Roland
St-Onge:—This
appeal
was
heard
at
Saint
John,
New
Brunswick
on
July
12,
1971
by
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
as
it
was
then
constituted,
and
is
from
a
reassessment
dated
April
29,
1970
wherein
tax
in
the
amount
of
$600,823.28
was
levied
in
respect
of
income
for
the
taxation
year
1968.
The
facts
in
this
appeal
are
fully
disclosed
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal
and
are
reproduced
hereunder
almost
in
their
entirety:
1.
The
appellant
is
a
company
duly
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
the
Province
of
New
Brunswick
and
is
and
at
all
relevant
times
has
been
primarily
engaged
in
the
business
of
the
wholesale
distribution
of
groceries,
produce
and
allied
lines
of
merchandise,
in
furtherance
of
which
business
it
regularly
extends
financial
assistance
to
independent
retail
grocery
operators.
2.
Prior
to
November
9th,
1964,
L
T
Cairns
Co,
Ltd
(hereinafter
called
“Cairns”)
was
an
independent
company
carrying
on
the
business
of
a
retail
grocer
in
the
Town
(now
City)
of
Campbellton
in
the
Province
of
New
Brunswick
and
was
controlled
by
the
late
Lawrence
T
Cairns
and
later
by
the
administrators
of
his
estate.
Cairns
was
a
customer
of
the
Appellant.
3.
On
November
9th,
1964,
the
Appellant,
pursuant
to
a
tender
submitted
in
response
to
a
public
call
for
tenders,
purchased
for
cash
all
of
the
outstanding
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
Cairns
for
a
price
of
$96,600,
subject
to
certain
adjustments
which
brought
the
total
price
to
$96,607.89.
4.
Cairns,
since
November
9th,
1964,
has
been
and
is
now
a
wholly-owned
subsidiary
of
the
Appellant.
9.
On
June
30th,
1964
(Cairns’
fiscal
year-end)
Cairns
had
undistributed
income
on
hand
of
$54,418.00.
After
June
30th,
1964,
and
prior
to
November
9th,
1964,
a
dividend
of
$4,700.00
was
paid.
Designated
surplus
within
the
meaning
of
Section
28(2)
of
The
Income
Tax
Act
(hereinafter
called
‘‘the
Act’’)
was
therefore
$49,718.00.
6.
On
the
said
9th
day
of
November,
1964,
the
assets
of
Cairns
comprised
a
lot
of
land
on
Roseberry
Street
in
the
Town
of
Campbellton
on
which
was
erected
a
multi-storey
building
(of
which
the
ground
floor
and
basement
were
used
for
retail
sale
of
groceries
and
the
upper
storeys
were
let
out
as
apartments);
store
and
office
furniture,
fixtures
and
equipment,
etc,
and
a
certain
vehicle;
stock-in-trade
of
merchandise
and
certain
accounts
receivable,
together
with
its
goodwill
as
a
grocery
business
and
certain
prepaid
expenses.
7.
The
purpose
of
the
Appellant
in
acquiring
the
shares
of
Cairns
was
to
ensure
the
retention
of
the
business
volume
of
Cairns
for
the
Appellant’s
wholesale
grocery
operations.
Though
the
Appellant
does
operate
some
retail
grocery
outlets
these
are
ordinarily
units
of
much
larger
size.
The
store
operated
by
Cairns
was
not
of
such
character
as
could
be
effectively
operated
by
the
Appellant
as
a
retail
outlet
with
salaried
personnel.
The
Appellant
was
therefore
anxious
to
establish
an
independent
retailer
in
the
store
theretofore
operated
by
Cairns
under
terms
which
would
ensure
to
the
Appellant
that
the
store
would
purchase
the
bulk
of
its
stock
from
the
Appellant.
8.
On
the
said
9th
day
of
November,
1964,
immediately
after
acquisition
of
its
shares
by
the
Appellant,
Cairns
sold
to
William
L
P
Caldwell
who
had,
since
the
death
of
Lawrence
T
Cairns,
been
the
manager
of
Cairns,
certain
assets
of
Cairns
as
follows,
for
the
consideration
stated:
|
Furniture,
fixtures,
equipment
|
|
|
and
vehicle
|
$16,700
|
|
Stock-in-trade
|
Cost
as
to
be
|
|
determined
by
|
|
joint
inventory
|
|
Accounts
receivable
|
Face
amount
with
|
|
no
reserves
|
|
Goodwill
|
$12,000
|
|
Prepaid
expenses
|
Pro-rated
value.
|
9.
|
After
such
joint
inventory
and
after
joint
accounting
as
to
value
of
receiv
|
ables
and
prepaid
items,
and
as
to
liabilities,
the
net
price,
after
deducting
liabilities
as
assumed
by
said
William
L
P
Caldwell,
was
established
at
$59,116.76,
no
part
of
which
was
paid
in
cash.
10.
The
said
William
L
P
Caldwell
thereafter
and
prior
to
December
22nd,
1964,
transferred
the
assets
so
acquired
by
him
from
Cairns
to
a
new
company
formed
by
him
named
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd.
11.
On
the
said
9th
day
of
November,
1964,
Cairns
also
demised
to
the
Appellant
the
ground
floor
and
basement
of
its
said
building
in
Campbellton
for
a
term
of
ten
years
with
an
option
for
renewal.
The
Appellant
thereupon
sublet
the
said
premises
to
the
said
William
L
P
Caldwell
or
to
his
company,
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd.
12.
As
security
for
payment
of
the
purchase
price
of
the
said
assets,
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd,
on
December
22nd,
1964,
executed
a
demand
promissory
note
for
$59,116.76,
the
payee
of
which
was
the
Appellant,
with
interest
at
7%
per
annum,
which
was
below
the
normal
interest
for
such
a
security
at
the
date
of
execution.
13.
As
security
for
the
payment
of
such
promissory
note
Cairns
Foodmarket
Lid
also
executed
a
chattel
mortgage
in
favour
of
Chignecto
Holdings
Limited
(hereinafter
called
“Chignecto”)
expressed
to
be
as
agent
for
the
Appellant,
in
the
said
amount
of
$59,116.76,
payable
by
instalments
of
$550.00
per
month.
14.
In
explanation
of
paragraphs
numbered
12
and
13
above,
the
Appellant
says
that:
(a)
the
Appellant
acts
as
the
banker
for
all
of
its
subsidiaries.
All
cash
received
by
its
subsidiaries,
as
well
as
its
own
cash
received
at
head
office
or
at
branches,
is
normally
deposited
or
transferred
immediately
into
the
consolidated
bank
account
of
the
Appellant;
(b)
the
Appellant
is
the
only
company
of
the
group
comprised
of
itself
and
its
subsidiaries
that
has
arranged
banking
facilities
continuously
available
for
discounting
notes.
