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It is not disputed that the net result of this system was, and apparently still is, that established operators with an allowable annual cut or quota were considered to have some form of ongoing entitlement to a licence somewhere within the PSYU to continue cutting at the rate of their allowable annual cut. ... Thus the subparagraph itself indicates that rights or licences obtained under the procedures referred to in subparagraph (ii) namely by extension, renewal, or substitution, can be considered “acquired”. ...

.;   (e)    The general partner and Château Cornwall Inc. are related and therefore do not deal with one another at arm's length;   (f)    The project of the limited partnership was the acquisition, development and operation of a seniors' centre (hereinafter referred to as the "real estate project");   (g)    According to the application forms signed in December 1988:   (i)   each investor was required to subscribe to a minimum of three units of the project at a purchase price of $150,000;   (ii)   each investor had to pay $40,476 in cash;   (iii)  with the limited partnership, each investor had to sign a mortgage assumption warranty, prorated to their participation [$109,524 ($36,508 per unit x 3 units)];   (h)      The Appellant bought 3 of the 252 units of the limited partnership;   (i)       There are two mortgage assumption warranty agreements:   (i)   a first agreement dated December 30, 1988:   (A)     this agreement indicated that each of the eighty members was required to sign the mortgage assumption, prorated to their participation, or $109,524;   (B)     this agreement was between the subscribers and the limited partnership and granted the general partner the authority to carry out the contents of the agreement at a later date;   (C)     according to the mortgage assumption warranties, the subscribers (investors) agreed absolutely and unconditionally to pay, on demand, to the limited partnership or to anyone authorized by it, the entirety of their interest in the first and second mortgages [maximum $36,508  per unit ($36,508 x 3 = $109,524)] with interest and other costs incurred;   (D)     the mortgage assumption warranty should not be executed except upon request by the limited partnership, in case the latter defaulted on payment;   (ii)   a second agreement dated August 1, 1989:   (A)     this agreement was signed between the subscribers, the Toronto‑Dominion Bank, the general partner and the limited partnership;   (B)     this agreement relates to a loan not to exceed $9,200,000 ($109,524 x 84 members);   (C)     this loan would be guaranteed, inter alia, by a first mortgage on the property held by the Toronto‑Dominion Bank;   (D)     according to clause 1 of the agreement, the subscribers (investors) agreed absolutely and unconditionally to pay the Bank, as a primary debtor and not as surety, the principal assumed and the interest and other costs incurred; this obligation was limited to an amount of $36,508 per unit;   (E)     according to paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 of this agreement, the Bank retained the right to sue the limited partnership as primary creditor according to the loan agreement;   (F)     the total cost of the project would therefore be financed as follows:   Cash contribution $ 3,400,000 1 st mortgage with Toronto‑Dominion Bank   $ 4,000,000 Loans from the proponent ($1.7M+$3.5M)   $ 5,200,000 TOTAL $12,600,000   (j)   On or about July 1996, the Toronto‑Dominion Bank contacted the investors to make the payments provided for in the loan contracts;   (k)  After this request, the subscribers (investors) did not make any payments to the Toronto‑Dominion Bank;   (l)   In accordance with the terms of the application form of December 1988, the Appellant committed to purchasing an amount of $109,524 in the limited partnership through a mortgage assumption in the amount of $109,524;   (m) However, the Appellant's mortgage assumption with the Bank was limited to $52,857;   (n)  The Appellant owed an amount of $56,667 to the limited partnership;   (o)  The Appellant mentioned to the Minister's representative that he had invested an additional $10,000 through his credit line with the Caisse populaire;   (p)  At no time was the Appellant able to prove that he invested this additional amount in the limited partnership;   (q)  The Minister granted the Appellant the following amounts as net losses from the limited partnership for 1988 to 1995, related to the Château Cornwall Limited Partnership:     Year   (Net losses from the limited partnership in $)   1988 (3,384) 1989 (5,088) 1990 (16,869) 1991 (33,189) 1992 (26,727) 1993 (11,499) 1994 (9,012) 1995 (2,052)   (r)   As a function of the foregoing, the Minister decreased the balance of the at‑risk amount of the Appellant's interest in the limited partnership by the assumed but unpaid mortgage balance in the amount of $56,667 for the 1996 taxation year (see Appendix II attached to this Reply);   (s)   The balance of the at‑risk amount of the Appellant's interest in the limited partnership was therefore reduced to zero for 1996;   (t)   Since the at‑risk amount of the Appellant's interest in the limited partnership was reduced to zero, the Appellant cannot claim losses related to his investment in the limited partnership for the 1996 taxation year;   (u)  At the objections phase, the Appellant presented documentation proving investments of $1,500 for the 1996 taxation year and $2,000 for the 1997 taxation year;   (v)  The Minister therefore granted additional amounts of $1,500 in 1996 and $2,000 in 1997 as net losses from the limited partnership;   (w) At no time was the Appellant able to prove that he invested additional amounts in the limited partnership, other than those already considered by the Minister for the 1988 to 1997 taxation years;   (x)  In light of the foregoing, the Minister refused to deduct the amount of $13,308 claimed by the Appellant as a net loss from the limited partnership for the 1996 taxation year;   (y)  The Appellant is not challenging the amount of $12,668 he claimed, that was refused by the Minister, for his 1997 taxation year as a net loss from the limited partnership;   (z)   Furthermore, a decision was made on May 7, 2003, by the Honourable Justice François Angers, in JACQUES BEAUCHAMP – CASE: 2001‑4537(IT)I for taxation years 1996 and 1997 refusing the amount of $13,308 as a net loss from the limited partnership for the 1996 taxation year for the following reasons:   [TRANSLATION]   The Appellant only succeeded in establishing that his payment of $10,000, made in 1996, went to reimburse the debt of the limited partnership for which he had a guarantee with the Caisse populaire de Notre‑Dame‑du‑Chemin in 1994. ...   [49]     In this respect, the testimony of Claude Goulet was determinative; he indicated that he analyzed the file and noted, without any difficulty, that the company that received the $20,000 investment from the Appellant did not meet the requirements in order to be considered a company operating a small business ...

