Words and Phrases - "with all due dispatch"
Dupuis v. Agence du revenu du Québec, 2021 QCCA 1061
The taxpayer, was reassessed within the normal reassessment period (for two years) or pursuant to a waiver (for the other year) to deny expenses claimed by him in computing income from his law practice, and filed notices of objection on a timely basis. The ARQ then took over three years to consider the objections, and the reassessed to allow a portion of the disallowed expenses, and waived interest for 16 months of that period regarding the expenses that continued to be denied. The taxpayer timely appealed such reassessments.
In finding that the taxpayer had no remedy based on such “delay” of over three years, the Court stated (at paras. 44-45, 54, TaxInterpretations translation):
The TAA [Tax Administration Act] provides two remedies if the case does not proceed. First, the taxpayer is under no obligation to wait for the outcome of the examination of the objection. The taxpayer has the right, as early as 180 days after sending the Notice of Objection, to appeal to the Court of Québec without waiting for the Minister's decision.
Alternatively, if the delay is prejudicial to the taxpayer because of the accrual of interest, the taxpayer may request the Minister to exercise his or her discretion under TA [Taxation Act] section 94.1 to waive all or part of the interest. …
The time limits for the assessment and collection of the tax debt are all expressly provided for in the TA and the TAA. The fact that no time limit is set for the assessment in response to a Notice of Objection is a deliberate choice by the legislature and is understandable. Importing the three-year limitation period of C.C.Q. [ Civil Code of Quebec] Article 2925 is unnecessary and would undermine the regime established by the legislature.
Regarding the obligation of the Minister in TAA s. 93.1.6 [similar to ITA s. 165(3)] to reconsider the objected to assessment “with all due dispatch,” the Court stated (at para. 57):
The Court of Quebec, like the Tax Court of Canada, has made it clear on numerous occasions that its powers do not include the power to set aside a notice of assessment on the basis that the Minister has not acted with dispatch.
Magren Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen, 2021 TCC 42, aff'd on other grounds 2024 FCA 202
The appellants engaged in transactions which were intended to result in the realization by them of substantial capital gains (resulting in additions to their capital dividend accounts (“CDAs”), that were immediately distributed by them), followed by the realization of largely offsetting capital losses later that day.
CRA issued nil assessments under Part I, beyond the normal reassessment period, that denied the capital gains and capital losses and reducing them to nil, and then issued notices of assessment pursuant to s. 185(1) on the basis that the capital dividends declared by the appellants were in fact excess dividends subject to Part III tax. In rejecting the appellants’ arguments that the Part III assessments were invalid because there was one assessment for multiple purported capital dividends and the assessments had not been issued “with all due dispatch,” Smith J stated (at paras 110, 111, 113 and 137):
I agree with the Respondent that the requirement that the Minister “examine each election” and “assess the tax, if any”, as required by subsection 185(1) must be considered in light of subsections 152(3) and 152(8) and section 166.
In particular, I find that the provision, as it pertains to the obligation to “examine each election” is directory at best (and not mandatory) and that there has been no prejudice to the Appellants: Kyte v. Canada, 1996 CanLII 3939 (FCA).
…I agree with the Respondent that the language of subsection 185(1) does preclude or exclude the possibility that the Minister may review more than one election or issue only one assessment dealing with multiple elections – particularly when those elections relate to dividends that have been declared and paid by the corporation in the same taxation year. …
I find that the Court is bound by the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal in Carter, and Ginsberg, supra and that even if the Court was of the view that the assessment process involved an “inordinate” amount of time, as suggested by the Appellants, “there is no power in the court to vacate an assessment on the grounds that the Minister did not act with due dispatch.” Had Parliament intended to give the Court that power, it would have said so in clear terms but it has not done so.
