Search - 阿里拍卖 司法拍卖

S. 43(2) of the IHTA provided: "Settlement" means any disposition or dispositions of property, whether effected by instrument, by parol or by operation of law, or partly in one way and partly in another, whereby the property is for the time being – (a) held in trust for persons in succession or for any person subject to a contingency, or (b) held by trustees on trust to accumulate the whole or part of any income of the property or with power to make payments out of that income at the discretion of the trustees or some other person, with or without power to accumulate surplus income…. ... Thus he did not shrink from submitting that in 2001 Mr Dreelan made three separate settlements for IHT purposes when he settled the original £100 on the trusts of the 2001 Settlement and then made two further transfers of property to it, even though any trust lawyer would say that Mr Dreelan had made a single settlement and then added property to it. … …I consider the better view to be that the 2001 Settlement was a single settlement for IHT purposes, constituted by a number of separate dispositions of property to be held on the trusts thereof. ...

Convention because of the exclusion in Art. 13 for dispositions of (deemed) real property situated in Australia, given s. 3A(1) of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth), which extended the application of the Art. 13 exclusion to dispositions of shares of companies “the value of whose assets is wholly or principally attributable, whether directly, or indirectly through one or more interposed companies or other entities, to … real property or interests”. ... It follows that on this basis of assessment of the RCF IV and RCF V partners there is to be excluded from the taxable value of the capital gain, the value attributable to the general purpose leases, the miscellaneous licence and the plants used in the processing operations rather than in the mining. … Whether the interests of the applicants in Talison Lithium also passed the principal asset test, for the purposes of s 855-25(1)(b), requires consideration of whether 50% or more of the market value of the assets of Talison Lithium were attributable to Australian real property. ...

. … …[I]f restitution was not possible before the date of the declaratory judgment of the Superior Court, it necessarily follows that there was no debt (in this context, an unjustified enrichment), before that date. ... Even taking as given that there was an unjustified enrichment in this case on the January 6, 2014 judgment date of the Superior Court, it nonetheless remains that the Minister assessed before that date, namely, April 30, 2013. … [I]f the judgment of the Superior Court had the effect of creating unjustified enrichment commencing on January 6, 2014, it remains that there was no enrichment when restitution of the amounts at issue was made by the appellant in October 2015. ...

. … [T]he second part of the deeming provision [in s. 39(2)] deems the capital gains and losses to have arisen from the disposition of a foreign currency as opposed to some other type of property. ... [whereas] under the Broad Interpretation … Parliament could have wanted to deem foreign exchange gains and losses arising from the disposition of property to instead arise from the disposition of currency.... ...

. … The services do not have the usual characteristics of management services which typically involve decision-making on behalf of the business … [nor of] of administrative services which typically involve support services. ...

. … After describing the DLC Arrangement in greater detail, the Court stated (at paras. 46-47): [T]hese arrangements were each a mechanism, an important mechanism, that ensured that Ltd and Plc were, are and would be operated and able to be operated as a "single unified economic entity". Contrary to the submissions of Ltd, the fact that Ltd and Plc operated in this way pursuant to a contract does not preclude a finding that they "sufficiently influenced" each other – otherwise, any company would be able to place itself outside the reach of the statute (of being "sufficiently influenced" by another company) by forming a contract to govern their relationship. ...

In reversing this finding (and before going on to direct that the assessments of the Corporation and of Demers for their 2006 years be affirmed), Bouchard JCA stated (paras. 92-94, TaxInterpretations translation): In accordance with Regina Shoppers Mall … a taxpayer does not make a misrepresentation where he or she thoughtfully, deliberately and carefully assesses the situation and files on what he or she believes bona fide to be the proper method. … Mr. ...

After noting and rejecting a taxpayer submission that it had filed a request in prescribed form for 2002 for the carryback regarding its 2002 loss and that “what is contemplated in the circumstances is an amendment to [this] original request for loss carry‑back” (para. 42) and that “it would be reasonable to interpret this request for carry back of the 2002 losses in an amount sufficient to reduce its income to nil as providing an ‘implied request’ to apply the 2002 unused losses to reduce the increase in income that resulted from the 2004 Grosvenor settlement,” St-Hilaire J stated (at para. 50): [P]aragraph 111(1)(a) … is a permissive deduction; only the taxpayer has the right to choose how to allocate their losses and the Minister has no basis to impose a particular allocation on the taxpayer subject to the restriction referred to earlier. ... St-Hilaire J dismissed the appeal, commenting (at para 83): …[T]he Court is left with legislation that does not satisfactorily address the circumstances and an administrative policy that seemingly seeks to address the lacunae but for which there is no legislative authority. … ...

. … Just because the documents are not part of the evidentiary record does not mean that they are not part of the Court record and, it should be recalled, it is the documents in the Court record that are subject to the open court principle. ... The open court principle allows any person to inspect a court record and any annex "that is available to the public" …. ...

In the course of rejecting the taxpayers’ submission that the CAE decision should instead be applied to treat the taxable capital gain as only being includible in the taxpayers’ income in 2010, Quenneville JCQ stated (at paras. 206-207, 210): [T]hat case … dealt with the change of use of property considered to be inventory that had been transferred in the course of a refinancing, but which had continued to be used by the plaintiff for the same purposes as before the transfer. ... In both cases, the income is derived from the building …. It can be seen that this argument is attractive to the plaintiffs, allowing them to argue that the capital gain should have been taxed in 2010 and to argue that this is a statute-barred year. ...