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Ferracuti and the Appellant were not dealing at arm’s length; d) at the time of the transfers, the fair market value of the Property was not less than $136,695: e) at the time of the transfers, the fair market value of the consideration given by the Appellant to Mr. ... For there to be a transfer within the meaning of section 160 of the Act, there must be a transfer without valuable consideration. There could be a transfer of property but if this transfer is for valuable consideration, then there is not a transfer within the meaning of section 160 of the Act. ...

According to the respondent, given that the vendor and purchaser are married and that the sale prices are below the real values, the consideration paid by the appellant is at least equal to the spouse’s tax liability. ... Potential use (L-8/R4580/T0/BT0) test_marked_paragraph_end (1352) 1.026 0774_3650_3774 The property under consideration is a former residence converted to a workshop by a land surveying firm. ... The Court cannot objectively take account of the consideration of $120,160 for the residence and $73,000 for the commercial building that the parties stated in the contracts to comply with section 9 of the Act respecting duties on transfers of immovables (Bill 47). ...

According to Black’s Law Dictionary (revised 6th edition), “gift” is defined at p. 688 as: A voluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration.... ... The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles at p. 849, refers to a “gift” in the following manner: A transfer of property in a thing, voluntarily and without any valuable consideration. ... [emphasis added I Thus I conclude for these Appellants the payments were voluntary and not pursuant to a contracted obligation but each Appellant did receive a consideration, that 1s, a secular education for their children in a Mennonite institution. ...

There was no evidence that I can recall that the agreement was supported by any consideration. ... I regard the $60,000 as having been received as consideration for the promise of the appellant to remain in the employment of the Company after the sale to Burke of Mr Alberts’ control block of shares. ... It might, and I think probably did, assuming still that there was such an agreement, represent in addition consideration for a promise to remain in the employment of the Company following a sale of control. ...

By an agreement dated June 1st, 1965 between Frank Merryth and the Appellant, Frank Merryth agreed in consideration of 100,000 shares of Bonanza Explorations Ltd to stake certain claims for the Appellant in the Slocan Mining Division in the Province of British Columbia. 4. ... By an agreement dated August 26th, 1965 the Appellant and Frank Merryth sold the option referred to in paragraph 5 and the four claims referred to in paragraph 6 to Bonanza Explorations Ltd (NPL) in consideration of 750,000 fully paid common shares, 100,000 of which were to be allotted to Merryth the remainder being allotted to the Appellant. 8. ... By an agreement dated February 17th, 1967, between Edward A Little and the Appellant, Edward A Little agreed in consideration of $25.00 per day to stake certain mining claims in the Kamloops Mining District of British Columbia. 4. ...

He claimed that the same situation exists in the appeal at bar because one could take into consideration the offer from third parties to buy the buildings which were eventually sold at a loss. ... Because it had already been taken into consideration as being a liability of Wentworth, it could not be allowed as a liability of the estate. ... As to the liabilities, taking into consideration sections 5, 6 and 30 of the Estate Tax Act, no deduction should be made because those liabilities did not become “unenforceable either before or after the death of the deceased”. ...

I am of the opinion that the income tax text most in line with a proper appreciation of this issue is to be found in paragraph (g) of subsection (6) of Section 20 thus worded (in part): (g) where an amount can reasonably be regarded as being in part the consideration for disposition of depreciable property of a taxpayer of a prescribed class [i.e. Class 3 of Schedule B of the Regulations] and as being in part consideration for something else, the part of the amount that can reasonably be regarded as being the consideration for such disposition shall be deemed to be the proceeds of disposition of depreciable property of that class irrespective of the form or legal effect of the contract or agreement;... ... The question in need of an objective answer may be implied from the textual quotation cited above, to wit: can the sale price of the Columbia Rooms, amounting to $65,000, be reasonably regarded ‘‘as being in part the consideration for disposition of depreciable property of a taxpayer ’ ’? ...

Contending that Section 20(6) (g) applies he argues that the consideration was in part for the disposition of the depreciable property and in part for ‘‘something else’’, being the undepre- clable portion and that the sale price should be attributed on the same basis. ... Appellant’s counsel for his part argued that although it was the property itself which was sold and not two separate items, namely, depreciable property and non-depreciable property, the entire consideration could not be considered as having been paid for the portion of the value of the property which was depreciable since the total value of the property also included the value of the undepreciable portion which did not simply disappear into thin air, and that a portion of the price must be attributable to this component as being ‘‘something else’’, as if, for example, it had been land on which the building had been built. ... On this interpretation the consideration paid must be considered as having been for the purchase of depreciable property of the taxpayer, and since the prices paid of $53,884.82 for the building and $95,164.90 for the equipment exceed in each case the undepreciated capital cost to the taxpayer at the date of the sale of $33,384.82 and $69,364.90 respectively, determined by the application of the deeming provision of Section 20(6) (h) the capital cost allowances claimed in each case for 1962 and 1963 are subject to recapture. ...

