decision Maker stated that this determination was based on the telephone
interviews conducted on July 6, 2010. It was also based on the Applicant’s
responses to the fairness letter and the responses in person at the interview
on September 20, 2010. The Decision Maker stated that the responses did not
alleviate the concerns.
[12]
The
specific concerns are outlined in the fairness letter as well as the CAIPS
notes by the Officer covering the September 20, 2010 interview. The Officer
expressed concern that:
- Huang Shaolin, who
had been employed at the Company for five years, stated that he did not know
the Applicant; and
- Huang Deng Ta, who
had been with the Company for 10 years, initially stated that he did not know
the Applicant, but two hours later explained that he did know the Applicant.
Huang Deng Ta had not been the Applicant’s supervisor and was in charge of
sales in a different region. However, the Officer was concerned that he would
say he didn’t know her as his brother Huang Liang Kun had been the Applicant’s
supervisor and the Applicant was a well-performing sales department manager.
[13]
The
Officer explained in the CAIPS notes that he was not satisfied that the
documents and statements at the interview alleviated the concerns that the
Applicant misrepresented her employment at the Company. The Officer stated that
he gave more weight to the telephone verification report than the information
provided later by the Applicant, as the latter “…appeared to have been prepared
for presentation purposes only” (Tribunal Record, p. 7).
ISSUES
[14]
The
Applicant has raised a number of issues, which can be captured by the following
questions:
a) Did the
Officer properly consider the Applicant’s explanations provided in response to
the fairness letter?
b) Was the
process by which the investigation was conducted adequate?
c) Are the
reasons for the decision provided to the Applicant flawed and/or inadequate?
ANALYSIS
[15]
A
foreign national wishing to reside in Canada on a permanent basis
must, before entering the country, file an application for permanent
residence. This visa will be issued if, after an examination, the visa officer
is convinced that the foreign national complies with the requirements of s.
11(1) of the IRPA and of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s. 70(1) [Regulations].
Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27
Application
before entering Canada
11.
(1) A foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for
any other document required by the regulations. The visa or document may be
issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the
foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
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Loi
sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, LC 2001, c 27
Visa
et documents
11.
(1) L’étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, demander à l’agent
les visa et autres documents requis par règlement. L’agent peut les délivrer
sur preuve, à la suite d’un contrôle, que l’étranger n’est pas interdit de
territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
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Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227
Issuance
70.
(1) An officer shall issue a permanent resident visa to a foreign national
if, following an examination, it is established that
(a)
the foreign national has applied in accordance with these Regulations for a
permanent resident visa as a member of a class referred to in subsection (2);
(b)
the foreign national is coming to Canada
to establish permanent residence;
(c)
the foreign national is a member of that class;
(d)
the foreign national meets the selection criteria and other requirements
applicable to that class; and
(e)
the foreign national and their family members, whether accompanying or not,
are not inadmissible.
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Règlement
sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2002-227
Délivrance
du visa
70.
(1) L’agent délivre un visa de résident permanent à l’étranger si, à l’issue
d’un contrôle, les éléments suivants sont établis :
a)
l’étranger en a fait, conformément au présent règlement, la demande au titre
d’une des catégories prévues au paragraphe (2);
b) il
vient au Canada pour s’y établir en permanence;
c) il
appartient à la catégorie au titre de laquelle il a fait la demande;
d) il
se conforme aux critères de sélection et autres exigences applicables à cette
catégorie;
e) ni
lui ni les membres de sa famille, qu’ils l’accompagnent ou non, ne sont
interdits de territoire.
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[16]
One
of the most important requirements of the IRPA in the context of a
permanent resident visa application is the obligation to provide true, correct
and complete information. Section 16(1) of the IRPA requires that a
person making an application under the IRPA truthfully answers all
questions that may be put to him or her. Indeed, the failure to do so will
result in the inadmissibility of the foreign national for grounds of
misrepresentation (see s. 40(1)).
