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TCC

McMaster v. R., [1999] 1 CTC 2658

(Emphasis added) Subsection 118.4(1) of the Act reads as follows: For the purposes of subsection 6(16), sections 118.2 and 118.3 and this subsection, (a) an impairment is prolonged where it has lasted, or can reasonably be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months: (b) an individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or is unable (or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic activity of daily living: (c) a basic activity of daily living in relation to an individual means (1) perceiving, thinking and remembering, (11) feeding and dressing oneself, (111) speaking so as to be understood, in a quiet setting, by another person familiar with the individual, (iv) hearing so as to understand, in a quiet setting, another person familiar with the individual, (v) eliminating (bowel or bladder functions), or (vi) walking; and (d) for greater certainty, no other activity, including working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity, shall be considered as a basic activity of daily living. ... C.A.), in which it considered what may constitute an inordinate amount of time, particularly as regards feeding oneself, a basic activity of daily living. ...
TCC

Voyer v. R., [1999] 4 CTC 2324

Although this First Amending Agreement might be considered as a separate contract, the appellant’s work was included in the initial contract between the World Bank and the CIDA by reason of the following language: “In addition, they will establish, implement and follow up a master plan for informatization”. ... In my view, there is simply no basis for the appellant’s claim that the First Amending Agreement of September 17, 1992 is a contract that must be considered separately from the Contribution Agreement of March 28, 1991. ...
TCC

Houle v. R., [1999] 4 CTC 2439

The term “eligible individual” is defined in s. 122.6 in part as follows: In this subdivision, [122.6] “eligible individual” in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time (a) resides with the qualified dependant, (b) is the parent of the qualified dependant who primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant, (C) is resident in Canada, and, for the purposes of this definition, (h) factors to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing may be set out in regulations made by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Minister of National Health and Welfare; [6302] For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition “eligible individual” in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant; (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant; (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides; (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant; (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant; (e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person; (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis; (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides. ...
TCC

Zovko v. R., [1999] 4 CTC 2685, 99 DTC 1001

Mulvale said that he considered the first three to be most comparable, and he gave the opinion that the appropriate value per acre for the subject property at November 30, 1990 was $25,000. ... Sabourin viewed this as a rate of decline of 24.66% per year, and he considered the annual rate of decline of the three residential properties to be respectively, 6.63%, 9.95% and 6.82%. ...
TCC

Richard v. R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 3176

Then, I also considered the size of the net worth difference I had arrived at, based on the balance sheets submitted by Mr. ... Then I also considered that there was no supporting documentation to indicate the source of the funds in the cash account. ...
TCC

Mendes-Roux v. R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2274

The Minister considered the $60,000 payment a “retiring allowance” within the meaning of subsection 248(1) and included it in the taxpayer's income pursuant to subparagraph 56(1)(a)(ii). ... The other factors such as damages for mental distress and costs are not taxable because they do not enter into the definition of retirement allowance as defined in subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act. 28 After having considered all of the evidence, the Court finds and declares that 50% of the sum of $25,376 was received by the Appellant as a “retirement allowance” and is therefore taxable. ...
TCC

Moore v. R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2521, 98 D.T.C. 1479

In my view, the subsection 56(12) definition of “allowance” is to be read together with subsection 60.1(1) of the Act and the latter subsection construed accordingly. 11 The next factor to be considered is the application of subsection 56(12) as it characterises the ‘allowance payable’ in paragraphs 60(b), (c) or (c.1). ... The budget papers, at page 10, describe what amounts payable to third parties were deductible: Before 1984, for an amount to be considered a deductible allowance, it must have been a fixed sum of money paid directly to the recipient for maintenance and support pursuant to a court order, decree or separation agreement. ...
TCC

Denis Beaumier Ltée v. R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2155

In making this determination, the Minister assumed inter alia the following facts: (a) Denis Beaumier is the appellant's principle shareholder; [admitted] (b) an analysis of the appellant's expenses revealed that the appellant had incorrectly claimed as business expenses for the taxation year ending November 30, 1991, an amount of $7,540 (80% of $9,425) in respect of a trip by the principal shareholder and his spouse to Singapore; (c) in a Notice of Reassessment issued on July 4, 1994, the Minister disallowed travel expenses of $7,540 claimed by the appellant for the taxation year ending November 30, 1991, as he considered this amount to have been a personal expense of the principal shareholder. 8 2.03 The facts assumed by the respondent in the case of Denis Beaumier (96-910(IT)I) are as follows: [TRANSLATION] 2. ... The business trip to the Orient was a trip for which the appellant company signed up for business purposes and it should for the following reasons be considered as an expense incurred in connection with the appellant company's business: (a) it was sponsored by the Association de la construction du Québec; (b) it was specifically organized for member contractors of the Association de la construction du Québec; (c) its purpose was to enable participants to attend conferences offered by various construction associations including the Hong Kong builders association, the Thailand builders association, and the Singapore builders association; (d) The conferences were aimed at providing Canadian contractors with information on various techniques used by contractors in the construction industry in the Orient and on the conditions under which contracts are concluded there, particularly with regard to: construction in wetlands; materials used; contractual obligations of contractors; relations and negotiations between contractors and government organizations; negotiations with unions; etc. ...
TCC

Ruffo v. R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2203, 98 D.T.C. 2245

Section 123.83 read (and still reads) as follows: 123.83 Directors, officers and other representatives of a company are considered to be mandataries of the company. and at page 349: Article 1710 C.C. reads as follows: The mandatary is bound to exercise, in the execution of the mandate, reasonable skill and all the care of a prudent administrator Nevertheless, if the mandate be gratuitous, the court may moderate the rigor of the liability arising from his negligence or fault, according to the circumstances. 20 But here again, it must be noted that the authors discuss at pages 354 et seq of this article, the degree of care, diligence and skill required by the Act and indicate that diligence must be exercised to prevent the failure. 21 I am of the opinion that the case law of the Court is consistent on the diligence that the director of a corporation must show to avoid the liability prescribed by subsection 227.1(1) of the Act. ... The degree of prudence required by subsection 227.1(3) leaves no room for risk. 23 The evidence is quite clear, both from the Notice and from the appellant's testimony, that the appellant made a conscious and considered choice to pay only the net salaries of employees and the amounts owing to key suppliers in the expectation that the business would become profitable. ...
TCC

Hassanali Estate v. R., 98 D.T.C. 1406, [1998] 2 C.T.C. 3055

Novoselac argued that the appeal should be considered a class C appeal, as the Notice of Reassessment changed the Appellant's total income from a $402,000.00 loss to a $433,000.00 gain at line 150 and that the total tax payable by the Appellant was determined to be $193,000.00. ... Gibson argued that amounts for computer research should be considered as overhead. ...

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