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Pierre and Miquelon who is the subject of a report made pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a); or   (b) a person who has been determined to be not eligible to make a claim to be a Convention refugee by reason of paragraph 46.01(1)(b) and who is to be removed to a country with which the Minister has entered into an agreement under section 108.1 for sharing the responsibility for examining refugee claims.   ... (d) a judge of the Court shall dispose of the application without delay and in a summary way and, unless a judge of the Court directs otherwise, without personal appearance; and   (e) no appeal lies from the decision of the Court with respect to the application or with respect to an interlocutory judgment.     97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally   (a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or   (b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or  punishment if   (i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,   (ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,   (iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and   (iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. (2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.  ...   112. (1) A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1).                                                                     ...   113. ... Pierre and Miquelon who is the subject of a report made pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a); or   (b) a person who has been determined to be not eligible to make a claim to be a Convention refugee by reason of paragraph 46.01(1)(b) and who is to be removed to a country with which the Minister has entered into an agreement under section 108.1 for sharing the responsibility for examining refugee claims.   70 ...

The United States statutes have not been based upon the international copyright treaties of the 19th and 20th centuries, being the Berne Convention of 1886 and the Rome Copyright Convention of 1928, as the United States of America did not become signatories thereto. Indeed it was not until the adoption by that country in 1955 of the Uni­versal Copyright Convention of 1952 that the United States participated in the field of interna­tional copyright law other than by a collection of bilateral agreements. ...

Il est fondé sur na nature même du mariage, et fait présumer entre les époux la convention de mettre en commun leur mobilier, leur revenus, les fruits de leurs épargnes et de leur commune collaboration. ... De plus, quand il s’agit de communauté conventionnelle, il est certain que la situation peut être différente, car les conjoints peuvent toujours par contrat, tout en stipulant la communauté qui doit déterminer le régime marital financier, faire toutes sortes d’autres conventions qui, évidemment, ne doivent pas être contraires aux bonnes moeurs ni à l’ordre public (articles 1257, 1262, 1268 du Code Civil). ...

McVey, reported as a note in [1955] A.C. 516, and particularly of the proposition ‘‘that in no circumstances will the courts directly or indirectly enforce the revenue laws of another country’’, goes on at pages 511 and 512 to suggest two explanations, as follows: “One explanation of the rule thus illustrated may be thought to be that enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign power which imposed the taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign authority by one State within the terri- tory of another, as distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties. ...

Ni le Companies Act de Saskatchewan ni les conventions d’association de la compagnie n’autorisaient la tenue d’un registre ailleurs que dans la province de Saskatchewan. ...

L'appelant a déposé une somme de $10,000 entre les mains de la compagnie D comme garantie de l'exécution de sa convention. ... La convention incorporée dans le bail de l'appelant n'était pas une à laquelle l'art. 18 de la Loi de l'Impôt sur le revenu s'appliquait. ...

But to say that precedent is now required for every proposed application to matter which differs only in accidentals, that new concrete instances must be left to legislation or convention, would be a virtual repudiation of the concept of inherent adaptability which has maintained the life of the common law, and a retrograde step in evolving the rules of international intercourse. ... It is the essence of the principle of precedent that new applications are to be determined according to their total elements including assumptions and attitudes, and in the international sphere the whole field of the behaviour of states, whether exhibited in actual conduct, conventions, arbitrations or adjudications, is pertinent to the determination of each issue. ...

In that case a municipal council had paid $231 to the mayor to reimburse him for his expenses in attending a municipal convention. ... There was at the time no authority for the municipal council to pay convention expenses. ...

Il ne faudrait pas considérer comme une rente viagère la convention par laquelle un individu vend un immeuble, à la charge par l’acquéreur de la nourrir, loger, chauffer et éclairer jusqu’à son décès: c’est une vente soumise aux principes généraux, et non aux règles particulières de la rente viagère.” ... Proudhon (Traité des droits d’usufruit, Vol. 1, p. 585), disait: “L’usufruit n’est point une chose de pure convention: sa nature est fixée par la loi: il consiste dans le droit ou la faculté qui est accordé à quelqu’un de jouir du bien d’un autre: il ne peut être que cela.” Et s’inspirant de cet auteur, Demolombe (Cours de Droit Civil, Vol. 10, Distinction des Biens, (2) p. 205) dit à son tour: “Telle est aussi la disposition impérative et absolue de l’article 617; et Proudhon remarque avec beaucoup de vérité. que l’usufruit n’est pas une chose de pure convention et que sa nature est fixée par la loi.” ...

I do not doubt that it is in pari materia and should be considered, if necessary, in construing the regulation just as the Rome Convention was considered in construing the Copyright Amendment Act intended to implement it. ...