[17]
A
foreign national seeking to enter Canada has a duty of candour
which requires disclosure of material facts. The Courts have recognized the
importance of full disclosure by applicants to the proper and fair
administration of the immigration scheme. As stated in section 9 of the Enforcement
Manual ENF 2 – Evaluating Inadmissibility, the purpose of paragraph
40(1)(a) of the IRPA is to ensure that applicants provide complete,
honest and truthful information in every manner when applying for entry into
Canada. As stated by my colleague Justice Mosley in Haque v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 315 at para 14:
Section 3 of the IRPA points to a number
of immigration objectives that should be kept in mind when administering the Act.
Among others, these objectives include enriching and developing the country
through social, economic and cultural means while ensuring the protection and
security of Canadians living here. In order to adequately protect Canada’s borders, determining
admissibility necessarily rests in large part on the ability of immigration
officers to verify the information applicants submit in their applications.
The omission or misrepresentation of information risks inducing an error in the
Act’s administration.
[18]
It
is against this legislative and regulatory backdrop that the decision rejecting
Ms. Hua He’s application must be reviewed.
[19]
Two
factors must be present for a finding of inadmissibility under subsection
40(1)(a) of the IRPA. First, the Decision Maker must conclude that
misrepresentations were made. Second, the misrepresentations must be material
in that they could induce an error in the administration of the IRPA.
This Court has determined that in both instances, the appropriate standard of
review is that of reasonableness (see, for example, Koo v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 931 at para 20, [2009] 3 FCR 446; Ghasemzadeh
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 716 at para 18, 372 FTR 247;
Mugu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 384 at
para 36, 79 Imm LR (3d) 64). Therefore, the Court shall intervene only if the
decision “does not fall within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which
are defensible in respect to the facts and law”(Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190). This is the standard against which
the first issue must be reviewed.
[20]
The
second and third questions raise issues of procedural fairness. Such issues
are to be reviewed on the standard of correctness (Suresh v. Canada (MCI),
2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.)
v Ontario (Minister of
Labour),
2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539).
a) Did the
Officer properly consider the Applicant’s explanations provided in response to
the fairness letter?
[21]
Counsel
for the Applicant submitted that the Officer did not understand the purpose of
a fairness letter and had a closed mind with respect to any explanation that
could be provided in response. As proof of this claim, counsel refers to the
following excerpt of the CAIPS notes, where the Officer wrote:
. . . [I] am not satisfied that the
documents and statements have alleviated the concerns that [the Applicant] misrepresented
her employment . . . In my assessment, I gave more weight to the telephone
verification report than to the information provided subsequent to the receipt
of our procedural fairness letter, as this appeared to have been prepared for
presentation purposes only. Now that the [Applicant] has been alerted to our
concerns, any further verifications of this information will not yield accurate
results as the verifying authorities are now aware of the circumstances and may
have been co-opted to provide false verifications.
Tribunal Record,
at p. 7
[22]
Having
carefully reviewed the Record, I disagree with the Applicant that it was
impossible for her to allay the concerns expressed by the Anti-Fraud Unit. As
previously indicated, the concerns regarding the Applicant’s alleged employment
and, by implication, the source of her funds, stemmed from the fact that both
Mr. Shaolin, who had been working at the Company for five years and was
responsible for preparing employees’ attendance sheets and keeping employee
names’ lists, and Mr. Deng Ta, the General Manager of the Company who was the
Applicant’s alleged direct manager in 2007, at first said that they did not
know the Applicant. During a second telephone conversation, the latter
recanted and said that he did not remember the Applicant at first since she had
been working at another branch of the Company; when pressed for more
information, he said he was busy and hung up the phone.
[23]
It
is true that, as a result of the fairness letter, both of these individuals
wrote letters explaining that they had made an error, and that they answered as
they did because of the privacy policy of the Company and to avoid getting into
trouble. The Officer was nevertheless entitled to give little weight to those
letters, in light of his interview with the Applicant and of his assessment of
the whole record.
[24]
First
of all, the Officer noted during the interview that the Applicant adduced
copies of payroll documents only from 1997 to 2000 and for 2005, and failed to
submit corroborating evidence regarding her employment at the Company between
2001 and 2004, as well as between 2006 and 2007.
