Search - 2005年 抽纸品牌 质量排名

Results 31 - 40 of 115 for 2005年 抽纸品牌 质量排名
Decision summary

Kretztechnik AG v Finanzamt Linz, [2005] EUECJ C-465/03, [2006] BVC 66 (ECJ (1st Chamber)) -- summary under Subsection 169(1)

Kretztechnik AG v Finanzamt Linz, [2005] EUECJ C-465/03, [2006] BVC 66 (ECJ (1st Chamber))-- summary under Subsection 169(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Excise Tax Act- Section 169- Subsection 169(1) costs of raising share capital were traceable to taxable outputs Kretztechnik raised capital through a share issue. ... Thus, the right to deduct VAT charged on the acquisition of input goods or services presupposes that the expenditure incurred in acquiring them was a component of the cost of the output transactions that gave rise to the right to deduct [36] In this case, in view of the fact that, first, a share issue is an operation not falling within the scope of the [Directive] and, second, that operation was carried out by Kretztechnik in order to increase its capital for the benefit of its economic activity in general, it must be considered that the costs of the supplies acquired by that company in connection with the operation concerned form part of its overheads and are therefore, as such, component parts of the price of its products. ...
TCC (summary)

Royal Bank of Canada v. The King, 2024 TCC 125 -- summary under Paragraph 1(a)

IX, s. 1 by virtue of the exclusion in para. 1(a) thereof for a “service [that] relates to (a) a debt that arises from (ii) the lending of money that is primarily for use in Canada”. ... He then stated (at paras. 79, 81-84): [T]he jurisprudence has recognized a clear distinction between the granting of credit and the lending of money. Dahl v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2005 BCSC 126 affirmed in 2006 CBCA 369 noted that because the “cardholder is permitted to defer payment of the debt, credit is advanced on the date of the purchase or service” and “this deferral of debt results in an extension of credit” [U]nlike a loan, “such credit is not initially paid out to the debtor in the form of money.” As indicated in Dahl “the cardholder’s liability to the merchant is discharged by the merchant’s acceptance of the credit card” and “the Bank becomes liable to the merchant, and the cardholder becomes liable to the Bank.” ...
FCTD (summary)

Mokrycke v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 1027 -- summary under Subsection 23(2)

Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 1027-- summary under Subsection 23(2) Summary Under Tax Topics- Other Legislation/Constitution- Federal- Financial Administration Act- Section 23- Subsection 23(2) a CRA decision, refusing to recommend FAA relief for reassessments that the taxpayer had failed to appeal, was “lacking in justification, transparency and intelligibility” The taxpayer submitted, in a January 17, 2017 application for a remission order, that: due to a host of personal and financial issues, he was not able to respond effectively to large CRA reassessments of his 2005 and 2006 years had he been able to respond effectively, he could have demonstrated the reassessments’ incorrectness an accountant retained by him had inexplicably failed to pursue the matter, and due to the above issues, the taxpayer failed to file a timely appeal after CRA issued a notice of confirmation in 2010 The CRA Remission Committee refused remission largely on the grounds that the taxpayer did not demonstrate that the assessments were unfounded, had not appealed to the Tax Court when that option was open to him, and was responsible for the failures of the professional to whom he entrusted his affairs. Before setting aside the Committee’s decision and remitting it for consideration by a different decision maker, Norris J stated (at paras. 69, 72-73): It was unreasonable for the Assistant Commissioner to reject the remission request simply on the basis that the information examined during the remission review “did not reveal that the CRA made any error at the audit stage or in reassessing the 2005 and 2006 tax years” when this was the very point in issue. [T]he Assistant Commissioner [also] simply stated the principle that errors or omissions by tax professionals “are not considered extenuating circumstances for the purpose of remission” and then treated it as a complete answer to the applicant’s submission. Given the importance to the applicant’s request of the question of whether any errors or omissions by the tax professionals who assisted the applicant could constitute an extenuating circumstance or, more broadly, made it unreasonable or unjust to recover the 2005/2006 debt, it was essential that the Assistant Commissioner explain why he concluded that they did not. [I]t is insufficient to simply state the rule without also explaining why an exception should not be made in this case. ...
Decision summary

Fowler v HM Revenue and Customs, [2018] EWCA Civ 2544, rev'd 2020 UKSC 22 -- summary under Article 3

S. 15 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 deemed divers in the continental shelf area, whose duties consisted mainly of seabed diving activities, to thereby be carrying on a trade in the U.K. ... This treatment entirely displaces the charge to tax on employment income …. ... My approach does not depend to any significant extent on the provisions of article 3(2) however, I would accept that the purpose of article 3(2) is to anchor the provisions of the treaty to the domestic tax law of the Contracting State which is applying the treaty. ...
Decision summary

Fowler v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2020] UKSC 22 -- summary under Article 3

S. 15 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 deemed divers in the continental shelf area, whose duties consisted mainly of seabed diving activities, to thereby be carrying on a trade in the U.K. ... Rather they are to be applied to the real world, unless the effect of article 3(2) is that a deeming provision alters the meaning which relevant terms of the Treaty would otherwise have. Were it not for section 15 of ITTOIA, there would be no doubt that article 14, not article 7, would apply to Mr Fowler’s diving activities …. ... This is because, as is recognised by article 2(1), the Treaty is not concerned with the manner in which taxes falling within the scope of the Treaty are levied. ...
TCC (summary)

Suncor Energy Inc. v. The King, 2024 TCC 31 -- summary under Paragraph 13(31)(a)

