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The Minister’s contention that the income of the company of Bernard Feinstein Inc should not be considered as separate and distinct from the business income of Mr Feinstein personally appears to have been the result of certain carelessness on his part in correspondence and in his tax returns which, although prepared by his auditor were signed by him and he is therefore responsible for the contents. ... The fact that Primrose chose to overlook the separate corporate existence of Bernard Feinstein Inc in the manner in which the letter is drawn is not in my view sufficient to conclude that all of the company’s income, not only from this contract but from all other contracts entered into verbally with other manufacturers should be considered as income of Mr Feinstein personally. ...

He visited The Claridge in the option period in order to examine The Claridge and what he considered to be high sales and operating costs. ... The tax loss was immediate and very large whether it is considered by itself or in relation to the investment made by the Appellants. ...

The Department of National Revenue considered that the sum of $12,500 (representing 50 per cent of the amount received in return for performing the duties of director) should be taxable and so included in calculating income for 1984, not the sum of $3,938.44 (representing /366ths of $25,000) as the plaintiff alleged. ... It accordingly considered that the sum of money received by the plaintiff when he realized on the share purchase option rights in Alcan Aluminium Ltd. cannot possibly be remuneration, since the plaintiff provided no services in return for this money. ...

It is my view that the matter of public policy need not be considered if the amount in question is not deductible under paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Act. ... It must be considered with an appreciation of the business world with particular consideration of the facts surrounding the failure to remit. ...

It is not disputed that the net result of this system was, and apparently still is, that established operators with an allowable annual cut or quota were considered to have some form of ongoing entitlement to a licence somewhere within the PSYU to continue cutting at the rate of their allowable annual cut. ... Thus the subparagraph itself indicates that rights or licences obtained under the procedures referred to in subparagraph (ii) namely by extension, renewal, or substitution, can be considered “acquired”. ...

.;   (e)    The general partner and Château Cornwall Inc. are related and therefore do not deal with one another at arm's length;   (f)    The project of the limited partnership was the acquisition, development and operation of a seniors' centre (hereinafter referred to as the "real estate project");   (g)    According to the application forms signed in December 1988:   (i)   each investor was required to subscribe to a minimum of three units of the project at a purchase price of $150,000;   (ii)   each investor had to pay $40,476 in cash;   (iii)  with the limited partnership, each investor had to sign a mortgage assumption warranty, prorated to their participation [$109,524 ($36,508 per unit x 3 units)];   (h)      The Appellant bought 3 of the 252 units of the limited partnership;   (i)       There are two mortgage assumption warranty agreements:   (i)   a first agreement dated December 30, 1988:   (A)     this agreement indicated that each of the eighty members was required to sign the mortgage assumption, prorated to their participation, or $109,524;   (B)     this agreement was between the subscribers and the limited partnership and granted the general partner the authority to carry out the contents of the agreement at a later date;   (C)     according to the mortgage assumption warranties, the subscribers (investors) agreed absolutely and unconditionally to pay, on demand, to the limited partnership or to anyone authorized by it, the entirety of their interest in the first and second mortgages [maximum $36,508  per unit ($36,508 x 3 = $109,524)] with interest and other costs incurred;   (D)     the mortgage assumption warranty should not be executed except upon request by the limited partnership, in case the latter defaulted on payment;   (ii)   a second agreement dated August 1, 1989:   (A)     this agreement was signed between the subscribers, the Toronto‑Dominion Bank, the general partner and the limited partnership;   (B)     this agreement relates to a loan not to exceed $9,200,000 ($109,524 x 84 members);   (C)     this loan would be guaranteed, inter alia, by a first mortgage on the property held by the Toronto‑Dominion Bank;   (D)     according to clause 1 of the agreement, the subscribers (investors) agreed absolutely and unconditionally to pay the Bank, as a primary debtor and not as surety, the principal assumed and the interest and other costs incurred; this obligation was limited to an amount of $36,508 per unit;   (E)     according to paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 of this agreement, the Bank retained the right to sue the limited partnership as primary creditor according to the loan agreement;   (F)     the total cost of the project would therefore be financed as follows:   Cash contribution $ 3,400,000 1 st mortgage with Toronto‑Dominion Bank   $ 4,000,000 Loans from the proponent ($1.7M+$3.5M)   $ 5,200,000 TOTAL $12,600,000   (j)   On or about July 1996, the Toronto‑Dominion Bank contacted the investors to make the payments provided for in the loan contracts;   (k)  After this request, the subscribers (investors) did not make any payments to the Toronto‑Dominion Bank;   (l)   In accordance with the terms of the application form of December 1988, the Appellant committed to purchasing an amount of $109,524 in the limited partnership through a mortgage assumption in the amount of $109,524;   (m) However, the Appellant's mortgage assumption with the Bank was limited to $52,857;   (n)  The Appellant owed an amount of $56,667 to the limited partnership;   (o)  The Appellant mentioned to the Minister's representative that he had invested an additional $10,000 through his credit line with the Caisse populaire;   (p)  At no time was the Appellant able to prove that he invested this additional amount in the limited partnership;   (q)  The Minister granted the Appellant the following amounts as net losses from the limited partnership for 1988 to 1995, related to the Château Cornwall Limited Partnership:     Year   (Net losses from the limited partnership in $)   1988 (3,384) 1989 (5,088) 1990 (16,869) 1991 (33,189) 1992 (26,727) 1993 (11,499) 1994 (9,012) 1995 (2,052)   (r)   As a function of the foregoing, the Minister decreased the balance of the at‑risk amount of the Appellant's interest in the limited partnership by the assumed but unpaid mortgage balance in the amount of $56,667 for the 1996 taxation year (see Appendix II attached to this Reply);   (s)   The balance of the at‑risk amount of the Appellant's interest in the limited partnership was therefore reduced to zero for 1996;   (t)   Since the at‑risk amount of the Appellant's interest in the limited partnership was reduced to zero, the Appellant cannot claim losses related to his investment in the limited partnership for the 1996 taxation year;   (u)  At the objections phase, the Appellant presented documentation proving investments of $1,500 for the 1996 taxation year and $2,000 for the 1997 taxation year;   (v)  The Minister therefore granted additional amounts of $1,500 in 1996 and $2,000 in 1997 as net losses from the limited partnership;   (w) At no time was the Appellant able to prove that he invested additional amounts in the limited partnership, other than those already considered by the Minister for the 1988 to 1997 taxation years;   (x)  In light of the foregoing, the Minister refused to deduct the amount of $13,308 claimed by the Appellant as a net loss from the limited partnership for the 1996 taxation year;   (y)  The Appellant is not challenging the amount of $12,668 he claimed, that was refused by the Minister, for his 1997 taxation year as a net loss from the limited partnership;   (z)   Furthermore, a decision was made on May 7, 2003, by the Honourable Justice François Angers, in JACQUES BEAUCHAMP – CASE: 2001‑4537(IT)I for taxation years 1996 and 1997 refusing the amount of $13,308 as a net loss from the limited partnership for the 1996 taxation year for the following reasons:   [TRANSLATION]   The Appellant only succeeded in establishing that his payment of $10,000, made in 1996, went to reimburse the debt of the limited partnership for which he had a guarantee with the Caisse populaire de Notre‑Dame‑du‑Chemin in 1994. ...   [49]     In this respect, the testimony of Claude Goulet was determinative; he indicated that he analyzed the file and noted, without any difficulty, that the company that received the $20,000 investment from the Appellant did not meet the requirements in order to be considered a company operating a small business ...

