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Only one need be considered here. It read in part as follows: 1. City Renderers shall buy from Canada Packers and Canada Packers shall sell to City Renderers, at prices determined in accordance with and otherwise as provided by this Agreement, all such raw materials, including bones but excluding blood, hog hair and hide trimmings, produced at the plant of Canada Packers located at 1260 Mill Street, Montreal, (Montreal Plant), and at the plant operated as the Wilsil Division of Canada Packers located at 1239 Mill Street, Montreal, (Wilsil Plant), as are disposed of by Canada Packers for the purpose of inedible rendering. 8. (1) This Agreement shall continue in force until the expiration of 5 years from the commencement date or until 100,000,000 lbs of raw materials, other than raw bones and beef head fat, shall have been supplied to City Renderers hereunder, whichever first occurs, and thereafter shall continue in force to the extent provided in the succeeding provisions hereof. ... Even if the facts of this case are viewed in the light most favourable to the plaintiff, I am of the opinion that the sum of $500,000 paid by Longueuil Meat cannot be considered as a part of the price of the raw materials to be supplied by Canada Packers Limited. ...

Even acceding to respondent’s contention that the entity to be here considered is the partnership itself, I fail to see how this partnership meets the definition of Canadian enterprise as contained in section 3(e) of the Protocol. ... I have the firm view that regardless of whether the Canadian venture is looked at as merely a part of the appellant’s total enterprise or as a separate partnership in itself, it can by no means be considered a Canadian enterprise within the meaning of the Protocol. ...

This judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court which dismissed the appeal without giving reasons, so it is not possible to say whether this was done solely on the basis that the proof did not indicate any payment of the premiums following assignment by Mrs Papp or whether the second ground that the assignment of a chose in action, even if it has no market value, constitutes a gift within the meaning of paragraph 3(1)(c) of the Act was also considered and adopted by that Court. ... I can, however, see no way of avoiding this situation if it is accepted, as was done in the Papp case (supra), that the policy transferred was a chose in action, even if it had no ascertainable monetary value which could justify the selling of same for a consideration to the transferee so as to avoid the transfer being considered as a gift within the meaning of the Act. ...

Those two items were: Sam Tick — Business Properties 56,880.52 Sam Tick — Personal Withdrawals 19,302.21 76,182.73 Appellant admitted that the first of these two items were expenses incurred in his other business interests completely outside the five apartment corporations being considered here. ... The circumstances in this case are quite similar to those considered in the case of Ross Gregory Trout v MNR, 7 Tax ABC 216; 52 DTC 388, where the appellant, a director and shareholder of a company signed a financial statement which showed that he was indebted to the company for $642.58. ...

As to paragraph 1(a) of Part XIII, Schedule III, the defendant submitted that a broad construction should be put on it and that the important words employed were “machinery and apparatus” and “manufacture or production”; that the fact that the defendant could have used something else was irrelevant; that it was too narrow an interpretation to consider the words in the subsection “directly in the manufacture or production of goods” in relation to the time sequence; that instead what should be considered were the things that contributed to the end result, that is the manufacture or production of lumber; that the word “directly” should not be used in the sense of “to the exclusion of”; and that what should be considered was the saw mill factory operation as a whole, from which it should be concluded that without such a type of refuse burner to dispose of waste such a factory could not operate at any of the various stages of manufacture, culminating in the production of lumber. ...

They considered that it was “too expensive for a manufacturer to be downtown”. ... Learned counsel for the respondent conceded that his position would be weak indeed if the only intention to be considered was the intention of Aimco. ...

At this stage, before dealing further with the facts, I refer to certain decisions which have considered subsection 83(5): MNR v The Mac- Lean Mining Company Limited, [1970] S.C.R. 877; [1970] CTC 264; 70 DTC 6199, which reversed [1969] CTC 257; 69 DTC 5185; Marbridge Mines Limited v MNR, [1971] CTC 442; 71 DTC 5231 (Exch); Bermah Mines Limited v MNR, 41 Tax ABC 359; 66 DTC 519. ... It is true that in 1960 there was some indication of ore between East Jersey and Jersey and the possibility of one pit was considered. ...

The respondent submits the Commission also reasonably considered the adverse impact of the delay on CRA, noting that some of the rationales for the time limitation of paragraph 41(1)(e) relate to safeguarding the ability to gather credible evidence, providing fairness for defendants, and ensuring that plaintiffs exercise due diligence. ... Tyler’s work performance assessment that were considered in the CRA investigation. [36] The respondent submits the Commission’s reasons were adequate and complete. ...

While this circumstance, if taken by itself, would not likely be conclusive, it is, in my view, a factor to be considered. 20 In the case of Western Leaseholds v Minister of National Revenue, [1959] C.T.C. 531, 59 D.T.C. 1316, Mr Justice Locke said at 542 [1322]: In Anderson Logging Company v The King, [1925] S.C.R. 56; [1917–27] CTC 207, Duff J, as he then was, said that if the transaction in question belongs to a class of profit-making operations contemplated by the Memorandum of Association, prima facie at all events the profit derived from it is a profit derived from the business of the company. ... Thus October of 1967 was probably the first really opportune time, from the point of view of the plaintiff, at which Sussex House could be sold. 22 Another factor which, in my view, has to be considered, is the fact that the sale of Sussex House did not occur as the result of an unsolicited offer. ...

This the Minister did not seek to tax in the plaintiff's 1971 taxation year having considered the gain to have been realized on the sale of a capital asset, the plaintiff having considered it expedient to sell. 28 In assessing the plaintiff as he did by disallowing the deductions listed above and claimed by the plaintiff as such the Minister did so on the following assumptions: (1) the expenditures were not made or incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income; (2) the expenditures were expended or incurred on account of capital; and (3) the expenditures were personal or living expenses. 29 The onus of demolishing these assumptions falls on the plaintiff. 30 The contentions on behalf of the Minister may be summarized as follows: 31 1. ...