All
such
notes
are
therefore
taken
in
the
name
of
the
Appellant
to
facilitate
such
discounting,
even
though
beneficially
owned
by
a
subsidiary;
(c)
Chignecto
is
a
wholly-owned
subsidiary
of
the
Appellant
and
often
acts
as
agent
and
trustee
of
the
Appellant
or
of
another
subsidiary
for
the
purpose
of
taking,
holding
and
enforcing
the
security
given
by
a
third
party
to
cover
a
discounted
promissory
note
such
as,
as
has
frequently
been
the
case,
a
chattel
mortgage.
15.
The
obligation
owing
by
the
said
William
L
P
Caldwell
or
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd
to
Cairns
was
transferred
by
book
entry
from
Cairns
to
Chignecto
by
entry
made
effective
the
3rd
day
of
April,
1965
at
its
face
amount.
Chignecto
was
shown
on
the
books
of
both
Cairns
and
Chignecto
as
owing
Cairns
the
appropriate
amount.
16.
The
obligation
owing
by
Williams
L
P
Caldwell
or
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd
to
Chignecto
and
the
Appellant
as
Chignecto’s
agent
was
paid
promptly
by
regular
instalments
and
was
discharged
on
March
12th,
1968.
17.
From
November
9th,
1964,
until
January
1st,
1968,
Cairns
conducted
no
trading
business
but
continued
to
hold
the
said
lands
and
building
in
Campbellton
and
collected
the
rents
thereof
from
the
Appellant
and
from
the
other
tenants.
18.
By
agreement
dated
as
of
January
1st,
1968,
Cairns
agreed
to
sell
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
(hereinafter
called
“Properties”)
the
said
lands
and
building
for
a
price
made
up
as
follows:
Lands
|
$17,700.00
|
Building
|
$24,880.00
|
|
$42,580.00
|
The
said
value
placed
on
the
building
was
the
book
value
thereof
and
the
value
placed
on
the
lands
was
the
fair
value
thereof
as
estimated
by
the
management
of
Cairns
and
agreed
to
by
the
management
of
Properties.
The
said
purchase
price
was
by
said
agreement
stated
to
be,
and
still
remains
as,
a
debt
owing
on
open
account
by
Properties
to
Cairns.
19.
The
said
sale
was
implemented
by
deed
dated
as
of
January
ist,
1968,
and
actually
executed
on
January
16th,
1968.
20.
Properties
is
a
real
property
holding
and
leasing
company,
no
shares
of
which
are
held
by
or
for
the
Appellant
and
which
is
at
arm’s
length
from
the
Appellant,
though
Properties
and
the
Appellant
have
close
business
relations.
21.
Properties
held
title
on
January
1st,
1968,
to
some
forty
foodmarket
sites
(on
most
of
which
were
operating
foodmarkets)
located
throughout
the
Provinces
of
New
Brunswick,
Nova
Scotia
and
Prince
Edward
Island,
all
of
which
were
demised
to
the
Appellant
by
lease
dated
as
of
November
1st,
1962,
and
expiring
on
October
31st,
2061,
and
by
instruments
supplemental
thereto.
The
said
lands,
building
and
store
premises
acquired
from
Cairns
were
added
to
this
lease
by
lease
amendment
dated
as
of
January
1st,
1968,
and
actually
executed
on
January
18th,
1968.
22.
Most
of
the
retail
foodmarket
sites
controlled
by
or
for
the
Appellant
are
held
in
the
name
of
Properties
and
so
leased
to
the
Appellant.
This
is
the
Appellant's
ordinary
manner
of
holding
real
property
used
or
to
be
used
for
retail
foodmarkets.
23.
By
a
Deed
of
Trust
and
Mortgage
dated
as
of
November
1st,
1962,
made
by
Properties
in
favour
of
The
Royal
Trust
Company
and
drawn
to
secure
First
Mortgage
Bonds
of
Properties,
all
of
the
present
and
future
lands
and
buildings
of
Properties
were
mortgaged
and
subjected
to
various
covenants
in
the
said
Deed
of
Trust
and
Mortgage
contained.
24.
As
a
result
of
the
transactions
described
in
paragraphs
numbered
18
and
19
hereof
Cairns
became
an
inactive
company
holding
nothing
but
book
debts
owing
to
it
by
Chignecto
and
Properties.
Its
business
activities
were
suspended.
The
debts
owing
to
it
were,
however,
owed
by
subsisting
companies
with
ample
assets
and
Cairns
was
and
ever
since
has
been
in
a
position
to
resume
trading
activities
as
soon
as
an
appropriate
role
could
be
found
for
Cairns.
Cairns
was
actively
considered
by
the
Appellant
in
1969
for
employment
upon
the
acquisition
by
the
Appellant
of
a
large
wholesale
grocery
business.
the
negotiations
for
the
acquisition
of
which
proved
abortive
at
that
time.
25.
By
Supplementary
Letters
Patent
dated
June
24th,
1970,
Cairns
changed
its
name
to
Valu-Mart
(1970)
Ltd.
Such
Supplementary
Letters
Patent
were
obtained
at
the
instigation
of
the
Appellant
for
the
purpose
of
protecting
the
trade
name
“Valu-Mart”
and
with
a
view
to
having
Cairns
enter
into
the
business
of
a
franchising
company
with
respect
to
the
name
“Valu-Mart”
which
is,
and
is
to
be,
employed
by
discount
warehouse
retail
food
stores
controlled
directly
or
indirectly
by
the
Appellant.
26.
The
Minister
has,
by
letter
dated
June
3rd,
1969,
stated,
as
regards
the
portion
of
the
said
assessment
appealed
against:
“A
dividend
of
$54,418.03
was
deemed
to
have
been
received
by
(Appellant)
in
1968
from
(Cairns)
under
the
provisions
of
sections
28,
81
and
82
of
The
Income
Tax
Act.”
In
his
20
pages
of
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal
the
respondent
alleged,
among
other
things,
the
following:
(h)
William
L
P
Caldwell
or
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd
paid
the
following
amounts
to
the
Appellant
in
full
discharge
of
the
said
promissory
note:
|
Interest
|
Principal
|
Nov.
10,
1964—
Mar.
30,
1965
|
$1,367.55
|
$
8,457.16
|
Mar.
31,
1965
—Mar.
30,
1966
|
2,972.61
|
11,077.39
|
Mar.
31,
1966
—
Mar.
30,
1967
|
2,024.81
|
14,075.19
|
Mar.
31,
1967
—
Jan.
7,
1968
|
997.73
|
10,252.27
|
Jan.
8,
1968
—
Mar.