The admission by the defendant that he was aware of the taxation advantages in endeavouring to show a substantial portion of the consideration for the shares as payment for services, which, if accepted, would be a deductible item. 18 5. ... On these facts, the Court held that the creation of a debt by a company in favour of a shareholder for no consideration confers a benefit on the shareholder within the meaning of subsection 8(1) and that, accordingly, the promissory note given appellant in 1965 by the company must be taken into account for the purposes of subsection 8(1) in 1965 and not, as contended by appellant, in the year when the note was paid. ... In my view, when a debt is created from a company to a shareholder for no consideration or inadequate consideration, a benefit is conferred. ...

The Motion was granted. 4 Counsel for the respondent further moved to amend the said Reply to the Notice of Appeal to include among the statutory provisions on which he relied the provisions of 5(1), 6(1)(a), 6(3) and 8(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, the last, 8(1)(b), referring to the allowance of the $200 as legal expenses. 5 The amendment which he was permitted to submit reads as follows: By reassessment made July 24, 1974, the appellant was allowed a deduction in computing his income for the 1972 taxation year in the amount of $200, which sum constituted an amount paid by the appellant as legal expenses incurred by the appellant in collecting his salary or wages owed to him by his employer, or former employer, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 6 Paragraph 5 of the Reply was also amended to include the sections that I have just indicated. 7 The respondent's position is that the sum of $6,500, less legal costs, is income pursuant to subsection 5(1) by virtue of subsection 6(3) or, in the alternative, paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 8 Subsection 6(3) under the heading of “Payments by employer to employee” reads as follows: 6. (3) An amount received by one person from another (a) during a period while the payee was an officer of, or in the employment of, the payer, or (b) on account or in lieu of payment of, or in satisfaction of, an obligation arising out of an agreement made by the payer with the payee immediately prior to, during or immediately after a period that the payee was an officer of, or in the employment of, the payer, shall be deemed, for the purposes of section 5, to be remuneration for the payee's services rendered as an officer or during the period of employment, unless it is established that, irrespective of when the agreement, if any, under which the amount was received was made or the form or legal effect thereof, it cannot reasonably be regarded as having been received (c) as consideration or partial consideration for accepting the office or entering into the contract of employment, (d) as remuneration or partial remuneration for services as an officer or under the contract of employment, or (e) in consideration or partial consideration for a covenant with reference to what the officer or employee is, or is not, to do before or after the termination of the employment. ... Accordingly, he addressed himself in the 21 years of his employment to this very narrow field of specialization. 14 As quality control engineer he was obliged on occasion to exercise his authority in that regard if the product did not meet the required standards and this, apparently, was not well received by the parent company sales department, which was more concerned with sales volume than with the quality of the product. 15 He further stated that a year or so earlier he discussed with some of the officers of the company the question of the possibility of taking an early retirement at age 60, and suggested to them that consideration should be given to providing his department with a suitable future replacement in sufficient time to enable the appellant to train him for the job. ... NOW, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that I Pollard, in consideration of the payment to me by Pirelli of the sum of $10,326.84, the receipt whereof I hereby acknowledge and delivery by Pirelli of the undertaking attached hereto, do hereby remise, release and forever discharge Pirelli and its predecessor Companies of and from all actions, causes of action, suits, debts, duties, accounts, bonds, covenants, contracts, claims and demands whatsoever which against Pirelli or its predecessor Companies I, Pollard, now have or which I or my personal representatives hereafter can, shall or may have for or by reason of or in any way arising out of any cause, matter or thing whatsoever existing up to the present time and in particular, without in any way limiting the generality of the foregoing, for or by reason of or in any way arising out of my employment with Pirelli or its predecessor Companies... 24 Upon execution of the said Release by the appellant he received the sum of $6,500 and paid his solicitor the sum of $200 in respect of legal costs. 25 In filing his income tax return for the taxation year 1972, the appellant included in his income the sum of $3,892.84, the amount of the original cheque mentioned earlier, but not the above sum of $6,500. 26 Learned counsel for the respondent argued that this was an additional payment of salary in lieu of notice and was referrable to the agreement mentioned in subsection 6(3) of the Act into which must be read an implied term that notice of termination must be reasonable notice in terms of time or payment of salary in lieu thereof. 27 He cited a number of cases, of which the principal one was the case of Quance v Her Majesty the Queen, [1974] C.T.C. 225, 74 D.T.C. 6210, in support of his argument. 28 With deference to the very able submission by counsel for the respondent, I do not think the authorities cited in that situation are decisive with regard to the issue herein. 29 The facts in the Quance case are substantially different from the facts in the instant appeal. ...