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They felt, as Mr Lucchési testified, that one of the problems in the Province of Quebec was a lack of sufficient people with administrative experience and considered that they could advise and help others realize on their investments. ... The requirement that two representatives of the plaintiff be on the board of directors of Fibracan at all times and the fact that this was to be the professed policy of the group in connection with any investments which Bourg- Royal would make, and that they considered that their engineering and business experience and financial and other contacts would be of substantial benefit to the small companies in which it was intended to invest, indicate that the policy was, if not to actually control the operation, to nevertheless be in a position to observe and influence the operation of the businesses in which investments were to be made, and thus to assist in turning these investments to a profit. ... What is the line which separates the two classes of cases may be difficult to define, and each case must be considered according to its facts; the question to be determined being—Is the sum of gain that has been made a mere enhancement of value by realising a security, or is it a gain made In an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making? ...

“J L GOURLAY” Director, Special Investigations Division After having considered the application made by the Director of Special Investigations based on the affidavit of Vernon Robert Milley. ... The evidence shows that the Minister himself never considered whether there were “reasonable and probable grounds” to believe that the plaintiffs had violated the Act at the time the seizure was made. ... It is apparent there is a wide variety of persons both within and without the Department of National Revenue who could potentially be considered “officers” according to paragraph 221 (1)(f). ...

It was considered that such assistance would enhance and encourage this aim. ... In its notice of appeal the appellant says, inter alia, that the taxability of the $450,000 is not in issue in view of the fact that the Department cancelled and annulled its claim on that score in respect of the taxation year 1962; if that amount is to be considered as taxable income it would have been taxable income only in the 1960 year when the contract was established, as the appellant is on the accrual system of accounting; under the Defence Production Act, RSC 1952, c 62, paragraph 15(f), the $450,000 was only an advance for a loan and not a grant or subsidy; there was no cancellation of the indebtedness of the appellant in respect of its obligation to repay the amount in 1961 or 1962, and even if there had been any such cancellation it would constitute capital and not income; and there was not any reassessment for 1961 or 1962. In the respondent’s reply to the notice of appeal the respondent says, inter alia, that the assessment for the appellant’s 1962 year, notice of which was dated June 5, 1964, was an assessment of the tax payable for that year, and the appeal is from that assessment; the respondent has at no time admitted or acknowledged that the assessment is incorrect; the $450,000 was paid to the appellant in its 1961 taxation year and was income for the appellant for that year; in making the assessment dated June 5, 1964, the respondent included the $450,000 in the computation of the appellant’s income for 1962, and, on objection, confirmed the assessment on the basis that the sum was income of the appellant for 1962, but he subsequently sent. forms T7W-C (Exhibits A-3 and A-4), indicating that he considered the sum should be reflected in the computation of the appellant’s loss for 1961, and therefore in the computation of its taxable income for 1962, and no change was made in the assessment of tax for 1962; the sum is to be included in computing the appellant’s income for 1962 or its loss for 1961 (and therefore its taxable income for 1962) because (a) it was received by the appellant in 1961 as income to be used in its business and to enable it to meet expenses which it treated as deductible in computing its income; (b) to the extent that expenses claimed by the appellant were defrayed or reimbursed by means of that sum it is obliged to reduce the expenses claimed by it in 1961 as deductions in computing its income; (c) the sum was paid as a contribution to the expense of development of the 24 Channel Equipment and Her Majesty was entitled to be paid an amount equal to part or all of that contribution only if a production contract. for the equipment was obtained, none was obtained and the project was abandoned by the end of the appellant’s 1962 year. ...

The concept of section 13 of the Income Tax Act in its present form and in previous statutory form has been judicially considered by this Court on a number of occasions, as for example in the following cases: MNR v Barbara A Robertson, [1954] CTC 110; 54 DTC 1062; George H Steer v MNR, [1965] CTC 181; 65 DTC 5115; J Harold Wood v MNR, [1967] CTC 66; 67 DTC 5045; MNR v Grieve et al, [1959] CTC 320; 59 DTC 1186; Robert Charles Simpson v MNR, [1961] CTC 174; 61 DTC 1117; CBA Engineering Limited v MNR, [1971] CTC 504; 71 DTC 5282; Oscar Dorfman v MNR, [1972] CTC 151; 72 DTC 6131. ... But the point to note is that the fact of reasonable expectation of profit or not is one indicium only to be considered in each case. ... In coming to a conclusion in this case, I have considered what the appellant did in respect to his business of horse racing from 1966 to 1971. ...

Cairns was actively considered by the Appellant in 1969 for employment upon the acquisition by the Appellant of a large wholesale grocery business. the negotiations for the acquisition of which proved abortive at that time. 25. ... According to the witness, the building was transferred at $24,880 which was the undepreciated capital cost — possibly to avoid recapture but also because it was considered to be part and parcel of a reasonable price for the overall deal. ... Since 1968 it has changed its charter and its name, and has filed documents in other jurisdictions to protect the name of Valu-Mart. it was actively considered by management for the acquisition of the assets of another company. ...