12,
1968
|
323.52
|
14,670.25
|
|
$8,186.22
|
$58,532.26
|
(i)
the
Appellant
deposited
the
said
funds
in
its
own
bank
account
as
they
were
received
and
appropriated
them
to
its
own
use,
and
on
its
books
entered
them
as
accounts
payable
to
Cairns,
while
Cairns
entered
such
amounts
as
accounts
receivable
from
the
Appellant;
(j)
by
book
entry
recorded
May
30,
1965,
the
Appellant
caused
Chignecto
Holdings
Ltd
to
assume
the
Appellant’s
debt
expressed
to
be
owing
by
the
Appellant
to
Cairns
in
the
amount
of
$60,120.21
and
at
the
same
time
reduced
by
that
amount
a
debt
expressed
to
be
owing
to
the
Appellant
by
Chignecto
Holdings
Ltd;
(k)
after
May
30,
1965,
the
Appellant
continued
to
receive
all
amounts
paid
by
William
L
P
Caldwell
or
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd
on
the
said
promissory
note
and
to
appropriate
such
funds
to
its
own
use,
and
required
Chignecto
Holdings
Ltd
to
express
such
amounts
as
owing
to
Cairns;
(l)
on
or
about
January
1,
1968,
Cairns
transferred
the
said
real
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
for
$42,580.00
at
book
value,
no
part
of
which
amount
was
paid
to
Cairns
or
secured
in
any
way;
(m)
the
business
of
Cairns
was
wound
up
or
discontinued
between
the
time
of
the
said
transfer
of
its
real
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
and
March
12,
1968,
and
Cairns
has
since
that
time
carried
on
no
business
whatsoever,
but
has
remained
an
inactive
company;
(n)
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
was
at
all
material
times
a
corporation
which
was
not
dealing
with
Cairns
or
the
Appellant
at
arm’s
length
because
(i)
all
of
these
companies
and
Loblaw
Companies
Limited
were
related
persons,
within
the
meaning
of
subsections
(5),
(5a),
(5b)
and
(5d)
of
section
139
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
(ii)
they
were
not
dealing
with
each
other
at
arm’s
length
in
fact,
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(b)
of
subsection
(5)
of
section
139
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
(o)
the
Appellant
at
all
material
times
had
control
of
Cairns
and
had
its
nominees
on
the
board
of
directors
of
Cairns;
(p)
the
transfer
of
the
said
real
property
by
Cairns
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
was
made
pursuant
to
the
direction
of,
or
with
the
concurrence
of,
the
Appellant
for
the
benefit
of
the
Appellant
or
as
a
benefit
that
the
Appellant
desired
to
have
conferred
on
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd;
(q)
no
payment
has
ever
been
made
to
Cairns
on
account
of
the
promissory
note
or
chattel
mortgage
or
on
account
of
the
transfer
of
the
real
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd,
and
at
no
time
has
Cairns
made
any
demand
for
payment;
(r)
the
Appellant
and
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
did
not,
as
consideration
for
the
said
assets
incur
any
real
or
bona
fide
obligation
to
pay
Cairns
a
sum
of
money,
or
make
such
promise
that
the
Appellant,
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
or
Cairns
intended
would
be
fulfilled
or
enforced;
(s)
the
said
transactions
whereby
Cairns
appropriated
all
payments
made
on
the
promissory
note
to
the
Appellant
and
transferred
its
real
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
were
part
of
an
overall
plan
or
scheme
whereby
Cairns
would
transfer
all
or
substantially
all
of
its
assets
either
to
the
Appellant
or
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
at
the
direction
of
or
with
the
concurrence
of
the
Appellant
without
the
Appellant
or
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
being
called
upon
to
pay
Cairns
therefor,
and
to
leave
Cairns
as
an
empty
and
inactive
shell:
(t)
as
a
result
of
the
appropriations
of
the
payments
on
the
promissory
note
between
January
8,
1968
and
March
12,
1968,
amounting
to
$14,-
993.77,
as
hereinbefore
more
particularly
set
forth
in
paragraph
(h),
funds
or
property
of
Cairns
in
the
amount
of
$14,993.77
were
distributed
or
otherwise
appropriated
to
or
for
the
benefit
of
the
Appellant,
within
the
meaning
of
section
81(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
(u)
had
the
transfer
of
the
said
real
property
been
made
to
the
Appellant
rather
than
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd,
the
result
would
have
been
that
funds
or
property
of
Cairns
in
the
amount
of
$42,580.00
would
have
been
distributed
or
otherwise
appropriated
to
or
for
the
benefit
of
the
Appellant
upon
the
winding-up,
discontinuance
or
reorganization
of
the
business
of
Cairns,
within
the
meaning
of
section
81(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
the
lesser
of
the
amounts
mentioned
in
section
81(1)
would
have
been
deemed
to
have
been
received
by
the
Appellant
as
a
dividend
and
all
or
a
portion
thereof
would
have
been
required
to
be
included
in
the
Appellant’s
income
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
sections
6(1)
(a)(i)
and
28
of
the
Act;
therefore,
since
the
said
transfer
was
made
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
pursuant
to
the
direction
of,
or
with
the
concurrence
of,
the
Appellant
for
the
benefit
of
the
Appellant
or
as
a
benefit
that
the
Appellant
desired
to
have
conferred
on
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd,
such
aforementioned
amount
is
to
be
included
in
the
Appellant’s
income
under
section
16(1)
of
the
Act;
(v)
at
all
material
times
and
at
the
end
of
its
1964,
1965,
1966,
1967
and
1968
taxation
years
Cairns
had
the
following
amounts
of
undistributed
income
on
hand,
within
the
meaning
of
sections
81
and
82
of
the
Income
Tax
Act:
June
30,
1964
|
$54,418.03
|
March
30,
1965
|
$61,028.03
|
March
30,
1966
|
$63,055.03
|
March
30,
1967
|
$64,728.03
|
March
30,
1968
|
$65,579.03
|
of
which
amounts
the
sum
of
$49,718.03
was
at
all
such
times
designated
surplus,
within
the
meaning
of
section
28
of
the
Act;
(w)
since
the
amount
or
value
of
the
funds
or
property
distributed
or
appropriated,
as
aforesaid,
between
January
1,
1968
and
March
12,
1968,
ie
$57,573.71,
was
less
than
the
amount
of
Cairns’
undistributed
income
then
on
hand,
ie
$65,579.03,
the
amount
of
the
dividend
deemed
to
have
been
received
by
the
Appellant
under
section
81(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
was
that
lesser
amount,
and
only
that
amount
is
to
be
included
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
for
the
1968
taxation
year;
(x)
since
Cairns’
designated
surplus
amounted
to
$49,718.03
at
the
time
when
the
Appellant
was
deemed
to
have
received
the
said
dividend
of
$57,573.77,
only
such
amount
of
the
dividend
as
was
not
paid
out
of
designated
surplus
is
deductible
under
section
28(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
when
computing
the
Appellant’s
taxable
income
for
the
1968
taxation
year.
16.