The King, 2024 TCC 31-- summary under Paragraph 13(31)(a) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 13- Subsection 13(31)- Paragraph 13(31)(a) s. 13(31)(a) deemed property acquisition by an LP did not accord it a corresponding deemed taxation year under the 2-year rolling start rule The taxpayer (Suncor) incurred $34 million in January 2005 to acquire Class 41 property, then on January 1, 2006 transferred the property on a s. 97(2) rollover basis to a limited partnership (the “LP”) of which it was the 99.9% general partner and whose first taxation year extended from February 1, 2005 to January 31, 2006 and second taxation year ended on January 31, 2007 (the “2007 taxation year”). S. 13(31)(a) deemed the LP to have acquired the property for purposes of s. 13(27)(b) at the time of its acquisition by Suncor, i.e., in January 2005. ... However, that is all it does …. There is nothing in the wording of subsection 13(31) that creates the fiction of the Limited Partnership having a year-end prior to February 1, 2005—specifically a 12-month fictional taxation year that ended on January 31, 2005. ...
TCC (summary)

Suncor Energy Inc. v. The King, 2024 TCC 31 -- summary under Paragraph 13(27)(b)

The King, 2024 TCC 31-- summary under Paragraph 13(27)(b) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 13- Subsection 13(27)- Paragraph 13(27)(b) transferee LP did not satisfy s. 13(27)(b) at the start of its 2nd tax year even though s. 13(31)(a) deemed it to acquire the property before its 1st tax year Suncor acquired a Class 41 property in January 2005, then on January 1, 2006 transferred it on a s. 97(2) rollover basis to a limited partnership (the “LP”) of which it was the 99.9% general partner and whose first taxation year extended from February 1, 2005 to January 31, 2006 and second taxation year ended on January 31, 2007 (the “2007 taxation year”). S. 13(31)(a) deemed the LP to have acquired the property for purposes of s. 13(27)(b) at the time of its acquisition by Suncor, i.e., in January 2005. ... However, that is all it does …. There is nothing in the wording of subsection 13(31) that creates the fiction of the Limited Partnership having a year-end prior to February 1, 2005 …. ...
Decision summary

Blank v Commissioner of Taxation, [2016] HCA 42 -- summary under Paragraph 6(1)(a)

The original agreement for GSs was replaced at various junctures, including in 2005 by the “IPPA 2005” (described at para. 35 as a "novation," being "'simply a new contract standing in the place of the old'"), at which time the taxpayer was granted phantom units (Profit Participation Units, or “PPUs”) in GI for calculating his entitlement to the profit participation ultimately payable to him as deferred compensation (styled as “Incentive Profit Participation” or “IPP”) on the surrender of his rights. ... Under the IPPA 2005, his IPP became due 30 days after his termination of employment on December 31, 2006 and was payable in 20 instalments over five years (with interest). ... In finding that the Amount was income to the taxpayer under s. 6-5(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, which provided that a person's "assessable income includes income according to ordinary concepts, which is called ordinary income," the Court stated (at paras 59, 61, and 63): The terms of the IPPA 2005 expressly stated that the Amount was deferred compensation from Mr Blank's employment with Glencore Australia. The Amount was paid as a lump sum as an additional reward to Mr Blank for the services he had performed for the Glencore Group. The IPPA 2005 also recorded that Mr Blank had no interest whatsoever in the GS and did not acquire any right in or title to any assets, funds or property of GI, Glencore AG or any other subsidiary. [A] GS granted no more than a claim to a cumulative portion of the balance sheet profit, and that the claim was granted not upon the issue or allocation of the GS to the employee but upon restitution of the GS at the time the employment ceased. The fact that the Amount was paid after the termination of the contract of service, by a person other than the employer (here, GI) and separately to ordinary wages, salary or bonuses, does not detract from its characterisation as income if the payment is, as here, a recognised incident of the employment. ...
Decision summary

Fowler v. HMRC Commissioners, [2016] UKFT 0234 (TC) (First-Tier Tribunal) -- summary under Article 3

S. 15 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (“ITTOIA”) deemed divers in the continental shelf area, whose duties consisted mainly of seabed diving activities, to thereby be carrying on a trade in the U.K. ... …[T]he phrase “[t]he profits of an enterprise” within Article 7 includes the charge to income tax on the “profits of a trade, profession or vocation” within the meaning of section 5 ITTOIA 2005 and that it also includes the profits arising from the deemed trade pursuant to section 15 ITTOIA. And at paras 113 & 114: It is the clear purpose of section 15 ITTOIA to re-characterise what would otherwise be the exercise of employment duties as the carrying on of a trade. ...
TCC (summary)

Agracity Ltd. v. The Queen, 2020 TCC 91 -- summary under Sham

Boyle J found that the evidence presented did not establish the existence of any sham transactions, nor any deceptive window dressing, stating (at para 78): The reassessed 2006 and 2007 transactions (involving NewAgco Barbados in its 2007 and 2008 fiscal years) are otherwise identical to the calendar 2005 year transactions which used NewAgco US, a related company that was not in a low tax jurisdiction. There was no attempt to mislead or deceive others about the adopted structure, the participants involved or its purpose and objectives. …[A] Canadian entity could not be the seller of the US ClearOut to the Canadian farmers under the OUI program. It was clearly NewAgco Barbados that purchased the ClearOut …[and] bore material risk in these transactions. That two related parties would sit down at year end and ensure the service fee generated a reasonable profit above the service provider’s costs should not be surprising or of much concern. The Services Agreement between AgraCity and NewAgco Barbados appears to be a valid contractual agreement setting out in very large measure what AgraCity was responsible for doing and what it in fact did, as well as how AgraCity was to be paid for performing those services. There is no requirement that such a contract or agreement be in writing. [C]onfused books and records are not, on their own, evidence of a sham unless their inaccuracies, inconsistencies and/or omissions can be shown to favor a particular, but clearly inaccurate, recording of the party’s rights, obligations, revenues etc. ...

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