Subparagraph a) means, therefore, that in the application of the Convention (that is, where there is a conflict between the laws of the two States) it is considered that the residence is that place where the individual owns or possesses a home; this home must be permanent, that is to say, the individual must have arranged and retained it for his permanent use as opposed to staying at a particular place under such conditions that it is evident that the stay is intended to be of short duration.   13.                   ... It is the permanence of the home, rather than its size or nature of ownership or tenancy, that is the measure of attachment to the country. 2   (emphasis added)   [16]          I am not convinced that the accommodations that the Appellant was occupying in the San Francisco area in 2000 could be considered a permanent home available to him. ...

A legal fiction principle cannot apply to a provision that is a rule. [31]   [37]         I also note that, in the Regulations, the words "antique object" is found rather than "antique", the word used in the budget papers; also, in French, the Regulations use the words "objet d'époque" rather than "antiquité". [32]   [38]         As I have already stated, in this provision or the context of the Regulations in question, or more generally in the provisions of the Regulations or the Act regarding depreciation, I do not see any reason to conclude that the words "any other antique object" or "tout autre objet d'époque" should be given any meaning other than their ordinary and very broad meaning. [33]   [39]         I therefore conclude that the other musical instruments in question, aside from the Sartory bow, are subject to paragraph 1102(1)(e) of the Regulations and cannot be considered depreciable property.   ... The Supreme Court considered the context of the Act, the existence of a specific provision, section 231.3, to obtain a search warrant for the criminal application of the Act.    ...

., said at 310 (D.T.C. 6245): The fact that the company was incorporated for the sole purpose of holding a single parcel of land and did not engage in any other type of business, is a factor to be considered but is by no means conclusive as to what the object of the taxpayer was in purchasing the land. ... While this circumstance, if taken by itself, would not likely be conclusive, it is, in my opinion, a factor to be considered. ...

The Trial Judge considered the evidence before him in order to determine whether the two partnerships had the “required degree of substance” or if they were “mere camouflage for what was essentially a tax-driven scheme for the purpose of redirecting income which would otherwise have accrued to the [taxpayer]” [3]. ... In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Continental Bank, Justice Bastarache, speaking on behalf of the entire Court with respect to the partnership issue, outlined various factors to be considered when assessing whether a valid partnership has been established. ...

Subsection 194(2) provides: 194(2) In this Part, the “Part VIII refund” of a corporation for a taxation year means an amount equal to the lesser of (a) the total of (i) the amount, if any, by which the scientific research and experimental development tax credit of the corporation for the year exceeds the amount, if any, deducted by it under subsection 127.3(1) from its tax otherwise payable under Part I for the year, and (ii) such amount as the corporation may claim, not exceeding 50 per cent of the amount, if any, by which (A) the total of all expenditures made by it after April 19, 1983 and in the year of the immediately preceding taxation year each of which is an expenditure (other than an expenditure prescribed for the purposes of the definition “qualified expenditure” in subsection 127(9)) claimed under paragraph 37(1)(a) or (b) to the extent that the expenditure is specified by the corporation in its return of income under Part I for the year exceeds the total of (B) the total of all expenditures each of which is an expenditure made by it in the immediately preceding taxation year, to the extent that the expenditure was included in determining the total under clause (A) and resulted in (I) a refund to it under this Part for the immediately preceding taxation year, (ID) a deduction by it under subsection 37(1) for the immediately preceding taxation year, or (III) a deduction by it under subsection 127(5) for any taxation year, and (C) twice the portion of the total of amounts each of which is an amount deducted by it in computing its income for the year or the immediately preceding taxation year under section 37.1 that can reasonably be considered to relate to expenditures that were included in determining the total under clause (A); and (b) the refundable Part VIII tax on hand of the corporation at the end of the year. ... must be considered in two parts. The first is whether, when the certificate was issued, it was for the amount of Hitec’s liability under Part VIII of the Income Tax Act. ...

The Queen, [1998] G.S.T.C. 91). [4]            Counsel for the respondent agreed with the proposition that a due diligence defence is available with respect to a penalty for failure to file a return, but did not concede that due diligence has been made out. [5]            For reasons that are set out more fully below I do not think that the appellant was resident in Canada in the years in question and accordingly the subsidiary issues need not be considered. [6]            The appellant did not sojourn in Canada for 183 days or more in any of the years 1992, 1993 and 1994 and so the statutory condition in paragraph 250(1)(a) is not met. ... They must be considered in the light of the basic premises that everyone must have a fiscal residence somewhere and that it is quite possible for an individual to be simultaneously resident in more than one place for tax purposes. ...

These circumstances must be taken into account, but must be considered against an objective "reasonably prudent person" standard. b.         ... For that reason, not concerning herself in any way with the company’s tax remittance obligations alter September 2001 can not be considered to have been exercising the degree of care, diligence and skill to prevent the failure that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable circumstances. ...

Justice Cory observed at 265, 6448: There can be no question that the issuing of a search warrant pursuant to s. 231.3 of the Income Tax Act must be considered to be an order of a judge. ... The Pacific Press case was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Descôteaux. v. ...