Alternatively,
as
a
result
of
the
said
transactions
whereby
Cairns
appropriated
all
payments
on
the
promissory
note
to
the
Appellant
and
transferred
its
real
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd,
Cairns
conferred
in
the
1968
taxation
year
on
the
Appellant,
or
on
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
at
the
direction
of
or
with
the
concurrence
of
the
Appellant,
a
benefit
of
$68,823.77,
being
the
total
of
$1,321.25
on
account
of
interest
and
$24,922.52
on
account
of
principal
paid
to
the
Appellant
in
the
year
on
the
promissory
note
and
$42,580.00
with
respect
to
the
real
property
transferred
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
in
January,
1968,
within
the
meaning
of
sections
16(1)
and
137(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
Cairns
is
therefore
deemed
by
section
137(2)
of
the
Act
to
have
made
a
payment
to
the
Appellant
in
the
amount
of
$68,823.77,
which
amount
is
to
be
included
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
by
virtue
of
section
137(2)
of
the
Act.
17.
In
the
further
alternative,
the
Respondent
says
that
if
the
said
property
and
assets
of
Cairns
were
not
distributed
or
otherwise
appropriated
to
or
for
the
benefit
of
the
Appellant
or
as
a
benefit
which
the
Appellant
desired
to
have
conferred
on
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
on
the
winding-up,
discontinuance
or
reorganization
of
Cairns’
business,
the
payments
made
to
the
Appellant
on
the
promissory
note
in
the
1968
taxation
year
and
the
said
transfer
of
the
real
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
at
the
direction
of
or
with
the
concurrence
of
the
Appellant,
the
total
in
the
years
amounting
to
$68,823.77,
were:
(a)
payments
made
by
Cairns
to
the
Appellant
qua
shareholder
otherwise
than
pursuant
to
bona
fide
business
transactions,
or
(b)
funds
or
property
of
Cairns
which
Cairns
appropriated
to
or
for
the
benefit
of
the
Appellant
qua
shareholder,
or
(c)
benefits
or
advantages
which
were
conferred
by
Cairns
upon
the
Appellant
qua
shareholder
otherwise
than
by
way
of
the
methods
specified
in
section
8(1
)(c)(i),
(ii)
or
(iii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
so
that
the
amount
of
$68,823.77
is
to
be
properly
included
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
for
the
1968
taxation
year
pursuant
to
sections
8(1)
and
16(1)
of
the
Act.
17A.
In
the
further
alternative,
the
Respondent
says
that:
(a)
If
the
said
amounts
which
were
paid
by
William
L
P
Caldwell
or
Cairns
Foodmarket
Ltd
to
the
Appellant
totalling
$26,243.77
in
the
1968
taxation
year,
were
in
fact
intended
to
be
repaid
by
the
Appellant
to
Cairns,
they
were
intended
to
have
been
received
and
retained
by
the
Appellant
as
loans
from
Cairns
and
are
thus
to
be
properly
included
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
for
the
1968
taxation
year
pursuant
to
section
8(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
(b)
if
the
amount
representing
the
value
of
the
said
real
property,
ie
$42,580.00
was
in
fact
intended
to
be
paid
to
Cairns,
it
was
intended
to
have
been
retained
by
Atlantic
Properties
Ltd
at
the
direction
of
or
with
the
concurrence
of,
the
Appellant
as
a
loan
and
was
therefore
a
payment
or
transfer
of
property
which,
had
it
been
made
to
the
Appellant,
would
have
to
be
properly
included
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
for
the
1968
taxation
year
pursuant
to
section
8(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
the
said
amount
of
$42,580.00
is
therefore
to
be
properly
included
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
for
the
1968
taxation
year
pursuant
to
section
16(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Mr
Douglas
J
T
Hamm,
who
has
been
with
the
company
for
25
years
and
who
is
its
president
as
well
as
president
of
its
subsidiaries,
testified
concerning
the
nature
of
the
operations
of
the
appellant
and
its
subsidiaries,
and
also
with
respect
to
the
transaction
dated
November
9,
1964
between
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
and
the
appellant
company.
He
stated
that
the
appellant
is
a
company
which
operates
a
wholesale
grocery
business,
having
18
branch
outlets.
It
has
24
retail
stores
and
its
consolidated
sales
volume
is
approximately
$82
million.
In
addition
to
operating
its
24
stores,
the
appellant
services
about
3,500
independent
accounts
of
varying
sizes.
In
1959
the
appellant,
for
the
purpose
of
becoming
more
familiar
with
the
supermarket
business,
purchased
one
major
supermarket
outlet,
namely
St
George
Fruits
Limited
in
Moncton.
Previously
the
appellant
had
been
involved
in
the
franchise
business
with
Red
&
White
and
Lucky
Dollar
groups.
In
1959
it
went
with
a
major
group
called
Save
Easy
which
was
Carrying
on
the
same
type
of
business
with
independent
operators.
The
witness
explained
that
the
appellant
will
purchase
land,
build
a
store
thereon
and
lease
it
to
an
independent,
but
a
customer
owning
his
own
store
may
also
become
a
member
of
the
organization.
In
the
latter
circumstance,
if
a
customer
wishes
to
renovate
his
store,
purchase
equipment
or
establish
his
business
in
a
new
outlet,
the
appellant
will
grant
him
financial
assistance
in
return
for
a
demand
note
or
chattel
mortgage
on
the
stock
and
equipment.
According
to
the
appellant’s
1965
income
tax
return
the
sum
of
$775,772
was
advanced
on
such
mortgages.
The
witness
explained
that
demand
notes
are
made
payable
to
the
appellant
company
whereas
chattel
mortgages
are
taken
in
the
name
of
Chignecto
Holdings
Ltd,
a
wholly-owned
subsidiary
of
the
appellant
company
and
primarily
an
insurance
agent.
According
to
this
financial
system,
the
appellant
at
the
material
time
was
able
to
obtain
a
line
of
credit
up
to
an
amount
of
$500,000
by
discounting
customers’
notes
at
the
Royal
Bank
of
Canada
which
would
credit
the
appellant
with
the
face
value
of
the
notes.
He
stated
that
the
appellant
company
also
operates
its
wholesale
grocery
business
through
two
other
wholly-owned
subsidiaries,
namely,
R
McGregor
and
Sons
Ltd
in
New
Glasgow
and
Kitchen
Bros
Ltd
in
Fredericton
—
each
company
having
a
warehouse
in
its
respective
city.
The
appellant
company
has
a
centralized
accounting
system
in
its
head
office
in
Sackville
to
which
all
accounts
from
the
different
branches
are
transferred
on
a
daily
basis.
As
already
stated,
the
appellant
deals
with
its
24
customers
in
two
different
ways
—
it
either
owns
and
leases
the
store
to
the
customer
or
the
customer
owns
his
own
store
but
is
bound
to
buy
his
stock
from
the
appellant.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
appellant
purchased
all
the
shares
of
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited,
sold
the
food
business
to
its
customer
and
the
land
and
building
to
its
wholly-owned
subsidiary
by
the
name
of
Atlantic
Properties
Limited.