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 185 - Subsection 185(3) | Part III tax assessments of distributions of gains that were denied outside the Part I tax normal reassessment period were not statute-barred | 314 |
| Tax Topics - General Concepts - Ownership | acquisition of income fund units to be held for a few days before their redemption did not represent an acquisition of beneficial ownership | 549 |
| Tax Topics - General Concepts - Sham | transactions did not result in real capital losses | 306 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 184 - Subsection 184(3) | election was not available where a CDA sham | 365 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 245 - Subsection 245(4) | no CDA addition where capital gains were not real | 373 |
Iris Technologies Inc. v. Canada (National Revenue), 2020 FCA 117
During an audit of the appellant (Iris), the Minister withheld GST/HST refunds for the reporting periods under examination and refused requests for release of such funds as Iris’ business operations suggested participation in a carousel scheme (i.e., under which GST/HST is never remitted at the other end of the chain). Iris appealed an order of the Federal Court dismissing its motion for an interim mandatory injunction to compel the payment of $62.3 million in GST/HST refunds. On April 9, 2020 (shortly prior to the hearing of the motion in the Federal Court, and before the completion of the audit, the Minister reassessed or assessed Iris’s January to November 2019 reporting periods, resulting in a large balance shown as owing in favour of the Minister.
Rennie JA agreed with the Federal Court below that Iris had not made out a strong prima facie case in its underlying application for mandamus to compel the Minister to pay the refund claims before the completion of the audit. He also endorsed the reasoning in Express Gold (which had been argued before the Court of Appeal) and, in particular, the findings that “the obligation to pay a refund with all due dispatch did not displace the Minister’s obligation to verify that the refund is in fact payable under the ETA” (para. 41) and that “’a reasonable interpretation of subsection 299(1) is that the Minister may choose to audit a claim for a net tax refund, in order to determine whether the amount is properly claimed’” (para. 42). Rennie JA also stated (at para. 44):
Only refunds that are "“payable”" under the ETA are required to be paid. This in turn means that the obligation to pay refunds is necessarily conditioned by the Minister’s obligation under section 275 of the ETA to confirm that they are in fact owing … .
Respecting the meaning of “with all due dispatch” he noted (at para. 46):
In what appears to be a relatively complex case, the CRA’s estimate that the audit would take ten months to complete is reasonable. Those ten months have not yet elapsed.
Rennie JA further stated (at paras 49 and 51):
… I do not wish to be taken as endorsing the Minister’s arguments that the issuing of the notices of assessment deprives the Federal Court of jurisdiction to consider the Minister’s exercise of discretion under the ETA.
…[T]he Federal Court retains jurisdiction to consider the application of administrative law principles and obligations to the exercise of discretion by the Minister in the application of the ETA. Examples of this include allegations of acting for an ulterior purpose or in bad faith, abuse of his or her powers or not proceeding in a reasonable time frame.
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Section 299 - Subsection 299(1) | s. 299(1) consistent with auditing before paying net refund required to be made "with all due dispatch" | 190 |
| Tax Topics - Other Legislation/Constitution - Federal - Federal Courts Act - Section 18.1 - Subsection 18.1(2) | CRA’s assessing does not oust Federal Court jurisdiction to review exercises of CRA discretion | 301 |
Express Gold Refining Ltd. v. Canada (National Revenue), 2020 FC 614
The applicant (“Express Gold”), which made substantial zero-rated sales of refined gold but claimed input tax credits on its purchases, claimed a net refund of $9.13 million for its August 2018 reporting period and was informed by CRA on October 4, 2018 that an audit of the August return had started and that the net tax refund for that month was being withheld. The scope of the audit was later expanded to cover the period from June 1, 2016, to October 31, 2018, and CRA advised Express Gold hat it would not be receiving its August net tax refund or any refunds for subsequent months while the audit was underway.