[25]
The
Officer also found it implausible that Mr. Shaolin would say that he did not
know the Applicant because he was not certain if it was a caller from the
Embassy or someone pretending to be, and because of the alleged Company’s
privacy policy. Had it been the case, Mr. Shaolin could have simply answered
that he could not provide information concerning the Applicant because of said
privacy policy and transferred the Officer to a person in authority, or asked
for proof (by way of official letter or otherwise) that the caller was indeed
from the Embassy.
[26]
As
for Mr. Deng Ta’s explanation, the Officer could similarly find it
implausible. The General Manager wrote in his letter that “[w]ithout the
efforts of Ms. He and her colleagues in the sales department, it would be
impossible for the company to grow into its current size”. Indeed, Ms. He was
apparently awarded the “Excellent Employee” prize or title by the Company, and
was twice awarded (in 2003 and 2004) “Merit Certificates” for her excellent
performance in sales. As such, it was surprising that when RHO first called,
Mr. Deng Ta could not remember the Applicant.
[27]
In
coming to the conclusion that more weight should be given to the telephone
verification report than to the information provided following the fairness
letter, the Officer did not close his mind to the explanations provided but
simply did not find them plausible. The Applicant’s argument amounts to a
disagreement with the weight given by the Decision Maker to the explanations
offered. The fact that another decision maker or this Court might have
accepted these explanations as reasonable is not the applicable test on
judicial review.
[28]
The
Applicant was told of the Anti-Fraud Unit’s concerns and was given an
opportunity to address these concerns, which she did by providing letters from Messrs.
Shaolin and Deng Ta and by offering her own testimony at the interview. The
fact that the Officer did not accept her version does not mean that nothing
could have been done to alleviate his concerns or that he did not weigh all the
evidence in a fair or neutral manner. It is clear from the detailed CAIPS
notes and the affidavits of the Officer and the Decision Maker that they
considered and weighed all the evidence. Visa officers’ preference for
certain evidence over others is a matter of the probative value to be awarded
to said evidence. They can rely on criteria such as rationality and common
sense and, as such, reasonably draw adverse inferences with respect to the
claimant’s credibility from implausibilities. As long as a visa officer’s
findings are rationally based on the material before the tribunal and are made
in good faith, this Court will not intervene with the ultimate result.
b) Was the
process by which the investigation was conducted adequate?
[29]
Counsel
for the Applicant submitted that the Decision Maker had an obligation to
undertake further follow-up following the interview. It was also argued that
the investigative method chosen by the Respondent was inadequate, and that
relying on phone calls to inquire about the employment record of the Applicant
was not a valid basis upon which to base a decision on misrepresentation, given
the concerns with Chinese culture and privacy.
[30]
The
Applicant relies on Guo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 626, 148 ACWS (3d) 975, for her assertion that the Decision Maker
should have sought further evidence if he was not satisfied with the
explanations provided as a result of the fairness letter. In that case, there
was simply no evidentiary record to allow the immigration officer to disbelieve
the applicant. In the present case, however, there was an evidentiary record
upon which one could find that the Applicant misrepresented her employment at
the Company. This case is therefore closer to a decision rendered in Ni v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 162, wherein Justice Zinn
similarly found that it was reasonable not to make further follow-up inquiries.
The Respondent also correctly cites Heer v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1357, 215 FTR 57, for the
proposition that once the applicant has been given the opportunity to address
concerns, the officer is under no obligation to request that better, further
evidence be produced (at para 19).
[31]
As
for the second argument, there is little foundation to support a finding that
the process of interviewing employees at the Company is flawed because of
privacy issues or cultural differences. Not only is there no evidence about
cultural norms to support the Applicant’s contention, but this Court has held
that decision makers or visa officers posted abroad have significant knowledge
of the culture and situation of the country in which he or she works (see, for
example, Uppal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009
FC 445 at para 35; Mamishov v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2004 FC 1164 at para 23, 133 ACWS (3d) 506). The Decision Maker
testified by affidavit that this method is commonly used in the Canadian
Embassy in Beijing, and that other techniques would be used to carry out their
verifications if the norms in China were such that these methods would be
ineffective. He was not cross-examined by the Applicant, and there is no
reason to doubt the veracity of his statement.