The
stock-in-trade
of
the
grocery
outlet
was
sold
to
one
Mr
William
Caldwell
for
a
price
of
$59,116.76,
and
the
ground
floor
of
the
building
was
leased
to
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
by
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
for
a
term
of
10
years
at
a
rental
of
$350
per
month.
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
leased
back
the
ground
floor
to
Cairns
Food
Market
Limited
for
$400
per
month,
under
which
lease
the
tenant
was
bound
to
purchase
all
its
merchandise
from
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited.
The
rent
is
collected
by
the
appellant
manager
of
the
Campbellton
branch.
Cairns
Food
Market
Limited
agreed
to
assign
the
book
debts
(December
21,
1964)
and
a
chattel
mortgage
(January
4,
1965)
to
Chig-
necto
Holdings
Ltd,
and
to
purchase
the
stock-in-trade
and
fixtures
from
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
for
$59,116.76,
which
amount
corresponds
to
the
amount
of
the
promissory
note
payable
to
the
appellant.
(The
said
promissory
note
could
not
be
located
and
consequently
was
not
filed
at
the
hearing.)
Apparently,
this
was
not
an
isolated
transaction
but
a
standard
procedure
used
by
the
appellant
to
facilitate
the
discounting
of
notes,
and
Chignecto
Holdings
Ltd
was
used
to
keep
the
name
of
the
appellant
company
out
of
Dunn
and
Bradstreet
reports
so
that
no
information
would
be
available
to
competitors
and
also
to
avoid
any
proceedings
against
the
appellant.
The
witness
also
stated
that
the
purchase
price
has
been
completely
paid,
the
promissory
note
returned,
and
the
chattel
mortgage
released;
that
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
has
been
inactive
since
November
9,
1964,
has
had
no
employees,
and
consequently
the
appellant
company
collects
the
rent.
The
financial
statements
of
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
dated
June
30,
1964
and
November
7,
1964
show
a
net
profit
of
$19,040.25
from
the
store
operation
and
an
amount
of
$804.84
as
the
net
rental
income.
Thereafter
the
rent
was
arrived
at
by
charging
60%
of
the
store
expenditures
in
lieu
of
a
fixed
rent
and
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited,
as
landlord,
was
reporting
and
paying
income
tax
on
an
annual
total
rental
income
of
$6,700.
The
promissory
note
mentioned
above
was
held
for
about
three
months
—
that
is
to
say,
until
there
was
sufficient
room
between
the
amount
of
credit
authorized
and
the
balance
of
notes
currently
discounted.
According
to
a
bank
ledger
sheet,
the
appellant
company
received
full
credit
for
the
face
value
of
the
promissory
note
on
August
12,
1965.
It
then
credited
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
through
a
company
account
wherein
this
amount
was
set
up
as
an
amount
owing
to
Cairns
and
receivable
by
Cairns.
In
1970
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
changed
its
name
to
Valu-Mart
(1970)
Limited,
and
according
to
the
financial
statements
filed
the
former
was
credited
with
an
amount
of
$60,120
which
was
the
sale
price
by
Cairns
Food
Market
Ltd.
in
1968
the
property
was
sold
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
for
the
sum
of
$42,580
—
$17,700
for
the
land
and
$24,880
for
the
building.
Mr
Hamm
also
stated
that
the
fact
that
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
had
a
non-distributed
income
on
hand
in
the
amount
of
$54,418.03
never
entered
his
mind
as
being
an
incentive
for
the
appellant
to
buy
the
shares,
and
the
examination
of
Cairns’
financial
statements
was
made
solely
to
appraise
the
value
of
the
shares
for
the
purpose
of
buying
the
company
in
order
to
retain
it
as
an
outlet
volume
for
their
branch
operation
in
Campbellton.
He
admitted
that
the
$54,418.03
was
income
earned
prior
to
the
sale
of
the
shares
and
that
it
was
undistributed;
that
the
appellant
company
never
took
over
Cairns’
assets
and,
therefore,
the
undistributed
income,
because
the
receivables
were
always
shown
to
be
owing
to
the
company.
However,
he
also
admitted
that
the
people
who
would
have
to
make
the
decision
that
Cairns
de-
mand
payment
would
be
the
same
people
who
would
make
the
decision
that
the
appellant
company
pay
the
debts;
that
from
1964
nothing
has
in
fact
ever
been
paid
by
the
appellant
or
demanded
by
Cairns;
and
that
nothing
was
planned
for
Cairns,
to
which
company
the
debts
could
be
owed
by
the
appellant
forever.
According
to
financial
statements,
when
the
appellant
discounted
the
promissory
note
at
face
value
of
$59,116.76,
it
was
credited
the
same
day
with
$12,076.32,
which
amount
represented
the
payments
made
by
Mr
Caldwell
up
to
that
date.
The
appellant
company
billed
Cairns
Food
Market
every
month
for
the
amount
it
had
to
pay
to
the
Royal
Bank,
plus
a
charge
of
1%
interest
to
cover
the
expense
of
the
clerical
work
involved.
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
never
reported
this
interest
as
income.
From
November
9,
1964
to
January,
1968
its
only
source
of
income
was
rental
income
and
all
activities
ceased
in
1968
when
the
property
was
transferred
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited.
On
May
30,
1965
Chignecto
Holdings
Limited
was
substituted
for
the
appellant
as
debtor
for
the
amount
expressed
to
be
owing
to
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited.
There
is
nothing
in
evidence
to
show
that
the
Cairns
Company
consented
to
this
substitution
of
debtors.
According
to
the
witness,
the
building
was
transferred
at
$24,880
which
was
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
—
possibly
to
avoid
recapture
but
also
because
it
was
considered
to
be
part
and
parcel
of
a
reasonable
price
for
the
overall
deal.
The
sum
of
$17,700
for
the
land
had
been
discussed
by
the
management
of
all
the
companies
when
they
decided
that
the
building
should
be
transferred
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
because
it
was
the
only
one
housing
a
retail
outlet
that
was
not
in
their
possession.
Consequently,
the
property
was
transferred
for
$42,580
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
but
the
latter
never
paid
anything
to
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
except
an
account
which
was
not
secured
by
a
mortgage,
and
which
was
to
be
owing
to
it
by
Atlantic
Properties
Limited.
Mr
J
R
Pichette,
who
was
in
the
real
estate
and
general
insurance
business
in
Campbellton
and
who
was
also
the
official
Royal
Trust
real
estate
representative
and
appraiser
in
the
area,
was
accepted
as
a
qualified
appraiser.