On November 7, 2018, Express Gold’s representative wrote to demand that the net tax refund for the August 2018 return be paid, and on December 6, 2018 Express Gold launched this proceeding in the Federal Court for an order of mandamus (based on the Minister’s obligation to pay the net tax refund “with all due dispatch” as required by ETA s. 229(1)),
In dismissing Express Gold’s application, Pentney J first summarized the general principles respecting “with all due dispatch” (at paras. 55, 76):
[T]he context for the provisions makes it clear that finding that the obligation to pay the refund with all due dispatch was not intended to displace the Minister’s obligation to verify the claim is not unreasonable.
The Minister is under a statutory duty to determine the tax that is owing or a refund is due in relation to the August 2018 return of the Applicant, pursuant to section 275 … . The Minister must do this without delay. The Minister is not obliged to pay the refund simply because it was claimed in the return, nor is the Minister forbidden from conducting an assessment or audit of the return, as long as this is done in good faith for the purpose of ascertaining the taxes due or refund owing (Ficek and McNally), and as long as it is done with all due dispatch.
He went on to find that here there had not been “sufficient time to complete the audit” (para. 82) before this application had been launched (two months after receiving notice of the commencement of the audit) given inter alia “that the Applicant’s business involves a high volume of transactions with multiple third parties, which in itself can be expected to add a degree of complexity to the undertaking” (para. 83).
In his conclusions, he stated (at para. 104):
I have concluded that the Applicant brought its application before a reasonable time for the performance of the duty had elapsed, and so I am dismissing the application. In doing so, it is worth underlining that if the Applicant has or obtains evidence that the CRA is acting for an ulterior purpose, or that the audit is being continuously expanded in bad faith, or otherwise not proceeding in a reasonable time-frame, it can bring another motion.
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 152 - Subsection 152(1) | "with all due dispatch" requires performance of audit in a reasonable time | 258 |
Poirier v. The Queen, 2019 TCC 8
Notwithstanding that the appellant and his wife had already agreed to lease the condo, on their acquisition of a new condo the appellant provided a signed New Housing Rebate application form to the builder along with a statutory declaration indicating that he would be occupying the condo, and was credited with the rebate amount at closing by the builder. However, the builder did not submit the New Housing Rebate application form to the CRA until February 24, 2014 (approximately 22 months after the closing). CRA sought additional information from the appellant by letter dated January 6, 2015, and in an ensuing phone conversation, the appellant was told that the New Housing Rebate would be denied. This occurred by Notice of Assessment dated February 13, 2015. Shortly before this assessment, the appellant filed a Rental Rebate application with CRA, which was denied by Notice of Assessment, and to which the appellant objected.
Smith found that the Minister had acted “with all due dispatch,” as required by s. 297(1), in considering the application for the New Housing Rebate, stating (at paras 14, 18 and 19):
…[T]he expression “with all due dispatch” is the equivalent of “with all due diligence” or “within a reasonable time” but there is no fixed time period for the performance of the duty to assess or reassess: Ficek v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 502 (para.19) and Duchaine v. The Queen, 2015 TCC 245 (para. 26).
… [I]it is only relevant to determine whether the Minister acted “with all due dispatch” during the two months that followed receipt of the application from the Builder and I have no difficulty in concluding that the Minister has satisfied that requirement. Even if the issue had been whether the Minister had acted “with all due dispatch” in the 12 months or so that followed receipt, I would have found that this was an acceptable period of time. …
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Section 254 - Subsection 254(2) - Paragraph 254(2)(b) | intention to occupy vitiated when agreement to lease the new condo | 103 |
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Section 256.2 - Subsection 256.2(7) - Paragraph 256.2(7)(a) | no power to extend 2-year deadline even where new housing rebate mistakenly applied for within 2 years | 126 |
| Tax Topics - Statutory Interpretation - Interpretation Act - Section 32 | failure to state material particulars not cured by s. 32 | 151 |
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Section 262 - Subsection 262(1) | failure to include prescribed information vitiated purported new rental housing rebate application | 270 |
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Section 296 - Subsection 296(2.1) | s. 296(2.1)(b) precluded using s. 296(2.1) to overcome the 2-year deadline for claiming the NRRP rebate | 302 |