Subparagraph a) means, therefore, that in the application of the Convention (that is, where there is a conflict between the laws of the two States) it is considered that the residence is that place where the individual owns or possesses a home; this home must be permanent, that is to say, the individual must have arranged and retained it for his permanent use as opposed to staying at a particular place under such conditions that it is evident that the stay is intended to be of short duration.   13.                   ... It is the permanence of the home, rather than its size or nature of ownership or tenancy, that is the measure of attachment to the country. 2   (emphasis added)   [16]          I am not convinced that the accommodations that the Appellant was occupying in the San Francisco area in 2000 could be considered a permanent home available to him. ...

A legal fiction principle cannot apply to a provision that is a rule. [31]   [37]         I also note that, in the Regulations, the words "antique object" is found rather than "antique", the word used in the budget papers; also, in French, the Regulations use the words "objet d'époque" rather than "antiquité". [32]   [38]         As I have already stated, in this provision or the context of the Regulations in question, or more generally in the provisions of the Regulations or the Act regarding depreciation, I do not see any reason to conclude that the words "any other antique object" or "tout autre objet d'époque" should be given any meaning other than their ordinary and very broad meaning. [33]   [39]         I therefore conclude that the other musical instruments in question, aside from the Sartory bow, are subject to paragraph 1102(1)(e) of the Regulations and cannot be considered depreciable property.   ... The Supreme Court considered the context of the Act, the existence of a specific provision, section 231.3, to obtain a search warrant for the criminal application of the Act.    ...

., said at 310 (D.T.C. 6245): The fact that the company was incorporated for the sole purpose of holding a single parcel of land and did not engage in any other type of business, is a factor to be considered but is by no means conclusive as to what the object of the taxpayer was in purchasing the land. ... While this circumstance, if taken by itself, would not likely be conclusive, it is, in my opinion, a factor to be considered. ...

The Trial Judge considered the evidence before him in order to determine whether the two partnerships had the “required degree of substance” or if they were “mere camouflage for what was essentially a tax-driven scheme for the purpose of redirecting income which would otherwise have accrued to the [taxpayer]” [3]. ... In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Continental Bank, Justice Bastarache, speaking on behalf of the entire Court with respect to the partnership issue, outlined various factors to be considered when assessing whether a valid partnership has been established. ...