He
stated
that
he
had
never
succeeded
in
selling
a
commercial
building
at
the
municipal
assessment,
and
he
put
the
following
valuations
on
the
property
at
issue
as
at
the
beginning
of
1968:
(a)
cost
of
replacement
less
depreciation
—
$47,500
(b)
with
respect
to
the
income
approach
—
$46,786
(c)
according
to
comparable
properties
sold
in
the
neighbourhood
—
$46,000
to
$47,000.
He
also
stated
that,
under
the
conditions
that
Mr
Caldwell
bought
the
property,
he
could
have
found
a
half-dozen
buyers
and
that,
as
a
salesman,
he
could
not
have
sold
that
building
for
more
than
$40,000
unless
the
buyer
intended
to
go
into
the
retail
grocery
business
and
wished
to
capitalize
on
the
Cairns
goodwill.
After
this
testimony
the
parties
admitted
that
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
and
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
are
non-arm’s
length
companies.
Mr
A
M
McNicol,
treasurer
of
the
appellant
company,
testified
that
no
inter-company
interest
was
charged
or
inter-company
security
documents
prepared
in
any
way
whatsoever.
Referring
to
financial
statements
prepared
and
filed
with
income
tax
returns,
he
quoted
the
following
figures:
|
Notes
and
Mortgages
|
Contingent
Liabilities
|
1966
|
$1,080,829
|
$655,885
|
1967
|
1,172,094
|
572,957
|
1968
|
716,470
|
559,113
|
Upon
cross-examination
he
admitted
that
in
the
case
of
loans
made
to
outsiders
the
appellant
would
charge
interest
and
take
securities.
He
corroborated
the
testimonies
of
the
other
witnesses
to
the
effect
that
the
appellant,
when
advancing
money
to
a
customer,
would
take
a
promissory
note
or
a
chattel
mortgage.
With
respect
to
the
transaction
under
discussion,
he
said
that
he
was
not
aware
of
any
resolution
made
by
the
Cairns
Company
authorizing
the
transfer
of
the
assets.
According
to
him,
the
appellant
company
operates
on
a
centralized
banking
system
whereby
it
deals
with
the
funds
of
all
the
other
companies
as
if
they
were
its
own.
Consequently,
from
1964
onward
the
Cairns
Company
did
not
make
any
use
of
the
money
as
it
was
always
shown
as
an
account
receivable
and
had
been
transferred
to
the
appellant.
Mr
McNicol
agreed
that
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
simply
removed
the
assets
of
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
and
used
them
for
its
own
purposes
and
gave
only
a
receivable
in
return.
Apparently,
this
was
done
to
split
the
winding
up
of
a
business
from
the
winding
up
of
a
company
because
subsection
81(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
does
not
apply
to
the
winding
up
of
a
company
but
only
to
the
winding
up
of
its
business.
He
also
stated
that
the
appellant
company
purchased
the
shares
of
another
company
by
the
name
of
Kitchen
Bros
Limited
which
is
still
operating,
and
that
it
had
at
that
time
an
undistributed
income
on
hand,
designated
surplus
in
excess
of
$400,000,
and
that
the
appellant
was
awaiting
the
outcome
of
the
present
appeal
before
dealing
with
that
company.
Mr
J
P
Palmer,
senior
partner
in
the
firm
of
Palmer,
O’Connell,
Leger
and
Turnbull,
and
president
of
Atlantic
Properties
Limited,
corroborated
the
previous
testimonies
and
testified
that
the
sum
of
$42,581
was
not
a
loan
but
an
obligation
arising
out
of
transactions
between
the
aforementioned
companies;
that
these
debts
are
recoverable
any
time
on
demand;
and
that
this
amount
was
for
the
value
of
the
property
transferred
by
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited.
He
stated
that
this
amount
has
never
been
paid
by
Atlantic
Properties
and
no
demand
for
payment
has
ever
been
made
by
the
Cairns
Company.
He
went
on
to
say
that
in
unusual
transactions
he
usually
reports
to
a
law
firm
in
Toronto
to
get
direction,
but
that
this
was
not
done
with
respect
to
the
transaction
under
discussion.
He
agreed
that
there
was
a
great
degree
of
cooperation
and
mutual
trust
between
the
different
companies,
but
he
did
not
admit
that
these
com-
panies
were
entirely
one.
He
stressd
the
fact
that
the
debt
was
a
demand
debt,
payment
for
which
could
be
requested
at
any
time.
It
was
not
guaranteed
by
a
mortgage
but
was
very
valuable
because
of
the
solvability
of
the
debtor.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that
the
appellant
carried
out
the
transactions
under
review
in
its
normal
course
of
business.
When
the
stock-in-trade
of
the
Cairns
Company
was
sold,
the
appellant
received
a
promissory
note
and
one
of
its
subsidiaries,
Chignecto
Holdings
Limited,
received
a
chattel
mortgage
from
Mr
Caldwell.
He
also
contended
that
when
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
sold
its
stock-in-trade
on
November
9,
1964
its
business
as
a
retail
grocery
was
discontinued
and
from
then
on
the
appellant
company
looked
after
the
maintenance
of
and
repairs
to
the
building,
collected
the
rents
and
kept
the
books,
Cairns
Company
having
no
employees
of
its
own.
He
stated
that
if
there
was
any
distribution
or
appropriation
of
property
it
happened
back
on
November
9,
1964,
but
he
submitted
that
there
was
no
appropriation
by
the
shareholders
of
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited.
He
stressed
the
fact
that
Cairns
got
rid
of
some
assets
and
received
another
one
in
return
—
an
account
receivable
which
was
very
valuable
because
of
the
substantial
assets
of
the
appellant
company.
With
respect
to
the
sale
of
the
real
property
by
the
Cairns
Company
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
for
$42,580,
counsel
for
the
appellant
submitted
that
the
evidence
of
Mr
Pichette
to
the
effect
that
on
the
open
market
he
could
not
get
more
than
$40,000
for
it
was
very
convincing,
and
that
it
does
not
make
any
difference
whether
this
amount
was
paid
by
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
to
the
Cairns
Company
or
whether
it
was
secured
by
a
mortgage
or
other
security
because
there
was
no
need
to
proceed
in
that
manner.
He
stated
that
the
debt
was
created
and
could
be
paid
at
any
time,
and
that
he
would
be
very
happy
to
own
personally
the
shares
of
the
Cairns
Company.
He
pointed
out
that
at
the
present
time
Cairns
is
doing
everything
possible
to
stay
alive.
It
files
annual
income
tax
returns
and
undergoes
an
annual
audit.
Since
1968
it
has
changed
its
charter
and
its
name,
and
has
filed
documents
in
other
jurisdictions
to
protect
the
name
of
Valu-Mart.
it
was
actively
considered
by
management
for
the
acquisition
of
the
assets
of
another
company.