It is not disputed that the Dodge car for the purpose of capital cost allowance fell in Class 10; or that the claims for such allowances for 1967 and 1968 respectively of $554 and $1,395 would have been correct if the appellant were entitled to the full amount without the apportionment provided for in Section 20(6)(e) of the Act which reads: 20. (6) For the purpose of this section and regulations made under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 11, the following rules apply: (e) where property has, since it was acquired by a taxpayer, been regularly used in part for the purpose of gaining or producing income therefrom or for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business and in part for some other purpose, the taxpayer shall be deemed to have acquired, for the purpose of gaining or producing income, the proportion of the property that the use regularly made of the property for gaining or producing income is of the whole use regularly made of the property at a capital cost to him equal to the same proportion of the capital cost to him of the whole property; and, if the property has, in such a case, been disposed of, the proceeds of disposition of the proportion of the property deemed to have been acquired for gaining or producing income shall be deemed to be the same proportion of the proceeds of disposition of the whole property; In the Cumming case (supra) Thurlow, J. in considering the provisions of that subsection said at page 441 [477]: On the basis of mileage alone, the use made by the taxpayer of the Chevrolet for the purposes of his practice appears to me to have been no more than 25 per cent of the total use and if this were the only thing to be considered as being “use” of an automobile the basis for calculation of the appellant’s capital cost allowance would, it seems, necessarily be limited by Section 20(6) (e) to 25 per cent of the total capital cost of the automobile. The appellant on the other hand, and his accountant, considered that 90 per cent of the use of the car was use for the purposes of the practice and this I think was derived by considering its use from the point of view of the time involved in keeping it available for operation in the practice. Thus on a day when the appellant drove the car to the hospital, left it standing there while he was at the hospital, drove it again to return home and perhaps made several more trips with it to the hospital and back in the course of the day and at no time had any occasion to drive it for any purpose not associated with the practice, the car might well be considered as having been used throughout that day solely for the purposes of the practice. ...

., her total 2018 net income), and only the excess could reasonably be considered out of pocket medical expenses paid by the Appellant. [22] Considering the issue in dispute as exposed above, the question to be answered by the Court is whether the Appellant paid the $19,484 as medical expenses in respect of Mrs. ... The Court takes this excerpt to mean that eligibility for the credit can be considered to the extent that the taxpayer's financial capacity is adversely affected by the expenses incurred. ... The financial consideration of the complete operation and the legal context governing the rights of the parties involved must be considered in order to reach a reasonable interpretation of the text. [56] Finally, Mr. ...

By this clause it was provided that the offer to purchase was “subject to the Purchasers being approved as Licensees by the Liquor Control Commission and should the Purchasers not be approved, the Offer to Purchase is to be considered cancelled, null and void and the Purchasers' deposit returned to them”. 24 This clause obviously indicates that unless the purchasers could obtain liquor licences they would not purchase the hotel. 25 One additional opinion is cited here, that of Mr E Karl Farstad & Associates Ltd. ... He also stated that it was one of the circumstances to be considered. 43 Nor did J O Weldon, QC say that in all cases the agreement must be decisive. ... It seems to me that the determination of the foregoing respective amounts can best be determined by ascertaining the reasonable value of the property and the deduction of that amount from the total consideration results in the amount attributable to something else. 61 In the Canadian Propane case no allowance had been made for “goodwill”, one of the appellant's principal witnesses stating that the appellant considered it had no value. ...

For example, the Appellants could have succeeded by establishing, on a balance of probabilities, new facts not considered by the Minister when making the reassessments; by showing that the travel expenses were incurred for business purposes; or by demonstrating that the Minister’s assumptions of fact in making the reassessments were wrong. ... I have also considered the overall reasonableness of the reassessments in my determination of whether to allow the appeals. [71] No supporting documentation was adduced in evidence to show that the disallowed expenses were incurred by Opco for the purpose of gaining or producing business income. ... John’s Testimony [84] For the following reasons, I find that John’s testimony was vague, not convincing and not credible. [85] His testimony was that all expenses referred to in the schedules to the replies to the notices of appeal were business expenses of Opco and should not be considered personal travel expenses of the Siblings and other family members. [86] Disallowed travel expenses included the following expenses: (i) Maria: Expenses incurred in Sint Maarten and at various restaurants; however, the evidence showed that Maria is not an employee of Opco and, therefore, John’s testimony that these are business expenses is not credible; (ii) Kostantinos: Travel expenses incurred at the Fairmont Tremblant in Mont-Tremblant, in Nassau and at a garden store in Saint‑Eustache; no credible evidence was adduced as to the purposes of these expenses, and no supporting documentation was adduced at the hearing to show that these expenses were incurred by Opco for business purposes; (iii) Kostantina: Travel expenses incurred in Mont-Tremblant and at Marriott’s Aruba Surf Club; no supporting documentation was adduced at the hearing. ...

However, it was understood among them that the diamond should be sold, the three to share in any profit realized or to bear any loss incurred in proportion to their contributions, although Marun considered himself indebted to his partners in the amounts advanced by them and they, in turn, considered him so indebted. ... Marun then decided, with the concurrence of Minogue, that the prospects of selling the diamond would be greater if the diamond were cut, but Minogue, whose ardour about the transaction had somewhat cooled, in giving his concurrence reminded Marun that he still considered him indebted to the extent of $10,000. ...