Search - 2005年 抽纸品牌 质量排名

In January 2004, the trust distributed $2.25 million to the taxpayer, and in December 2005, made a further distribution to him of $0.83 million, as a result of which the trust was terminated. After finding that the trust had realized departure tax pursuant to s. 128.1(4)(b) in 2001 and had a tax debt that had amounted to $1.6 million at the end of 2005, Gagnon J confirmed the Crown’s position that the taxpayer had not given consideration to the trust for either distribution (e.g., in exchange for part satisfaction of his capital interest in the trust). In this regard, Gagnon J first noted (at para. 62, TaxInterpretations translation): [I]f one party is enriched and the other impoverished by the same amount, it will be possible to conclude that the party who became richer did not offer equivalent consideration …. ...

Before concluding that the waiver was valid, Bocock J found (consistently with Nguyen, 2005 TCC 697, at para. 33) that the taxpayer “was not unduly pressured, mislead or unduly influenced to the extent of nullifying his executed consent to the waiver” (para. 15). ... Radelet’s tax return. … [T]he CRA … reasonably granted the extension, but in exchange for a waiver relevant to the upcoming reassessment period. ... Bocock J also found (at para 29) that none of the medical reports suggested that the taxpayer lacked mental capacity, and (at para. 41): … One can reasonably and objectively conclude, given the relative ease, precision and detail exercised by Mr. ...

His practice income increased dramatically from his 2005 to 2006 fiscal year, and fell again for 2007. Accordingly, his taxable income for his 2006 taxation year was "extremely high relative to the actual income earned for any 12 month period" (para. 11), as he had an addition of 11/12 of his income for fiscal 2006 and a deduction of 11/12 of the much lower income for fiscal 2005. In rejecting a submission that this represented a harsh result, Woods J noted that the effect reversed in the following year – and in any event "it is well established that this Court cannot grant relief on grounds only that the result is harsh: Lans v The Queen, 2011 FCA 290. ...

") – earned management fees and rental fees from W.L. In 2003, the taxpayer lent $3.5 million to an arm's length supplier of specially prepared boards ("Interact") secured by patents held by Interact's principal ("Cable"). Following the bankruptcy of Interact and Cable earlier in 2005, the trustee in bankruptcy for Cable assigned the beneficial ownership of the patents to the taxpayer, so that it was deemed under s. 79.1 (6) to have acquired them at a cost of $3.5 million plus $0.4 million of relevant legal costs. ... In finding that the patents satisfied Reg. 1102(1)(c), Rip J noted that the taxpayer had made the $3.5 million loan in order to assist a financially strapped supplier (Interact) to supply it with the wood sizes it wanted, and that it acquired the beneficial ownership in 2005 with the objective (which was not realized) of exploiting the patents in a future joint venture so that the taxpayer could derive licensing revenues from them. ...

Prospector obtained a tax shelter registration number for the 2005 and 2006 years, but not the other years. ... In also rejecting the single property argument, Fournier JCQ stated (at paras 551-552): [T]he assets acquired under the … franchise agreement must be considered separately for tax shelter determination purposes because they have different tax characteristics. The software suite is a Class 12 property while the membership right is an eligible capital property with different rates of depreciation. … The definition of tax shelter contained in TA section 1079.1 … militates in favour of an individual analysis of the property in question in order to determine whether or not it qualifies as a tax shelter. ...

The Funds' common shares of the Corporation were repurchased in 2005, and the taxpayers had their Holdcos distribute most of the PUC of their preferred shares in cash during 2006. ... I reiterate his factual conclusion that in 1998, no one could have predicted that the Corporation would generate sufficient cash to fund the 2005 and 2006 share repurchases. ... The excerpt from Trustco shows that this may be an alternative exercise depending on the circumstances of the case. … Copthorne … approved both approaches because each situation is an individual case. ...

On April 28, 2006, their family trusts sold all the shares of RJCG to the preferred shareholder of Gestion Lagarde (“Aviva,” which was a financial institution and, in turn, was owned by a non-resident parent) and a subsidiary of Aviva, pursuant to the exercise by Aviva of an option on those shares which (leaving aside some documentary deficiencies) had been granted to it by the taxpayers in December 2005. In April 2002, Aviva had been granted an option, pursuant to the shareholders’ agreement for Gestion Lagarde, to subscribe at any time after May 1, 2005 for such number of common shares of Gestion Lagarde as would result in it holding 66.3% of the class. ... In finding that s. 148 was not breached by the 2002 option, so that it was valid, Rip J stated (at paras. 48, 50): [N]either Aviva nor an assignee "held" or owned shares of Gestion Lagarde or RJCG before April 28, 2006. … Until such time as the contemplated transaction closed, it is arguable that Aviva could have carved up its rights to acquire the shares among other persons so that, at closing, it would acquire not more than 20 per cent of the target company. ...

Other Applicants requested interest relief before the 2005 amendment to s. 220(3.1) denying interest relief more than 10 years after a taxation year (the “2004 Applicants”). ... Before dismissing the Applicants’ applications for judicial review, Boswell J stated (at paras 55- 57): … [T]he sheer quantity of the delays did not automatically warrant interest relief. … The Delegate reasonably considered the length of the delays and recognized that certain time periods were not appropriate for interest relief and others had already been accounted for in the earlier reviews. … … [T]here were no circumstances beyond the Applicants’ control which prevented them with complying with their obligations to pay tax. ... If they paid the taxes owing as stated in the assessments, no interest would have accumulated. … … [F]or the 2014 Applicants … [u]nder subsection 220(3.1), the Minister no longer has discretion to cancel or waive interest beyond 10 years …. ...

The taxable income of the affiliate for 2000 had arisen as a result of a 2005 settlement which had reduced a 2001 non-capital loss (and, thus, reduced the loss carryback to 2000), thereby leaving 2000 unsheltered. ... Noël C.J. also agreed with the Tax Court’s rejection of the taxpayer’s submission that given that the word “pour” used in the French version of s. 160(1)(e)(ii) was narrower than “in respect of” used in the English version, s. 160 did not extend to interest that had accrued on the tax payable by the affiliate subsequent to the 2003 transfer date, stating (at paras. 46-47): The phrase “in respect of” is broad and all encompassing … and the word “pour” in the French text can have a similarly broad meaning. … It can be seen that both texts can be read so as to capture interest that accrues on the transferor’s liability from the year of the transfer onwards. This aligns with the purpose of subsection 160(1) which is to allow for the collection of “the total of all amounts” that the transferor is liable to pay under the Act without any distinction as to the makeup of these amounts … and without any time limitation. … Words and Phrases in respect of ...

The Queen, 2014 DTC 1216 [at at 3872], 2014 TCC 309-- summary under Stare Decisis Summary Under Tax Topics- General Concepts- Stare Decisis weight of obiter depends on fulness of argument Before finding that the taxpayers' argument was contradicted by the "authoritative obiter " in S.T.B. that s. 245(7) applied to third parties only, Hogan J paraphrased (at para. 28) R. v. Henry, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 for the proposition "that obiter dicta move along a continuum and diminish in weight the further they stray from the dispositive point of judicial opinion," and noted (at para. 29) that in S.T.B. ...