He
further
contended
that
these
amounts
of
$59,116.76
and
$42,580
were
not
loans
to
shareholders
but
a
balance
owing
from
the
sale
of
properties.
He
referred
the
Board
to
two
cases,
namely,
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
v
George
Burrell,
[1924]
2
KB
52,
and
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
v
Blott,
[1920]
2
KB
657,
to
say
that
appropriation
of
property
in
section
81
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
means
complete
and
utter
distribution
or
complete
appropriation
or
benefit
from
property.
He
contended
that
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
and
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
owed
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
the
fair
market
value
for
what
they
received
and
that
there
was
no
appropriation
or,
alternatively,
if
there
was
appropriation
by
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited,
it
happened
in
1965
when
the
benefits
were
received.
Counsel
for
respondent
referred
the
Board
to
subsection
8(1)
of
the
Act
to
say
that
if
a
shareholder
gets
property
without
giving
value
for
it,
then
this
is
to
be
included
in
computing
the
shareholder’s
income.
On
the
other
hand,
if
a
company
makes
a
loan
to
a
shareholder,
then
under
certain
circumstances
which
are
spelled
out
in
subsection
8(2)
of
the
Act,
such
loan
also
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
the
shareholder.
In
a
case
where
property
comes
into
the
hands
of
a
shareholder
without
the
shareholder
giving
adequate
value
in
return
—
and
this
may
happen
in
the
course
of
the
winding
up
or
discontinuance
of
a
business
—
subsection
81(1)
would
come
into
operation.
If
the
shareholder
that
gets
the
appropriation
is
a
corporation,
then
further
rules
come
into
play
under
the
various
subsections
of
section
28
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
present
assessment
was
made
on
the
assumption
that
there
was
an
appropriation
of
funds
from
a
company
by
the
name
of
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited,
either
to
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
or
to
another
company,
Atlantic
Properties
Limited,
with
the
concurrence
or
at
the
direction
of
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited,
and
therefore
subsection
16(1)
of
the
Act
comes
into
play.
According
to
him,
when
you
look
at
the
substance
of
the
various
transactions,
it
appears
that
at
one
point
in
time
in
1964
there
was
a
company
which
owned
valuable
assets,
but
at
the
next
point
in
time
the
said
assets
disappeared
and
in
their
place
was
an
account
receivable.
He
contended
that
the
substitution
of
an
account
receivable
for
a
valuable
property
was
simply
a
device
that
was
used
to
detract
from
the
fact
that
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
or
a
company
at
its
direction
had
acquired
the
use
and
benefit
of
the
property.
According
to
him,
what
really
happened
was
that,
instead
of
valuable
property
coming
into
the
hands
of
the
Cairns
Company,
an
account
receivable,
totally
unsecured,
was
received.
Neither
the
principal
nor
any
interest
thereon
has
been
paid
up
to
the
present
time,
and
the
appellant
has
had
the
full
use
and
benefit
of
the
property.
Cairns
was
just
left
sitting
there
with
the
account
receivable.
According
to
counsel
for
respondent,
the
Cairns
Company
continued
to
carry
on
the
business
of
leasing
the
real
property,
but
in
so
far
as
the
grocery
property
was
concerned,
that
property
or
its
value
was
appropriated
and
came
into
the
hands
of
the
appellant
company.
Similarly,
when
the
Cairns
Company
transferred
its
real
estate
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited,
this
again
was
done
with
the
complete
concurrence
or
at
the
direction
of
the
appellant
because
everything
was
done
by
the
same
group
of
people
which
directed
all
the
companies.
He
contended
that
when
Cairns
transferred
the
building
to
Atlantic
Properties
for
an
account
receivable,
not
even
a
promissory
note
was
given
to
secure
this
amount;
no
interest
was
paid
and
no
mortgage
given.
In
substance,
what
happened
was
that
the
parent
company
simply
appropriated
the
assets
remaining,
shifted
them
around
in
such
a
way
as
to
have
their
value
come
into
the
hands
of
its
nominee,
Atlantic
Properties
Limited.
Consequently,
it
is
simply
a
substitution
of
an
account
receivable
for
real
property.
After
contending
that
in
substance
there
was
appropriation
in
both
transactions,
counsel
for
the
respondent
saw
fit
to
determine
the
nature
of
those
appropriations
through
point
of
time.
With
respect
to
the
real
property
transferred
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited
on
January
1,
1968
he
stated
that
there
was
no
difficulty
in
determining
when
the
appropriation
took
place
because
it
happened
in
the
taxation
year
under
appeal.
With
respect
to
the
payment
of
the
promissory
note,
his
colleague
had
argued
that
if
there
was
an
appropriation,
it
took
place
in
1964
or
1965
—
in
1964
when
the
appellant
received
Caldwell’s
promissory
note,
or
in
1965
when
it
discounted
the
note
with
the
bank.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
what
happened
in
1964
was
only
the
receiving
of
a
promise
to
pay,
and
that
no
payments
were
received
until
the
payments
on
the
note
were
received.
Consequently,
if
there
were
appropriations,
they
consisted
of
funds
received
from
Mr
Caldwell
and
the
latter
did
not
pay
anything
in
1964.
As
for
1965
he
submitted
that
the
appellant
took
the
promissory
note
to
the
bank,
and
the
bank
credited
the
appellant
with
the
full
amount
of
the
promissory
note,
ie
$59,000.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
admitted
that
at
this
point
the
appellant
had
full
use
of
the
money
but
because
the
appellant
received
the
money
on
the
condition
that
the
promissory
note
would
be
fully
paid,
he
contended
that
the
appellant
did
not
have
full
beneficial
ownership
of
the
said
money
until
it
was
actually
received
from
Mr
Caldwell.
He
stated
that
no
evidence
was
adduced
to
contradict
the
figures
mentioned
in
his
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
and,
consequently,
the
Board
should
rely
on
those
amounts.
According
to
him,
the
problem
would
have
been
different
if
the
promissory
note
had
been
sold
to
the
bank
without
any
recourse
because
the
bank
then
would
have
had
to
collect
the
money.
However,
that
was
not
the
case
in
the
present
appeal.
The
discounting
amounted,
in
substance,
to
nothing
more
than
the
lending
of
money
by
the
bank
to
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited
on
the
security
of
a
promissory
note.
Consequently,
he
suggested
that
since
the
Board
is
dealing
with
the
1968
taxation
year,
the
payments
that
were
made
on
the
promissory
note
are
those
referred
to
on
page
6
of
his
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
namely,
those
made
from
March
31,
1967
to
January
7,
1968
and
from
January
8,
1968
to
March
12,
1968.
These
amounts
make
a
total
of
$24,922.52
(paragraph
16
on
page
11
of
the
Reply).
