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In the course of determining that the surrender payments were “eligible capital expenditures,” and after noting (at para. 103) the statement in Canada Trustco (2005 SCC 54 at para. 74) that the capital cost allowance provisions “use ‘cost in the well-established sense of the amount paid to acquire the assets,” Sommerfeldt J found that the exclusion in para. (f) of the ECP definition for “the cost of … a right to acquire [a share]” did not apply, given that “the word ‘cost’ contemplates an acquisition of an asset or other property” (para. 103), whereas “when a stock option is surrendered to the issuing corporation, the rights represented by that option [instead] are extinguished” (para. 122). ...

IX, s. 1 by virtue of the exclusion in para. 1(a) thereof for a “service [that] relates to (a) a debt that arises from … (ii) the lending of money that is primarily for use in Canada”. ... The Queen, 2005 TCC 425, where Lamarre J. (as she then was) found that when Parliament makes a rule and lists certain exceptions, the latter must be regarded as exhaustive and so strictly construed. ...

Hogan J stated (at para 25): … In Aridi, I held that an accountant’s neglect or carelessness in preparing a tax return is not sufficient in and of itself to allow the Minister to reassess beyond the Normal Reassessment Period. ... Hogan J dismissed the appeal, finding (at para 31): When a taxpayer hires an accountant to prepare his tax return and is aware that tax planning involving a deferral strategy … is being used to secure a tax advantage for the taxpayer’s benefit, a minimum degree of attention to or oversight over the accountant’s work must be exercised by the taxpayer. …[T]he Appellants exercised oversight in 2005 but failed to pay reasonable attention to the reporting of the Deferred Income thereafter. ...

In December 2005, Canada Inc. purchased land with a view to using it in a condominium project. ... He then stated (at paras. 38-39): Permitting the crystallization of the time for the benefit respecting the transfer of a future immovable to be prior to the time when the property exists is not only impracticable, it is also an impossibility. … …[As per] Robertson and Henley … it is only when the condition or contingency is met that such a benefit arises. ...

In 2004, the taxpayer determined to effect a butterfly spin-off of a portion of its (laminated products) assets, which resulted in the receipt by its shareholders of shares of a new public company (“Novelis”) in January 2005. ... In finding that the oversight expenses paid to the investment dealers would also have been deductible under s. 20(1)(bb), he rejected the Crown’s submissions that such fees were “commissions” and that they were not in respect of a “specific security” because they were in respect of all the Pechiny or Novartis shares, stating (at paras 89-90, and 96-97): … In my view, neither “specific shares” nor “certaines actions” excludes the possibility that the provision applies to a sale of all of the shares of a particular issuer. ... She has not done so. … He also rejected the Crown's submission that s. 40(1)(a) should prevail over s. 20(1)(bb) as the more specific provision, stating (at para. 97) that "paragraph 40(1)(a) is no more specific than paragraph 20(1)(bb). ...

Canada (National Revenue), 2019 FC 1599-- summary under Subsection 220(3.1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 220- Subsection 220(3.1) CRA required to consider waiver of interest that accrued during a three-year delay in dealing with a late-filed Objection In 2008 the CRA contacted the taxpayer to ask him to provide supporting documents to prove commission expenses for the 2005 to 2006 taxation years, which he was unable to do as his former partner, who had also been his landlord, had destroyed the partnership documents, and his former spouse had also withheld correspondence and destroyed documents relevant to those taxation years. ... Favel J found that the taxpayer had implicitly requested the Minister for an extension pursuant to s. 166.1 of the time for objecting, stating (at para. 50): Notices of Objection filed after the 90 day delay for objecting, but within the extension of time delay, have been interpreted as implicit applications to extend time …. ... Rather, the Minister remained passive for two years …. The Minister’s analysis of delays imputable to the CRA is limited to those incurred between the TCC order of February 26, 2013 and the assignment of the Applicant’s file to an appeal officer in November 2013, and consequently, at the initial level, cancelled interest for one month during that period (October 2013) to account for the delay. ...

Gagné objected on the basis inter alia that he had ceased being a director for more than two years before such reassessment, and a few days before the trial of the appeal of his estate (following his death) from such reassessment, its notice of appeal was amended to allege inter alia that Gagné had never been a director (given that the proper corporate procedures had not been followed for his appointment, including his consenting to such appointment. and there being an absence of any resolution appointing him) – an argument that Gagné. ... Third persons may submit any proof to refute the information contained in a declaration …. and noted that the ARQ had been entitled to rely on the rebuttable presumption arising under s. 62. He also indicated (at paras. 44-45, TaxInterpretations translation) that the absence of a resolution appointing Gagné should be given little weight given the absence of corporate records since 2005, stated (at para. 48) that “[i]n other contexts, the defence of corporate formalism is of equally little value when it comes up against the totality of the facts of the case” and further stated (at para. 49): In the context of this case, the problem is that the Estate is seeking to exploit a governance defect that the principal never even raised when, on more than one occasion, he had ample opportunity to do so. ...

The Corporation had been restored to financial health, and following a repurchase by the Corporation in September 2005 of all the Class A shares of FRSE and FSTQ for $1.85 million and $2.18 million, respectively, the Holdco of Charles made a paid-up capital distribution to him (in February 2006) of $555,000 (being virtually all of the shares’ paid-up capital). ... Respecting his first finding, he stated (at paras. 64-65, 72-73, TaxInterpretations translation): [T]he evidence … demonstrates that the investment made by the FSTQ in 1998 in Class A common shares as well as the exchange by the FRSE Fund of its share in the Corporation for common shares, were imposed on the Custeau Group by the FSTQ. These transactions did not form part of a tax plan or a long term plan with an objective or goal of crystallizing the capital gains exemption in 2003 and 2004 and reducing capital in 2006. … [T]he capital dilution had already occurred in 1998, at the time of the investment by FSTQ, and is not to be linked to the 2006 capital reduction that produced a tax benefit. … [I]t was financially inconceivable in 1998 for the plaintiffs to one day to be in the position to redeem the investment of FSTQ and FRSE and have enough liquidity to effect a reduction in capital in the neighbourhood of $555,000 each in 2006. ...

. … [T]he Notes… are investments by SLT in debt instruments of BNSIL and TDII, which are non-resident entities. ... It was also unreasonable for CRA to assess all of the increase in value of the Note in the taxation years prior to 2005 (which were statute-barred) in its reassessments for the 2005 taxation year. ...

The Queen, 2016 TCC 161-- summary under Subsection 147(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Other Legislation/Constitution- Federal- Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure)- Section 147- Subsection 147(1) promoter of a leveraged donation scheme jointly and severally liable with the unsuccessful test-case taxpayers for the Crown’s costs 16,000 donors participated during the 2004 and 2005 taxation years (and 27,000 up until 2014) in a leveraged donation program. ... Pizzitelli J rejected argument that the costs should be reduced based on the Lead Cases being test cases (and lead cases under Rule 146.1) stating (at paras. 42, 54): …[The fact the Minister had thousands of cases at the objection stage that were not confirmed does not constitute special circumstances that justify departure from the usual costs rule. … The taxpayers chosen as lead appellants can proceed to the determination of their appeals faster and without the complications and time requirements of being heard as part of a larger group. ... [T]he promotional materials … talked of dealing with the matters by lead cases. … The Promoter clearly controlled all aspects of the Program… and it controlled the litigation that resulted therefrom. ...