[32]
Even
assuming that there is a confidentiality policy at the Company, Mr. Shaolin
could have mentioned it at that time and referred RHO to the
General Manager instead of telling him that he did not know the Applicant. As
previously mentioned, both Mr. Shaolin and Mr. Deng Ta could also have refused
to answer instead of saying that they did not know the Applicant.
[33]
For
all of the above reasons, I am therefore of the view that the Applicant’s
argument with respect to investigation techniques used at the Embassy is
without merit.
c) Are the
reasons for the decision provided to the Applicant flawed and/or inadequate?
[34]
Counsel
for the Applicant has a number of grievances with respect to the CAIPS notes; he
alleges they are confusing, appear to be incomplete, are out of chronological
order and are not always clear as to who actually wrote them. It follows, in
his view, that these notes are inadequate as reasons for decision, since it
makes it difficult to confidently rely on them as a complete review of the
evidence. He also expresses concerns with the entry “NOTES TAKEN IN WORD.
EDITED FOR CLARITY AND PLACED INTO CAIPS THIS DATE”, as it is not known what
was rendered clearer or edited. Finally, counsel submits that no reasons are
given to explain the final conclusion by the Decision Maker, who only says that
he agrees with the recommendation of the Officer.
[35]
Once
again, I find these arguments without merit. The flaws identified by the
Applicant revolve for the most part around some misunderstandings with respect
to the use of terms and acronyms. Once it was explained that “AFU” is the
acronym used for the Anti-Fraud Unit where RHO worked,
there remains no confusion as to who conducted the telephone interviews with
employees of the Company.
[36]
As
for the entry “NOTES TAKEN IN WORD. EDITED FOR CLARITY AND PLACED INTO CAIPS
THIS DATE”, the Applicant made much of it without ever substantiating her claim
that the CAIPS notes do not properly summarize the telephone conversations and
the interview. As there is no evidence or indication beyond blind speculation
to the contrary, as the Respondent argues, it must be assumed that the Decision
Maker and Officer acted in good faith. Allegations of misconduct, procedural
fairness or apprehension of bias are very serious allegations that must be
supported by solid and concrete evidence demonstrating that the conduct in
question derogates from the standard required. The Officer declared under oath
in his affidavit that he transferred his notes into CAIPS notes the day
following the interview, after having checked them for spelling and grammar,
and he certified that the content of the interview notes was not modified in
any way. If the Applicant wished to question the veracity of the Officer’s
declarations, she could have cross-examined him on his statutory declaration,
which she has not done.
[37]
The
Applicant’s final argument is that the reasons provided for the decision are
insufficient because they fail to explain how the decision was rendered. The
decision as communicated to the Applicant states:
I have reached this determination through
the results of a telephone verification conducted on July 6, 2010. You were
given an opportunity to address these concerns by mail and in person at an
interview on September 20, 2010, but your responses did not alleviate my
concerns.
[38]
This
Court has confirmed on a number of occasions that CAIPS notes form part of the
reasons for the decision. Taken together with the decision letter sent to the
Applicant, I agree with the Respondent that they provided sufficient reasons as
to how and why the Decision Maker made his determination. They explain the
process by which the Decision Maker arrived at his/her conclusions, and provide
a basis for an assessment of possible grounds for judicial review, as well as
allow this Court to determine whether the Decision Maker erred. They clearly
set out why concerns of misrepresentations regarding the Applicant’s alleged
employment at the Company and her alleged earnings were raised, that all the
elements adduced by the Applicant following the transmission of the fairness
letter were considered and the reasons why they did not alleviate the Decision Maker’s
concerns, and why said misrepresentations are material.
[39]
Finally,
this Court has also held that it would be inappropriate to require
administrative officers to provide detailed reasons for their decisions as may
be expected of adjudicative administrative tribunals. Moreover, this Court has
also held that “when notes are the method used to provide reasons, the
threshold for adequacy of reasons is fairly low” (Ozdemir v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 331 at paras 8-11, 110 ACWS (3d)
152; Jeffrey v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC
605 at para 15, 148 ACWS (3d) 975).
[40]
In
light of all the foregoing reasons, I am therefore of the view that this
application ought to be dismissed. No questions of general importance were
proposed and none are certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that
this application for judicial review is dismissed.
No questions of general importance are certified.
"Yves
de Montigny"