Consequently,
he
contended
that
in
1968
the
total
appropriation
was
this
amount
of
$24,922.52,
plus
interest
of
$1,321.25,
and
the
amount
of
$42,580
on
the
transfer
of
the
real
property,
making
a
total
of
$68,823.77.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
also
argued
that
if
the
appropriation
on
the
Caldwell
note
took
place
in
1964
or
1965,
then
the
assessment
should
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
on
the
basis
that
the
only
amount
that
should
be
taxed
as
an
appropriation
is
the
$42,580
with
respect
to
the
real
property.
On
the
other
hand,
he
argued
that
the
business
was
not
wound
up
in
1964
or
1965
as
contended
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
because
the
last
amount
on
Mr
Caldwell’s
note
was
collected
on
March
30,
1968
and
no
business
is
discontinued
when
accounts
continue
to
be
collected
and
assets
serviced.
He
referred
the
Board
to
Household
Products
Company
Limited
v
MNR,
34
Tax
ABC
441;
64
DTC
164,
in
which
it
was
held
that
as
long
as
a
company
oper-
ated
after
a
point
in
time
one
of
its
normal
aspects
such
as
the
collection
of
accounts
receivable,
the
company
will
be
in
business
until
such
accounts
are
collected.
He
also
submitted
that,
in
dealing
with
the
case
at
issue,
the
Board
should
look
at
the
substance
of
the
matter,
and
he
referred
the
Board
to
the
following
cases:
Smythe
et
al
v
MNR,
[1967]
CTC
498;
67
DTC
5334
(Exch),
affirmed
by
Can
SC
[1969]
CTC
558;
69
DTC
5361;
Craddock
and
Atkinson
v
MNR,
[1968]
CTC
379;
68
DTC
5254
(Exch),
affirmed
by
Can
SC
[1969]
CTC
566;
69
DTC
5369;
No
507
v
MNR,
19
Tax
ABC
193;
58
DTC
279;
St-Germain
v
MNR,
[1969]
CTC
194;
69
DTC
5086
(Can
SC);
Sokyo
v
MNR,
[1971]
Tax
ABC
140;
71
DTC
129;
Farris
v
MNR,
[1963]
CTC
345;
63
DTC
1221
(Exch);
British
Columbia
Power
Corporation,
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1966]
CTC
451;
66
DTC
5310
(Exch).
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
it
is
clearly
apparent
that
the
appellant,
being
a
corporation,
appropriated
not
only
the
funds
of
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
but
also
the
buildings
which
were
transferred
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited,
a
subsidiary
of
the
appellant,
and
in
both
cases
in
exchange
for
an
account
receivable,
unsecured,
bearing
no
interest
and
lacking
the
usual
elements
of
a
bona
fide
business
transaction.
These
appropriations
were
effectuated,
to
use
the
wording
of
subsection
16(1)
“pursuant
to
the
direction
of,
or
with
the
concurrence
of”
Atlantic
Wholesalers
Limited.
In
such
a
case,
the
Board
should
look
at
the
substance
of
the
various
transactions
which
shows
that
at
one
point
in
time
in
1964
the
Cairns
Company
owned
valuable
assets
which,
at
another
point
in
time,
disappeared
only
to
be
replaced
with
an
account
receivable.
This
course
of
conduct
may
be
customary
in
the
appellant
company
and
may
be
acceptable
as
good
business
policy,
but
a
great
many
sections
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
prevent
such
behaviour,
and,
by
the
same
token,
prevent
tax
evasion.
The
appellant
submitted
that
the
account
receivable
was
a
valuable
asset
because
of
the
importance
and
solvency
of
the
appellant
company.
This
argument
has
some
merit
but
in
the
present
context
one
should
not
forget
that
the
account
receivable
was
completely
unsecured,
and
that
the
appellant
did
not
even
issue
or
sign
a
promissory
note
in
favour
of
Cairns
in
order
to
crystallize
such
an
account
receivable.
Furthermore,
there
is
absolutely
nothing
in
the
Cairns
Company
records
either
authorizing
or
allowing
such
a
transfer
of
money
or
property.
The
whole
course
of
conduct
of
L
T
Cairns
Company
Ltd
and
the
appellant
company
in
those
transactions
does
not
brand
them
as
being
non-arm’s
length
companies.
If
such
had
been
the
case,
they
would
have
taken
more
serious
means
to
protect
their
own
interests.
It
also
appears
very
clear
that
the
appellant
company
did
empty
the
treasury
of
the
Cairns
Company
to
its
own
advantage
or
profit.
The
appellant
did
not
sign
any
promissory
note
but
was
happy
to
use
the
promissory
note
signed
by
Mr
Caldwell
as
collateral
with
which
to
borrow
money
from
the
bank.
It
did
not
sell
the
Caldwell
promissory
note
to
the
bank
and,
consequently,
it
cannot
be
said
that
in
1964
the
appellant
appropriated
the
full
amount
of
the
said
note.
The
funds
were
therefore
appropriated
by
the
appellant
when
the
latter
received
the
last
payment
from
Mr
Caldwell.
The
appellant
was
fortunate
enough
to
be
able
to
get
two
separate
negotiables
for
the
same
transaction,
namely,
the
promissory
note
signed
by
Mr
Caldwell
and
a
chattel
mortgage
granted
by
Cairns
Food
Market.
It
is
self-evident
that
all
the
parties
involved
in
those
transactions
were
not
dealing
at
arm’s
length,
the
appellant
being
careful
to
take
all
necessary
business
precautions
to
secure
the
sale
of
assets
to
people
with
whom
he
was
dealing
at
arm’s
length
while
taking
none
whatsoever
when
dealing
among
themselves.
Although
the
companies
under
review
may
have
mutual
trust,
apparently
the
Minister
cannot
entertain
the
same
degree
of
optimism
and
goes
so
far
as
to
construe
the
so-called
account
receivable
as
one
that
will
never
be
collected,
especially
when
the
vested
interests
of
the
creditor
and
the
debtor
appear
to
be
the
same.
After
the
sale
of
the
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited,
L
T
Cairns
Company
Limited
seemed
to
have
no
useful
purpose
even
though
its
name
was
changed
to
Valu-Mart
to
protect
a
trade
name.
Valu-Mart
Limited
had
no
course
of
conduct
and
the
Board
cannot
rely
upon
future
events
that
might
never
take
place
to
make
a
decision
in
the
present
case.
Therefore,
the
payments
made
on
the
principal
of
the
promissory
note
in
1968
and
the
interest
paid
thereon
in
the
same
year,
in
the
amounts
of
$24,922.52
and
$1,321.25
respectively,
are
deemed
to
be
appropriation
of
funds
by
the
appellant,
and
these
amounts,
together
with
the
amount
of
$42,580
on
the
transfer
of
the
real
property
to
Atlantic
Properties
Limited,
make
a
total
of
$68,823.77
which
should
be
included
in
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
year
1968
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Consequently,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.